

June 26, 1973

Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun and C.V. Narasimhan

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Summary:

Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report on UNCURK's visit with the president and ROK government's posture on the Korean Question.

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cc - Mr. Shevchenko

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)

CONFIDENTIAL: No. 190

17 June 1973

UNCURK'S VISIT WITH THE PRESIDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1973

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

On 13 June at 10:00 a.m. ROK President Park Chung Hee received the five representatives on UNCURK and the Principal Secretary at what was described as a "courtesy call".

Although the meeting (arranged during my absence), had been Dear Ahmet, members to seek the President's views on internal and external matters in question-answer form, the Foreign Minister in-
I refer to your confidential letters numbered 190 and 191 of 17 and 20 June respectively. I have taken note of their contents.

It is also noteworthy that the call was made during the visit of the members of the North-South Co-ordinating Committee and that unlike past practice the UNCURK visit was given prominent first page coverage in all Seoul dailies. This was pre-
ceded by one day by anti-ROK "propaganda broadcasts" by the DPRK across the DMZ.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

* * *

The President commenced his half-hour statement by expressing profound appreciation of UNCURK's C.V. Narasimhan
Chief de Cabinet
such as its efforts to help bring about peaceful Korean unification and to assist in the development of representative government in Korea. Regretfully however, he said, UNCURK was not accorded the co-operation the ROK always rendered by North Korea.

Mr. Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary
UNCURK
Seoul, Korea

Mr. Park then referred to UNCURK's mandate with regard to the observation of elections and the development of representative government and its travel in the country. He pointed out that the Commission had received the unreserved co-operation of the ROK to perform this task properly efficiently. However, UNCURK was unable to travel and function in the North.

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chief de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL: No. 190

17 June 1973

UNCURK'S VISIT WITH THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

On 13 June at 10:00 a.m. ROK President Park Chung Hee received the five Representatives on UNCURK and the Principal Secretary on what was described as a "courtesy call".

Although the meeting (arranged during my absence), had been requested by members to seek the President's views on internal and external matters in question-answer form, the Foreign Minister indicated just before the get-together that the visit was purely a courtesy call and that any questions should be addressed to him subsequently.

It is also noteworthy that the call was made during the visit of the northern members of the North-South Co-ordinating Committee and that unlike past practice the UNCURK visit was given prominent first page coverage in all Seoul dailies. This was preceded by one day by anti-ROK "propaganda broadcasts" by the DPRK across the DMZ.

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The President commenced his half-hour statement by expressing profound appreciation of UNCURK and its contributions in past years such as its efforts to help bring about peaceful Korean unification and to assist in the development of representative government in Korea. Regretfully however, he said, UNCURK was not accorded the co-operation the ROK always rendered by North Korea.

The President went on to say that UNCURK and the UN Forces in Korea were extremely essential and had the fullest support of the ROK. He added that these two presences could not be done without.

Mr. Park then referred to UNCURK's mandate with regard to the observation of elections and the development of representative government and its travel in the country. He pointed out that the Commission had received the unreserved co-operation of the ROK to perform this task properly efficiently. However, UNCURK was unable to travel and function in the North.

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

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Regarding the continued importance of the UN political and military presence in the Republic, the President said that a number of countries were not keen about the presence. Most of these, in remote areas, did not have the historic memory of the Korean question and the war. ROK delegations had been visiting these countries to acquaint them with the Korean question and to obtain their support. However, the North was also sending many missions abroad to express its own views.

The President observed that the basic line of Pyongyang had been that the UN presence in the ROK -- both military and political -- had been an impediment to North-South contacts and that its removal was therefore necessary. Mr. Park asserted that this was wrong and that quite the contrary was true. He said that nonetheless there were some countries -- a small number -- which were persuaded by this line of thinking.

The President went on to say that the ROK Government was in the process of fully evaluating all contingencies before the next UNGA session. However, no final decision had yet been made.

The President stated that while UNCURK would prepare its report to the United Nations, the ROK was reviewing its policies. The Foreign Minister would be in close contact with the Commission and inform it of the results of its assessment and its decision on contingencies.

* * *

As you would note, there appears to be something of a contradiction between the first ^{and ROK} part of the President's statement. In the beginning he declared that UN presence -- both political and military -- was indispensable. However in the latter part of his remarks he seemed to include perhaps this presence as well in the contingency planning of the ROK. The question arises whether the President might or might not consider dispensable either the political or the military component of the presence or both.

While no one I know appears to be in a position to give a definite reply, it is my personal feeling that there may actually be no contradiction at all. The President might have referred solely to the possible full abandonment of the ROK deferment policy; to its review of the matter of DPRK participation in a Korean debate; and evaluation also of the issue of the latter's potential observer status at the United Nations. What I would pose as another pertinent question is whether the same persons in the middle echelon of decision makers might somehow prevail over

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top officials' advice against double Korean UN membership — a most pertinent question I have taken the liberty to write to you about in two letters dated 5 and 12 January 1973, respectively entitled "THE GERMAN PRECEDENT AND MATTER OF DOUBLE UN MEMBERSHIP FOR KOREA" and "STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL RELATING TO KOREA, AND ITS IMPACT".

