

**November 18, 1978**

**'Pakistan Proliferation Problem,' Department of  
State Cable 292469 to US Embassy United Kingdom**

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**Summary:**

Discussion of a British list of countries that were actual or potential manufacturers of inverters. The U.S. does not want to approach any "nuclear threshold states" yet because some might not cooperate or might inform Pakistan. Also discusses strategies for approaching the Soviet Union and China in the future.

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TAGS: MNUC, PK, UK

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN PROLIFERATION PROBLEM

REFS: (A) LONDON 18055, (B) 281962

1. CATEGORIES I AND II IN UK LIST REFERRED TO IN PARA 4,  
REF A DESCRIBE COUNTRIES UK KNOWS TO HAVE TECHNICAL  
CAPABILITY TO MANUFACTURE INVERTERS, CATEGORY III STATES  
ARE "ASSUMED" BY UK TO HAVE SAME TECHNOLOGY AND INCLUDE:

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SPAIN, USSR, EASTERN EUROPE, CHINA, SOUTH KOREA, IRAN, ISRAEL, INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND BRAZIL. WE AGREE WITH COMPOSITION OF THIS GROUP. THIS GROUP IS TOO DIVERSE TO BE COVERED BY A SINGLE STRATEGY ALONG LINES OF REF B INITIATIVE.

2. SPAIN WAS AN ADDRESSEE OF REF B AND HAS ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED. US WILL CONTACT USSR ON MARGINS OF NOVEMBER INCE PLENARY TO ADVISE SOVIETS OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT PAKISTAN AS A POTENTIAL PROLIFERATOR, IN ORDER TO SET THE STAGE FOR FUTURE SOVIET SUPPORT IN ANY FUTURE EFFORTS TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON PAKISTAN. THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN GOP-USSR RELATIONS WHICH MIGHT ENHANCE SOVIET INFLUENCE (CURRENTLY NOT SUBSTANTIAL) ON THIS ISSUE.

3. WE DO NOT WANT TO CONTACT ANY NUCLEAR THRESHOLD STATES (E.G., INDIA, ISRAEL, ROK, ROC, ETC.) AT THIS TIME. SOME OR ALL MAY NOT COOPERATE IN THIS INITIATIVE, MOREOVER, THEY COULD THREATEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR EFFORTS BY INFORMING THE GOP, OR BY MAKING OUR EFFORTS PUBLICLY KNOWN. FINALLY, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, PAKISTAN IS UNLIKELY TO SEEK ASSISTANCE FOR ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM FROM SOME OF THE CATEGORY III STATES (I.E., INDIA, ISRAEL, SOUTH AFRICA).

4. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE PRC WOULD ASSIST PAKISTANI EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. AT AN APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY IN THE FUTURE, WE PLAN TO INFORM THE PRC OF US PLANS TO RESUME AID TO PAKISTAN AND WILL THEN TOUCH ON OUR CONTINUING CONCERNS ABOUT GOP'S NUCLEAR INTENTIONS, AGAIN WITH A VIEW TO ENLISTING PRC COOPERATION IF NEEDED AT A FUTURE DATE.

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5. EMBASSY SHOULD COMMUNICATE ABOVE TO HMG, WE WILL SHARE CONTENTS OF THIS CABLE WITH UK EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

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