

October 30, 1962 Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

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Summary:

Vidaković speaks with Brazilian ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto on Brazil's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations and Fidel's argument for Cuban sovereignty and independence.

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Telegram -DDD-

TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

From the talks with the Brazilian ambassador [Luis] Bastian Pinto.

Fidel came to the residence. Talked to [Brazilian President João] Goulart's special envoy, Private Secretary [Gen. Albino] Da Silva for a couple of hours. Informal talks. Da Silva expressed the standpoint of Brazil on all current problems and especially on the running crisis. The essence of Goulart's position defined in P[unta]. Del Este. Fidel must consider the course towards neutralization gradually if he takes into account the possibility of final relations with the US being resolved. Suggested accepting control [e.g., inspection] as a necessary measure, under the condition of lifting the blockade.

Fidel antagonized. Said that he couldn't accept the controls, stating all kinds of reasons (sovereignty, prestige). Besides, the agreement between Russians and Americans without him was a matter he couldn't either understand or accept. Da Silva explained to him the necessity of accepting the principles of the control of the UN, provided it could be done later and over the opposite side: control and monitoring of the sovereignty and independence of Cuba, possible control of the Caribbean countries, avoiding setting up bases against Cuba and similar. This was accepted by Fidel, but only as an idea. There were no concrete results of the talk. It's in progress. Goulart calls on the phone 2-3 times every day wishing to know the course of the talk.

Vidaković