

March 1975

Memorandum, Lt-General Raymond Fullarton Armstrong, US Department of Defense, Israel-South Africa

Citation:

"Memorandum, Lt-General Raymond Fullarton Armstrong, US Department of Defense, Israel-South Africa", March 1975, Wilson Center Digital Archive, South African History Archive, The Freedom of Information Programme Collection, Nuclear Weapons History, Department of Defence. Obtained and contributed by Anna-Mart van Wyk, Monash South Africa. https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/114145

Summary:

A memorandum written by Chief of the Defense Staff Lt-General Raymond Fullarton Armstrong describes South Africa's nuclear weapons systems needs and outlines the rationale for having a nuclear deterrent.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)

Original Language:

English


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Original Scan

ISRAEL AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN BOMB

Appendix 1 Memorandum of March 1975

(Armstrong memorandum)





- d. Confrontation between the Free World and the Secialist Block has been replaced by consultation; thus lessoning the danger of nuclear escalation.
- The bi-polar conformation in world conflict has broken up into a multi-polar prier.
- f. Western solidarity has been chattered by rocont ovents and by divergent interests and political systems.
- st The proliferation of nuclear vespons and the potential capability for their manufacture by smaller nations has rendered a super-passor stratery irrelations in respect of localized conflict.
- h: Therefore the limited and localised use of nuclear waspons need not inevitably escalate to a general nuclear war.
- J. Therefore the limited and local cuployment of nuclear meapons has suce again become tencerable at the present point in time.
- Kin Therefore the threat of the use of nuclear weapons
- 1. The psychology underlying terrorism; nodern revelutionary insory and Red Chinase, doctrine, would not bracked the use of nuclear responsers the RSA.
- m. Therefore our direct stratery must take 3 nto account a patential nuclear threat the

Beterrent bettom

3. Should it become symerally known that the RSA possesses a nuclear weapon and that we would use it if we were subjected to nuclear attack; such a deterrent strategy could be used as a positive weapon in our defence.

Afternative methods of delivering a ruclear weapon

- The South African Air Force has aircraft in service thick entit be capable of delivering a muclear Leapon should we ocquire
- Itorover, calthough our petratial onemics in Southern Africa have not yet acquired highly rophisticated air defence aveters to protect their vital installations, we commet ignore the real possibility that the Russians or the Chinese may provide them with tuch systems, as they have done in the chie of certain Arab, and other states such as Kerth, Tiethen.

DECLASSIFIED

Duckingsongapon

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

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5. Dhea modern air defence systems have been deployed around vital installations, the high attrition rate makes conventional attack by exergit a limiting factor in defence utrategy. This rate amply proven in the Yom Kippur var of October 1973, and is even more valid in the case of the MAA because we do not have a ready source of replacement for our stack aircraft.

Alternatives are either stand-off Television-guided bombs or surface-to-surface mixiles. We possess multher and we would be well advised to add these very expensive but highly criticient wespons to our amount. The deterrent effect and additional flexibility which they offer, apart from the reduction in losses of vital alternativality and to our departmental strategic posture.

Strike Capability with aircraft and JERICHO

Attached are tro maps on which are chown targets which could be reached by Buccanest aircraft and by JEHTED misples from 85A territory and from Miodesia. In the rase of the radius of action shown for Buccanest aircraft, this has been calculated on figure assumption that a bond load of 8 x 1 000 15 temps is being corried and that no air to min requesting takes place.

No offective desence against JERICHO

9. Once the missile has been launched there is no affective defence against such a reapon. The accuracy indicated by the supplier is acceptable if the missile is armed with a nuclear workend (500m at 300km):

Additional considerations

10. Should it be desided to acquire the JERICHO memon system.
Financial provision will have to be made for the following additional
requirements over and above the quotation sivan:

- e. personnel
- b. base and storage facilities
- c. workshons
- f. maximum eocurity system.

Conclusion

11. In spite of the considerable post involved in acquising even a limited sumbors of miskiles with the DERICHO weapon existen, in view of the potential threat which focus the USA in the forecable future, the possession of such a system will greatly (dd to our ability to respectate from a page legical at the life.