

**November 19, 1951**  
**Soviet Politburo Decision with Approved Message  
from Gromyko to Razuvaev**

**Citation:**

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November 19, 1951, Wilson Center Digital Archive, APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829,  
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**Summary:**

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev requiring more clear explanation about the earlier inquiry regarding Korean situation.

**Original Language:**

Russian

**Contents:**

Translation - English

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P84/422 Copies: Comrades Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko

19 November 1951

Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (bol'shevik)]

Decision of 19 November 1951  
422. Telegram of Comrade Razuvaev  
No. 1352.

To adopt the attached draft instruction to Comrade Razuvaev.

SECRETARY CC

To p.422(op) pr.PB No. 84  
Top Secret  
Top Priority

NORTH KOREA

To RAZUVAEV

1352. From your telegram it is not clear in connection with what and on whose initiative the question arose about an appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and the Security Council with a demand concerning a speeding up of the resolution of the Korean question. It is also not clear how the Chinese friends regard this, since you do not communicate anything about this in your telegram.

An appeal by the government of the DPRK to the General Assembly and to the Security Council as it is set forth in your telegram: about the immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops along the front line and the creation of a two kilometer demilitarization zone and about making answerable those guilty of prolonging the war in Korea, could be evaluated in the present situation, in conditions of blackmail by the Americans, as a sign of weakness on the Chinese-Korean side, which is politically disadvantageous.

Therefore, not having the text of the appeal, not knowing the opinion of the Chinese comrades and not knowing the motives which are guiding the Korean friends, we consider it necessary that you advise the Korean friends to set aside resolution of the question of an appeal until the elucidation of the aforementioned questions.

We await a more detailed report from you.

Confirm receipt.

A. GROMYKO

19/XI/51