

November 19, 1982

**Henry S. Rowen, National Intelligence Council, to
DDCI [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
McMahon], 19 November 1982, with attached
memorandum from National Intelligence Council
staffer [name excised], 'Pakistan'**

Citation:

"Henry S. Rowen, National Intelligence Council, to DDCI [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence McMahon], 19 November 1982, with attached memorandum from National Intelligence Council staffer [name excised], 'Pakistan'", November 19, 1982, Wilson Center Digital Archive, CIA Records Search Tool [CREST]. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #6.

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Summary:

Despite the concerns about sharing the ALR-69 radar warning receiver with Pakistan for fear of it falling into Chinese hands, CIA officials argue that failure to meet Pakistani demands would lead to a "serious blow to U.S. worldwide nonproliferation efforts."

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

19 November 1982

NOTE FOR: DDCI

FROM : C/NIC

If you think that there is a significant chance that Shultz and Weinberger have not made a connection between these aircraft and our leverage over the Pak-nuclear program, a call should be made to Shultz and Weinberger, to call this to their attention.

Henry

Henry S. Rowen

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

19 November 1982

NOTE TO: DDCI

THRU: NIO/NESA

FROM: A/NIO

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SUBJECT: Pakistan

1. The first squadron of F-16 aircraft to go to Pakistan did not leave from Texas this morning. President Zia maintains his firm position that he will not purchase these aircraft from us without USAF level radar. Secretary Shultz yesterday at breakfast asked Secretary Weinberger to reconsider DOD opposition to this sale, since this could seriously damage the totality of the US-Pakistan relationship, including cooperation across a broad range of matters.

2. We note that the aborting of the nascent US-Pakistan arms supply relationship would remove any basis for pursuing General Walters' conversations with Zia on Pakistan's nuclear program, a serious blow to US worldwide nonproliferation efforts.

3. As you know, an important component of DOD's position against sale of radar to Pakistan has been the intelligence judgment that it was likely to be passed to China. It does seem that our policy not to supply this advanced US radar to China nor to acquiesce in its probable leakage to them by Pakistan may cause us to pay a very high price in other aspects of our relationship with Pakistan, including nonproliferation efforts.

4. We are bringing this to your attention because no single intelligence assessment has pulled these various threads together, and we do not believe policymakers have examined this close linkage.

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