

## **May 1, 1958**

# **Radio Liberty Broadcasting Policy Guidelines**

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### **Summary:**

Policy guidelines for Radio Liberty broadcasting approved by the Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy.

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Gray Broadcasting Policy

Approved by Committee on  
Radio Broadcasting Policy

1 MAY 1958

Toward

No. 14

THE SOVIET UNION

I. Objectives

In the interest of assuring maximum possible impact and effectiveness of the total US broadcasting effort directed to the USSR and to the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe, the methods and aims of both official and unofficial American radio stations broadcasting to the area have been thoroughly reviewed in the light of current US policy objectives. In accordance with instructions of the Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy, upon whose request this review has been undertaken, individual papers are being prepared for each of the target countries on each of the broadcasting operations concerned, outlining the role each should play in the furtherance of both general and specific American objectives in the area, and recommending such changes or modifications of present operating practices as may seem desirable to this end.

The following paper concerns only gray broadcasts to the Soviet Union. It establishes practices and policies to be followed by the gray station in its broadcasts to the Soviet Union with a view to assuring close conformity of the activities and aims of the station with current policy objectives of the US with respect to the Soviet Union and to achieving maximum effectiveness in this regard by defining for the gray station a constructive role, distinctive in so far as practicable from that of the official Voice of America.

II. Policy Considerations

A. Background of US Policies

The fundamental aims of US foreign policy are to maintain the security of the US and the vitality of its fundamental values and institutions, and to promote the general welfare of its people.

B. Assumptions about the USSR

1. Soviet Policy - Despite a large number of significant developments in the Communist orbit since the death of Stalin the threat to the US, and in fact to the Free World by the Communist conspiracy appears to remain basically undiminished.

As far as can be determined Communist leaders retain the objective of undermining and ultimately destroying all rival power; they continue to command a military capacity of truly formidable proportions; they retain in the world Communist apparatus a pliable instrument of subversion; and they continue to enjoy the advantage inherent in a policy which seeks to exploit and magnify the world's ills rather than to overcome them.

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2. Stability - The Soviet Government has serious internal problems and difficulties both actual and potential. However, nothing discernible in the present situation justifies the assumption that the Communist power structure is in jeopardy in the near future or that there are factors operating that will compel a change in the hearts of the Communist leaders or force them soon to abandon any of their objectives. The forces at work are erosive rather than explosive. They may over a period of time produce significant change. Meanwhile, Soviet power is and will remain a hard reality.

C. US Policy Toward the USSR

The US believes its security will be enhanced if in the long run the Soviet Union conducts itself more as a cooperative member of the society of nations and moves in the direction of government responsible to the will of the Soviet people. The precise nature and composition of such a government is a matter for the determination of the Soviet people themselves. The US recognizes that there are national minorities in the USSR which may aspire to a greater degree of autonomy than they now enjoy but does not favor any course of action which would predetermine any government or governments which may evolve in the present territory of the USSR.

The fundamental hostile policies of the USSR and its growing military and economic power present a basic threat to US security. The US must find ways to pursue its long-range objectives and at the same time reduce the military threat of the Soviet Union, without however disturbing the peace or becoming engaged in nuclear warfare endangering the survival of both Western civilization and the Soviet system.

There is no foreseeable prospect of significantly reducing Soviet military strength, which is the core of Communist power, except by mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by large-scale military action. The initiation of such military action is not an acceptable course for the US.

Accordingly, US policies are designed to (a) affect the conduct and policies of the Soviet Union in ways that further US interests (including safeguarded disarmament); and (b) to foster tendencies that lead it to abandon expansionist policies. This offers the best hope of bringing about at least a prolonged period of armed truce, and ultimately a peaceful and orderly world.

In pursuing this general strategy, the US efforts are directed to:

- a. Deterring Communist aggression and preventing total war insofar as compatible with US security.
- b. Assisting in building the strength and cohesion of the Free World.
- c. Influencing Soviet conduct by means of political, military and economic programs and actions.
- d. Taking advantage of attitudes, conditions and developments within

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the USSR in order directly to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet Government in ways that further US and Free World security.

e. Destroying or neutralizing the international Communist apparatus in the Free World.

### III. Radio Broadcasting

#### A. Policy considerations affecting radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union

It is recognized that the US has limited means for taking advantage of the attitudes, conditions, and developments within the Soviet Union which might directly foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet Government. Within available possibilities, however, radio broadcasting plays a leading role. With existing limitations on other effective media, radio is depended upon to advance all US information objectives in the Soviet Union, even though jamming and other Soviet countermeasures greatly reduce its impact.