The Commission was invited by the Foreign Minister on 14 June at a working luncheon. He arrived quite late, in morning coat, having participated at Blue House ceremonies for the presentation of credentials of three new envoys. Therefore, the discussion was very brief. Basically, he reiterated the President's views.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

AHMET H. OZEUDUN
Principal Secretary

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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL ; No. 191

20 June 1973

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

There appear to be political impulses in the air lately that the ROK Government will make its posture on the Korean question known in the near future. In fact two target dates are mentioned, namely 25 June (the twenty-third anniversary of the Korean conflict), and 10 July. One rumour circulated in diplomatic circles is that the new posture may range from the abandonment of the deferment policy to the adoption of a two Korea policy. Such deferment and a "positive" approach to the "invitation" issue are regarded to be almost absolutely taken for granted. The question remains as to what the ROK hopes to obtain on a quid pro quo basis, if any; or whether it is going to make concessions on a "silver plate" even beyond "hopes" entertained last year by some proponents of the "Algerian" item. Or, would the ROK merely engage itself in a tactical game with the DPRK, somehow to embarrass it or to place the onus of any rejection or failure on Pyongyang.

Government leaders seem to be engaged in feverish activities, including contacts with political leaders, presumably to rally support for a bipartisan policy of the ROK. Personally, I would not be surprised if even decision makers later reflected disharmony or differing views, or even an outbreak of factionalism.

Reasons for a possible ROK policy shift vary considerably and include the following:

- Lack of progress at (if not stalemate in) the North-South Contacts.
- Despair (if not undue panic) emanating from the WHO vote.
- Impact of the overrated German precedent and growing number of proponents of double Korean UN membership.
- Dwindling support from ROK allies and proponents of the UN posture.

Mr. C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

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- Global "unpopularity" of the ROK arising from the constitutional or structural changes (October Revitalization Reforms) and subsequent national balloting; "curtailment" of civil liberties, the press freedom, etc.
- Action of most Nordic Countries and others to recognize two Koreas and lack of reciprocal recognition of the ROK by Socialist countries, and the concomitant abandonment, probably fully, of the ROK "Hallstein Doctrine".
- Exaggeration of the "fear" felt by some that the UN presence in both military and political form cannot be saved; that one or the other might best be placed on the "sacrificial altar"; and that if a choice become incumbent it should be the political presence which should be allowed to wither so as to save the military presence. (I believe both would if one did first -- but would "buy" time for the remaining one.)
- The reduction by two of UNCURK's membership and circulating rumours that some of the remaining five might not be too unhappy if the Commission were allowed to "fade away".

Mr. Adam Malik, on whom I had paid a courtesy call during his recent visit, had confidentially mentioned that he would favour, as some other non-aligned world leaders, to recognize both Koreas, and, in fact, a double Korean UN membership. Other diplomats however expressed preference against two Korean policy since this would cause the UN presence to exit, leaving behind a most explosive vacuum. They feel that the presence should remain unless it could be replaced with as viable or more viable guarantee and unless the "sacrifice" of the presence would attain a counter-concession from the "other side" of equal magnitude.

Another matter of great political significance is Mr. Lee Hu Rak's comment to the Press, after the departure of Northern Members of the Co-ordinating Committee, that he would not totally dismiss the "now untimely" Pyongyang demand for a peace treaty. Many question whether this, if and when it comes about, would not entail actual recognition between the two Koreas and thus lead to a full two Korea policy.

A final matter which occurs to me at this point is the recollection of the Secretary-General's statement relevant to double Korean UN membership at his New Year's press conference this year and the tremendous support it had received on the international level as well as in the ROK. Among many reasons why I would personally and, for that matter, infinitely prefer postponement of "double membership" is my conviction that this would definitely scuttle realistic efforts


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for Korean unification of some form and extent.

Would it not be possible to devise a single unified seat for Korea (temporarily vacant) to be left at the disposition of the two Governments to fill eventually -- commencing with the creation of a very loose confederal structure In fact, cannot the existing North-South Co-ordinating Committee be subjected to some re-modeling temporarily to "fill" the aforesaid single, unified Korean seat, pending actual tightening of the confederal structure into first a more tightened one thereby encouraging the further graduating of the structure into progressive modes of the federal scheme. This would alleviate fears of a permanent Korean division. It would render the concept of Korean union more credible merely by differentiating between two concepts: RE-UNIFICATION in the status quo ante sense (of a unitary state) which will not come about in the foreseeable future (even distant); and UNIFICATION, which would only aim to a limited unity ranging between the loosest possible confederal structure and the involving progressive stages of federalism. As to the creation of a single, unified and vacant seat: the numerous and varied experiments with the concept of membership as practiced by the UN in the past (I could cite a dozen plausible ones) render the Organization fully entitled and capable to create yet another category (or concept) of membership. Is not the most recent example, to be added to this most plausible categorization, the more or less "conditional" membership of the two Germany's, based on consent etc. of the Big Four? Cannot the "Special Korean Co-ordinating Committee" have the Co-Chairmen entitled to one half vote each (by common advance agreement) -- the delegation actually casting a vote only if the Co-Chairmen agreed. Also the UN membership could be accorded on a temporary or trial basis, enabling each component to withdraw from the Korean seat which would again become vacant until mutual agreement either to return to the seat or to apply for separate North and South UN membership is reached.*

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,



Ahmet H.E. Ozguden
Principal Secretary

* This is a gist of an earlier paper of mine in 1967, entitled "An International Approach to the Question of Divided Countries". The above summary rendition may have to be supplemented by ideas of that paper in order to become more plausible.