

March 27, 1979
**Revolutionary Command Council Meeting after the
Baghdad Conference of 1979**

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Summary:

Saddam and his executive Revolutionary Command Council discuss the March
resolutions of the Arab League, which included the expulsion of Egypt and the cutting
diplomatic ties due to its peace treaty with Israel.

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Key: UM = Unidentified Male Speaker.**Translator comments, clarifications, and additions are italicized in brackets.**

[The audio begins with the meeting already in progress]

UM1: *[UM1 speaks with a Levantine accent]*...with all the more reason, we have a vested interest. On one hand, we have an interest in formulating an Arab position that refuses to give in. Thus, this issue requires an initiative, which I believe falls on the shoulders of Iraq before any other Arab country, especially when considering that the resolutions were taken in Baghdad, at a conference that took place in Baghdad. On the other hand, we feel that there is a national responsibility that falls on the shoulders of the Iraqi state. And from this outlook, I believe that Iraq must not be content with only implementing these commitments, but also must take the lead and move forward to force other Arab countries to implement the commitments as well.

I developed this conviction based on what I have heard from Your Excellency in our previous meeting at the time of the Summit conference. Mr. Deputy *[UM1 is addressing Saddam as Mr. Deputy which indicates that this is a pan-Arab Ba'ath Party meeting with non-Iraqi participants]* do you remember when we asked you who would guarantee us that Arab nations or countries would implement those resolutions? You said, "I am the one who would guarantee you this and not you. I am ready, and we are ready in Iraq to tour all these Arab nations and hence force them and incite them to commit to these resolutions, and if those countries were too slow implementing, then you should come to us and we would be ready to take on this task."

As of now, and to the best of my knowledge, there isn't any commitment; at least with regard to the easy part of the resolutions, which is the financial one, let alone the other parts. Also, I would like to address a question to the Deputy: the position that we all heard, and were happy about, when you said that any Arab regime that does not implement the Baghdad resolutions, which are the bare minimum, and anything less would be considered treasonous. My question is do you have an idea in terms of the measures that must be taken against those Arab regimes that won't abide by the resolutions?

Saddam Hussein: We have said it publicly and announced it in our own audio-recorded voice before the Conference of Ministers was held. We said *[in case of]* a traitorous regime; we would deal with it on that basis by instigating its people and providing them with all that they need to topple the regime, for its treason. We said it publicly and they have heard it before they came here.

UM1: Yes.

Saddam: We repeated it today, the same speech. We repeated it just in case they would think that those words were *[only]* for public consumption, but it is for them too. We repeated the same words.

UM1: It has become clear, at least as of today, that there are three Arab countries that refuse to abide by the Baghdad resolutions, and they even refuse to attend the Foreign Affairs Ministers conference in Baghdad. In my estimate, and in all honesty, there are other countries that would

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yield the same position. Thus, I believe that adopting those measures to force governments to abide by the resolutions is a key and central issue in order to stop others from adopting similar decisions of non-commitment. This is a key issue.

As for breaking off relations with the United States of America, we have heard yesterday from Dr. Munif al-Razzaz [*Syrian leader who was the last Secretary General of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party*] that Iraq in fact has nothing to do with that, which is a good thing. We didn't come here only to discuss what is expected of Iraq or the Palestinian revolution. As far as we are concerned, we are ready, as I have mentioned Mr. Deputy, to carry out any task we are given especially by Arab nationalistic regimes to incite others toward adopting similar positions. But, I also believe that you have a big responsibility on your shoulders to play the role of an instigator in pushing these countries to take the same position, meaning to take a unified Arab position toward this issue.

The United States, Mr. Deputy is threatening to take measures against [*any*] Arab country that refuses the treasonous deal. We must first formulate an Arab position that opposes this deal of surrender. This issue, in my opinion, will also need an initiative. In absence of an initiative, we will be leaving each Arab country to act in its own way, because to my knowledge, there is nothing specific concerning the United States in the Baghdad resolutions. As Your Excellency has mentioned, it was -- [*Interrupted*]

Saddam: The bare minimum.