It is essential that both the officially and unofficially sponsored American stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union should seek to develop among all listeners a high degree of respect for the stations as thoroughly responsible, reliable and trustworthy sources of news, commentary and other information. Only if there is such reliance is it possible to gain maximum impact from material made available to the Soviet audience.

#### B. Target groups in the USSR

It should be borne in mind that the Soviet audience as a whole is living under a stable and powerful regime and that possibilities for action are extremely limited. Available evidence indicates that the broad masses of the population accept the authority of the regime and do not seriously entertain thoughts concerning its fundamental alteration. This does not imply that there are not specific policies and practices of the regime which are widely unpopular. It does imply that, at the present time, at least, the people tend to think of the possibilities for change largely within the present system.

The specialized nature of US objectives determines the target audiences to which radio broadcasts must be directed. The "politically-alert," as the group which potentially can exercise the greatest influence in the direction of liberalizing the regime and effecting evolutionary changes desired by the US, becomes the primary audience of US propaganda media. For the purpose used here the "politically-alert" includes high party and governmental (including military) officials who actually make decisions; the bureaucracy of managerial and administrative personnel; the skilled workers; the intellectual proper (writers, artists, professional people, scientists, teachers); and, probably most important of all, the talented youths who may in time enter the decision-making class. These categories embrace both Russian and national minority audiences. The target audience

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described above probably comprises a significant portion of the actual audience, in as much as short wave sets seem to be concentrated largely in the hands of the above-listed categories.

While the foregoing groups are the primary radio targets, it is recognized that there is a listening audience and larger public which will include many diverse elements of the population. It is believed that the reactions of the masses of the people can materialize into "pressures from below" and can constitute a source of concern to those officials directly responsible for the supervision of the people. This wider listening audience includes foremen and workers in factories, toilers on collective farms and machine-tractor stations, agricultural bureaucrats in the cities,

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junior officers and soldiers in the field, and guards and inmates of forced-labor camps and colonies.

Soviet troops stationed outside the USSR, particularly in Eastern Europe and East Germany, constitute a special audience. Their eventual return to the USSR, plus their closer contact with the non-Soviet world and better listening opportunities, make them a particularly valuable target. Also, in the light of their greater potential opportunity to escape, one of the objectives of US broadcasts beamed to this group is to induce defection, although in an indirect and discreet manner.

### C. Gray Broadcasting to the USSR

Gray broadcasting is an unacknowledged instrument of the US Government. Its sole reason for existence is to further US policy. Its aims are those of American foreign information policy in general, which includes specific formulations of policy for both the official radio and the Gray station.

### D. The Relationship Between Gray and Official Stations

In furthering these aims, gray broadcasting has distinctive characteristics which differentiate it from acknowledged official broadcasting, such as VOA. This is mainly because the US Government is not formally accountable for the content of gray broadcasts, though its actual responsibility may be inferred.

A rational allocation of roles between official and gray broadcasting permits each to concentrate on aspects for which it is best fitted, in order that taken together their operations efficiently cover all the aims of US broadcasting to the Soviet Union. A certain amount of overlapping is inevitable but the basic principle applies that each carries responsibility for certain tasks which have been mutually agreed upon.

### E. Objectives of Gray Information Programs

Gray information programs to the Soviet Union should give primary attention to the following objectives:

1. Expose Communist aims and actions and adequately counter Soviet propaganda. ✓
2. Encourage whatever evolutionary development is manifested in the Soviet system, along lines consistent with US security objectives and the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet Union: ✓
  - a. Convince influential elements within the USSR that alternatives exist to present Soviet policies which might come to be considered compatible with the security interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

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b. Encourage popular attitudes and attitudes in circles with some influence which will result in making it more difficult to reverse a trend toward peaceful policy and which might over the long run lead to basic changes in the outlook or character of the Communist regime.

c. Encourage bureaucratic and popular pressures inside the Soviet Union for greater emphasis by the regime on the solution of internal problems; the effort being to pose the necessity of devoting attention and resources to solve them or facing increased disaffection if they are ignored.

d. To the extent possible undermine the faith of the Communist ruling classes in their own system of ideology.

3. Encourage defection, albeit indirectly, to the Free World of Soviet nationals, particularly Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe.

#### Long Range

Seek to create support for alternative forms of Soviet governmental structure and behavior and encourage whatever evolutionary change manifests itself in the Soviet system which would better satisfy the natural aspirations of the Soviet people as well as the interests of the US and the Free World security.

