

December 15, 1971

Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

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Summary:

Narasimhan and Ozbudun inform each other of the Red Cross negotiation agenda proposal failure and Park Chung Hee's announcement of a state of emergency.

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CVN/je cc: Mr. Kutakov

15 December 1971

Confidential No. 8

Dear Ahmet,

I have received your confidential letters Nos. 24, 25, 26 and 28 and have taken note of their contents.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet

Mr. Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary
UNCURK
Seoul, Korea

P.S. I do not seem to have received No. 27.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL No. 24

4 December 1971

THE 11TH PRELIMINARY MEETING
OF NORTH-SOUTH RED CROSS NEGOTIATIONS

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

The representatives of the ROK and the DPRK Red Cross Organisations held their 11th preliminary meeting on 3 December at Panmunjom. During their one-hour-and-54-minute meeting, the two parties again discussed their respective proposals on the agenda for the full-dress meetings. They failed to reach any agreement.

However, the ROK Red Cross proposed that besides family members, relatives be also included in the agenda. This was an addition to its five-point agenda for the search of family members proposed at the 6th preliminary meeting on 27 October. The ROK Red Cross said that the revised proposal was made "in an effort to seek a breakthrough to the current deadlock", and urged its counterpart to accept the new proposal without any conditions.

The DPRK Red Cross did not make an immediate reply to the new proposal and reiterated its previous demand to include the search for friends as well, as an agenda item.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ahmet H. Cebadun".
Ahmet H. Cebadun
Principal SecretaryMr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL: No. 25

10 December 1971

12TH PRELIMINARY MEETING
OF THE NORTH-SOUTH RED CROSS TEAMS

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

Early radio reports indicate the following concerning today's meeting:

The representatives of the ROK and the DPRK Red Cross Organisations held their 12th preliminary meeting today at Panmunjom. During their one-hour-and-ten-minute meeting, the two parties discussed further the agenda for the full-dress negotiations but failed to reach any agreement.

However, the DPRK Red Cross proposed a new three-point agenda for the full-dress talks, as follows: (1) location of family members and relatives dispersed in the south and the north, and arrange for their free travel and exchanges of correspondence; (2) reunion, at their own free will, of family members and relatives dispersed in the south and north; (3) other matters to be solved in connexion with a humanitarian view point, including matters concerning the search for the friends dispersed in south and north Korea.

The ROK Red Cross said that it was glad that the DPRK proposal came a little closer to its six-point proposal but demanded that north Korea study more carefully and accept the six-point agenda it had proposed at the 11th meeting. The two parties agreed to hold the next meeting on 17 December.

Spokesman Chung Choo Nyon of the ROK Red Cross stated after the meeting that substantially there was nothing new in the revised north Korean proposal though it appeared to be new. While it appeared that north Korea had withdrawn its demands for the inclusion of friends in the agenda, it had made it clear that the search for friends should be included in item 3. The Spokesman stressed that as long as the north Korean Red Cross demanded the free travel and inclusion of friends in the agenda, the ROK could not accept it. He urged the north Korean team to review further the ROK proposal and to accept it.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New YorkAhmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL; No. 26

10 December 1971

DECLARATION OF A STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY
--THE MATTER OF MILITARY THREAT--

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

.....

Attached herewith are the texts of the (1) "PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY", and (2) "SPECIAL STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY", both dated 6 December 1971.

These documents were conveyed personally by the Foreign Minister last Monday to resident Ambassadors and Charge d'Affairs whom he called into his office one by one.

The two texts are quite self-explanatory in that they reflect the anxieties of the ROK Government which appeared to be very much "real" to its leaders.

The motivation for the Declaration is probably multi-fold rather than based on a single factor. However, one factor among a number of factors probably acted as a catalyst or common denominator, namely the "honest-to-goodness" fear of renewed hostilities, not perhaps imminently but at the same time in the not too distant future.

The fear for a renewed invasion from the North might emanate from recent developments including the following: (1) Reduction of US troops already effected and indications that the remaining might also be phased out in accordance with the "Nixon Doctrine" (The American unwillingness, moreover, to "guarantee" ROK's security, is a powerful auxiliary worry in this connexion); (2) Decreased Soviet influence over Pyongyang, as against the increased influence of the PRC (Apparently Seoul regards that Soviet influence has heretofore contributed towards the preclusion of renewed hostilities in a most efficient manner, and that the PRC might either "allow" Pyongyang to engage in another armed venture, or be unable to prevent one if Pyongyang were bent upon it); (3) "Infiltration" of north Korean agents over the years into the ROK in sufficient numbers so as to accumulate into a serious potential danger (Surmizing on the numbers of those agents killed or captured, ROK officials must be deeply