UM1: It was the bare minimum on the scale of the vacillating, fearful, uncommitted Arab countries. There was no stance toward the United States. [*Time Stamp: 5:00*]

We demand escalation. We have reached a crossroad, and there is a need for us as Arab nations to have a more developed and escalated position. This more developed position needs an initiative [*for two reasons*]: First, to force Arab nationalistic countries to adopt this stance; Second, to put pressure on the weak Arab regimes—let me call them that—to adopt positions that are less involved with the United States in this regard. Another point, as my comrades had mentioned earlier, is in regard to a meeting among all nationalistic and progressive forces. I believe, in all honesty, that we are in a position that requires us to be coherent and to put aside all the differences that separate us from each other. Consequently, at some point we will face the need to create a national, progressive and coherent front in the Arab region, which can truly stand firm against this current of surrender. Based on that, I also believe that we need an initiative.

In the past, as we mentioned yesterday in our meeting, there was the Resistance and Defiance Front. Iraq had its reservations toward the Resistance and Defiance Front. Fine, let it be something else. We are not trying to cling to a specific formula. We want a meeting for all nationalistic and progressive powers in the Arab world, whether they are in leadership, progressive positions, or in nationalistic organizations. It does not have to be the Resistance and Defiance Front. Let it be something else as long as it will give the impression to the Arab world first, and to our enemy [*second*] that there is a coherent front that can adopt positions in an organized and united manner. Thank you, Sir.

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UM2: [UM2 speaks with a Palestinian accent] The point that you have mentioned, comrade Saddam, is that Sadat did not arrive in Jerusalem coincidentally [Anwar al Sadat, the Egyptian President from 1970-1981], is a very significant point, which we have discussed at length for many years. When Sadat stopped the war on October 16th, and gave his famous speech, it was obvious that he really wanted a war of liberation, and he repeatedly reiterated that, but it was foggy [this is an Arabic term that means "the atmosphere was not right" or "the circumstances were not favorable"]. For one, there was the Pakistan-India War, and for another there were other wars in different parts of the world. There was the notion that this war could lead to exceptional nationalistic results for the Palestinian cause. We, as patriot Palestinians and Arabs, have always said that we are in support of reclaiming every inch of this Arab land, because this Arab land concerns all of us, whether it's the sands of Sinai or the rocks of the Golan Heights.

The settlement path [the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1973] that Sadat followed split Arab nationalists and progressives into two segments [inaudible]. We said that we must not be the side scapegoated for pushing Sadat toward settlement, and we presented our positions and announced them clearly shortly after the October War. We stated that a settlement would mean an end to our Palestinian cause. And we said that we were looking from a nationalistic prospective at the struggle with the Zionist enemy as a struggle for survival, a civilizational struggle, and a struggle where we either defeat and wipe out this Zionist enemy or be wiped out by it. This means we must not accept a settlement. Also, we must not educate [and familiarize] the Arab and Palestinian public with the ideology of settlement. [Time Stamp: 9:55]

The purpose of the settlement is to split the Arab unity [inaudible]. We waited until Sadat signed the Sinai Accord, then waited until he signed the second accord, and then waited until he went to Jerusalem. It is unfortunate. [Had we not waited that long], the offices of the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO] in Cairo would have been opened right now. We are not embarrassed to mention this point because we are meeting at the highest level here and not at the lowest one. The lowest level at which Arab regimes met in Baghdad, and where Baghdad wants them to be accountable because [inaudible]. But we are meeting as nationalists, revolutionaries, and Arab progressives at the highest level, which calls upon us to protect this nation [the Arab world], its people, interests, and future. This leads us to say that an openness to settlement had turned into an ideology and into a waiting [game], as well as [a game of] survival in favor of Sadat, who went to Camp David and is now holding dialogues and making coalitions with the Zionist enemy and the imperialistic American enemy too, to finish off all the nationalistic, progressive, and revolutionary strongholds in our region.

In all honesty, we must now take a clear and firm stance against the settlement; otherwise, we would be meeting in a clear type of [inaudible, someone coughing]. That is a total renunciation of the settlement idea, total renunciation of betting to get a share, total renunciation that we want some of Palestine, because Palestine, in all honesty, does not concern us as Palestinians, or concern the Iraqis as Iraqis or the Syrians as Syrians. Palestine is the spot that summarizes, or the theater that determines historical struggles between the nationalistic, revolutionary Arabs representing the people of this nation [the Arab world] and the Zionist enemy and all of those who supports and stand by it.

