

## **June 8, 1982**

### **The State of Foreign Policy**

#### **Citation:**

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#### **Summary:**

Discusses issues related to upholding Sino-Soviet relations, to maintaining an active foreign policy with socialist and capitalist countries, and touching on issues related to various socialist countries at the time.

#### **Original Language:**

Russian

#### **Contents:**

Translation - English

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Issues elaborated by First Deputy Minister V.F. Mal'tsev:

[...]

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Let me touch on some of the questions raised in your information.

First, it is correct and beneficial to hold bilateral meetings between fraternal Asian countries on Asian questions on the basis of new Soviet proposals. This will be significant for you in the conduct of future work. If you meet with the Korean comrades to exchange opinions, it is necessary to take into account the specifics of their policy, to judge the events which are taking place on the international stage from class positions, to note that it is necessary to fight alongside socialist countries, to let them understand the danger of the Sino-US collusion. During such consultations, probably the Korean side will push the notion of turning Northeast Asia into a nuclear-free zone. Please pay attention that as this proposal (advanced together with the Japanese socialist party) is not clear to us, we do not support it.

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When conducting foreign policy activities in the 1980s, we must pay attention to the following two directions. First, to make the current international situation more healthy, to widen the forces directed against the elimination of the nuclear threat, to deal a blow to the forces of aggression. To widen cooperation with the developing countries on the premise of strengthening socialism and the national liberation movement. To this end, one must actively use the UN and the non-aligned movement. And one must support the leftist wing of this movement. Secondly, fraternal countries are to work together in the struggle to strengthen the security situation in Asia; to strengthen all-sided support and aid to Afghanistan and Kampuchea, to intensify relations with India, to support appropriate proposals with regard to the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, to pay attention to the development of confidence building measures in the Far East on bilateral or multilateral basis. This proposal is currently in a stagnant stage. It has not been developed to the extent we wished.

Secondly, we would like to confirm that we support, on principle, to hold the deputy foreign minister meeting of socialist countries in Ulaanbaatar in 1983. The coming meeting will discuss the measures of the USSR, MPR and other fraternal countries, especially proposals related to the Far East, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, directed at strengthening the security situation in Asia. It is important to begin early and thorough preparation for the meeting, on the basis of the experience from the meeting in Vientiane. If need be, we are ready to cooperate with you, and provide all practical aid in clearing up the matter for discussion and developing final documents [for the meeting].

Thirdly, we support your policy of intensifying connections with Asian countries along foreign ministry lines. During these meetings, it is appropriate to pay attention and emphasize key problems of the Asian continent. For example, to clarify the danger from the harmful policy pursued against Southeast Asia by rulers in Washington and Beijing,

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to explain [their attempts] at using the "Kampuchean question," and the "Soviet [and] Vietnamese danger" to worsen relations and throw a bone between ASEAN and Indochinese countries.

Rightist forces are gaining greater ground in ASEAN countries, especially Thailand and Singapore. Indonesia and the Philippines easily come under US pressure and support the anti-Soviet line. Indonesia is reducing relations with the USSR. But the Soviet policy aimed at normalization of relations with these countries remains unchanged.

As for Japan, as before, we are pursuing the line of developing good neighborly, friendly relations with this country. We are trying to turn Soviet-Japanese relations to a factor of strengthening peace in the Far East. But Japan is unfriendly to the USSR, it is orchestrating an anti-Soviet campaign, intentionally making an obstacle from the territorial question. It is participating in the embargo staged by the Western imperialist countries to put socialist countries under pressure. They are using these measures against Poland and Vietnam. They take a discriminating approach to socialist countries, build joint enterprises, but at the same time use the economic "net" to force political concessions, trying to obtain a lever to influence policy.

There are no joint enterprises between the Soviet Union and Japan, and there cannot be. This question must be considered from a political viewpoint. The problem of joint enterprises is that of "the outside is white, and the inside is black." This will allow Japan and its capital to enter the economies of socialist countries. And it means that Japanese specialists will come in large numbers. In this connection, there will be economic pressure or problems connected with harmful ideological propaganda.

We have put forward a proposal to develop confidence measures with Japan. And although we have also put forward a proposal on mutual guarantees with regard to the non-use of nuclear weapons and

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the non-production of nuclear weapons in Japan, they have not given a clear answer. But they are intensifying activities directed at colluding closer with the USA and China and subsequently organizing a military grouping against socialist countries called the "Pacific Cooperation Community."

For you comrades, it is appropriate to study thoroughly and approach very carefully the development of economic relations with Japan. If you like, comrades, we can have another meeting on the development of economic relations with Japan as the Soviet-Mongolian experts' meeting, held in 1973.

Fourthly. Although the evolution of the Chinese internal situation is confusing and multi-sided, the Maoist nature of policies remains unchanged. In terms of foreign policy, one can say it is the matter of "wiping the foam and leaving the beer."