#### Short Range

1. Expose Communist aims and actions and adequately counter Soviet propaganda.

2. By stimulating pressures for the satisfaction of popular desires to keep the government's attention concentrated on its domestic affairs and thereby curtail its chances to stir up trouble elsewhere.

While the above objectives are to a degree shared with VOA the Gray station will have primary responsibility for covering these objectives from the standpoint of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. The Gray station will share with VOA responsibility for broadcasting in the national minority languages.

#### F. Structure of Gray Broadcasting Station

The organizational structure (operating base) and image (propaganda face) of the Gray broadcasting station should be as follows:

##### 1. Organizational Structure

The station should be so organized that it is a joint endeavor of Americans and emigres, but the Americans should exercise tight control and direction over the station. As an instrument for furthering unannounced policy the Gray station will be governed strictly by the policy guidance

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furnished to it through appropriate channels. In the absence of policy guidance covering a new or unanticipated situation the station will be expected to exercise its own best judgment on the most appropriate measures to be undertaken, bearing in mind the total objectives of the US.

The station should not be dictated to by emigre political organizations, nor responsible to them for what is said over the station. The emigres working with the station should, however, be encouraged to exercise initiative and to explore new propaganda approaches within the framework of established policy.

## 2. Image

The station should assume an emigre face both before the Soviet Union and the Free World. While there may be some question as to whether or not Soviet citizens feel a large measure of kinship and sympathy toward those who have left the USSR and that there is thus a bond between them that enables Soviet emigres to speak for their countrymen, nonetheless, there are approximately one million Soviet nationals who have chosen the West since 1939 and an equal number exiled between 1917 - 1939. These people are dispersed throughout the Free World. Their sheer numbers should serve as a drawing force for their compatriots in the USSR, and the emigre face is the most desirable available image the Gray station can assume. It should, however, be stressed that it is the experience of the emigres in the Free World and their past acquaintance with Soviet life that are the Gray station's principal assets. It is from these assets - and not from any presumed authority of individual Soviet emigres or groups of emigres - that the Gray station should be able to draw and to express thoughts and ideas that will stimulate Soviet listeners to think critically of the Communist system. The station should represent everything in the emigre community which illustrates the advantages and superiority of a free society; it should not represent any emigre political group or groups nor serve as a vehicle for the platforms of such groups.

Despite being the spokesman for the national exile, the radio station must maintain its independence of this exile community and above all refrain from identifying itself with emigre political parties or organizations. It must seek to serve as a window between the Soviet peoples and the West through the medium of the emigres in the West. To achieve this image the station must achieve stature and respect on its own merit, yet drawing fully upon the emigration and Western institutions in a form which is sympathetic to the peoples of the USSR and understanding of their need to work things out in their own way and in their own form. The station should not try to represent the emigration as a strong political force. It should place primary stress on trying to identify the emigres speaking over the station with the people they left behind.

The emigre image of the station is potentially useful in the event of open hostilities between the USSR and the West, or other unforeseen major change within the Soviet Union. Under such conditions a Gray station would be able to exploit even more than at present an area of Soviet vulnerabilities of demonstrable value in a manner which is denied to official US stations. The emigre image is thus a valuable holding instrument.

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#### IV. The Role for Gray Radio Broadcasting to the USSR

(This Section is based on assumptions set forth in the Policy Section as to the probability of evolutionary change within the present political climate of the USSR. It is anticipated that this climate favoring such evolutionary change will continue for the foreseeable future. However, forty years of Soviet history has shown that periods of evolutionary change have been succeeded by periods characterized by increased use of internal terror, intensified central internal controls, and some reversal of processes of gradual change. Should this pattern recur and the change in political climate appear sufficiently sharp, this Section will be reviewed).

The general nature and content of broadcasts to the USSR will be adapted to the characteristics of the Gray Radio as (1) a voice of the Soviet emigre community interested in the welfare of their fellow-countrymen in the USSR, and (2) an instrument, unattributable to the U.S. Government, for the furthering of U.S. policy.