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We call for a firm and decisive position on the issue of settlement, and we say, as revolutionaries, that what has worked in other parts of the world is absolutely not applicable to the Palestinian issue. While it remains possible that certain revolutionary forces in other parts of the world can negotiate for a piece of land, or [*say*] Lenin negotiated with the Germans for a duration of time, but we cannot implant this negotiation notion into the psychology of the Arab citizens at the expense of their destiny, future, and role in civilization and humanity.

As far as we are concerned, there is a need to call for an agreement on this issue and we need to develop it, so that this position would be the beginning of a response, which Mr. Deputy described as a psychological response to the Arab people and a psychological response to the settlement issue. Arab masses would then understand that our journey of struggle against the Zionist enemy is a long journey. We will not [*inaudible*], but we will bring victory to our nation, which would be achieved through a long, complicated, and bitter struggle. We do not in any way bet on imaginary or western solutions from any power in the world no matter who that power is. We must first define what we want, and which direction we are taking, and what we must do toward an issue that will determine our fate, an issue that supersedes and overtakes all [*other*] issues, which is the Palestinian cause. Thank you.

Saddam: Yes, comrades, I am sure that all of you have something in mind that you would like to express an opinion about. Certainly, all opinions expressed by any activist, even the simplest person, and even if the opinion was not correct, still can push toward correctness, through hopefulness. This is true even if it comes from a simple citizen with no analytical skills. [*Time Stamp: 14:55*]

Saddam: Now, [*you can imagine*] what the case would be if that person were to be an activist with experience like you. However, I believe that the questions and opinions presented by the comrades and all of you were in the same discussion workshop [*tackling the same issue*]; let alone the fact that you were originally in the same circumstances because you fight for the same cause. Those differences in opinions are just part of life, which are minor or tangential differences. Dialogue mitigates them and brings out the best forms of common ground.

As for the regimes that disgrace, meaning go below the lowest dividing boundary line in the joint relationship, as we said before, if treason has levels, but of course treason has no levels... Perhaps, we can say that there are levels to nationalism in expressing certain nationalistic stance, but we cannot say that there are levels to treason. However, we assumed this rhetorical assumption in order to emphasize a point that those who support al Sadat are traitors like him, to the same extent.

What is our position toward them? Actually, we have stated our position toward them. We have stated it publicly in a live radio recording that was broadcasted and distributed. But is this an approach for the governments or for the revolutionary action of the movements and masses?

In fact, the approach of holding responsible those who supported Sadat or who take a traitorous stand like him is an approach that is first and foremost directed toward the masses and revolutionary organizations, and at another level for nationalistic regimes. Other than that, we must not give any importance to the stance of other governments. Rather we must imagine the

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possibility of an agreement to punish the regimes that go to the extent of Sadat. We only want from these regimes to adhere to the Baghdad resolutions in boycotting Sadat. Had they expected him to sign, they probably would not have agreed to the Baghdad resolutions. But some of them thought the matter [*negotiations*] would last for a long time, and so some regimes fell into a trap when Sadat indeed signed. But, since they had signed these resolutions [*with us*] they are now required to adhere to them. This is our approach as revolutionary fighters whose methods in dealing with traitors are known, and I don't want to get into that. As for nationalistic regimes, they switched their positions from a tentative practical and general position into a public position. Into a position where we have no shame at all in saying, when a shipment of weapons is seized, that it was coming from Iraq directed at the Sudanese regime. We shall say that on the radio. "Yes, we did send it to the fighters in Sudan," we will also announce it on the radio; still that does not constitute a new position. Our relationship with the activists in Sudan is much earlier than that, because of Sudan's reactionism. But now we are taking a different approach in dealing with this regime. Now, it is justifiable for us to say, officially and out loud, that we consider such people [*the government of Sudan*] to be traitors. And today, before we came here, the 6 o'clock news broadcast might have probably announced -- [*Interrupted*]

[*Time Stamp: 20:39*]

Tariq Aziz: At eight o'clock, the six o'clock one did not...