There are no changes in Soviet-Chinese relations. The Chinese, as before, are actively pursuing activities directed at the organization of an anti-Soviet front, and appealing to others, and organization of a structure of joint opposition to the USSR.

We have put forward several proposals aimed at the normalization of bilateral political relations with China. We are waiting for the response. But the Chinese are not moving.

There is no clear response to [our proposal regarding] arranging the border problem

and to the proposals advanced in the Tashkent speech. The Chinese are not prepared to cooperate with us on an equal basis.

Although the Chinese are talking about "small steps", in reality they are not making such steps. They are using such talk to pressure the USA.

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It is not easy to give a direct answer regarding Sino-Mongolian border trade. One can carry on with such trade. But one must think about it from the perspective of security and profit. One cannot allow the conduct of harmful propaganda and espionage activities in the border areas. Therefore one must be extremely careful in approaching this question.

Generally, looks like the Chinese have started messing with Mongolia. The working of the border commission is part of the policy of differentiating socialist countries. One must be careful not to enter the trap set by the Chinese.

In developing relations with China we must pay attention not to cause harm to ourselves, and not to jeopardize the interests of the unity of the socialist commonwealth. Their policy is directed at breaking up this precious unity.

[...]

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This meeting took place on June 8th, from 10 to 12:10 am [...]

ACQUAINTED D. YONDON  
FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

[...]

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Issues elaborated by the head of the First Far Eastern Department M.S. Kapitsa:

Although we have passed information through ambassadors to the Chinese and the Japanese sides regarding our readiness to exchange opinions on establishment of confidence-building measures on the basis of the European experience, they have refused. The European experience is that like what was agreed upon at Helsinki - to invite observers to military exercises, and exchange information on the movement of troops. We have also added a proposal to exchange information on the movement of Naval and Air forces.

The Japanese first and foremost oppose us with the "northern territories question." Because the US is interested in maintaining military force in the Far East, the Japanese are following their policy.

Recently I visited China on the invitation of our Ambassador. I met with people from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and talked a lot about political questions, including reminding them about confidence-building measures. They say they cannot talk about such measures at the time when there are Soviet forces in Afghanistan and Mongolia.

To tell you the truth, the proposal regarding confidence building measures is a purely political slogan directed at Japan and China. For now we plan to use this idea only as "political air." If talks resume on the border question, we plan to put in one article into the documents regarding confidence-building measures.

In this connection he informed that in the context of the UNESCO-sponsored history of Central Asia, the part written by the Chinese experts is a clear effort to support Chinese territorial aspirations and pervert history.

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Therefore we have instructed our experts to rebuff this effort resolutely, or by demanding to rectify history, to postpone or altogether ruin this work. It would be good if our Mongolian comrades participating in the writing of this history did the same thing.

With regard to Sino-Soviet relations, the Chinese do not wish to improve relations with the USSR. They are not ready, and they don't even have such a plan. But they have a policy to limit deterioration of the situation with small steps. They pretend like they are taking actions but in reality they are not doing anything in the interest of relations of the two sides.

We have put forward a proposal to renew scientific-technical relations, and exchange of athletes and students. The Chinese are saying they are studying it. But we don't have much hope either. If it comes to student exchange, it will not exceed 10 on each side, under appropriate control.

We take a hard line on the Chinese citizens resident in the USSR. There are about 1700 Overseas Chinese in Moscow. We do not let them into the Embassy, but give them a special permission after clarifying their issues. On the basis of reciprocity we have banned Chinese diplomats from traveling to the Central Asian states and Kazakhstan.

Bilateral trade was 141 rubles in 1981, and although we have agreed on 230 million for 1982, I think it will not reach this level. Although the Chinese propose to increase trade with other socialist countries, they do not act on this. Last year even trade with their Yugoslav and Romanian friends fell by half, and this shows the nature of the "policy of differentiation."

You can develop trade with China. We will try to direct a part of the freight to you, to help [you] by increasing the extent of transit through your territory.

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In carrying out border trade, it is appropriate to carry out strict control. One should not over-value this trade. We also put forward such proposals several years ago. There is still no result.

I think it is probably too early to restore relations in other areas. The Chinese too are not doing anything to show that they are improving relations with socialist countries, to scare imperialism.

Although the Chinese internal situation has stabilized somewhat, the internal political struggle continues. Deng's group has strengthened but has not been able to win completely. It is correct that the Chinese are paying attention to economic problems,

it is what we wanted. As a result technocrats will multiply. And they don't like the political nonsense.

Now the speed of Chinese development is low, about 4-5 percent. The infrastructure problems of roads and energy are very serious, there is a lack of engineer-technical cadres. They are lacking the professional workers to fulfill the plan of development until year 2000. Even then the situation will not greatly change; I think they will reach 80 percent production capacity of the American industry in the 1970s.

