

# July 23, 1971

## Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

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## **Summary:**

Kuzbari reports that Nixon's visit to Beijing and shift in power in East Asia creates instability for ROK government.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Seoul, 23 July 1971

President Nixon's projected visit to Peking has been widely commented on by the officials of the Republic of Korea and the press here. While the initial reaction on that was described as that of "shock and surprise", subsequent comment indicated that the Government had no other alternatives but to welcome it as a mark of cold war detente.

The implications of the Sino-US improved relations on South Korea were the subject of a high level conference held yesterday at the office of President Park Chung Hee. It was reported that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kim Yong Shik, had advised that the Government should use this move to its advantage by working for a US-Communist China understanding on Korea. Currently there are two prevailing views with regard to this move: one embodying a sense of "betrayal" by the US to its closest allies, and the other to capitalise on it in order to neutralise the role of China in the Korean conflict. One of the major difficulties facing the present Government is that it has not psychologically conditioned its people to accept these sudden shifts in the big powers' relations in Asia, and is suddenly finding itself "caught" in an intricate game of super powers' politics. By the same token, political observers here are following with great interest the reaction of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to this move in order to find out whether Pyongyang, as a result of it, will be inclined to come closer to the Soviet Union or remain in the middle of the center.

Zanter Kolen

Mr. C.V. Narasimhan Chef de Cabinet