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

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concerned about those many who might have penetrated "successfully"); (4) Alleged superiority of the DPRK in air power, reportedly augmented with "90" Soviet recent model combat airplanes (In addition, the PRC was reported to have pledged vast and free-of-charge military aid to Pyongyang); (5) "Reliable information" concerning the "intention" of the DPRK to launch a Blitzkrieg of "20 days duration" upon the ROK with a "huge, "well-trained", and "action-ready" army of "superior fire-power" (The danger period is said to be between now and the first part of 1972); (6) The development in the North of a vast militia (All youth, including children are said to be undergoing military training); (7) "Indication" that ROK's allies, especially the US, would not be willing to come to its aid in the event of renewed conflict as they had in 1950 (Nor could the UN authorize again such assistance). Etc...


The danger, whether real or imaginary, has prompted the ROK Government to adopt a posture of full alert. This is described in some quarters as unwarranted frenzy whereas in other sources it is considered utterly justified. Reality might be somewhere in between.

Two reactions in particular might cause the ROK to reflect further on its State of Emergency. First, the US expressed strong disagreement as to the matter of north Korean threat, particularly its nature and imminence. Secondly, the DPRK Foreign Ministry was reported to have denied any bellicose intentions on the part of Pyongyang and to have stressed that it was merely engaged in efforts to bring about the peaceful unification of Korea. I tend to think that the ROK Government did not expect either the strong opposition by Washington or the mild and conciliatory reaction from Pyongyang.

If Seoul is not adamant for other reasons to persevere in its state of national emergency for a long time, it may be persuaded by both of these reactions and deem them as justification to lift the emergency sooner than could be normally expected. The need to protect its international image might also cause the ROK to expedite the return to normalcy.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,



Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary

PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION
OF THE
STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Seoul, December 6, 1971

Close watch and careful review by the Government of the Republic of Korea on the rapid changes in international situations including the recent admission of Communist China into the United Nations, its effect upon the Korean peninsula and the various fanatic moves by north Korean Communists for invasion preparations have drawn a conclusion that the Republic of Korea is now faced with a crucial time for reshaping her national security posture.

The Government, therefore, declares forthwith the state of national emergency with a view to informing the people of this stark reality, keenly realizing the urgent necessity of jointly renewing the firm determination for the Government and people to overcome the current difficult situation.

1. The Government will henceforth place top priority on the national security matters and establish a strong security posture at an earliest possible date.
2. All social unrest that risks the national security will not be tolerated and all element of unrest will be removed.
3. Irresponsible arguments on national security matters must be refrained from.
4. Every citizen must willingly shoulder his share and faithfully fulfill his duty in ensuring national security.

5. Every citizen must establish in himself a new sense of value in consistence with the national security requirements.

6. Every citizen must be prepared with a determination, when the worst contingency arises, to concede some of the freedom that he enjoys for the sake of national security.

/ S /

PARK CHUNG HEE

President

co-signed by

Prime Minister

Members of the Cabinet

Special Statements by the President
on the
Declaration of the State of National Emergency

Seoul, December 6, 1971

Dear Citizens!

Today, I declared the state of national emergency to inform the people that our country, the Republic of Korea, is, at present, confronted with a grave situation. I have, in my president's duty to safe-guard the nation and preserve the freedom of the people, derived this estimate from a thorough analysis, review and evaluation of the recent international situations and the north Korean moves. It is well to say that the general trend of international society tends towards peace and is moving from confrontation to negotiation.

This trend, however, is only an aspect of big powers trying to maintain status quo in a stalemate of nuclear arms race. The situation in our Korean peninsula, however, is not at all running in parallel to such trend. On the contrary, we must be fully aware of the fact that the local tension in the Korean peninsula is constantly mounting. This is because the north Korea is dead-set with its red scheme to unify the country only by communism and does not cease aggressive provocations taking advantage of the general trend when the manoeuvrability of the major powers are limited with a stalemate of nuclear arms race.

The local tension of the Korean peninsula which occupies a corner of the globe may not seem significant in the major power's world perspective that is mainly

directed to maintain status quo. Nevertheless, we must unmistakably let ourselves know that those very people who live in this tense corner of the world are none other than ourselves, and that the tension of ours is the very matter of our own life or death.

Communist China who aided and joined with north Korean Communists in the invasion of the south in the tragic and unforgettable Korean war, has now been admitted in the United Nations and been made a member of the Security Council.

Judging from the recent Communist China's support to the demand of north Korea calling for immediate dissolution of the United Nations Forces and the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, we must foresee thorny trials that might come in the path of our national security.