Saddam: I am not talking about the speech by the ministers, but the comment on the Sudanese position, which can no longer be endured. It is an obvious position. They officially said that they would not be attending. So they are practically with Sadat. Therefore, we said that Sudan's decision not to attend must be broadcasted in all newscasts, and that the ruler of Sudan has sided with the traitor Sadat and thus became his accomplice in treason. In the past, we would not have said that, but now we do. We say it officially, from the position of the government and not the position of the activists, meaning from the state's position, and we act accordingly.

There were two countries, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who officially expressed their displeasure at what we expressed in the news, to different degrees but with obvious displeasure. We told the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to call for both ambassadors and tell them, "I am afraid you believe this is just a speech. No, this is the approach of the Iraqi state, and we will apply it in the exact words. It is not a slip of the tongue or a mistake, but rather it is the approach of the Iraqi state with all its capabilities and political power. We will abide by it and consider any ruler who does not adhere to the resolutions of the Baghdad Summit to be as much of a traitor as Sadat." The method of expressing our position has taken a new framework and new look.

We must encourage any regime that can work within the same framework, however, we must not expect other governments to act in the manner we do. I am talking about the non-nationalistic, or non-progressive, or non-nationalistic-progressive governments. But as activists, we must not be silent. You must not expect from other governments to act [*on your behalf all the time*]. [*For example*] we [*Iraqis*] are against a certain regime, and we instigate its people and support them to topple that regime. While other organizations, whether in the resistance or in another place, only fall or speak analytically [*Saddam is telling them to act on their words instead of using rhetoric*]. You must publically announce that. [*Say*] yes, al-Numairi is a traitor, a traitor like Sadat. His

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people are required to revolt against him and we are required to chase him like Sadat whenever we spot him. We are not embarrassed to provide you with weapons if anyone of you wants to kill al-Numairi. You can go and pick them up from our embassy in France. Even if it were to be discovered that it was delivered through our embassy in the diplomatic pouch, and is officially said to be from Iraq, we will admit that we want to kill the traitor al-Numairi, who is as much of a criminal as Sadat, just as we would do with Sadat.

We do not vacillate or have double positions. Once we take a stance that is it. We express it out loud the way it is. That is why we announced it repeatedly in our meeting with the ambassadors when we called them. They have been told and we are going to say it again at the meeting of the Arab Foreign Affairs and Economy Ministers, in case they didn't understand it well the first time. And [*indeed*] we said it again at the Arab Foreign Affairs and Economy Ministers meeting. We don't have any more patience. It is over. [*Time Stamp: 25:05*]

UM3: It is over, that is it.

Saddam: The bottom line is that the land is not to be given to foreigners. They insist on giving the land to foreigners with this bestowed position that is based on predetermined treason. Numairi did not decide to betray today. He had made up his mind a long time ago. It was not the peaceful resolution that made Sadat a traitor. Sadat is a traitor anyway, however, the peace resolution facilitated that to him, technically, to commit treason causing the biggest amount of loss possible. That is the analysis.

Let us look at the Lebanese situation. There are two important issues that are of particular significance to us: First of all, for Syria and the Unity Nation [*Iraq and Syria*] to not be officially involved in anything that would make it easier for the Zionist enemy and imperialists to hurt us with an attack that we are not prepared for. Secondly, from a strategic standpoint, we are interested to see the denominational issue resolved in Lebanon, which requires unusual efforts. This is a more complicated issue than the first one. How can we go about that? Is it doable or not? There are many things that may not happen now, but it is important for our approach to be correct so that it can impact the opposite side. Do we want our Maronite Christians in Lebanon to stick together against us? No, we don't want that. We only want the people who are linked to colonialism and Zionism to be the ones joining against us, while those who do not have leanings toward treason must stay outside this group [*of traitors*]. We definitely want the first option. Thus, we must act with an approach that will put the traitors, by thought or premeditated act, within a trench inside Lebanon. However, we definitely do not have in mind any idea to act in any way that would hurt the Palestinian cause or the revolutionary movement inside Lebanon.