##### A. U.S. policy will control the overall policy of the Gray Radio.

1. Broadcasts must adhere to US policy in general and avoid positions which would produce a net result injurious to US policy. The Gray Radio will, at the same time, maintain a flexibility and objectivity appropriate to its particular identity. With respect to the internal and external affairs of the US which merit or demand treatment in broadcasts to the Soviet Union, the Gray Radio will report objectively, giving fair coverage to legitimate points of view not necessarily in accord with the public position of the US Government.
2. Unannounced US foreign policy will from time to time be conveyed to the Gray Radio. As an instrument for furthering unannounced policy, the Gray Radio will be guided strictly by the policy guidance furnished to it through appropriate channels. This guidance will relate to specific events and conditions and may, in some instances, appear to be in conflict with announced policy. In most instances, guidance on unannounced US policy will relate to objectives which can be undertaken by the Gray Radio as an unattributable radio, but which would be inappropriate for an official organ or spokesman of the US Government.
3. In its programming, the Gray Radio will strive for an appropriate balance between the need to avoid the appearance of an American propaganda instrument and the natural interest which Soviet audiences have in the US as the leading Western power. In seeking this balance, the Gray Radio will be guided by (a) the necessity for a broad coverage of news, the reporting and commentary on which should be consistent with the Radio's role as a medium of Soviet emigres as distinguished from its covert representation of US policy, and (b) the recognition that it is the principal role of official radio broadcasting to the USSR to reflect the American point of view and to cover "Americana."
4. Although the US Government and its official media maintain a position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations,

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it is desirable and necessary that the Gray Radio, with due regard to the sensitivities of its audiences, concern itself with Soviet domestic affairs. The Radio will serve to promote the objectives of the US vis-a-vis the USSR in its discussions of the myriad ways in which the Communist dictatorship acts against the legitimate interests of the Soviet people, deprives them of any meaningful role in the making and control of policy, and interferes grossly in their private lives. At the same time, the Radio will suggest alternatives to the system of Communist totalitarianism through programs discussing the structure and operation of democratic political, economic and social institutions in free societies.

5. The Radio will endeavor to convince its listeners that the US, and the West in general, has only peaceful intentions in regard to the Soviet Union, but that it considers that the peace of the world cannot be assured until the deep aspirations for peace of the Soviet people can find channels for influencing the policy of their government. The Radio will make clear that it is the aggressive and subversive political nature of the Communist regime and its exploitation of the economic and human resources of the state for these ends which constitute the real menace to the peace of the world. In its discussion of alternative political systems the Gray Radio will attempt to convey the impression that the West desires only that the Soviet people have a form of government of their own free choice, a government truly representative of the Soviet people. While democratic rather than authoritarian systems should be made to seem more attractive, the Radio will in no way suggest that the West seeks to impose any particular form of democratic government on the Soviet people.

6. The Gray Radio will combat the Soviet propaganda line which seeks to represent Western society as adhering to the 19th century pattern of socially irresponsible capitalism by elucidating the wealth of progressive reforms instituted in the various free nations and by analyzing the role of democratic governments and social institutions in bringing about and guaranteeing these reforms. The Gray Radio will also attempt to counter Soviet propaganda about the Communist "wave of the future," and the feeling of futility or resignation that line tends to produce, by calm and objective reporting on all developments attesting to the growing unity and internal strength of the democratic West and its capabilities of defense against possible aggression, and by heralding the steadily increasing awareness in the world that genuine social and human progress is inseparable from democratically guaranteed civil and individual freedoms.

7. In the event of emergency conditions in the Soviet Union due to violent demonstrations, armed uprising or revolution, or war, the Gray Radio will not assume any attitude toward the event or participate in it in any way, except for straight news reporting, until it receives direction from appropriate channels.

B. In the implementation of the immediate goals of US policy toward the Soviet Union, the Gray Radio will be guided by the following basic principles.

