

**June 2, 1966**

**Cable 1052 from the Department of State to the US  
Embassy in Israel**

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**Summary:**

The Department of State requested that the Embassy inform the Israelis that they were satisfied with the inspection of Dimona, but ask Israel to clarify the location of the uranium ore from Argentina.

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV 1052  
INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES 1350

Info:

EXDIS

REF: Deptel 957 to Tel Aviv  
Buenos Aires 1776 to Department

- Embassy requested approach Foreign Minister Eban to state we have now received AEC team report and wish thank GOI for our opportunity visit Israeli atomic installations March 31-April 4. Embassy should state we are in general satisfied by what team saw. However, we are concerned by fact Israeli technical personnel could supply no information about Argentine-Israeli transactions of uranium concentrate. We understand substantial deliveries from Argentina have in fact occurred and that the arrangement between the GOI and GOA includes only a general ~~undertaking~~ <sup>undertaking</sup> ~~undertaking~~ that the uranium will be used for peaceful purposes. There are no provisions for safeguards requiring reports, inspections, and other verifications equivalent to IAEA safeguards system.
- To avoid possibility casting shadow of doubt on generally satisfactory results from visit, we would hope Israel could clarify question of whereabouts in Israel of Argentine uranium concentrate and use to which it being or intended be put. Embassy should state this is precisely type of problem which augments apprehension in high levels USG and elsewhere where proliferation and underscores need for IAEA type safeguards to

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NEA:NE:ANNyerges:av 6/1/66		NEA - <del>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</del> <u>RPD</u>
Clearances:	ARA - Mr. Klebanoy <u>ahy</u>	SCI - Mr. Zook <u>ahy</u>
	INR - Mr. Spain <u>ahy</u>	AEC - Mr. Dalton (info) <u>ahy</u>
	NE - Mr. Symmes <u>ahy</u>	S/S - Mr. Walsh <u>ahy</u>
		ACDA - Mr. Rochlin <u>ahy</u>
		ACDA - Mr. DePalma <u>ahy</u>
		NEA - Mr. Davies

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reassure world of peaceful orientation Israel nuclear program. This is subject we plan take up with GOI further in near future. Embassy should recall the Secretary's statement to Eban February 9 that Israel was apparently following a policy designed to create ambiguity in the Arab world, that this also created ambiguity in Washington and Israel should expect the US to be extremely clear and utterly harsh on non-proliferation

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