Is it a tough issue to deal with? Yes, it is tough, but we have to come up with an approach. We must come up with an approach that, first and foremost, won't put Syria in a predicament. The other important thing is that we have to make sure that the Unity Nation won't be in a predicament either. How do we balance that? We can do it by dialogue and discussion until we reach a formula that will bring us some at least, if not all of what we have in mind.

As for the situation in Jordan, you certainly all know the uniqueness of Jordan's situation. It is not always possible, despite all strategic scenarios drawn, to end up with the results one desires.

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But it is always important that the end results of all strategies are correct and forward-thinking. Jordan's position is against Camp David, against Sadat, and against signing of the peace treaty, but with continuous steadfastness. We must encourage this position. [*Time Stamp: 30:00*]

King Hussein clearly explains, "We [*Jordanians*] don't have anything against setting up hopes. Based on my experience from 1967 until now, I am convinced that if we have something to say, I would have said it, but there is nothing. No one has anything set aside for us, people" and now some of them are saying that we can put Jordanian Police on the Palestinian land. So we must encourage this approach and this man [*King Hussein*]!

We have talked about how we should think of the enemy. Now, it is of an equal importance that we think of how the enemy would think [*of us*]. The masses' psychological state of mind is definitely better now than it was before and after the signing of the Camp David Accord. Following the Iraqi-Syrian meeting and the Baghdad Summit resolutions, the psychological state of mind of the Arab masses started to improve. I don't believe that the Arab masses had a strategic psychological relapse after Sadat signed; rather it was a psychological quake.

However, if it were not for the move that led to the new relationship between Iraq and Syria and to the Baghdad Summit resolutions at that time and its subsequent efforts up until now, I believe that the Arab masses would have suffered from a psychological relapse that would have had significant strategic ramifications. Colonialism knows that, and the Zionist entity definitely knows it too. The Americans, in spite of all their arrogance and all the mistakes they make in evaluating the situation will also come to that conclusion. Thus what's needed? Was the goal of signing the accord with Sadat to only isolate Sadat from the Arab world? No, the goal was to make the entire Arab world kneel down, not as governments but primarily as masses. Because as long as the masses remain a strong psychologically foundation, [*only*] the unhealthy governments are expected to be removed in this case. Thus, their [*America and the Zionists*] goal is to ensure that their interests are achieved through psychological means by making the Arab masses kneel down. Meaning that the masses would be convinced that they are defeated—defeated not on the battlefield, but strategically, which in turn could lead to a total relapse. Certainly, it is obvious to them that up to now the Arab masses have not reached that point. We need to respond to this psychological surge, and we need to think of how to develop it and move forward with it. It will surely move forward.

But how do we envision the enemy, and how do we envision the behavior of the enemy that would make this development slow or keep it within its track [*limits*], or otherwise make it worse?

Two main issues worry us. First, A quick attack on either front or on both fronts simultaneously. Let us call it one front now, Syria-Lebanon-Jordan. A detrimental military strike and not your everyday strike, but a quick war [*military*] strike that would tell the entire Arab world and the masses that this is the result of all of your struggling. [*Time Stamp: 35:03*]

Let us take a look at what the Iraqi-Syrian relations have done to prevent the unity from enjoying the same status that the masses desire and strive to. Because the military situation on the Syrian front is known now and so is the military situation on the Jordanian front. The Iraqi army is still

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in Iraq. This is the first point, and based on this point we have possibilities that we must take into account. You remember, of course, the 1973 war. The Zionist enemy is a smart and capable enemy, and we must not underestimate it. For that reason we said we are fortunate, of course, that we have prepared our nation to be steadfast when it will face such an enemy, because the nation will be forced—it will be forced to resort to the act of defending itself and its existence.

As for the [*inaudible*], it has to be creative not in methods, rather at a high level of strategic vision. This is a smart and capable enemy that will not allow the 1973 experience to be repeated. The Iraqi army sneaked from here... from the borders... the Iraqi-Iranian borders where it was mobilized, starting from Damascus, Syria and ending at the borders. The enemy [Israel] will not allow such an experience to be repeated, especially after closing the Egyptian front, which had kept him militarily preoccupied. Therefore, the anticipated timeframe [we planned] for the Iraqi army to arrive in 1973 may not be the same now should the Syrian front come under a counter-attack. The Syrian front has its own characteristics, as well as emotional and mental connections with us, especially in the aftermath of the new Iraqi-Syrian relations. However, let us leave the Syrian front and move on to the Jordanian front.

