

April 1984

**Defense Intelligence Agency Report, 'Soviet Military
and Other Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa'**

Citation:

"Defense Intelligence Agency Report, 'Soviet Military and Other Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa'", April 1984, Wilson Center Digital Archive, National Security Archive, SA01629. Included in "Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974," edited by Sue Onslow and Anna-Mart Van Wyk.

<https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/118166>

Summary:

An overview of Soviet political, economic and military involvement in Africa. The document asserts that although Moscow continues its policy of taking an active and aggressive role in the affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa, much of the momentum it initially possessed has been lost. Moscow now finds itself holding onto the influence it maintains most notably in Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation

Original Language:


English

Contents:

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DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY



Soviet Military and
Other Activities in
Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

APRIL 1984

10411-87 & 1087-87




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SUMMARY


(U) The USSR is the most important Communist power active in the spectrum of military, political, and to a lesser extent, economic affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa. Although Moscow's attention is primarily focused on Southern Africa and the Horn, where its clients are involved in protracted military conflicts, the Soviets continue their efforts in other areas to create and exploit instability.



(U) Moscow made great gains in Africa in the mid-1970s as a result of the decline of the Portuguese empire and the Ethiopian revolution. Although Moscow continues to seek gains, its momentum of the mid-1970s is gone and a major amount of Soviet effort is now devoted to protecting Moscow's positions in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.



(U)  It is primarily through military assistance programs that Moscow generates influence and gains access to military facilities in Sub-Saharan countries. The volume of Soviet military assistance outstrips that of any other supplier. Moscow's acquisition of military access rights in the region both enhance Soviet military capabilities, particularly vis-a-vis SLOC monitoring, and enable the Soviets to demonstrate their presence and support for regional socialist states.

(U)  Overt political ties, though low-key in recent years, also continue to play an important role in Soviet foreign policy execution. These are conducted through routine state-to-state relations as well as party-to-party relations with ruling Socialist and Marxist political parties. Overt ties also include a variety of cultural activities.

(u) [redacted] Covert activities are also important. These include support for subversive organizations, use of front organizations like the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, and disinformation campaigns.

(u) [redacted] Angola and Ethiopia are the two countries in which Moscow is most heavily involved. [redacted]

[redacted] In return for its military support, Moscow reaps the considerable benefits of continued use of naval and air facilities at Luanda. Also of great importance to Moscow is the fact that Angola provides a base of operations for the leftist South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) which seeks to end South African rule in Namibia. Moscow's position is increasingly threatened by the growing strength of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which seeks to oust the pro-Soviet Angolan Government. UNITA strength and the apparent ineptitude of the Angolan Government will require Moscow to provide increasingly expensive military assistance if its client is to survive.

(u) [redacted] Ethiopia remains the most valuable Soviet client in Sub-Saharan Africa because of its strategic location--close to the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf--because of its ability to dominate militarily the Horn of Africa, and because it is heavily committed to the maintenance of close ties with Moscow. Over 60 percent of all Soviet military sales to Sub-Saharan Africa since 1977 have gone to Ethiopia. In return, Moscow continues its exclusive use of facilities in the Dehalak Archipelago as well as air access for Il-38/MAY aircraft at Asmara to support the Indian Ocean Squadron. Although political ties have undergone some strains because of Soviet efforts to hasten Chairman Mengistu's formation of a Communist party, Mengistu's military dependence upon Moscow dictates against the likelihood of a deterioration of relations.


(u) [redacted] An important shortcoming of Soviet policy in this region is its unwillingness or general inability to furnish sizable amounts of economic aid. Soviet preferences for such assistance still lie with high visibility and heavy industry-related projects, which both provide tangible evidence of Soviet assistance and insure prolonged Soviet involvement during lengthy construction and shakedown phases. Commercial relations are unlikely to expand significantly in the near future, but Soviet use of African waters for fishing will continue to provide an impetus for such ties.

[redacted]

(u) [redacted] Soviet influence in Sub-Saharan Africa varies widely from state to state; however, it is in southern Africa and the Horn where Soviet efforts will be concentrated through the mid-1980s. The Soviets are gradually being forced to commit a significant amount of resources to the consolidation and defense of their substantial gains in these key regions.


1. INTRODUCTION

(U) The Soviet Union is the major external Communist participant in the military, political, and to a lesser extent, economic affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa. Moscow's primary targets remain in Southern Africa and the Horn, where pro-Soviet and pro-Western countries engage in protracted military conflicts. In other areas, however, Moscow also employs its instruments of influence to both create and exploit instability.



