

**February 14, 1978**  
**Memo, South African Department of Foreign Affairs,  
'Kits for C130's [Aircraft]'**

**Citation:**

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**Summary:**

Memo regarding South African C130 Aircrafts.

**Credits:**

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**Original Language:**

English

**Contents:**

Original Scan

1/33/3

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KITS FOR C.130's

1. Telegram 37 (ex Washington) was referred to Kmdt. Eksteen (711411 + 465) S.A.W. on Monday 16.1.78. He undertook to inform HQ.
2. On 27.1.78 Kmdt Eksteen said in reply to a telephone enquiry that there had been no developments.
3. In reply to a further telephone enquiry of 13.2.78 (Monday) Kmdt Eksteen referred me to Brig Geldenhuys, Airforce HQ, direct (29541 x 675). (Direkteur van Lugmagvoorrade - DLVY, Lugmag ).

4. Brig Geldenhuys said :

- (a) A signal from the military attache in Washington (Col. Coetzee). No. 002 was missing;
- (b) According to his latest information from Washington, S.A. should sit tight and make no official representations, pending the result of efforts by Hayes (i.e. Lockheed) themselves to State Dept.

I undertook to send him copies of 8/24/10 of 26.1.78 from Washington and annexures (letter of 6.1.68 from Hayes and reply 8/24/10 of 26.1.78) received in the interim.

5. Washington then phones (Mr. Shearan), to say :
- (a) Hayes had now made representations to State Dept. (Munitions Control) but had unexpectedly attached copy of Embassy's letter to them 8/24/10 of 26.1.78 to the representations.
- (b) Hayes now wanted the Embassy to go ahead with representations, i.e. pulling out all the stops and there was not in the circumstances much point in holding back so that the Embassy could join the fray at a later stage;
- (c) Hayes were expected also to be making an approach to Senator Spankman shortly.
- (d) In response to a suggestion that direct official involvement at this stage might be counterproductive, - the Embassy regarded the present situation as analagous to the impoundment of the modified C 130 aircraft in the USA, following modification at Birmingham, Alabama, and

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its subsequent release following Embassy intervention, towards the end of last year. The Embassy would make the case that the ~~knts~~ had likewise been illegally impounded for the reasons set out in the correspondence.

(e) With the concurrence of Mr. van Dalsen (consulted telephonically) the Embassy was authorised in its discretion to proceed, subject to the concurrence of the SAAF. Mr. Shearer undertook that Col. Coetzee would phone or telex Brig. Geldenhuis in this connection.

(f) Washington would keep us informed.

6. I phoned Brig. Geldenhuis to alert him to call from Col. Coetzee. He said he would keep us informed.

PRETORIA

14.2.78

While there is nothing to be lost in this procedure it is doubtful whether Senator Sparkman will retain such influence with the State Department now that he has announced his retirement at the end of this year.