November 17, 1970

Report, UN Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, 'Ramification of Chile's Withdrawal from UNCURK'

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Summary:

The Department of Political and Security Council Affairs report on the impact of Chile's UNCURK withdrawal request. The report posits that UNCURK and the UN stand on Korea will be challenged.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOLITICAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

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RAMIFICATIONS OF CHILE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM UNCURK

2. The Chilean letter announces a decision taken by the new Government to withdraw from the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

3. As discussed in the aforesaid paper, the new decision will deeply affect the prevailing UN stand on Korea and eventually might contribute to some alteration in that stand.

4. The initial impact of the decision will demonstrate itself when the substantive aspects of the Korean question will be taken up by the First Committee in the next few days. As a matter of fact, the Chilean letter was published as an "A" document and under agenda item 98: "Question of Korea."

5. The aforesaid impact will most likely menifest itself overtly, <u>inter</u> <u>alia</u>, by the following:

6. First, the decision will be discussed at some length by a number of Member States at the First Committee.

7. Second, UNCURK's composition and possibly its mandate might be challanged by opponents of the Commission, probably in more severe a manner than at any time in the past. Earlier criticism to the effect that UNCURK's composition is not representative of the current membership of the UN, would be duplicated and perhaps be surpassed. There may be suggestions to alter the Commission's composition and, what is more, its mandate. Some Members would demand, more vigorously than ever, the prompt dissolution of UNCURK. Others would suggest that the Assembly select another Member to replace Chile.

8. Third, concomitant with the above, the matter of Pakistan's nonparticipation in the Commission and decision not to sign its reports for the past few years would be inevitably brought up. In this connexion, some

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delegations will argue that in effect the Commission is working with only 5 of its 7 Members selected by the Assembly. (One vital question in this regard is whether intention to withdrew, if any, on the part of Fakistan might not be enhanced and expedited as a result of Chile's withdrawal and discussions thereon). Fourth, regardless of the outcome of the debate, the votes cast at the pirst Committee on the three draft resolutions before it (there may very well be a fourth proposing an end to the UN discussion on Korean unification). there could be some fluctuations causing erosion of support for the UN stand and commensurate increase in support accorded to draft resolutions opposing that stand. However, the resolution submitted under sub-item (c) of item 98, namely the report of UNCURK, probably would still muster the requisite two-thirds majority despite some loss as compared to the twenty-fourth session. part of which may be directly attributable to Chile's withdrawal. On the other hand, the draft resolutions opposing the UN stand by their demands of withdrawal of troops from Korea, the dissolution of UNCURK, and an end to discussion of Korean unification, would gain support (perhaps again partially attributable to Chile's withdrawal) but not even close to the two-thirds majority requisits for adoption. Moreover, even if the draft resolution supporting the UN stand failed to attain two-thirds majority, that stand would still prevail on the basis of earlier resolutions pending such time when its opponents are able to muster a two-thirds majority of their can.

Fifth, some Members of the First Committee might direct appeals to 10. Chile to reconsider its decision for withdrawal. It should be recalled that it was upon the request of some Members and UNCHERK itself that Chile had decided to "reconsider" its withdrewal of 5 August 1966, on 15 September 1966. However, Chile did not address a communication to the Secretary-General indicating a decision to return to the Commission. It merely did so and became active in the latter's work.

Considering that the matter of revolving a decision does cause some measure of embarransment to a government, as evidenced in the manner Chile returned to the Coumission, and considering that this is Chile's second withdrawal, it is highly unlikely that Chile would be persuaded to return on the basis of appeals.

Certain powerful advantages that persuading Chile not to take a 12. decision to withdraw would have had for the UN stand and for all concerned. was discussed in the aforementioned companion paper submitted earlier today.

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If a great majority of Member States feel the same, there would be nothing to prevent them (following private contacts with Chile) from simply "rejecting" Chile's withdrawal, possibly in a resolution, and appealing to it to return to UNCURN for the general benefit of the Organization. This, would not cause any "embarrasement" for Chile. Actually, it might rather enhance its determination concerning its special mission on behalf of the United Mations.