The Jordanian front is the original one. Before the arrival of the Iraqi army and the establishment of the Iraqi-Syrian union, this front was in a very precarious situation that made Iraq, Syria and all Arabs face a very bad situation. How do we envision the situation to be if the Israeli army crosses the Jordan River and reaches sensitive military spots, arrives and is there? How do we imagine the military situation? How will the Iraqi army react in a difficult situation like this if he [*the enemy*] is now in Baghdad and other [*Iraqi*] cities? The Zionist entity would go to the United States, and their media would tell us, “Is this what you wanted? Is this what you have been striving for?”

So, go ahead and try your luck!” This is a more worrisome thought to us than signing the [*Camp David*] Accord. Since we started working, we started with the intention and determination to have a different type of relationship with Syria. [*Still*] the matter is still worrying us today and it will continue to worry us as long as the Iraqi army is in Iraq and as long as the Iraqi-Syrian relationship is in its current state of affairs. I will certainly respond and explain the stage of where things are [*right now*].

The Jordanian front will continue to worry us to the same extent, because of the presence of a military force, even if it is not in Jordan. In Syria, we can tactically organize the army situation and its military weight in such a way that an uncomfortable possibility on the Jordanian front would be avoided. However, if matters progress in the relationship between Iraq, Syria and Jordan to such an extent that the military presence is there on both fronts, with the same coordination, one force with proper distribution, then matters would take, of course, another position. [Time Stamp: 40:06]

Comrades, we surely were asked about this issue at the Iraqi-Syrian Doctors and Pharmacists meeting, along with other Arabs who attended the meeting, and we replied clearly. We explained to them how we fought, and how difficult the circumstances that our nation went through. We informed them that we didn't want a relationship just so you can be there for us in a temporary difficult time in life, rather until liberation. Thus, the relationship we want has become one of

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unity between Syria and Iraq. So, we are following this approach.

We made a statement in Baghdad and brother Abd-al-Halim [*Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, Syrian Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister from 1970-1984, and Vice President from 1984-2005*] also made a statement in Paris in response to a question posed by an Arab student. He stated that there are currently documents that speak of the Union's constitution, and documents talking about the unity of the Party. This is a shuttle move [*shuttle diplomacy*], but of course not like Kissinger's. Since the signing of the accord and up to now, we have had discussions with our friends in Syria concluded two weeks ago by submitting to our Syrian comrade a complete constitution of the Union and a whole document about the unity of the Party as we envision it. I am sure the brothers in Syria will discuss this matter and formulate an opinion regarding it and we will start the detailed study to establish the Union.

The other point that worries us is Geneva... they believe that the Iraqis and Syrians are serious about this unity deal and thought to throw in another factor to put them in a new situation. Also, it looks like the Palestinian resistance and other forces have truly joined a new collaborative relationship and joint work, and thought to throw in another factor for them too. They met... the ministers are getting together here to discuss ending their relationship with Sadat. Of course, we [*Iraq*] will not agree to anything without true dissociation from Sadat, otherwise let each of us go their separate ways. We are not here to make mock changes. We either implement [*inaudible; possibly the Baghdad summit resolutions*], even if we were to have the flexibility we had at the Baghdad Summit, which we do not have anymore in implementing the Baghdad summit resolutions.

And if it turns out to be something important, the Geneva people are going to say, "Let us give those people some space and some kind of cover or excuse, and you will see the regressive regimes all excited about [*inaudible*] more than any other regime." They [*regressive regimes*] are going to say, "Yes this is crazy and this is better than the cause of that damned traitor Sadat. Let us go to Geneva, and then you will start seeing the fractures in the main group, and then on the popular level." This is a significant matter and we must all be well aware of and warn [*others*] about it.

