

November 24, 1962

Cable no. 384 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

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Summary:

Anastas Mikoyan awaits the results of the New York City meetings and is actively preparing for the UN Security Council meeting in this cable. While Mikoyan is waiting with anticipation, there are still signs of reservation among the Cuban people and the revolutionary government regarding the approach of the Soviet Union. Confidence in the Soviet Union as a reliable ally has waned, accompanied by a loss of prestige and trust. The doubts are marked by a belief the U.S. will not hold up its end of the agreements, Cuba's stubborn refusal of inspections, and the belief that the resolution was bought at too high a price at the expense of the Cuban revolution.

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IMMEDIATELY

At the time of this report our friend [Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas] Mikoyan is awaiting the results of meetings in New York, and preparing for a meeting of the [UN] Security Council in the event that an agreement is reached. As soon as the position of the Security Council will be negotiated he will fly to Moscow again, via New York. Meanwhile, we can still see reservations about the approach of the Soviet Union and often disappointment, as reflected in talks with and speeches of government officials, as well as in the mood of the general population. The Cubans claim that the Cuban revolution will suffer not only internally by way of Fidel [Castro]'s authority, the government's authority, and a slowing of the revolutionary process, but most especially in the Latin American countries and others fighting for national liberation and independence. At the same time they condemn as politically risky and harmful to the socialist camp the position of the People's Republic of China, and the speeches of the Albanians. They claim that in contrast to the earlier limitless confidence in the Soviet Union, not long ago supported by [Cuban President Osvaldo] Dorticos at the UN and by Fidel, there is a markedly noticeable decrease in the country's prestige and a loss of trust. About three views of strong doubts are taking shape which also match the observations of the Soviet friends and correspond to difficulties during their explanations. The first reality is the Cubans' opinion that the USA did not give and is not willing to give any definitive guarantees, which not only confirms the continuation of flight observations and provocations, but also gives no indication of the withdrawal of forces from Florida and in the end also of the OAS [Organization of American States]'s last maneuver of organizing actions against the subversive acts of Cuba in Latin American countries. The Cubans refuse to believe any US guarantees. The second is the categorical and unchangeable view of Cubans regarding any kind of inspections on Cuba. They say that Cuba did nothing wrong and inspections indicate a humiliation and an attempt by the USA, the aggressor, to further provoke and insult Cuba. They do not even agree with inspections on the open ocean because it is an issue between the Soviet Union and the USA. They consider even this to be humiliating. Finally, as a third point they believe that the situation was bought out at far too high a price at the expense of the Cuban revolution, and without preliminary discussions with Fidel regarding questions of inspections; to this point only the Soviet Union and Cuba have fulfilled the concessions while the USA continues its arrogant provocative actions and declarations. They fully understand the Soviet steps taken to secure peace and avert a nuclear war, though they fear for the Cuban revolution because of the absolutely insufficient guarantees. The viewpoints expressed in conversations with us and other friends are decidedly reserved and one is able to observe the mixed feelings of confusion, disappointment, and insufficient understanding, which the press, radio, and television all help to spread. We think that this is an unfortunate reflection of the situation in the government and ORI [Integrated Revolutionary Organizations]. Despite this, together with our friends in favor of honesty and diligence amongst the leaders of the revolution, we believe in a return to a better understanding, though not without a long and difficult road of explanations and discussions.

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