

March 6, 1978

Informational Note from the Eight Parties' Meeting in Budapest

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Summary:

This document presents "information and views on the current problems in the international and workers' movement, the China question and anti-communist offensive struggle against imperialism."

Original Language:

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Contents:

Translation - English

Secret Informational Note from the Eight Parties' Meeting in Budapest On March 1, 1978, after the conclusion of the meeting of Secretaries of Ideology and International CC Departments of socialist countries, a meeting took place in a narrower circle of eight fraternal countries. The participants were: B.N. Ponomarov, M.V. Zimyanin, K. V. Rusakov (CPSU); J. Lukaszewicz, R. Frelek (PUWP); K. Hager, H. Axen, V. Lamberz (SED); V. Bilak, J. Fojtik, J. Havlin (CPCz), M. Ovari, A. Gyenes, I. Gyori (HWSP); A. Lilov, D. Stanishev (BCP); R. Paleaz (CPCuba), and S. Sosorbaram (MPRP). The Heads of other CC Departments of fraternal countries also participated in the meeting - J. Muszynski, W. Piatkowski, and K. Rokoszewski represented the Polish side. The subject for discussion was the exchange of information and views on the current problems in the international and workers' movement, the China question and anti-communist offensive struggle against imperialism. [...] The subject of K. V. Rusakov's pronouncement was the analysis of the situation of the socialist commonwealth which had found itself under the strong pressure from Maoism, on the one hand, and from imperialism, on the other. Currently, we are dealing with an unprecedented offensive attack on socialist countries, which aspires to break its unity. This offensive is being coordinated between the West (imperialist forces) and the East (Beijing). In this context, Rusakov presented a series of interesting assessments on the China question. We should take into account the presence of new turbulences and perturbations on the Beijing arena. However, regardless of what group comes to power, Beijing's overall goal will be to increase its military potential and continue with the militarization of the country. The campaign of "four modernizations" is designed precisely to do just that. As far as foreign policy, Beijing leaders not only intend to modify their course, but they are doing everything to consolidate it. They are using a growing number of methods such as: economic intrigues and an intensified policy of differentiation toward socialist countries. They are giving economic credits to Korea, Romania, and Yugoslavia, while conducting an intensive differentiation policy toward Vietnam, instigating Cambodia, and posing territorial claims to Vietnam. Therefore, this is a selective approach [in their relations with] socialist countries, an approach based on the Maoist theory of "the Third World." By doing all of the above, Beijing aims to eliminate the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact - two organizations which it views as the tools of "the Soviet reign." [...] Beijing's differentiation policy toward socialist countries is especially visible in the area of economy. [The Chinese] are trying to establish contacts with individual socialist countries, while not responding to Soviet [economic] proposals. This [behavior] also applies to other areas: exchanges in science and technology, culture, sports, and tourism. Beijing's method can be understood as follows: "We want to cooperate with socialist countries except for the USSR. Don't worry about the USSR. We will take care of it. The [Sino-Soviet] normalization will come later. This is what they are saying in Beijing." Soviet comrades see this behavior as entirely hypocritical. They stress that this is why we need to coordinate our China policies all the more through strengthening our effective mechanisms, such as the "Interkit." The USSR favors economic cooperation with China, but approaches this issue with an exceptional vigilance, as economic contacts could contribute to increasing China's military potential. This is why an even tighter coordination between interested departments and institutions of fraternal countries is indispensable. Another of our important tasks is to continue to combat the theory and practice of Maoism. However, while conducting such struggle, the USSR is also taking steps toward normalizing Sino-Soviet relations... Generally speaking, the CPSU leadership highly assesses the hitherto results of the joint and coordinated policy of socialist countries toward China. [...] The International Department
CC PUWP
Warsaw, March 6, 1978