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**May 23, 1973**

**Letters between Shail Upadhya and C.V.  
Narasimhan**

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**Summary:**

Upadhya sends a report to Narasimhan on ROK's reaction to DPRK's admission to WHO.

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cc - Mr. Shevchenko

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA  
(UNCURK)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

18 May 1973  
23 May 1973

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

North Korea's withdrawal to the WHO Thursday has stunned the ROK Government. Officials here appear to be too distraught to offer any coherent explanation of what went wrong in a contest expected to win with a comfortable margin. It seems the Soviet tactics of having the vote conducted by a secret ballot proved decisive. ROK officials indicated that the Soviet move was totally unexpected and that they are now re-examining their strategy for the forthcoming General Assembly.

Dear Shail,  
I acknowledge receipt of your confidential letter of 18 May regarding ROK reaction to the admission of North Korea to the WHO. I have taken note of its contents.

With the failure of the ROK to have north Korea's membership With kind regards, IPU deferred, the entire deferment policy of the ROK has come into question. Although the policy served it well for two successive years in the General Assembly, it appears increasingly doubtful that it will work again this year. Officials here have indicated that the failure of their deferment policy at the WHO and the IPU will prompt them to take a hard-look at the policy and possibly, to devise other strategies for the General Assembly session.

Yours sincerely,

C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

ROK officials are speaking of the mistakes of the WHO debate and not letting it happen in the United Nations General Assembly this Fall. But there is no question that their confidence in their deferment strategy has been shaken. It seems that when the ROK Foreign Minister came to my confidential letter of 4 May, he was in the process of formulating alternative strategies for the General Assembly, he had doubts that deferment tactics might work a third time. The WHO and the IPU votes will surely strengthen those doubts. The Foreign Minister had then told me that one alternative strategy he had in mind was to concede on the deferment and invitational aspects and concentrate on the substantive aspects relating to the presence of UNCURK and the UN Forces. This strategy should now prove more attractive to the ROK than its now discredited policy of deferment.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,  
*Shail K. Upadhye*  
SHAIL UPADHYA

Acting Principal Secretary

C. V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet  
United Nations

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA  
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL

18 May 1973

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

North Korea's admission to the WHO Thursday has stunned the ROK Government. Officials here appear to be too distraught to offer any coherent explanation of what went wrong in a contest they had expected to win with a comfortable margin. It seems the Soviet tactics of having the vote conducted by a secret ballot proved decisive. ROK officials indicated that the Soviet move was totally unexpected and caught them completely off guard. They said they will have to let the dust settle before they can assess the implication of the situation and map out their strategy for the forthcoming General Assembly session accordingly.

With the failure of the ROK to have north Korea's membership in the WHO and the IPU deferred, the entire deferment policy of the ROK has come into question. Although the policy served it well for two successive years in the United Nations General Assembly, it appears increasingly doubtful that it will work again this year. Officials here have indicated that the failure of their deferment policy at the WHO and the IPU will prompt them to take a hard look at the policy and possibly, to devise other strategies for the General Assembly session.

ROK officials are speaking of learning from the mistakes of the WHO debacle and not letting it be repeated in the United Nations General Assembly this Fall. But there is no question that their confidence in their deferment strategy has been shattered. It now appears that when the ROK Foreign Minister told me some days ago (refer to my confidential letter of 4 May) that he was in the process of formulating alternative strategies for the General Assembly, he had doubts that deferment tactics might work a third time. The WHO and the IPU votes will surely strengthen those doubts. The Foreign Minister had then told me that one alternative strategy he had in mind was to concede on the deferment and invitational aspects and concentrate on the substantive aspects relating to the presence of UNCURK and the UN Forces. This strategy should now prove more attractive to the ROK than its now discredited policy of deferment.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

*Shail U. Upadhyaya*  
SHAIL UPADHYAYA

Acting Principal Secretary

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet  
United Nations