

## **February 2, 1973**

### **Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to C.V. Narasimhan**

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#### **Summary:**

Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report on UN policy of the ROK, greater civilian control at the ROK Defense Ministry, and director of the ROK CIA.

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Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

Other than pertinent issues, mostly involving domestic matters and contained in this week's Summary of Development, there is hardly anything this week that would merit extensive reporting or assessment.

The only exceptions to this may be briefly presented as follows:

#### UN POLICY OF THE ROK

The Government's basic UN policy on the Korean question appears again to be geared toward further deferment. This was recently confirmed confidentially by a ranking ROK official who felt that the policy was based on the conviction that if a vote on the issue were taken "today", the majority in favour would be as extensive as that recorded at the twenty-seventh session.

The official, however, did not rule out possible adverse developments which might prompt the ROK towards "flexibility". No one knows or is willing to impart, as to what this concept might entail. Government leaders are extremely happy, however, by news reports on Japanese Premier Tanaka's recent statement before the Diet favouring deferment in view of the continuing Korean dialogue. He was reported to have said that discussions at the UN were "unthinkable" when the north-south dialogues were "on the track".

#### GREATER CIVILIAN CONTROL AT THE ROK DEFENSE MINISTRY

A reliable source confided in me that President Park Chung Hee, in his recent inspection of the Defense Ministry, had instructed officials concerned to turn over top departmental and bureau directorships to civilians. Heretofore, the two level directorships have been assigned to major generals and brigadier generals, respectively. The President is said to have also instructed the turn over of section chief functions of colonel rank also to civilians. The total number involved may entail the removal of over one hundred officers which the President might assign to the field.

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet  
United Nations

- 2 -

While some may feel that the alleged instructions, if true, may entail a lowering of the military profile by "civilianizing" the Defense Ministry for the purpose of the Korean dialogue, others may feel that the move may be connected with impending domestic ramifications of the ROK troop withdrawal from Viet-Nam which is to lead to the discharge of 19,000 officers and men from the Armed Forces.


DIRECTOR OF THE R.O.K. C.I.A.

According to another usually reliable source, Mr. Lee Hu Rak, the Director of the ROK Central Intelligence Agency, and concurrently Co-Chairman of the North-South Co-ordinating Committee, might return to his former post of Director-General of the Chong Wa Dae (Blue House) Secretariat (as Chief Secretary to the President). It is said that he might take along with him substantial power and authority he wields as CIA Director. This possible change of post was allegedly pressed by the north Korean side in the Co-ordinating Committee which "prefers" the south Korean Co-Chairman not to be identified with the CIA. The Agency has all along been in charge of investigations and arrests of agents and dissidents.

If the change takes place in the manner reported, it is felt that two immediate developments may occur: First, the powerful overall influence of the CIA as such would be vastly curtailed. Second, earlier rumours that Mr. Lee might replace his arch rival Kim Jong Pil as Premier would be thwarted. This would mean the prolongation of the latter's tenure.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,



AHMET H. OZBUDUN  
Principal Secretary