(U) In the mid-1970s, the decline of the Portuguese empire, in addition to the Ethiopian revolution enabled Moscow to gain a great deal of momentum in spreading its influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. That momentum has since been lost. Furthermore, Moscow's efforts in West and Central Africa continue to be challenged by a Socialist French government which, while less enthusiastic than its predecessors, remains committed to its role in these regions. Moscow must also account for the efforts of the People's Republic of China, which is reinvigorating its role in parts of Africa. A major amount of Soviet effort is now devoted to protecting Moscow's gains in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

2. SOVIET PERSPECTIVE ON AFRICA



(U) Modern Soviet policy toward the region was refined in 1956 at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The most important facet of this policy was the acceptance of the principle of "many roads to socialism." In other words, Marxist principles could be adapted to local conditions. This flexibility permits, from an ideological standpoint, much closer ties with a variety of socialist countries which would have been shunned during the earlier period of more dogmatic Stalinist policies.

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


Figure 1. Countries Discussed in Text.

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(U) Soviet activities in Sub-Saharan Africa are motivated by a blend of ideological and pragmatic considerations. The subcontinent is important to Moscow, however, for two major reasons. First, Western countries are heavily dependent upon Africa and sea routes around the continent for access to many strategic raw materials. Second, the Soviet Union strives to gain and exploit the political and ideological support of the Third World, of which Sub-Saharan Africa is a major part.

(U) Marxism/Leninism dictates that capitalist nations have depended upon colonies for economic survival. Before the Russian revolution, Lenin's writings stressed the link between hastening the end of colonialism and the spread of Communism. Because a large number of Western colonies were located in the resource-rich continent of Africa, and because this involved the control of large black populations by white Europeans, it was logical from an ideological standpoint that Moscow would be drawn to undercut the West in the region.

(U) Economic considerations, specifically the West's need for African minerals, form the link between Moscow's ideological and pragmatic motivations, especially in Southern Africa. For example, Western Europe gets about 50 percent of its cobalt from the area; the US gets about 60 percent; and Japan, 68 percent. Cobalt is vital to the production of jet engines and other military materiel. Similar dependencies exist for chromium, platinum group metals, manganese, and industrial diamonds. The end of the colonial era contributed to an increase in the cost of raw materials, but producing countries must, of economic necessity, sell these materials. Therefore, Moscow cannot merely be content to have witnessed the decolonization process. It must actively seek to create the conditions whereby Western access to Africa's raw materials could not only be interrupted for short periods, but made more expensive overall. This probably would generate price increases in Western and Japanese economies. It would also increase Soviet income from mineral sales.

(U) The primary Soviet means of affecting Western supplies of raw materials is by fomenting and sustaining instability in and around producing regions. The two invasions of Zaire's copper and cobalt producing Shaba province by ex-Katangan gendarmes in 1977 and 1978 are key examples of this technique. The rebels, known as the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), are believed to have launched both attacks with Soviet support and with at least the indirect assistance of East German and Cuban advisers. Such instability can shut down production during periods of warfare and have the longer term effect of driving away skilled technicians who are vital for mining operations. In addition, insurgent activity can close major land routes from ports to mines. South African-backed insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique, a consequence of Soviet support for the marxist regimes there, have closed major railroads through those countries, thus channeling most surface shipping from mineral producing countries of Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe through South Africa. Should the Soviet-supported Marxist-Leninist African National Congress (ANC), which seeks to establish a multiracial socialist regime in South Africa, become more aggressive, operation of railroads and some mines in South Africa could be periodically disrupted.

(U) To foster instability, Moscow must maintain good relations with regional states which have their own motivation for sheltering and funneling support to various insurgencies. In southern Africa, Angola serves such a

purpose and represents Moscow's most significant regional inroad. Decisive Soviet and Cuban intervention in support of one of several competing Angolan political factions led to the establishment of a Marxist, pro-Soviet state upon achieving independence in 1975. Angola provides training for the ANC, and is a base of operations for the FLNC and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO). SWAPO has challenged South Africa's occupation of Namibia in a low-level guerrilla war along the Namibian/Angolan border since the mid-1960s.

W [redacted] Mozambique is another country which went directly from being a Portuguese colony to being an independent Marxist state. Although Mozambique has resisted Soviet efforts to expand their influence with some degree of success, it remains heavily dependent on Moscow for military assistance. It also serves as a base for ANC operations against South Africa, thus furthering Moscow's goal of supplanting the current pro-Western government in Pretoria with a nonaligned or pro-Soviet one. However, continued South African support for Mozambican insurgents may reduce Maputo's ability to resist Soviet domination in the long run.