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1. The Gray Radio must establish a reputation of complete reliability; information presented as factual in newscasts, commentaries and special features should be scrupulously accurate. Only through utter reliability can the Radio hope to win a faithful audience and influence its thinking. Only in this way will the Soviet peoples turn to the Gray Radio for guidance in the eventuality of a domestic or international crisis.
2. In order to lead maximum possible conviction to its image as the vehicle of former Soviet citizens and to derive the maximum possible advantage from it, the Gray Radio must ensure that its programs are developed with due regard for those terms and frames of reference in which its audiences tend to think as a result of their specific experiences under Communist rule as well as of their specific national traditions. As the voice of former Soviet citizens addressing their fellow-countrymen still under Communist domination, the Radio must maintain and continually increase its understanding of the attitudes of its listeners to conditions within the Soviet Union, to the position of their country in the world community, and to messages directed to them from the outside.
3. The Gray Radio conceives of the eventual replacement of Communist totalitarianism in the Soviet Union by some form of representative government as a process having its fundamental roots in the dynamics of Soviet society itself, rather than in pressures from the outside. The Radio recognizes that the pace and nature of this development and the final forms it will take are the basic responsibility of the peoples of the Soviet Union themselves. The Gray Radio, therefore, assumes the role of a catalyst, disseminating information and views on domestic Soviet and foreign developments, suppressed or distorted by the regime, which will stimulate independent thought, feed existing and latent currents of dissatisfaction with official policies and skepticism about the prevailing Soviet system, and make Soviet citizens more conscious of desirable alternatives to various aspects of that system.
4. The Gray Radio will rely on indirection to stimulate independent thought among its listeners, on the force of the program material in its entirety to suggest points of view and feasible lines of approach to a problem. The Radio will not attempt directly or indirectly to urge any particular political creed or to promote directly any line of action.
5. In recognition that liberalizing currents in other Communist countries can make a significant contribution to similar developments in the Soviet Union, and that these currents, especially in the Soviet Eastern European bloc, will be greatly affected by Moscow's policy towards them, the Radio will attempt to arouse and increase a sympathetic understanding among its listeners of what these peoples are trying to achieve. As suggested, such an understanding may be translated into a subtle restraint on Moscow's ability to interfere with positive developments in Eastern Europe as well as into pressures for similar policy modifications in the USSR.
6. Recognizing the great dearth of purely factual information available to Soviet citizens, the Gray Radio will strive constantly to

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broaden its coverage of world events and of significant political, economic, social and cultural developments in free societies and in countries under Communist rule.

In its world news coverage the Gray Radio will be guided in its selection of news by considerations of propaganda effectiveness in addressing the specific audience and of omissions and distortions of news items by official Soviet media. The radio will not distort the news.

7. In broadcasts to the various national minorities of the Soviet Union, the Radio will be guided by the principle of nonpredetermination, which holds that it is the right of the peoples themselves to determine the over-all state structure of the USSR when they are free to do so. ✓

8. As the voice of free emigres dedicated to the task of helping its listeners find their own path to eventual freedom, the Gray Radio must not serve as a platform for any political group in the emigration or espouse any political creed or ideology of any political group in the emigration, but will, when appropriate, report the news and interests of moderate elements in the emigration. Moreover, the Radio will reinforce its character as a non-partisan service organ for the Soviet peoples and give variety and added interest to its programs by seeking to broadcast regularly the views on problems in their sphere of competence of figures prominent in the political, economic, social and intellectual life of the West and Asia.

C. For the consistent implementation of the foregoing basic principles, the Gray Radio will be guided in its daily operations by the following high-priority considerations and practices.

1. General Approach and Techniques

a. The sensitivity of the Soviet audience to denunciatory and over-simplified propaganda, the complex emotional involvement of the people with the Communist regime and the patriotic sensibilities of even those Soviet citizens sharply dissatisfied with one or another aspect of Communist rule make it imperative for the Gray Radio to avoid generalized or vituperative attacks against Soviet leaders and wholesale condemnation of Communist domestic and international policies. Criticism of individual leaders and the Soviet regime should be selective and focused on specific practices and policies which are inimical to the interests of the various strata of Soviet society, which are prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the Soviet people on the international scene, and which are contradictory to professed Communist principles and goals. The positive aspects of measures associated with the regime which are believed by the people to be in their true interests or in which they take patriotic pride (broad extension of educational opportunities; widened social security benefits; industrial modernization; scientific progress; the heightened prestige and influence of the Soviet state in world affairs) should be acknowledged for propaganda effectiveness at the same time as the limitations, distortions, heavy

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human costs and implications of many of these programs and developments are cogently and persistently discussed.

b. The Radio will depend on the cumulative effect of its treatment of the inadequacies of specific Soviet domestic practices and policies to convince its listeners that it is the totalitarian basis, the all-pervasive Party power-monopoly basis, of the Soviet system, which fails to satisfy the people's material and human needs. In like manner, the Radio will attempt to build in its listeners' consciousness an awareness of the responsibility for world tension of the aggressive and expansionist aims of the international Communist character of the regime by the cumulative effect of broadcasts giving specific evidence of Moscow's international machinations.

c. To make the audience aware of possible alternatives to the Soviet system, the Gray Radio should systematically explain the actual workings and guiding principles of democratic institutions in the West and Asia. Voluntary cooperative undertakings and the variety of publicly operated or controlled economic activities and social services in the democracies are good areas of emphasis. However, there should be no implication that any particular system of government or social relations is being urged on the listeners, nor any attempt made to conceal the problems yet to be solved by these institutions. In keeping with the Radio's character as a Soviet-emigre organ, commentaries may include observations on the greater or lesser relevance of one or another arrangement for their native country.

