

November 6, 1962
**Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the
United Nations (Afonso Arinos), New York, 8 p.m.,
Tuesday**

Citation:

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<https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/115369>

Summary:

Melo-Franco says he received some confidential information from Secretary General U Thant about the situation in Cuba. He also lists the advise he gave to the Cuban ambassador Carlos Lechuga.

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Portuguese

Contents:

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
13073

FROM THE DELEGATION OF BRAZIL AT THE XVII SESSION OF THE GENERAL-ASSEMBLY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS - NEW YORK
ON/6/6/XI/62

SECRET - EXTREMELY URGENT
DNU/DEA/DAS/DAC/DAM/DOr/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.
Brazilian mediation.

128 - TUESDAY - 2000hs - For the exclusive information of the Minister of State and of the Secretary General, Ambassador Carlos Alfredo Bernadares. I was received by Secretary General U Thant who gave me the following confidential information about the situation in Cuba: 1) the Soviets and Americans are combining to effect an inspection on the sea of Soviet ships or [ships] rented by the Soviet government; the Red Cross accepts, in principle, to make an inspection but is reluctant to accept a review of possible alleged arms that its regulations do not permit this; 3) the discussions continue about this point; 4) Fidel refuses to authorize a UN inspection in Cuba alone declaring that it is not against the UN but considers it blocked from heeding this suggestion due to acts by the United States; 5) Khrushchev did not consult Fidel about his decision which was communicated to the Cuban government after its transmission to Washington; 6) Fidel responded with his legendary [lendo] declaration against inspection three hours after receiving the note from Khrushchev; 7) Fidel is strongly supported by China; 8) the situation is aggravated between Peking and Moscow to the point that China will not send a delegation to the commemoration tomorrow of the anniversary of the Russian Revolution; 9) in the American delegation [Adlai] Stevenson and [John] McCloy will meet this afternoon with the Russian delegate [Vasily] Kuznetsov [sic-Kuznetsov]; 10) Stevenson is more conciliatory and McCloy more firm; 11) the American government focuses entirely on the problem of inspection in Cuba, which the Cubans reject;[1] until today U Thant has not seen any progress in the negotiations of [Anastas] Mikoyan. In making this explanation U Thant asked me if Brazil, which is "the country most respected in Latin America," was not able to make some contribution. I took advantage of the opportunity, however, to repeat to him the suggestion that I made already some days ago in a personal character to the Cuban ambassador [Carlos] Lechuga, who promised to send it to his government. This suggestion was as follows: 1) Fidel invites the diplomatic representatives of some countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Switzerland, Sweden, India and perhaps, others, to comprise a group of inspection in order to bear witness to the dismantling and the departure of the arms considered offensive; 2) these representatives will supply a report to the American and Soviet governments and to the secretary general; 3) the solution will not represent neither foreign inspection nor an American imposition; 4) after mediating, U Thant declared that he considered my suggestion worthy of examination and asked me if I received a response from Lechuga; 5) I told him that [I had] not and explained that Lechuga accepted [it] well but feared an American rejection; 6) U Thant asked me if I desired that he pass on the proposal to the Americans; 7) I told him that yes but that would ask such a thing of him [que o fizesse como coisa dele], because it would give more authority and because I did not have authorization of Your Excellency; 8) without hesitating U Thant responded that he would take on the initiative and requested me to maintain secrecy until he called on me again. As U Thant spoke to me of the importance of a personal demarche of [Brazilian] President [João] Goulart, I consult Your Excellency [whether] it would not be appropriate for the president of the republic to telephone the prime

minister of Cuba.

AFONSO ARINOS DE MELO FRANCO

[1] For example, a researcher who visited the foreign ministry Archives in Brasília was unable to see previously opened files of records of Brazilian diplomacy in Chile during the Allende period (1970-1973).