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## **February 23, 1973**

### **Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun, C.V. Narasimhan, and Robert Muller**

#### **Citation:**

"Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun, C.V. Narasimhan, and Robert Muller", February 23, 1973, Wilson Center Digital Archive, "International incidents and disputes - Korea - correspondence general (603.1)," Executive Office of the Secretary-General, S-0196-0008-01, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.

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#### **Summary:**

Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report on ROK foreign policy and National Assembly elections.

#### **Credits:**

This document was made possible with support from Kyungnam University

#### **Original Language:**

English

#### **Contents:**

Original Scan

603.1

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

cc: Mr. Narasimhan  
Mr. Kutakov

RM/fp

15 February 1973

23 February 1973

Dear Mr. Ozbudun,

I thank you for your letter and Summary of Developments dated 16 February 1973. The information was quite interesting and would have been helpful in connexion with the Foreign Minister's visit, but, as you know, that visit was cancelled.

We just learned that you were taken to the hospital and we are waiting for further news. We wish you all the best.

Warmly yours,

Robert Muller  
Director

Mr. Ahmet H. Ozbudun  
Principal Secretary  
UNCURK  
Seoul  
Korea

Mr. C. Y. ...  
Chief de Cabinet  
United Nations

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA  
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL : No. 124

16 February 1973

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

The following topics may be of interest:

ROK FOREIGN POLICYDEFERMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION

Yesterday, the Korea Times, an English language daily in Seoul, carried a "UPI" story on its first page in regard to the Secretary-General's visit in Japan. The second paragraph read as follows:

"In view of the shelving of the Korean issue last year, it would be better for the UN to carry on quiet diplomacy for some time", Waldheim was quoted as telling Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira".

This paragraph was interpreted by a ranking ROK official as denoting the Secretary-General's preference for another deferment of the Korean question this year. The official said that while he was most happy regarding the report, the ROK Embassy in Tokyo was so far unable to confirm the matter one way or another.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministry continues to attach ever-deepening interest in the forthcoming meeting between the Secretary-General and the Minister on 23 February.

Apart from this, there are growing signs that the Seoul Government might once again "bank" on its policy of deferment as the most realistic among conceivable options and the only one capable to advance the cause of the Korean dialogue, détente and eventual unification.

ROK's "HALLSTEIN DOCTRINE"

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik reportedly declared to the Press on 10 February, that the Government would launch, as of this year, a "flexible diplomacy" with a "new direction" to cope with the "rapidly changing international situation".

While he did not define these terms, he said, inter alia, that the ROK was planning to modify its position on the application of its "Hallstein Doctrine" to adapt it to the substantial interests of the nation as well as to "realities", on a case-by-case basis. He was quoted as having elaborated as follows: "The Government is carefully

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet  
United Nations

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examining problems related to raising the consulates to the ambassadorial level in foreign countries which presently maintain formal diplomatic relations with north Korea, if it is in the interest of the nation, disregarding the old and existing conception of the Doctrine".

Some diplomatic circles in Seoul, while understanding the Government's anxiety to further expand diplomatic relations through the aforesaid elevation, question the long-range wisdom of what would be tantamount to the full extinction of the Korean "Hallstein Doctrine". They believe that if the ROK does do this (instead of cutting its relations with countries establishing diplomatic ties with nations now maintaining relations with both Seoul and Pyongyang), then other countries, which maintain ties only with the ROK, would be "encouraged" to emulate a "two Koreas" policy. These observers strongly hold that numerous states, heretofore recognizing the ROK alone, would establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK while all countries which now maintain relations with Pyongyang alone, would continue to shun ties with Seoul. What is more, these diplomats are convinced that these turn of events will lead to the revival of the double Korean UN membership issue and consequently result in the abandonment of efforts for eventual Korean unification.

#### MR. KISSINGER'S VISIT IN THE P.R.C., AND THE D.P.R.K.

Some ROK circles are increasingly apprehensive about Dr. Kissinger's new visit in the PRC, particularly since the DPRK Foreign Minister's visit there occurred almost during the same time.

On 13 February, diplomats in Peking reportedly expressed the belief that north Korea had asked Chinese leaders to present its case to the US Special Envoy for a complete American troop withdrawal from south Korea. The diplomats were said to feel that the matter had been raised during the current visit in the PRC of Foreign Minister Ho Dam of the DPRK. Mr. Ho held two meetings with Premier Chou En-lai and three with Foreign Minister Chi since his arrival on 9 February. Mr. Chi had been in Pyongyang as recently as December 1972. Hence, it is believed that a return visit by Mr. Ho so soon, and almost coinciding with that of Dr. Kissinger, must have been of considerable substance to necessitate renewed contact at this time. Moreover, some informants who have been recently in Pyongyang are said to relate President Kim Il Sung's belief that China now had greater leverage with the US than the USSR.

At any rate, in a press communiqué issued on 14 February and broadcast over Peking Radio yesterday on Foreign Minister Ho Dam's visit from 9 to 14 February, the PRC reportedly declared that the US must withdraw its troops from the ROK and that UNCURK must be dissolved

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in order to let the Korean people settle their own problem of reunification without outside interference. (For related matters, please see this week's Summary of Developments, pp. 8-9.)

#### NEW UN POLICY ON KOREA?

What is further disturbing to some Seoul circles is a recent report from a south Korean newsman in the US that some American officials would not oppose the dissolution or suspension of UNCURK provided that some form of a new UN military presence, acceptable to the Great Powers, would be established to preserve peace in Korea. These officials, moreover, were said to have informally suggested that the Korean question, the last cold war issue in the UN, should thus be brought to a "conclusion" rather than being deferred indefinitely.

#### UNCURK MEMBERS

Last but not least, some quarters in Seoul have been concerned about recent rumours that one or two member governments represented on UNCURK might gradually alter their views on the Commission as a result of "Chinese pressure" and/or their "desire" to establish some ties with the DPRK.

#### NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

The Committee of UNCURK has decided to conduct an observation of the National Assembly Elections of 27 February in accordance with the Commission's mandate. In this connexion, it has again received an invitation from the ROK Government, in line with the practice commenced in 1963, together with assurances for full cooperation and assistance.

We are deeply immersed in preparations for this undertaking (third in three months), including the formation of six observation teams and arrangement of their programme of activities. Prior to the field trips (on 25 and 26 February), the Committee will separately meet with the Chairman of the Central Election Management Committee and leaders of the three political parties contesting the Elections. We are also preparing documentation, including the translation of the National Assembly Laws, which will be included in the observation files. I will transmit two sets of these as they become available for insertion in your files.

The ratio of contestation this time is 2.3 candidates per seat — the lowest yet in ROK elections. The ratio had been 3.6 to 1 in the 1971 National Assembly Elections. Observers attribute the

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
decrease of candidates to several factors, including public apathy; the much weakened role of the Assembly in the new State structure; strict limitations on campaigning; non-participation of splinter parties; decrease in the number of constituencies; and the requirement of 2 million Won deposits from party candidates and 3 million from independents (to be lost if a candidate receives less than one-third of ballots in his area). Some observers feel that the percentage of voters might also drop considerably despite the Government's efforts to achieve a high rate.

Many fear that if the National Assembly does not somehow rekindle the traditional spirit of inter-parliamentary opposition, and rather is confined to a role of rubber-stamping, the future of relative self-government, however limited, will further erode, perhaps to a point of no return.

\* \* \*

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,



AHMET H. OZBUDUN  
Principal Secretary