

November 13, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Belgium cable 21508 to State Department

Citation:

"'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy Belgium cable 21508 to State Department", November 13, 1978, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Mandatory Declassification Review request. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #3.

<https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/112919>

Summary:

Belgian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

UNCLASSIFIED

R9 15



13 NOV 78Z 16 14

003482

Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

RELEASED IN FULL

NODS-00-S-NODS-00-S-NODS-00-S

SECRET

NODW19

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 21508 131539Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

-----117232 131541Z /42

O 131539Z NOV 78
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9869

SECRET BRUSSELS 21508

DECAPTIONED

NODIS

DEPT PLS PASS LONDON, ROME, BERN, BONN, CANBERRA, MADRID
OTTAWA, STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE, TOKYO, VIENNA, ISLAMABAD
PARIS, AND THE WHITE HOUSE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MNUC, TECH, PK, BE
SUBJECT: US DEMARCHE ON PAKISTANI REPROCESSING PLANT

REF: STATE 281962

1. ON NOVEMBER 10 THE CHARGE CALLED ON THE MFA DIRECTOR-
GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS (SCHOU MAKER) AND MADE THE
DEMARCHE AS INSTRUCTED REFTEL. THE CHARGE LEFT
THE NON-PAPER WITH HIM AND DISCUSSED AT LENGTH THE BACK-
GROUND OF THE MATTER AND OUR REASONS FOR PARTICULAR CONCERN.

2. SCHOU MAKER, WHO WAS LAST AMBASSADOR TO PEKING AND KNOWS
ASIA FROM LONG EXPERIENCE, ENDORSED OUR REASONS FOR CONCERN
RE PAKISTAN. HE SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT BHUTTO, A
DEMAGOGUE, HAD SET HIS SIGHTS ON A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY FOR
PAKISTAN. WHAT HE SET IN MOTION THERE WAS NOT LIKELY TO
BE SCRAPPED VOLUNTARILY, SCHOU MAKER SAID.

3. HE SAID THAT THE GOB WAS UNEQUIVOCALLY OPPOSED TO
ANY SORT OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HENCE WE

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

*Department of State***INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 BRUSSE 21508 131539Z

COULD BE SURE THAT BELGIUM WOULD NOT PERMIT ASSISTANCE OR DELIVERIES OF TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN IN POSSIBLE FURTHERANCE OF SUCH AIMS.

4. IN COORDINATION WITH US, THE UK DCM CALLED THE SAME DAY ON THE CHIEF OF THE MFA OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR NUCLEAR AFFAIRS (HERPELS) AND WENT OVER THE SAME GROUND, NOTING THAT BY AGREEMENT THE US CHARGE WAS RAISING THE MATTER AT THE POLICY LEVEL. HERPELS SAID SHE WOULD ALERT THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OFFICE WHICH WOULD HAVE TO APPROVE EXPORT OF INVERTERS OR OTHER EQUIPMENT USEFUL FOR THE SUSPECTED PROJECT. SHE NOTED THAT ANY SUCH EXPORTS WOULD IN ANY CASE HAVE TO GET POLITICAL CLEARANCE FROM THE MFA. SHE ASSURED THE UK DCM THAT THE MFA WILL INSURE THAT THESE CONTROLS ARE EFFECTIVE IN THIS CASE (PRESUMABLY BY INSTITUTING A LOOKOUT FOR ANY INQUIRIES OR NEGOTIATIONS LOOKING TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY DELIVERIES TO PAKISTAN). CHAMBERS

NOTE: NOT passed LONDON, ROME, BERN, BONN, CANBERRA, MADRID, OTTAWA, STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE, TOKYO, VIENNA, ISLAMABAD, PARIS, THE WHITE HOUSE by OC/T

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED

S
-
D
-
D
-
S
-
D
-
D
-
S