We warned [*the Soviets*] about this fact during our visit to the Soviet Union. We told them, "Do not fall into the American trap, because that is always a possibility. We do not have information. We are a small nation with little support, but we must put the enemy before us and find out how he thinks, in order for us to make conclusions." While our conclusions may not come true, we still have the right to make them, so that matters that we did not take into consideration do not surprise us. [*Time Stamp: 45:06*]

The people's position was that after the Baghdad Summit, Geneva took a step back. The issue now and the new reality is that Arabs have to work according to the Baghdad Summit resolutions, and we support and accept this approach. But to what extent will we commit to this issue? This international policy issue is originally built on variables, and one must also expect some variables.

But we as Arab activists, nationalistic and progressive regimes, only deal with international

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policies that affect our issues. And if we envision matters in that manner, then that means we are robbed of our self-determination. These are two of the issues that are worrisome.

[Blank audio from 46:21-49:21]

Saddam: The point that... the point that [*inaudible*] military, but as we envision it... the Arabs who are officially involved in the conflict frontlines must not fall into the trap of the notion that the war is something that would last for weeks or days. They must not commit such a deadly mistake, which cannot bring a definite victory, and at the same time, will not have enough time to mobilize the masses against the regimes that have regressive positions, or a betraying, vacillating position. It cannot crystallize the situation in such a way that would mobilize the Arab masses, in terms of quality, change them and develop them. This is what we envision.

We envision a war with the enemy, whether in the Unity nation, the Iraqi-Syrian military effort, or with the Iraqi-Syrian-Jordanian military effort, must be planned based on many months of conceptualization, and not days and weeks. How should it be planned? We can plan it. Do we really want a war in which we gain miles quickly, but then step back and withdraw, or do we want the slow, step-by-step war, where every step we take becomes part of the land and we keep moving forward? The step itself is not the most important thing here; even more important is the widespread cheering from the masses that will accompany each step we take forward, which will reach every corner of the Arab world. This is more important than the meter, kilometer and half kilometer that we will gain. [*Inaudible*] that could take a whole month; we can gain three kilometers in depth. But we cannot decide to stop after one month. This has its requirements, of course.

The most important requirement is that we must be in Iraq and Syria, in the front and have taken into consideration the enemy and its air force. The enemy will come and attack, destroy, etcetera. We still must endure it and keep going. We must put pressure on our friends, the Soviets, and make them understand our need for one weapon; we only need one weapon, just one weapon. When [*and if*] the Zionist enemy attacks our civilian establishments, we want to have the weapons to attack the Israeli civilian establishments too. After that, we would not use this weapon, except when the enemy attacks civilian establishments in Iraq or Syria. This way we can ensure a long war that is destructive to our [*the Israeli*] enemy, and take at our leisure meter by meter, each meter of land, and drown the enemy with rivers of blood. We have no vision for a war that is any less than this.

I mean not this year, and not in the next five years. The blast and quick movement war, you all know how difficult the situation in the Golan is and what is going on there right now. [*Banging on table*] If we go and tell the Iraqi-Syrian armors to attack, we must expect that they will all be destroyed and retreat, if not to the same line, maybe behind it... [*Pause*] in a land this rough, one must primarily work on it. We are in the process of research and mobilization envisioning [*planning*], but the strategic visualization is what is important. So that you do not attach importance and drive us up in the direction of how to launch a three day war, in which we neither win nor lose and end there. That is what is needed as far as the Zionist enemy is concerned.

[Time Stamp: 54:02]

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What is required is a war of patience, where we fight for twelve continuous months, and after twelve months we take stock and figure out how much we have gained and how much we have lost. We must keep in mind that losses will be in the thousands. We must also say that we are prepared to lose fifty thousand martyrs in those twelve months, and accept it.

As for the fighting in the north, we were not only fighting al-Barzani [*Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)*], but also all the advanced American weapons of the Shah, except for the aircraft and tanks. The tanks were used and we had an armored battle on the borders, but they were not used in the mountains, and neither were the aircraft. Even the surface-to-air missiles were used. Before the war started, we said we needed to face the fact of losing twenty thousand martyrs just so we can engage in the battle. We went forward accordingly, but when the number reached sixteen thousand and the fighting stopped, we realized that the loss was lower than our estimate.