(U) The ultimate means of manipulating access to Southern Africa's raw materials will be by having all ports of access controlled by anti-Western or pro-Soviet countries. Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa control these ports. Should a Marxist government ultimately come to power in South Africa, the potential would exist for a coalition of socialist states which conceivably could control access to raw materials either physically or financially. As such, the lack of reliability of the sources of supply could have a profound effect on the West. Any threat to Western supplies of these raw materials might have the effect of revealing cracks in the Western alliance in much the same manner as did the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74. At that time some West European countries were willing to break with the US on political issues for the sake of insuring continued access to oil. The Soviets would be likely to encourage a similar effort by strategic mineral and metal producing nations to split the US from its Western allies.

(U) The USSR maintains and seeks military access to air and naval facilities in and around the continent to enhance its military capabilities, and, as a result, to be in a position to challenge the West and protect Soviet power in remote areas. In the south Atlantic Ocean, port facilities in Conakry, Guinea and at Luanda and Namibe, Angola support Moscow's West Africa patrol (see table 1). This small naval force shows the Soviet flag and protects Soviet fishing vessels along the Atlantic coast. It numbers between five and seven units and is normally augmented for 8 to 9 months of the year by an landing ship (LST) carrying a reinforced naval infantry company. Maintenance support for this force was enhanced in the summer of 1982 when Moscow moved an 8,500-metric-ton capacity floating dry dock to Luanda. To the east, the much larger Indian Ocean Squadron has its primary support base in the Dehalak Archipelago, off the coast of Ethiopia (see table 2). In recent years, the squadron strength has varied between 19 and 32 units. In the first half of 1983, its strength level averaged 20-25 units.

Table 1

Soviet Naval Port Visits to West Africa (U)

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of Visits</u>			
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>Mid-1983</u>
Senegal	8	9	5	3
Guinea-Bissau	0	5	1	1
Guinea	42	37	44	20
Sierra Leone	0	0	1	0
Ivory Coast	1	1	0	0
Benin	7	0	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	4	0
Congo	0	1	6	0
Angola	23	25	56	17
TOTAL	81	78	117	41

Soviet West African Naval Contingent Ship Days

<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>Mid-1983</u>
2,613	2,326	2,849	1,350

Table 2

Soviet Naval Port Visits to East Africa (U)

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of Visits</u>			
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>Mid-1983</u>
Mozambique	4	21	24	15
Madagascar	1	0	0	0
Seychelles	4	11	12	4
Mauritius	5	8	6	0
Djibouti	7	5	4	2
Ethiopia	103	104	93	38
TOTAL	124	149	139	59

Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron Ship Days.

<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>Mid-1983</u>
11,180	10,712	10,169	4,374

(U) These military forces serve as tangible evidence of Soviet intent to support socialist states throughout Africa. On five occasions, starting in 1979, combatants of the Indian Ocean Squadron have visited the Seychelles during local crises as a show of support for the socialist government. Most recently, a lone LST carrying naval infantry visited the port of Victoria in March 1983, probably in response to a rumor of a coup attempt. Soviet ships visited Maputo, Mozambique following South African raids on ANC safehouses in Maputo in early 1981, although the visit is believed to have been scheduled months in advance.

(U) [REDACTED] Another related practical consideration which draws Soviet attention to the African continent is its proximity to the sea lines of communication (SLOC) from the oil producing nations of the Persian Gulf to the West. The desire to monitor traffic in the SLOCs and to develop a capability to interdict them provides additional motivation for Moscow to gain access to military facilities. [REDACTED]

(U) From a political standpoint, Sub-Saharan Africa is important to Moscow because it contains a large number of the Third World/nonaligned nations. The Soviets seek the support of the nonaligned nations for their foreign policy initiatives as a means of establishing a vague legitimacy for their actions. Because Moscow promotes itself as the natural ally of the nonaligned movement, it has a vested interest from a credibility standpoint in enlisting Third World support for its initiatives, above and beyond the propaganda and psychological value of such backing. These factors give Moscow added incentive to cultivate influence in Sub-Saharan Africa.