d. In addition to the democratic alternatives, the Radio will inform Soviet listeners fully on desirable divergencies from Soviet practices in other Communist-ruled countries. Because of the impact which knowledge of greater freedoms and concessions to popular desires in other Communist countries is likely to have on the Soviet audience, the Gray Radio should pay particular attention to this type of material. At the same time, the Radio should treat this material primarily as factual reporting, using original source material to the maximum possible degree to show the reasons for the particular developments and the beneficial effects they have had for the people affected.

e. The Gray Radio must always comment on world events from an enlightened Soviet-emigre point of view. While its enlightenment would lead it to uphold the essential unity of legitimate interests of all countries, its Soviet-emigre character demands that the Radio avoid creating the impression that it represents the primary interests of the United States or the West in general.

f. Stories about defectors and emigres should be used in broadcasts to the Soviet audience to support the general aims of the Gray Radio. Aside from their value as defection inducement, programs about defectors can assist in illuminating the inequities of the Soviet system and the advantages of a democratic society. In order to elicit the sympathy of the audience and its receptivity to the basic message, defector broadcasts should make frank admission of the psychological

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conflicts inherent in the decision to defect, as well as of the difficulties of settling into a new life. Attempts by emigre groups to forward the true interests of their fellow-countrymen should also be recounted. Of special value in enhancing the listeners' interest would be programs devoted to prominent cultural and professional figures among the emigres -- to their continued activity and to their views on the intellectual life of the West and the Soviet Union.

g. In its effort to transmit to its listeners the views of prominent figures in the public, intellectual, and artistic life of the West and Asia, the Gray Radio should arrange special interviews with these people and solicit their preparation of material especially for Gray Radio broadcasts. The Radio should also include in its programs appropriate messages from Western and Asian organizations and groups -- student, writer, artist, scientist, and labor groups, among others -- to their Soviet counterparts.

## 2. Themes and Targets

a. Gray Radio programs should, where appropriate, be developed around and exploit the following themes, among others:

- (1) Democratic "Wave of the Future." The "wave of the future" belongs not to Communist totalitarianism, but to a social order based on genuine popular sovereignty, which alone can guarantee both personal freedom and social justice.
- (2) Ideological Bankruptcy of Communism. Communism has lost its ideological appeal. The failure of the Communist system in practice to justify the past faith of its adherents and the continued distortions of Communist ideology to serve the purposes of the Soviet State have emptied it of its former dynamism and its ability to command the loyalties of Party members and sympathizers. The continued demonstration of the fact that its doctrines do not fit the existing conditions or the course of developments in the Free World has also contributed to its loss of appeal.
- (3) Peaceful Intentions of the West. The sole aim of the foreign policy of the US and the West in general vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is the defense of the right of free peoples to live in peace under freedom.
- (4) Hostile Soviet Foreign Policy. The Kremlin is engaged in a comprehensive program to inflame world tensions and to subvert free nations. All means at its command are devoted to this end: diplomatic, military, economic and psychological intimidation and blandishments.
- (5) Soviet System "Socialist" In Name Only. The use of the term "socialism" to characterize the Soviet system is illegitimate. This is confirmed not only by democratic socialists but also by growing numbers of dissident and

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revisionist communists, who have come to realize that Soviet Communism is the systematic, total exploitation of man economically, politically, socially and culturally. Soviet "socialism" is a fiction cynically cultivated by Moscow to confuse their own people as well as the outside world.

b. The following observations on certain distinctive vulnerabilities in Soviet society and their relation to target groups are illustrative of ways in which the Gray Radio should make its programs peculiarly meaningful for various Soviet audiences in the context of the Radio's basic aims and changing circumstances.

(1) The standard of living of the Soviet people is a most important theme for the Gray Radio to exploit for a variety of reasons. First of all, dissatisfaction with the low standard of living probably unites a greater number of people in all strata of Soviet society than any other complaint. Secondly, the Soviet system peculiarly invites judgment on the basis of its ability to satisfy material needs because of the blatantly materialist theoretical basis of this system and the professed *raison d'etre* of Communist dictatorships as a superior method of meeting material needs and desires. Next, to the extent that Soviet authorities are compelled to meet increasing pressures to improve the standard of living, to that extent will their ability to concentrate on war-potential industries and their maneuverability on the international scene be restricted. This is all the more true because demands for improved living conditions will only be whetted by partial concessions. Moreover, material improvement by itself is not likely to satisfy the more alert elements of the population: a lessening preoccupation with basic necessities and enjoyment of some of life's amenities will increase self-respect, consideration for personal and civil rights, and an appreciation of the need for political reform to guarantee those rights as well as a rising standard of living.