Thus, we want a war of patience and steadfastness. We don't want the petroleum installations to be bombed in Iraq, and we don't want the development projects and the cities to be bombed. Of course, this won't be the case. In a war with such an enemy, one must envision unusual sacrifices because the enemy is unusual. Comrades, we are happy that you, the branches of the Palestinian revolution, consider the Iraqi-Syrian unity as your unity because it is really so. In the beginning of work, we saw those of you who were cautious, afraid or doubting, but to hear from you now that you consider this to be your unity, that is extremely delightful and we are really happy about that, because that is really the case. It is designed for you, the nation, the striving, the revolution, the advancement, and for confronting the Zionist enemy.

Negotiations while in revolutions, under certain circumstances, and in special cases are not to be rejected. But how should it take place? In return for some flexibility in leadership...in return for some flexibility in his leadership, Lenin ruled the Soviet Union entirely, after the communist revolution led by his party. That is not wrong. He must have done it, for sure, based on the concept that if it weren't for this flexibility, he would have lost the revolution and probably would have lost large parts of the Soviet Union. His party would not have even existed while he is the revolution leader. Meaning socialism would not have been achieved in the Soviet Union. [*Time Stamp: 58:17*]

In 1975, we had the same situation, but we bravely faced it. We had the difficult situation when our air force had only three bombs, and the entire artillery had only two thousand bombs. After that we used to get between 2500 to 3000 bombs on a daily basis. The Iraqi army used to get this much daily. So, how would you explain losing sixteen thousand between martyrdom and injury? We continued fighting for twelve whole months while capturing a few meters every day. We were moving forward. We must implement such a vision.

In light of this difficult situation, we must have a clear map of political actions [*to follow*]. Meaning if we go through the north of Iraq, we might lose the entire revolution altogether. However, if we lose Shatt-al-Arab, part of it, in return for seizing border lands as big as Bahrain, and killing the horse that the Shah is riding, that being al-Barzani. This is what should happen.

This is the right scheme, because these are its balanced components, and these are the facts as

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they are and not as we imagine them to be. When we reached this point, it was not out of weakness. We were ready to fight not only for twelve months, but also for twelve years in this manner. But we don't have [*this luxury*]. We don't make our weapons; we import them. When the weapon source left our air force with three bombs and two thousand cannon bombs that were launched in two days, we reached this inevitable situation.

But what was the end result? Our borders became all of Iraq and we took from Iran's borderlands as much as the size of Bahrain, and only gave up some of Shatt-al-Arab. That is a scheme, but is it like that now? Practically, Sadat [*inaudible*] gave up all of Egypt. Instead of giving some of Sinai, according to his notion of the regional independent solution, he actually did give up all of Egypt, and sold out all Arabs and collaborated with the Zionist entity against the Arabs. As a result, this is what is going to happen and you are going to see the Egyptian army moving around jointly with Zionist entity army against the Arabs should he have the favorable conditions.

UM2: He donated Palestine.

Saddam: He sold the Arabs including Palestine. He sold all Arabs and all of Egypt. The Zionist entity had a part of Sinai and Sadat then gave [*them*] all of Egypt. He gave them all of Egypt as a strategic field in the military equation. He gave them all of Egypt to benefit in commerce, projects, the use of manpower, and to cross over into Africa for the purpose of causing economic, political, propaganda, and military damage... etcetera against the Arab world.

But, the day we fight for twelve months in the Golan will come, God willing. Once we oversee the Sea of Galilee, the Americans will threaten us saying, "If you don't stop we will throw an atomic bomb on you." Then we can tell them, "Yes, thank you, we will stop; what do you want?" They in turn will reply, "Stop, do not move, not even for one meter, we will hit you with the atomic bomb." We will say, "We have stopped but we have not given up." We will stay, and stay by the Sea of Galilee and watch for any changes in circumstances that will allow us to go forward further.

We don't want to ignore the nation and jeopardize it by either achieving victory or by getting crushed forever. No, we want it to move forward, move forward even by a few meters. In military terms and of course in political terms, we want it to be a rising movement that will accompany this militarily. I have talked a lot in this meeting, but it has been a long time since I have seen you. May God bless you!

End of Recording