3. TRENDS

a. General

(U) [REDACTED] Moscow continues its policy of taking an active and aggressive role in the affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa, but it has lost much of the political and psychological momentum it gained in the mid-to-late 1970s. This momentum developed as a result of the dissolution of the Portuguese empire, the Ethiopian revolution, and increased Soviet, Cuban, and East German military, political, and subversive activities. In the 1970s, Moscow was heavily involved in eroding Western influence in the region. Although Moscow itself suffered significant setbacks in the Sudan and Somalia, what it gained in Ethiopia has compensated for these losses in continuing influence in the Horn of Africa. In the 1980s, however, Moscow finds itself heavily involved in defending its gains of the 1970s at the same time as it targets the South African Government. Two successful insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, both backed by South Africa, are targeted at pro-Soviet Marxist regimes. These are the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). In addition, the Marxist regime in Ethiopia faces serious challenges from several insurgent groups, particularly in the north where unsuccessful government counter guerrilla campaigns have been conducted with tens of thousands of troops.

(U) [redacted] Moscow is encountering problems in Sub-Saharan Africa because, in general terms, the goals of the Soviets and their clients are diverging. In Southern Africa, for example, the ruling Marxist parties in Angola and Mozambique prefer to negotiate peace arrangements or at least a modus vivendi with South Africa in order to concentrate their efforts domestically to consolidate their power and engage in nation building. The Angolans have repeatedly spoken out in favor of a negotiated settlement of Namibian independence and have conducted bilateral talks with South Africa. Mozambique has also conducted talks with South Africa on border issues and RENAMO. More recently, Mozambique's President Machel proposed a meeting of US and Soviet officials, with Mozambique mediating, to discuss the problems of southern Africa and demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. Moscow on the other hand, wants to use these countries as bases for insurgency targeted against South Africa and Namibia, with the result that military pressure from South Africa prevents consolidation of power by the regional Marxists.

(U) [redacted] In Ethiopia, Chairman Mengistu still needs greater amounts of economic aid to help consolidate the revolution. Moscow has pressured Mengistu to create a Communist party, a development which the Soviets hope will increase their ability to manipulate events at the cost of Mengistu's power base. The Soviets calculate formation of the party will create several centers of political power as well as develop leadership alternatives to Mengistu. Mengistu wishes to guard his power which is based largely on his personal relationships with, and loyalty of key followers. In January 1983, Chairman Mengistu announced at the second Congress of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) that the Party would be established at the third congress, probably in 1984. Since then, Moscow has signaled a greater willingness to provide economic support. It is believed that Mengistu decided to announce the party's formation on the basis of his belief that he can control it, but Ethiopia's stagnating economy and a need for Soviet aid likely influenced his decision. Soviet efforts to gain influence in the party, when formed, will be a continuing source of friction between Mengistu and his Soviet mentors.

(U) [redacted] In most cases, countries with which Moscow has established close ties seek to rejuvenate their economies, having bolstered themselves militarily with Soviet assistance. Moscow has not provided the needed economic assistance.

[redacted] Soviet models of agricultural development have not succeeded. In Mozambique, President Machel himself has criticized his own party for promoting large and inefficient Soviet style farms at the cost of small-scale, private agriculture.

(U) As a result of this situation, socialist and Marxist nations in Sub-Saharan Africa are seeking Western development assistance. Western aid to foundering nations, however, can lead to International Monetary Fund (IMF) involvement. Should an IMF bailout be required, it probably would require economic reforms which are likely to be detrimental to socialist economic institutions. This is a particularly tricky problem for Moscow. On the one hand, the Soviets claim it is the West's responsibility to finance development

because Western colonialism is responsible for Africa's poverty. This absolves them from the responsibility for and the expense of providing economic aid. On the other hand, the Soviets have stated that in order for these socialist nations to achieve independence in foreign policy they must free themselves from economic dependence on the Western powers.

(u) As a result of this divergence, and the growing perception of African leaders that Moscow's interest in the region centers primarily on East-West issues and not the needs of African states, the Soviets can expect little overall gain in Sub-Saharan Africa in the foreseeable future. If Soviet gains in Sub-Saharan Africa were to be categorized by decade, the late 1950s and early 1960s could be characterized as a time of modest Soviet gains based on the ideological naivete of some leftist African leaders who rushed to embrace Moscow. The 1970s were a time of major Soviet gains based on military support for local wars, insurgencies, and revolutionaries. In this context, the 1980s will probably be a time of mixed results--limited Soviet gains based on exploitation of regional instability, individuals, and government factions but potentially greater losses in Southern Africa at the hands of anti-Soviet insurgents and South Africa.

b. Military Presence and Aid

(u) Military sales and assistance programs remain the most visible and the most important means by which Moscow seeks to penetrate Sub-Saharan Africa. Moscow is the dominant arms supplier; trainer of indigenous military personnel abroad; and with the exception of Cuba, supplier of military advisers to the region.