While, therefore, the Gray Radio should insistently exploit the standard-of-living theme, its approach should be subtle and varied. It is a cliché to recall that merely to draw attention to the shortcomings of the Soviet standard of living, or to make simple direct comparisons with the West, only provokes a resentful and even defensive reaction on the part of the listeners. Instead, taking for granted the people's dissatisfaction with their daily lot, the Radio should concentrate on the reasons for the situation and on methods to ameliorate it. The implication for consumer needs and desires of many of the regime's domestic and foreign policies should be shown. For example, broadcasts should point out how much housing could have been financed by funds designated for public buildings and other undertakings meant only to glorify the regime or to accommodate the bureaucracy; they should show how the satisfaction of the needs of the people is being subordinated to foreign aid.

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programs designed merely to enhance the regime's influence in the underdeveloped neutral areas and to support inefficient and unpopular regimes in the Sino-Soviet bloc. Inefficient industrial organization and poor administrative procedures should be shown as contributing factors to the unsatisfactory supply of consumer goods and the supply of unsatisfactory consumer goods. Regime concessions to the people should not be ridiculed but exploited to increase the people's expectation of still further concessions. Programs reflecting superior conditions in the West should be designed to point up the role which political, economic and social institutions play in ensuring the satisfaction of people's material needs and desires. Above all, programs should be devised to emphasize the economic feasibility of greatly improving material conditions in the Soviet Union, as opposed to the arbitrary and purely political decisions of the Party regime to pay scant attention to the people's needs through the disproportionate emphasis on investment and heavy industry to the detriment of consumption, agriculture, and light industry.

(2) Programs on the standard-of-living theme should be oriented also to impress the mass audience of industrial and farm workers with their importance in Soviet society and with their potential ability to make the regime more responsive to their dissatisfactions. For this purpose, fullest publicity should be given to those concessions made in other Communist countries to factory and farm labor -- abolition or reduction of obligatory farm deliveries, abandonment of collectivization, establishment of workers' councils, increased pay, etc. -- as well as to all action taken directly by the producers to extract concessions from the regime. Belief in their ability to extract similar concessions will be induced among industrial and farm laborers by dissemination of all statements by leading figures in other Communist countries of the harm done to the economic and moral life of these countries, as well as of the violence done to the principle of the "workers' and peasants' state" by ignoring the needs of the people and by keeping them in a position of blind subordination to the impersonal state. Programs on the increasing dependence of the Soviet regime, in the present economic and social context, on the good-will and labor efficiency of workers in industry and agriculture will also contribute to the basic broadcasting aims.

(3) In order to promote a feeling of solidarity among the various strata of Soviet society in the movement for a better and freer life, the Gray Radio should systematically transmit material which indicates that the Soviet intelligentsia is becoming increasingly concerned and articulate not only about the material deprivations of the people, but also about the deformation and neglect, under Communist rule and ideology, of their purely human and spiritual needs.

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(4) The Gray Radio will give priority attention to communicating with those politically alert elements in Soviet society -- economic administrators and managers, the technical intelligentsia, military officers, the cultural intelligentsia, and the students -- who have real or potential professional grievances or moral objections against the Soviet system and who are capable of influencing the ultimate course of Soviet development. In devising programs for these audiences, however, it must be remembered that along with the discontents, these groups have a real personal stake in the Soviet system. To the limits of practicability, therefore, these broadcasts should: (a) endeavor to take advantage of this group's position of being governed from above as opposed to their being the governors, and (b) suggest that more flexible and less doctrinaire policies and methods will enhance, or at least not weaken, the privileged position of these groups in the state.

Programs for the politically alert target groups should concentrate on exploiting the specific resentments of its members. Thus, Party controls, limited participation in policy decisions, the adoption of professionally abhorrent policies and procedures for purely political or ideological reasons, arbitrary transfers of post, lack of real job security, penalties for failure to meet unrealistic goals -- all such legitimate grievances of those directly responsible for the economy and the armed forces provide fertile ground for exploitation.

In the case of intellectuals and students, programs should take advantage of resentments over the suppression and distortion of information, bureaucratic controls over creativity, denial of free speech, enforced ideological conformity, denial of free access to the products of officially disapproved thought, arbitrary assignment of school graduates, restrictions on travel abroad, and the pervasive cynicism and materialism of elements within the ruling bureaucracy. Broadcasts of this type should attempt subtly to reinforce the view which has already occurred to certain elements within these groups that, in the present social and economic context, the Party is a superfluous and parasitic element in Soviet society.

