

September 5, 1973

Memorandum of Conversation—Kissinger and Schlesinger

Citation:

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Summary:

Kissinger and Schlesinger discuss possible concessions to France in light of potential changes in their government. Other topics of discussion include foreign relations with the Middle East, MIRV, and security in Europe.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Dr. James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
General John A. Wickham, Jr., Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: September 5, 1973
8:00 a.m. (breakfast)

PLACE: The Pentagon

Schlesinger: Our people don't know about the de-Mirved Poseidon for the Brits. They are therefore at a disadvantage. Can we tell our people?

Kissinger: I am worried about leaks.

Cotton: A de-Mirved Poseidon could cost more.

Kissinger: What could string it out the longest?

Kissinger: The French talks went well. The French have good ideas about MIRV. [Discussion] The real quid pro quo is the basic orientation of French policy. Galley said he understood but it would take them time.

Schlesinger: Pompidou is dying.

Kissinger: Brandt is closer to [Swedish Premier Olof] Palme than Pompidou. Egon Bahr would get our support for a neutral united Germany and then get us out. Don't conclude anything with Galley in September.

I will send you a transcript of my talks.

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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
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Schlesinger: Chaff we could give them with no sweat. When do you see a payoff this fall?

Kissinger: We may not want anything this Fall. It's better to drag it out to next Spring.

The Europeans have the idea that we need the Year of Europe to restore the President's popularity.

I want to discuss how we will make the NSC system work. Would you think it a good idea if you, I, Colby and Moorer had breakfast at the beginning of each week?

Schlesinger: Great. Every Tuesday.

Kissinger: Scowcroft can take notes.

On the NSC bodies, the only non-head of an agency is Clements. If you want to attend, it would be fine. I just want to be fair to you. There is no problem with Clements. I plan to let State handle the NSC business and I will just chair.

Schlesinger: Let's just do a Tuesday meeting and let the rest stay as it is.

I think we maybe have too many meetings.


Should we send Clements to Saudi Arabia?

Kissinger: I think he has no foreign policy judgment. He has an oil man's view to get along with the Arabs.

I think the way to get along with the Saudis is to do something on the Arab-Israeli dispute. I am doing something, but we can't surface it now. The Saudis are least equipped to deal with the Arab-Israeli dispute. We want the Egyptians where we were with the DRV -- we have to get the thing past an unconditional surrender.

Egypt now wants Israel to withdraw and then negotiate with the Palestinians. That is insane. I am working to get a reasonable position out of them. If we get it, we can then put massive pressure on Israel. It will take massive pressure. Hussein will accept the Allon plan if he gets a piece of Jerusalem. This is similar to the Saudi position.

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Clements is too much of a bull in a china shop. He would pour arms into Saudi Arabia, which would force them to engage in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Schlesinger: I agree 98%. Clements would just hold hands. I think we must keep the Persian Gulf issues away from the Arab-Israeli conflict. I would just send Clements to the Gulf area.

Kissinger: But do you think he can be controlled? He will just go out and do what he wants anyway.

Schlesinger: We need to hold Saudi hands. Let me test Clements in Korea. He goofed in Japan.

Kissinger: And in the Persian-Arabian Gulf.

Schlesinger: Let's talk contingency plans. The Iranians could take Kuwait but not cross the Gulf.

Kissinger: The Shah wants to know if the F-14 and F-15 mix. Rabin says he wouldn't have the F-14.

Schlesinger: We are running out of money for Cambodia. I would like to go to Stennis and ask him to let DOD draw down its ammunition account for the next year.

Kissinger: What are the disadvantages?

Schlesinger: None.

Kissinger: Okay.


Schlesinger: Australia. Whitlam is a bastard.

Kissinger: I agree.

Schlesinger: I would like to cool them a bit. There is an ANZUS intelligence conference. Whitlam is playing games. I would like to say to Kird thanks but Australia hasn't responded. I would like to say thanks, but until Australia makes a decision, a US answer would be premature.

Kissinger: Fine. Be careful, because Green will leak. Anything we do should be a response to provocation. Can you wait until the middle of next week?

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Schlesinger: Iceland. The British Ambassador doesn't think a new agreement could be gotten through Iceland parliament. This is different from the US Ambassador's assessment.

Kissinger: I think we should stay out of it.

Schlesinger: I agree.

Kissinger: On the Poseidon. We want to keep Europe from developing their unity as a bloc against us. If we keep the French hoping they can get ahead of the British, this would accomplish our objective. If we gave the British MIRV while the French were so far behind, it would be bad. If we could give the British the dispensing mechanism and hold open the MIRV for the French a few years, we could keep them even.

On Germany; Scheel and Leber are okay. Schmidt maybe, but the old German national Bolshevism is more compatible with the CDU than the SPD.

Schlesinger: The French are important.

SALT. DOD is ready on the ideas I outlined.

Kissinger: Okay, but hold now on the old position.

Schlesinger: Security assistance. We are in trouble. We don't have enough money for everybody. We must cut the Koreans or the Turks. The Turks need it more.

Kissinger: Okay. Can I sell this to the Chinese? When will you announce?

Schlesinger: It doesn't have to be announced. I want to go to Germany and Turkey.

Kissinger: Good, go to Greece also.

Schlesinger: Poseidon. Should we play the British along more? Let them know they have a clear shot at MIRV?

Kissinger: I told Sykes it was 51-49 with the President inclined to go to bat for it.

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Schlesinger: Security Assistance. State and DOD have been at each other's throats for five years.

Kissinger: That will stop. What do you think of Tarr?

Schlesinger: He has brains but no drive or foreign policy sense.

Kissinger: What should be done?

Schlesinger: Stop the bickering at the middle levels.

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