Now the Chinese socialist is in the course of being eroded. To the old two [one?] sectors of the economy, two sectors of state monopoly and capitalism have been added. Having advanced the slogan of "Let's get rich" they are pushing everyone to trade and commerce. In ten years, there will be so many rich and kulaks, they will have to be crushed by tanks. It is a tragic matter to try to develop social by anti-socialist means and through anti-Soviet views.

With regard to the Chinese foreign policy, they are fully acting out the role of an imperialists' support column.

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It is not accidental that they broke off relations with socialist countries. Mao and Zhou from the start thought of America as a lever to modernize China.

There are serious contradictions between China and the US. China is pushing the US against the USSR, and the US is pushing it back. When we meet with the Americans we read them full lectures about the specifics of the Chinese character. We tell them that the Chinese cannot be anyone's friends for long.

Probably in 10-15 years the Chinese will open their eyes, and will keep the USA and the USSR at equal distance. At that time anti-Soviet views will weaken, and the tense situation in relations between the two countries will soften. Now China is not afraid to lose anything from anti-Soviet views. It is more useful to them to trade in such views with the West to obtain capital, and so notwithstanding Taiwan and other questions, their relations with the US and West Europe are developing in all spheres.

There are serious difficulties in relations with Japan. They are trying to become a great power on the international stage on the basis of their economic development.

The Japanese make noise about the "Soviet danger," intentionally inflate the "territorial question," support the economic sanctions against the USSR and reduce cultural exchange. On the European continents, they interfere in the Polish affair, they are starting to speak the imperialist language like "if the USSR does not make mistakes in Asia, we are ready to help". If we give back the Kurile islands, we will lose the exit to the Pacific.

The intensity of the two sides' economic relations is the same as before. In the Far East we are developing two big economic projects with the Japanese, and building 8 industries with Japan's help.

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We sell 8 tons of lumber to Japan. There is the question of prospecting for oil and gas with the Japanese financing. We are setting up industries with the rule of compensating Japan. But we are not letting Japanese experts in. After the opening of

BAM two years ago, if we ship Japanese goods to Europe, we can return the investment of BAM construction (20 billion rubles) within three years.

Although our relations with the DPRK are normal, they are not sincere, they are at a certain temperature. We are building 15 sites in Korea, but no military sites. The Koreans support us "from under the blanket" on international questions. We don't openly support their confederation question. In the sphere of the non-aligned movement, the Korean activity is useless; they join the right wing in talking that both superpowers are responsible for the tense international situation, etc.

There are cases of Korean diplomats being caught spying on some of our sites (such as solid rocket fuel).

We involve South Korea representatives in activities which take place along international lines. Although the Korean comrades express their opposition, they are gradually "getting used" to it. Our country will participate in the 1988 Olympic Games in South Korea. We are instructing our people overseas not to avoid meeting their representatives. We also send our own "officials" to South Korea along the UN lines.

For now we have no trade relations with South Korea, but in the future we cannot help but have trade with them through third countries.

We can say that the Vietnamese take a sincere approach to us. Their economic situation is tough. Therefore,

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they are saying to us: "you'll pay for us for 15 years, then we will create an economic district and pay on the Soviet check."

For as long as Kampuchea cannot stand on its own, the Vietnamese will not get out of there. The fighting are using the Pol-Potists to fight an "endless war." There are now about 40000 Pol-Potists in Thailand, and Thailand does not know what to do with them, and they have adopted the tactic of sending them against Kampuchea. Because the Thailand capitalists have profited from consecutive wars, they aspire to take the political power now, and this is feared by the feudal group, which has become a Chinese puppet.

India is coming to a fight with Pakistan. They intend to make a preemptive strike soon and secure Pakistan by dividing it into 3-4 parts. Under these circumstances, they are trying to clarify what position China will take, and are trying to make contacts to "tie hands". We are supplying India with weapons.

Although the Indian capitalists understand the importance of cooperation with the USSR, they are afraid that "communists have come to Afghanistan" and want to use the USA as a counterbalance against the Soviet Union. However, because the Americans are pursuing a stupid policy, they have turned to France. But France has no power, it cannot go beyond supplying "Mirages".

The situation in Afghanistan is turning positive. But there are many difficulties. When they want to organize an army, [the soldiers] run away. Now at last they got 100-120 thousand people. Although they have put the border under control, 70 percent of the territory is not accessible. It is becoming a war of the basmachi with the participation of small groups.

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They have stopped some of the extreme measures against the religious figures [sanvaartnuudyn talaar?], taken a part of the intelligentsia into state service, and the cadres have been growing quickly.

Soon Afghanistan and Pakistan foreign ministries will have a meeting, but I don't think it will be successful.

The meeting took place on June 9th from 10 to 12pm [...]

Acquainted

First deputy minister D. Yondon