(5) Because of the Party affiliation of large numbers of the politically alert group and their intensive Party indoctrination in general, an important place in programs for these groups should be assigned to demonstrating the chasm between Communist ideology and Soviet practice, to holding up the irrelevance of much of Marxism-Leninism to contemporary conditions, and to stressing the rigidity, inhumanity and failures of the Soviet Communist adaptation of Marxist theory. It is in this effort that the intensive dissemination of heterodox views and practices in the Sino-Soviet bloc, in Yugoslavia and in the world Communist

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movement, as well as of the statements of disillusioned ex-Communists, is of special importance. Criticisms and actual or potential deviationist views from Communist sources will be highly persuasive because they are couched in the habitual language and frames of reference of the target audience -- communication is direct, the approach is "legitimate." Moderating developments in countries under Communist rule will provide valuable food for thought for the politically alert targets, the dissatisfied members of which, out of conviction or considerations of practical expediency, tend to think in terms of effecting positive changes within a basic Communist system. (The Gray Radio will not advocate the theory of Marxism as such or use an exclusively Marxist approach). At the same time, the present inclination of Soviet intellectuals to reexamine Soviet reality in terms both of their national traditions as well as of basic Communist theory should be encouraged by broadcast presentations of the best of traditional Russian and other national democratic thought.

(6) Direct appeals by the Gray Radio to the strictly Party professional are likely to be unproductive since it is to the personal and selfish interest of the professionals to maintain themselves in their positions of power and material advantage. Indirectly, however, the Radio may contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of reduced confidence among Party professionals in the ability of Party policies and leaders to continue to forward basic Party aims, an atmosphere which will, in its turn, facilitate the general ferment in Soviet society and make the Party more vulnerable to pressures for change. Programs on dissidence and divergencies from Soviet Communism within foreign communist movements, such as those referred to above, may serve as useful material for this purpose, as may thoughtful analyses of the Party's serious alienation of those strata of Soviet society on which the continued strengthening of Soviet state power and prestige increasingly depends.

(7) In recognition that in some areas of the Soviet Union nationalism is an ingredient in the existing ferment and that it can play an increasingly large role in the pressures for change, the Gray Radio's programs to the national minorities should uphold those cultural, historical and spiritual values and interests which are being threatened, distorted or suppressed by Communist policies, where these programs do not directly seek to promote political nationalism. In these broadcasts, the Radio shall attempt to foster national pride without, however, arousing inter-national animosities and without advocating separatism.

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(8) While Soviet military personnel stationed in Central and Eastern Europe are basically interested in the same type of material as their relatives and fellow-servicemen back home, the Gray Radio should take into account their special

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situation by informing them of the legitimate national aspirations of the peoples in their areas of assignment and by explaining the specific resentments of these peoples against the Moscow regime. Broadcasts should highlight the favorable deviations of Eastern European policies and institutions from those in the Soviet Union and should show, wherever applicable, how these differences contribute to the better living standards of the people. Attention should also be given to stressing those complaints against internal conditions which these people have in common with the Soviet people.

(9) The Gray Radio will make no direct appeals to military or civilian personnel to defect, but will make clear through broadcasts about defectors and emigres that all those who are willing and able to defect will be given good treatment, will be granted political asylum, and will be able to lead happy and productive lives in their new homes.

V. Gray Radio Broadcasts Will Avoid:

- A. Inclusion of any material harmful to the interests of the host governments which might embarrass the radio in the conduct of its relations with the host governments.
- B. Polemical, vituperative or blatantly propagandistic presentations. Messages will be most effective when constructed and delivered in a calm and reasoned manner. ✓
- C. Use of any material which would cause listeners to regard it as the voice of any government or of any emigre political grouping or faction.
- D. Any departure from the principle of non-predetermination of the future state structure of the USSR.
- E. Criticism which would offend the listeners' self-esteem or national pride.
- F. Direct encouragement of any action which could expose the listener to regime reprisal.
- G. Programs which could legitimately be construed as deliberate appeals for revolutionary action. ✓
- H. Tactical advice or the promise of outside aid in the event of disturbances or armed uprisings.
- I. A condescending tone or material presented in such a way as to imply an obvious assumption of the political naivete of the listener.

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J. Use of political, ethical or philosophical generalities, which are likely to have a Communist-perverted meaning for the Soviet audience, without making clear the practical manifestations of these concepts.

K. Sensationalism; frivolous or vulgar satire or humor; flamboyant language.

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