

January 31, 1952
**Ciphered Telegram No. 16008 from Beijing, Mao
Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]**

Citation:

"Ciphered Telegram No. 16008 from Beijing, Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]",
January 31, 1952, Wilson Center Digital Archive, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 342, ll. 73-77, and
RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 342, ll. 0073-0077.

<https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/113020>

Summary:

Mao asks Stalin advice and instructions concerning issues raised during negotiations,
particularly the establishment of a monitoring organ comprised of officials from neutral
countries.

Original Language:

Russian

Contents:

Translation - English

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16008

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 23:00 31.1.1951

Series "G" T

To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]

For the past period of time, in view of the deliberate prolongation of the negotiations by the enemy in the course of the negotiations for an armistice in Korea, up to the present time a final agreement has not been achieved.

However, on the basic questions of the cessation of military operations, for example: on the question "Establishment of a military demarcation line between the two sides for the purpose of establishment of a demilitarized zone" an agreement has already been reached on three points.

On the question "working out practical measures for the implementation of a ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including the personnel, powers and functions of the apparatus for monitoring the implementation of the conditions of the ceasefire and armistice" an agreement has already been reached on six points (the texts are attached).

However, on the questions "Measures about prisoners of war" the enemy in principle cannot oppose the liberation of all prisoners of war. As a consequence of this, the negotiations cannot be dragged out for a long time. Nevertheless, the enemy is trying to drag out the negotiations under the pretext of a rash demand about limiting the rebuilding and construction of airports after the cessation of military operations and also a demand about liberation of prisoners on a voluntary basis. However, in view of the fact that our side decisively opposes these proposals and also in view of the fact that it is very difficult for the enemy to mobilize public opinion for continuation of the war in Korea, the satellites of the enemy and the USA itself are trying to bring an end to the war in Korea, therefore in recent days the enemy was forced to set aside the discussion of the question of limiting restoration and construction of airports in Korea and moved to discussion of small questions concerning the agreement.

According to the concrete conditions of the text of the agreement on an armistice proposed by the enemy, it is obvious that, as before, this text is not final, in other words that, as before, the enemy has included conditions about limiting the restoration and construction of airports and about liberation of prisoners of war on a voluntary basis, after having declared that these conditions can be omitted and it is possible not to discuss them. From this it is obvious that the possibility of reaching a final agreement is increasing. Of course, we never have and are not now counting only on these possibilities.

We simultaneously will vigilantly follow the tricks of the ruling circles of the USA who in view of the growth of internal and external opposition will carry out as before a policy of prolonging and even of breaking down the negotiations in order to strain the international situation even more. However we are prepared in military and in political relations to inflict decisive blows on the enemy in order to shatter its plans. At the present time both sides in the negotiations have already moved over to detailed discussion of the questions.

For the purposes of achieving a final agreement on an armistice it is necessary to receive your concrete instructions on the following questions:

1. About the monitoring organ composed of representatives of neutral states.

The American side proposes that both sides each invite three states whose armed forces are not participating in the military operations in Korea, and also that each invited state name one senior officer as a representative (in all 6 persons from the neutral states of both sides) for the creation of a monitoring organ of neutral states.

We intend to agree with this arrangement and ask the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia to send representatives so that they could discuss the matter on an equal basis with representatives of the three states invited by the USA and also have the right to veto.

2. Each of the abovementioned neutral states must name one deputy representative who could participate in the meetings of the monitoring organ in the name of its representative. All representatives can take with them assistants-advisers from among the citizens of their country. All invited neutral states will provide the necessary number of administrative workers for the creation of a secretariat responsible for keeping protocols, transmitting documents and translations.

3. The functions of the monitoring organ of neutral states are:

a) Practical control and monitoring of the observation of the agreement by both sides--not to transport to Korea from abroad, through mutually agreed upon points, shipments to the rear as reinforcements, military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, tanks, arms and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and goes into force, and also to carry out an exchange of military personnel of both sides on the scale stipulated by the agreement and in identical numbers;

b) Report about places where an incident occurs, about the guilt of anyone from the [two] sides outside the demilitarization zone who violates the agreement on armistice, and also the carrying out of practical observation.

At the request of both sides or one side of the commission on military armistice, the monitoring organ must immediately send a neutral group for inspection and observation and also for bringing the results of the investigation to the commission on military armistice.

4. Simultaneously with the establishment of the functions indicated in column "A" point 3, the American side also proposes that both sides after cessation of military operations must present information about precise places of deployment of the land, sea and air units which are participating in the military operations in Korea, and also must not change the deployment or carry out a concentration of their troops. We intend not to agree with this, since it was not stipulated in the points on which agreement was reached.

5. As concerns the points of disembarkation in the rear where observation must be established, the American side proposes to establish in South Korea Seoul, Chemulpo [Inchon], Dzioio, Gensiu, Tsiusiu, Taiden, Anto, Dzensiu, Gunzan, Taiko, Dzenten, Pusan--in all 12 points. In North Korea to establish Singisiu, Manpkhodin, Kangge, Khesandun, Khekido, Sengdzii, Kaisiu--in all 15 points.

At each point a region of operation for the neutral state must be established within a radius of 30 miles from the center of the point.

We consider that the enemy has proposed too many points, the area of operation is too broad, and the number of open points is not equal. We intend to agree that both sides open 3-5 points each in North Korea: Singisiu, Seisin, Khanko, Manpkhodin and one airport. In South Korea: Pusan, Chemulpo, Suigei, Reisui, Khokodo. We also intend to propose that the radius of operations of the neutral group be established as 5 kilometers from the center of the point.

6. Neutral groups of observers will be attached to the monitoring organ of neutral states. The group must be organized as a minimum from four mid-level officers (lieutenant-major), two officers each from the representatives of neutral states invited by each side. In case of necessity subgroups can be created attached to the monitor groups, composed of two representatives, one person from each side.

The American side proposes to create 40 neutral groups of observers. We consider that this is too many. If an agreement is reached that both sides will each open 5 of their rear points, then it will be sufficient for fulfilling the obligations of the monitoring organ to have 16 neutral groups of observers, of which 10 groups will be permanently located at mutually agreed upon points of disembarkation and 6 groups can be used as reserves to send to the site of incidents.

7. The monitoring organ of neutral groups and the commission on the military armistice must be located in one place. The neutral groups of observation during the fulfillment of the tasks of inspection and observation do not have the right to study the "construction and characteristics" of all types of arms and ammunition.

As concerns the reports about results of the work of the neutral groups of observation, we consider that official reports must be adopted by the majority of the members of the given group, but reports not adopted by the majority of members or reports from individual persons cannot be official documents. They can be used as reference materials.

8. Material supply of the monitoring organ of neutral states and the groups subordinate to it must be provided by both warring sides. Both sides must provide the monitoring organ with transport for trips of its members to points and to places where a violation of the agreement on armistice occurs.

All the 8 points set forth above concern questions of monitoring by neutral states in the rear regions of both sides outside the demilitarized zone.

I ask you to review whether our point of view is correct and whether anything needs to be added.

If you agree with our opinions, then do you consider it necessary to communicate about this in advance to the comrade leaders of the parties of Poland and Czechoslovakia[?]

I ask you to give your answer.

Note: The texts of the agreement reached on two agendas was sent to you by separate telegram.

With greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

No. 326
31.1.52

[...]