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**The International Activities of the Chinese
Leadership and Conclusions for the Practice of the
GDR's Relations with the PR China**

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Summary:

The GDR Foreign Ministry outlines the current shifts in the PRC's foreign policy within the international community under the Mao group.

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□International Activities of the Chinese Leadership and the Tactics Applied

1. Foreign policy activities of the Maoist leadership confirm how the latter continues to maintain the foreign policy strategy outlined at the IX CCP Party Congress [1969]. The leadership is making efforts towards practical implementation and further expansion of this strategy.

The "theoretical" basis of foreign policy by the current Chinese leadership consists in the so-called four great contradictions as stated in the report to the IX CCP Party Congress. They are based on an anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist platform ("between subjugated nations and imperialism and social-imperialism, between proletariat and bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries, between imperialist states and the social-imperialist state as well as between the imperialist states, between socialist states and imperialism and social-imperialism").

The "four great contradictions" are expression of a long-term conceptual foreign policy of global character. The strategic aim of the Mao Group consists in realizing its plans for world domination with nationalistic and anti-socialist policies.

In 1971 there was an escalation of conflicts within the Chinese leadership resulting in the elimination of Lin Biao and the strengthening of Zhou Enlai's position, and thus in an even greater concentration of power in the hands of the Mao Group. As a result, a further aggravation of anti-Sovietism in domestic and foreign policy, and a still broader collaboration with imperialism is noteworthy.

At the same time, those conflicts have again revealed the instability of the Mao Regime. They are a reflection of latent contradictions between policy of the Mao Group dictated by subjectivist great power ambition and the objective requirements of social and historical developments.

2. The extremist, militant, and adventurist methods in foreign policy, as on display during the "Cultural Revolution", have failed. The Mao Group suffered a fiasco when it attempted to split the communist world movement. The balance of forces has shifted towards world socialism. The tendency towards unity and cohesion among the forces of world socialism is increasing further.

This balance of forces revealed the Mao policy's limitations. It induced the Chinese leadership to apply corrections to its tactical line and seek refuge in various demagogic maneuvers. Recently, the Mao Group also increasingly used economic means in its foreign relations.

This policy resulted in a reactivation of PRC international relations (for instance, establishment respective re-establishment of diplomatic relations with 21 states since October 1970, among them five NATO member states; reinstatement of the PR China in its rights within the United Nations; development of relations with the DPRK, Romania, and Yugoslavia; rapprochement, as well as improvement of relations, with the United States).

3. The Chinese leadership is attempting, with a certain taking into account of the balance of forces, to create more favorable conditions to accomplish its international objectives. Means and methods applied in this regard are manifold, flexible, and differentiated. They reach from regular diplomatic activities all the way to interference in internal affairs.

Major efforts are undertaken in particular in political-ideological regards. Here the Mao Group is again eager to exploit nationalistic, as well as rightist and leftist opportunism, in order to penetrate the ranks of the international communist movement. This way they intend to undermine from within the unity and cohesion of the international communist movement, and especially the rallying around the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Those activities of the Mao Group are met by sharp rebukes from the Marxist-Leninist parties by ways of a principled political-ideological struggle.

On the international level, we can now normally observe a mostly correct, more businesslike attitude by PRC representatives in terms of form and protocol. The Chinese leadership was able to expand its international reach primarily in the Afro-Asian region through, among else, the pretension to develop relations with all states according to the principles of peaceful coexistence. However, at the same time the increasingly open collusion with imperialism, in particular American imperialism, is also limiting this reach and its effectiveness. Examples for that are statements made by PRC representatives in the United Nations on issues like disarmament and the Indian-Pakistani conflict.

Also, the Chinese leadership substantially increased its activities in economic, as well as in cultural and scientific areas.

4. The USSR persistently undertook in 1971 as well steps in its efforts towards a normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. It made the known proposals, which were however rejected by the Chinese leadership. In fact, the Chinese leadership did not show any interest in the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, not even on secondary issues. To the contrary, the political struggle of the Maoists against the Soviet Union became aggravated further. The main reason for this is the fact that anti-Sovietism and hegemonism has still remained the core of the Mao Group's domestic and foreign policy.

This policy of the Chinese leadership is in particular on display at the border negotiations. Intentionally the Chinese leadership is delaying those negotiations. At the same time, it wants to maintain tensions along the border. Currently, the Chinese leadership is not interested in a final and complete agreement with the Soviet Union on border issues.

Towards the socialist countries the Mao Group is implementing a broad range of differentiation policy with anti-Soviet objectives. As everywhere else in the world, the Chinese leadership also attempts within the socialist world system to establish "bases" with anti-Soviet bias in order to undermine unity and cohesion of the socialist countries. In the course of these efforts, the Chinese leadership has made certain gains (DPRK, Romania, Yugoslavia).

5. The Chinese leadership attempts to further expand its influence vis-a-vis the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and to push back against the growing influence of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Here it uses especially the "superpower thesis" in order to win the confidence of the small countries (China will never become a superpower) and play up the role of a "representative" for those countries.

6. The invitation of President Nixon to the PR China, as well as the swiftly proceeding advance preparations, are testament to the great interest on both sides to achieve a rapprochement and development of relations.

In their steps towards the development of mutual relations, the PC China and the United States are guided by their global interests. They are directing this policy against world socialism, and in particular against the Soviet Union.

The Chinese policy of continuous expansion of trade with Japan and the increase of political pressure are beginning to show ever more effects. The number of Japanese companies willing to comply with political conditions set by the PRC is growing and growing. The Chinese-American rapprochement and domestic pressure will induce the Sato government to further modify its policies vis-a-vis the PRC and Taiwan.

7. Western Europe is growing to gain in importance for the Mao Group's foreign policy. Accordingly, the PR China has determinedly activated its policy towards the European capitalist countries (in particular France, Italy, England, Austria). Currently the PRC has diplomatic relations with 10 NATO member states.

Concerning its policy towards Europe, last year [1971] the Mao Group devoted greater attention to the European Economic Community.

Besides France, the FRG [West Germany] is a matter of special interest for the Mao Group's policy in Western Europe (confrontation between FRG and the socialist community of states, relationship between GDR and FRG, economic potential). However, due to other priorities in their respective policies both sides have recently not undertaken major activities to develop their bilateral relations.

Still, the FRG government is paying close attention to steps taken by the United States, Japan, and other imperialist states to develop relations with the PRC in order to be able to undertake similar steps where appropriate. The reactionary forces in the FRG are openly advocating a rapid establishment of diplomatic relations with the PR China.

The Mao Group's strategic line is also on concrete display through the rejection of the convening of a European security conference. All efforts towards detente in Europe and respective successes achieved (treaties of the Soviet Union and Poland with the FRG, Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin) were either negated or harshly condemned [by the PRC]. At the same time, such was linked with explicit slander directed against the USSR, and implicitly so against the GDR and other socialist states.

With the reactivation of the Chinese foreign policy there also occurred a reevaluation of international organizations by the Chinese leadership. This was most pronounced in the Mao Group's changed attitude towards the United Nations. The reinstatement of the PR China's rights in the United Nations will increase the destructive impacts and options of the Mao Group. As the first appearance of the Chinese delegation at the XXVI United Nations General Assembly demonstrated, the Chinese leadership attempts to use the stage of international organizations in particular for harsh slander of the Soviet Union and other progressive states. In the United Nations, the PR China exhibits its collusion with U.S. imperialism - what is so despicable as well as dangerous, both for the socialist countries and the anti-imperialist struggle.