

May 18, 1953 CIA Criticizes American Committee for Liberation Policies

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Summary:

Dana Durand, chief of the CIA/DDP SR Division, now responsible for the Radio Liberty project, concludes that efforts to unify the Russian emigration have become counterproductive, that RL broadcasting should be separated from émigré politics, and that AMCOMLIB president Leslie Stevens is too wedded to the old approach to continue in office.

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MEMORANIZIM FURT

Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT

Recommendations concerning

has been La During the past six months, the systematically reviewed by the SR Division and the PP Staff. On the basis of this review, up are of the opinion that fundamental changes of policy and of personnel are necessary. I have stated the principal steps which should be taken in a sextes of 39 recommendations to ID/P, accompanying the report of the Forde-

- 2. The fundamental issue is whether to continue the effort to bring about the unification of the Soviet enigration on a broad base. In the spinion of the Chairman of the American Constitues for Liberation from Bolshevian, and of certain numbers of the Committee and the State Department, this effort is both desirable and feasible. Admiral Stevens believes it to be desirable for a reason lying beyond, but including, the attempt to obtain % reasonable sponsership for the highly necessary and urgent operation of radio broadcasting." In assence this reason is that a Coordinating Center of united Soviet enigres could assume responsibilities in a post-liberation situation, which the United States Government should not assume. Admiral Stavens holds that such a Conter can be established on a viable basis, given time, patients and money's
- l. With a considerable measure of reluctance, we have none to the conclusion that this effort, however desirable, is probably not feasible, and that continuation of it may well serve only to intensify and advertise extention differences. We been this constitution on the fellowing considerations:
 - as Emperione of the Project over a period of nearly three years indicates that irreducible differences exist among onigre political groups, notably between Great Russian and non-Great Russian, and between left and right wing groups
 - b. Experience of the Agency also indicates that the political validity, and effectiveness within the target country, of any enders grouping has been over-astinated in the past-
 - c. The Agency is confronted by a mounting body of evidence that the security situation in is very grave, and that Soviet penetration of the Coordinating Center is effective and demarcing.

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he the further conclude that, regardless of the decision with respect to the unification effort, the business of enigra politics should be separated as far as possible, both organizationally and geographically, from the operation of Redio Liberation. We balisve that conclusions of RFE regarding this problem are sound, both for professional and escurity respons. This does not signify any intention to "suprissentes" Radio Liberation in the sense of trying to cost its programs in the U.S. commercial pattern, to deprive ourselves of enigre prefessional talent, or to eliminate needed, sponsorably by such an endare grouping as we may in fact be able to heap in being. The intent, without, is to

minimize the always districting and frequently danging effect of enigre political intrigue upon the personnel and politics of the radio epocations

- 5. These conclusions if eccepted by the Agency, will extell a departure from what Adedral Stevens rightly holds to be the policy under which has hitherto exempted. Prior to taking such a serious step, we feel that a final review should be sade to confirm the validity of points a) and o) above.
- 6. In undertaking this reviews I request approval of the following stope:
 - as This review shall be conducted by the SR Division with guidence and assistance from the PP Staffs
 - b. A term of Agency personnel shall conduct this seview during the month of June; the term shall constat of Chief. SR Division. Chief. SR Admin
 - of State and the Psychological Structery Board to propare for acceptance of the change in policy proposed above.
- 7. A number of practical considerations impose a repid tempo en this review. The recommendations of the Lock Report on the administration of have largely been implemented. A management survey by an outside firm should failou as more as possible. The 1954 badget has been subsitted by the New York Consittee and reviewed by SR Rivision. This review indicates that substantial reductions of the New York estimates are advisable. The revised budget will have to be subsitted for FC approval before the Hundah review can be completed. For this reason, we shall recommend to FRG that allotsents for the political appears of the Consittee's work be approved only for the pariod 1 July to 30 September 1953.

in the event that the review proves favorable to centiming the Coordinating Conter.



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8. In substance, what is requested is authority to proceed on the ensusption that the policy of ______ in the political field will be altered in the first quarter of FT 195h, and that the security and psychological warfare aspects of the Project will largely be senarated from the political and will be given too priority.

This principle Address Stevens has been reflectant to accept. In view of this and of his generally low evaluation of the personnel of the Agency most closely connected with the Project, we do not feel that he will be able to adjust hisself to the changes proposed.

several of the key members of his staff will come to be useful to the Project. Finally, we believe that sufficient computent personnel, within and without Cli, are swallable to conduct the Project successfully in the future.

Chief. SR Mivision

CONCUR

Chief, Political and Psychological Warfers Staff



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