And, examining the situations of the United States, we feel that the United States is running into difficult position to allow us to depend on or ask for the same level of support for our national security as before. The heated debates in the United States Senate on foreign aid bill is a warning to the aid-recipient countries to hasten to self-burden their national security requirements. We also learned that the question of an additional reduction of the United States troop strength in Korea has already been raised in the United States.

Japan, our neighboring country, has embarked in more frequent contact with both Communist China and north Korea. Only we, the Koreans who have the personal experience, can tell how terrible the Asian communists menace is. Close watch and analysis of these rapid changes in the international situation and of the north Korean moves show us that our national security matters have reached a momentous phase for reposituring.

Furthermore, they have built up the fanatic dictatorial state through totally brain-washing the whole populace in the north Korea by the so-called "Kim Il-sung's Yoo Il Cult" and are enforcing the military training even to the boyish middle school students as well as women and the aged to receive training for firing.

The north Korean communists have already turned its entire land into a huge garrison with considerable fortifications. In addition to 500,000 regular forces, north Korea has 1,400,000 red militia and 700,000 red youth guards that can be instantly committed to armed conflict equipped with weapons and training comparable with those of regular forces. Furthermore, north Korea is busily occupied in mass production of war weapons, thus having nearly completed the preparation for invasion.

It should also be noted that the north Korean militia units are obligated to undergo five hundred hours military training a year.

While north Korea is letting its representatives meet ours in the Red Cross talks for the search of separated families proposed by our National Korea Red Cross, it is, on the other hand, stepping up infiltration of armed espionage agents into the south and their methods of penetration are becoming ever more vicious in nature.

Dear citizens!

Let us now take a close look at our own internal situation when the external threat is so imminent. First of all, I have to point out that there are even dissension over such vital matters as the up-keep of the home-land reserve force and the college military training. There has been hardly any sincere argument for the good of the country's security. Instead, the free-wheeling arguments on the national security matters are frequently used as tools for partisan politics and

election tactics and are only sending the whole populace into bewilderment.

Some self-styled intellectuals in the name of the freedom of expression irresponsibly enjoy taking up indiscreetly the matters of national security, adding more confusion in the mind of general populace. Such lavish and imprudent arguments on national security result in not only lowering public morale but also impede the formation of the united opinion of the peoples of the country and are consequently very harmful to the nation's security.

When I see the certain aspects of our society deteriorating in an easy-going mood that seems to have forgotten the very fact of the presence of the communists in the north at our door step, I can not help being reminded of the eyes of the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. It seems to me that there are a number of people who have already forgotten the bitter experiences of the Korean war. We should never forget the lessons of the war. We all were caught unprepared in the Korean war.

I am deeply worried, lest our people should again fall victim of the popular catch words such as "the thaw", "the peace mood" and "detents" to degenerate the people's thinking to the extent where people tend to resort in such wishful term as "not so likely to happen" which was so characteristic of the prevalent mood of the pre-war period of the early 1950.

Dear citizens!

I have faith in the superiority and the efficiency of the free democratic system over the Communist-totalitarian system. I am also firm in the belief that the best system against communism is democratic system.

However, for the present emergency, I am afraid that our current peace-time system has considerable vulnerabilities. I now pose the question on how we should react when someone tries to seize on or destroy such precious thing, if we value our democratic system as the most precious thing.

It is self-evident that the aggressor's sword and gun can not be warded off with only callings of "peace" and "freedom". To defend the freedom and peace from the communist aggressors, we must pay the price. We have to face it with firm determination to forsake, if necessary, even some of the freedoms we now enjoy.

Dear citizens!

As a result of assiduous observation and deep thinking on the changing external as well as internal situation, I have declared today the state of national emergency for the sake of the security of the nation and the permanent preservation of our precious democracy, with a view to inform the people of the emergency. I now determinedly resolve to tide over this national emergency with the concerted effort of the Government and the people.

The national security is the primary responsibility of the President. The primary responsibility entrusted upon the president is the safe-guarding of the security of the nation and this responsibility is inalienable whatsoever. I, therefore, have the duty to determine the seriousness of the situation threatening the national security and decide to take an appropriate measures in good time for the security of the country. I take a great pride in the ability of our people in surmounting any ordeal or crisis once they come to realize the urgency of the situation.

I solicit herewith, therefore, the understanding and the cooperation of the people in this national emergency and wish to ask every one of them to contribute to the furtherance and the attainment of the adequate national security set-up.

Let us now resolve together that we will never again repeat the same mistake and be so short-sighted as those ancestors of ours who paid no heed to the repeated warnings of Lee Yul Gok and his foresight.

Let us all be united in the march to surmount wisely the present state of national emergency.

PARK CHUNG HEE
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul