



June 5, 1973
**Letters between Shail Upadhya and C.V.
Narasimhan**

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Summary:

Upadhya sends Narasimhan a report on ROK stance on the UN.

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cc 0 Mr. Shevchenko

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

5 June 1973

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

The Foreign Minister admitted in the National Assembly the other day what he had told me a few weeks ago — that the ROK Government was willing to concede on the deferral issue with regard to the Korean question at the forthcoming UN General Assembly Session "if a majority of the UN member countries are desirous of seeing the question dealt with". He added, "I do not believe that the postponement of the UN discussion of the Korean question will bring about advantages to Korea at all times, even though we have successfully manoeuvred to block the UN debate for the past two years".

Thank you for your confidential letter of 1 June

regarding various matters. The contents of your letter regarding the Korean question were discussed in the General Assembly of the National Assembly. Mr. Kim said that in the Assembly session was discussed in the General Assembly this year, the ROK Government was confident that it could defeat the resolution on the dissolution of UNCURK and the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. He said that in the UN debate the ROK Government would "expose before the UN what are the factors detrimental to the peaceful unification of Korea". By that he meant that the ROK was now willing and ready to have a polemical and acrimonious Korean debate in which the ROK Government would indulge in slanderous accusations against North Korea, blaming the latter for the impasse in the South-North talks, accusing it of sending armed agents into the South.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

C.V. Narasimhan
 Chief de Cabinet
 vis-à-vis the North-South dialogue
 a pretext to gain diplomatic advantages.

Although it is widely believed here that the ROK's decision to abandon its deferral policy in favour of a debate was triggered by the WHO debacle, the fact is that the Government had concluded some time ago that the deferral strategy coupled with the North-South dialogue was now working to its disadvantage and in favour of the DPRK. As I had reported to you earlier, Foreign Minister Mr. Shail K. Upadhyaya told me long before the WHO vote that the ROK would raise the deferral question in favour of UNCURK.

Seoul, Korea

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
 Chief de Cabinet
 United Nations
 New York

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

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(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1973

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

The Foreign Minister admitted in the National Assembly the other day what he had told me a few weeks ago — that the ROK Government was willing to concede on the deferment issue with regard to the Korean question at the forthcoming UN General Assembly Session "if a majority of the UN member countries are desirous of seeing the question dealt with". He added, "I do not believe that the postponement of the UN discussion of the Korean question will bring about advantages to Korea at all times, even though we have successfully manoeuvred to block the UN debate for the past two years".

In addition, in yesterday's hearings of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, Mr. Kim said that in the event the Korean question was discussed in the General Assembly this year, the ROK Government was confident that it could defeat resolutions calling for the dissolution of UNCURK and the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. He said that in the UN debate the ROK Government would "expose before the UN members what are the factors detrimental to the peaceful unification of Korea". By that he meant that the ROK was now willing and ready to have a polemical and acrimonious Korean debate in which the ROK Government would indulge in slanderous accusations against North Korea, blaming the latter for the impasse in the South-North talks, accusing it of sending armed agents into the South and charging it with insincerity vis-à-vis the North-South dialogue and with using the dialogue as a pretext to gain diplomatic advantages.

Although it is widely believed here that the ROK's decision to abandon its deferment policy in favour of a debate was triggered by the WHO debacle, the fact is that the Government had concluded some time ago that the deferment strategy coupled with the North-South dialogue was now working to its disadvantage and in favour of the DPRK. As I had reported to you earlier, Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik had told me long before the WHO vote that the ROK might concede this year on the deferment question in favour of

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
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New York

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a debate and instead concentrate on defeating resolutions demanding the dissolution of UNCURK and the withdrawal of UN forces. This he has now confirmed before the National Assembly.

With the Government having decided to concede on the deferment issue, if necessary, the sentiment here is growing that the Government ought to go one step further and concede on the question of dissolution of UNCURK and the withdrawal of the UN emblem from the United States Forces stationed here. An Opposition New Democratic Party Assemblyman suggested to the Foreign Minister at yesterday's Foreign Affairs Committee hearings that it would be realistic for the Government to concede on these issues. Similar sentiments were expressed in some local newspaper editorials. But the Foreign Minister replied that concession on these issues would not be necessary as the Government was confident of defeating all resolutions to that effect.

Meanwhile, it is learned that the ROK will try to obtain deferment of North Korea's admission to the ILO at the ILO General Session to be held this month. But the question is purely academic since North Korea has not yet applied for membership in that body.

However, this indicates that the Government has still not totally abandoned its deferment policy; and should the policy succeed at the ILO it is then possible that the Government might change its mind regarding the Korean question at the UN and revert to the policy of deferment.

In my personal opinion, the dichotomy in the Government's policy, i.e. willingness to abandon the deferment strategy in the UN while retaining the strategy with respect to ILO, stems from a confusion on the part of the policy makers as to what course to adopt. That the confusion exists is evidenced by the fact that high Foreign Ministry officials are openly asking diplomats if they have any suggestions as to how to proceed on the matter. This confusion has resulted mainly from North Korea's continuing successes in the diplomatic field including its stunning victory in the WHO. This has made shambles of the ROK's status quo policy which consisted of seeking deferment in the UN and related Agencies while trying to dissuade other countries from recognizing the DPRK. Having put all their eggs in the status quo basket, and finding that the bottom of the basket has now caved in, the ROK officials are naturally confused. But from this confusion and disarray and disillusionment, and from the ashes of its past policies, it is to be hoped that the ROK Government will eventually evolve a more realistic policy -- a policy that recognizes and accepts the existing international political realities and trends and does not pretend that the ROK alone represents and speaks for the entire Korean peoples.


This concludes the weekly series of letters that I have been sending to you during Mr. Ozbudun's absence. Mr. Ozbudun returns next Tuesday and will resume the weekly letters in accordance with

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the usual practice.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,



Shail K. Upadhyaya
Acting Principal Secretary