

April 11, 1963
**Letter, South African Ambassador to the United
States**

Citation:

"Letter, South African Ambassador to the United States", April 11, 1963, Wilson Center Digital Archive, South African Foreign Affairs Archives, United States of America Defence, 1,33,5 Vol 4 Pienk. Obtained and contributed by Anna-Mart van Wyk, Monash South Africa. <https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/116173>

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Original Language:

Afrikaans

Contents:

Original Scan
Translation - English

Ref no : 50F/1

EMBASSY OF SOUTH AFRICA

WASHINGTON 8 DC

11 April 1963.

[Not clear to translator]

The SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

(Copy to CAPE TOWN and PERMANENT DELEGATION, NEW YORK)

Attached, you will find copies of notes on the discussions with Mr. Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, on 5 April.

2. As indicated in our telegram No. 53 of 5 April, none on the American side issued any threats against us. To which this can be attributed may be hard to say - at least at this stage - and one should probably not attached too much importance to this fact. Nevertheless, Mr. Bennett, the Minister of the Federation, whom Mr. Williams saw immediately after me, later remarked to me that he wondered what I said to Mr. Williams to "soften" him "up" because Mr. Bennett's conversation with him went amazingly better than usual.

3. As for the comments I made to Mr. Williams in connection with the statement of the Chief of the US Navy, Admiral Anderson, the desk officer for South African Affairs in the State Department, said after the interview with Mr. Williams that it was an important and new point to him. Mr. Williams himself has not responded to this point, but it should be again noted that we should not expect too much, because even the previous Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs, i.e. the number 3 man in the State Department, once said to me that this is a serious consideration that is given particular attention, and yet American pressure regarding South-West Africa has not decreased.

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4. As to the definition of what should be the best American political strategy, as referred to in the notes, I would like to draw your attention to a letter that we hope to send to you in today's bag, where more detailed comments are made on the statement of Admiral Anderson and recent declarations of Mr. McNamara, Secretary of Defence, on the strategic position of Africa.

5. In a recent telegram I said that I would hope to make recommendations after the second conversation with Mr. Williams concerning the transfer of the discussion between the US authorities in Washington and us to a higher, or the highest level. All in all, including impressions which are more or less indistinct, I do not feel inclined to make a specific recommendation to you in this regard except to say that we would hope that it will be possible to conduct any further discussion that may take place with the International Organizations Division of the State Department. We have determined that the two formal discussions with the State Department on South-West Africa over the past week or two was held with Mr. Williams because he insisted to address the matter.

6. As for the transferal to a higher level, I want to share some thoughts on which the Department may, in the meantime, will want to respond. We now know (because at the latest talks Mr. Dunn coincidentally has seen a copy, in the hands of one of the Americans, of the State Department's notes on the first conversation with Mr. Williams which was seen by Mr. Rusk) that the Secretary of State was informed about the conversation. It is possible that the first steps taken to put pressure on us occurred without approval from the highest authority in the State Department...

but / ...

but our experience has already indicated a number of times that after there has been acted against us at lower levels; the Secretary of State finds it difficult to deny his subordinates. If a higher level is considered in connection with the possible decisions of the Government of the United States on the issue of South-West Africa, then we may have to consider going to the President himself because it is quite clear that all considerations of US policy is crystallised in the White House only.

7. A further question that arises is at what point it should be discussed with a higher or highest level. Should it be 'now' or should it wait until the matter is submitted to the Security Council? In that respect, the impression is already quite strongly that, similar to the era of the Eisenhower Administration, policies are often developed by individual rulings on matters of lesser importance at a lower level; which makes it impossible for the Heads of Departments to go against this trend when the situation actually requires a decision of great importance. If this situation is correct, then it is advisable to relatively quickly raise the South-West matter with the President. It could perhaps be considered, if we find it advisable for tactical reasons to make some concession on the principle that to go two steps forward one sometimes have to go one step backwards, that we then ask of the President himself an insurance in advance, for support in any further developments.

8. It goes without saying that the Embassy's views in this regard are based on limited information.

9. In the meantime, all appropriate channels and all possible levels are exploited to discuss the South-West Africa issue in its broadest implications.

W.C. NAUDE

AMBASSADOR.

SECRET.