

**November 23, 1973**

**Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to Ismat Kittani, "Bits  
from Side to Center"**

**Citation:**

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**Summary:**

Ahmet H. Ozbudun sends a letter to Ismat Kittani Korean containing issues including Algerian resolution on the Korean Question and two Koreas' membership to the United Nations.

**Credits:**

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA  
UNCURK

IK/nmcf

CONFIDENTIAL: No. 230Recd 21 Nov 73  
16 November 1973ITEMS FROM SIDE TO CENTER 23 November 1973

Dear Mr. Kittani,

CONFIDENTIAL There is full awareness in this rather pleasantly talkative diplomatic community that the center of gravity and decision-making on the Korean question is least of all in Seoul nowadays, points are made here and there which are worthwhile reporting:

-- While chances for the adoption of the "Algerian" versus "Western" draft resolutions on Korea at the current UNGA are locked in a see-saw contest (i) both might fail; (ii) both might be adopted (confusion unlimited); (iii) one might "succeed" but get defeated by "proven" need to require two-thirds majority... In any case, after the substantial watering down in stance which each draft has been compelled to undergo, victory, especially for the

Dear Ahmet,  
Thank you for your confidential letter No.230 dated 16 November 1973. I have taken note of its contents.

With kind regards, <sup>the</sup> proverb, "Many will provide sound directions after the bridge has been washed off": A vote on total deferment of the Korean question next year might have been easier to come by for the West, and with more meaningfulness, than **Yours sincerely,** for the present pre-Secol draft.

-- As a consequence of the aforesaid: The best tactics perhaps would have been not to table the **Ismat T. Kittani**, and to leave the burden of adoption to the "Algerian" draft which would have presented the status quo on the Korean question directly intact.

-- UNCURK will go not with the curve of the adversary but the **Mr. Ahmet N. Ozbudun** under-supporters, including the ROK, whose **Principal Secretary** must have obtained a viable substitute for it.

**UNCURK**  
**Seoul**  
**Korea.** The Commission will go down: (i) together with prospects of a settlement; (ii) along with the UN principles on Korean unification; and (iii) in the short rather than the long run, taking the UN Command and forces with it.

Mr. Ismat T. Kittani  
Executive Assistant to the Secretary General  
United Nations  
New York

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JK.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA  
(UNCURK)

Recd 21 Nov 73

CONFIDENTIAL : No. 230

16 November 1973

BITS FROM SIDE TO CENTER

Dear Mr. Kittani,

While there is full awareness in this rather pleasantly talkative diplomatic community that the center of gravity and decision-making on the Korean question is least of all in Seoul nowadays, points are made here and there which are worthwhile reporting:

-- While chances for the adoption of the "Algerian" versus "Western" draft resolutions on Korea at the current UNGA are locked in a see-saw contest (i) both might fail; (ii) both might be adopted (confusion unlimited!); (iii) one might "succeed" but get defeated by "proven" need to require two-thirds majority... In any case, after the substantial watering down in stance which each draft has been compelled to undergo, victory, especially for the pro-Seoul draft, will be utterly devoid of meaning. There may be much more in the offing for further dilution.

-- In accord with the proverb, "Many will provide sound directions after the bridge has been washed off": A vote on total deferment of the Korean question <sup>to</sup> next year might have been easier to come by for the West, and with more meaningfulness, than to attain victory for the present pro-Seoul draft.

-- As a concomitant of the aforesaid: The best tactics perhaps would have been not to table the pro-Seoul draft at all, and to leave the burden of adoption to the "Algerian" draft. This tactics would have preserved the status quo on the Korean question utterly intact.

-- UNCURK will go not with the curse of the adversary but the blessing of its former founders-supporters, including the ROK, whose concerted action could at least have obtained a viable substitute for it.

-- The Commission will go down: (i) together with prospects of a replacement; (ii) along with the UN principles on Korean unification; and (iii) in the short rather than the long run, taking the UN Command and Forces with it.

Mr. Ismat T. Kittani  
Executive Assistant to the Secretary General  
United Nations  
New York



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-- There may yet be fierce battles at the First Committee or Plenary regarding the matters of (i) priority for the competing two draft resolutions; and (ii) requisite majority for adoption (i.e. simple or two-thirds?). The political climate is already over-electrified at the First Committee and the impending two battles would bring the atmosphere to a point of no return. This may further expedite the full advent of the Sino-Soviet schism, also on the Korean question, and further erode any prospects for peaceful unification.

-- While there will be no "good" whatsoever that can accrue from Korean deliberations, (i) the membership issue (unified versus double) will remain fully unresolved; (ii) UN Forces issue will at best be postponed. However, regardless, the UN political presence (and UN posture on Korean unification) will be abandoned.

-- This political void would come about abruptly rather than in gradual steps hence depriving the ROK of much needed political and other acclimatization. (Even the original "Algerian" proposal had ventured only so far as demanding the "suspension of activities" of UNCURK rather than its abrupt dissolution.

-- Diplomats here favouring the replacement of UNCURK with a representative (or representatives) of the Secretary-General (an idea I have been confidentially suggesting to you as most essential, for a long time) are getting more and more vocal. They feel that if the initiative in this direction is made now, rather than after UNCURK's exit, there would be little or no opposition, even by the DPRK.

May I further elaborate on my own inner thoughts:

First, considering the high potential for serious conflict in Korea, the Secretary-General, under Article 99 of the UN Charter, can conclusively justify his stationing of a Special Personal Representative (i) one for both Koreas; or (ii) one each for each Korea; or (iii) one for whichever Korea is willing to accept. Surely, this would be the best way to discharge his responsibilities in respect of Article 99 so as to determine, in this clearly and presently dangerous area, any threats to international peace and security.

Second, the DPRK would perhaps not be less anxious than the ROK to maintain such a representative of the SG in the form, if need be, of a UN liaison office or UN Permanent Observer's Mission (parallel or reciprocal to the one in NY). Clearly, the representative, the office or

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the mission would have nothing to do with Korean unification -- at least in the sense of a UN role or UN principles on such unification. Hence, a potential North Korean concern not to have UN involvement in unification affairs would not be aroused.

Third, in the South, the representative, office or mission would constitute, if indirectly, some SG liaison with not only the Government but with the United Nations Command as well. This would be most welcome by North and South Korea as well as the four Big Powers in the area.


Fourth, the DPRK and its allies, having already ensured UNCURK's exit without replacement with the UN principles on Korean unification and hence also with all Korean UNGA resolutions, would welcome or not object to closer association with the UN.

Finally, all concerned might appreciate the free access to all the three options of having the SG representative: one for the whole of Korea; or for Pyongyang and Seoul separately; or for one or the other alone (whoever wishes to have). The first option would leave open the prospect of an agreed SG role in terms of North-South conciliation or mediation between them. The second option would allow later consideration for the two separate special personal representatives to establish contact with one another. The third alternative -- if in the beginning only one Capital accepts a special representative -- might eventually encourage the other also to accept.

The danger of political vacuum looms so vividly at this end that I was compelled to sound a further alert with the foregoing suggestions. These suggestions may be far more amenable to implementation now than later -- when the matter may develop insurmountable controversy.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,



AHMET H. OZGUL

Principal Secretary