(u) The Soviets have entered into military sales or aid programs with nearly half the states in this region. Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are the USSR's most important clients in this regard, with Ethiopia accounting for over 60 percent of all Soviet military sales to Sub-Saharan Africa since 1977. The likelihood of continuing military conflict in the Horn and Southern Africa, as well as the general instability endemic to many African states, insures for Moscow opportunities for sales, primarily to old customers. In addition to providing a vehicle of influence, this aid provides a minor source of hard currency. Table 4 provides the figures for Soviet military aid as of late 1983.

Table 4

Estimated Values of Soviet Military Agreements (A) and Deliveries (D)
to Sub-Saharan Africa (Million US Dollars) (U)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total Aid</u>	
	<u>A</u>	<u>D</u>
Angola	1969.6	1288.1
Benin	341.4	188.4
Botswana	7.0	7.0
Burundi	22.6	22.6
Cameroon	.2	.2
Cape Verde	65.0	65.0
Central African Republic	3.0	3.0
Chad	6.5	6.5
Congo	176.8	156.8
Equatorial Guinea	23.0	23.0
Ethiopia	3941.4	2590.7
Gambia	.1	.1
Ghana	10.0	10.0
Guinea	145.5	97.0
Guinea-Bissau	43.7	36.1
Kenya	.4	.4
Madagascar	111.5	98.2
Mali	161.6	131.7
Mozambique	340.9	336.1
Nigeria	216.6	193.0
Rwanda	.1	.1
Sao Tome and Principe	2.0	2.0
Seychelles	8.0	8.0
Sierra Leone	2.4	2.4
Somalia	402.0	402.0
Sudan	99.7	99.7
Tanzania	358.4	337.0
Uganda	144.0	123.0
Zaire	46.5	46.5
Zambia	251.8	251.8
Zimbabwe	2.5	.4
	<u>8,904.2</u>	<u>6,526.8</u>

(u) - Another means used by Moscow to enhance its military capabilities, as well as its overall presence, is through the extension of AEROFLOT civil aviation service throughout Africa. AEROFLOT provides visibility and legitimate service, as well as a vehicle for covert logistical support and bases for espionage in the guise of AEROFLOT offices.

c. Political and Subversive Activity

(u) [REDACTED] Since mid-1981 there have been 16 visits by African heads of state and leaders of insurgent movements to the USSR, and 12 to other Warsaw Pact countries (see table 5). Nearly all of these leaders are from countries with which Moscow has or seeks military access rights.

Table 5

Visits of African Leaders to The USSR (U)

Aristides Pereira, Prime Minister of Cape Verde	July-August 81
Yasouf Dadoo, Chairman of the South African Communist Party	October 81
Manuel Pinto da Costa, President of Sao Tome and Principe	September-October 81
Cdr. Didier Ratsiraka, President of Madagascar	September-October 81
Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola	October 81
B.G. Joao Bernardo Vieira, President of Guinea-Bissau	November-December 81
Sam Nujoma, President of the South-West Africa People's Organization	December 81
Gen. Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of the African National Congress	May 82
Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia	October 82
Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola	November 82
Col. Denis Sassou-Nguesso, President of the Congo	November 82
Samora Moises Machel, President of Mozambique	November 82
Aneerood Jugnauth, Prime Minister of Mauritius	December 82
Samora Moises Machel, President of Mozambique	March 83
Chief Leabua Jonathan, Prime Minister of Lesotho	May 83
Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola	May 83

(U) Other overt activities designed to promote Soviet policies include media broadcasts to the region, the placing of news articles in local papers, trade fairs and exhibits, and cultural activities. Sub-Saharan Africa received 274 hours per week of Soviet international broadcasting in 1982, having increased less than 3 percent since 1979. Throughout 1981 Moscow also regularly placed radio and TV programs in the media programming of Benin, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, and Madagascar. Soviet press reports regularly appeared in these countries as well as in Angola, the Congo, Ghana, Mozambique, and Nigeria. Throughout the region in 1981 the Soviets held 18 film festivals, 4 trade exhibits, and 25 cultural exhibits.

(U) . Disinformation campaigns also remain a staple of Soviet covert operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Probably the most frequently employed technique is that of the forged document which is designed to damage US interests. Although the forgeries are often easily recognized as such, it is frequently difficult to tell whether the Soviets or one of their proxies actually prepared them. Nevertheless, the KGB coordinates and monitors all such operations.

[REDACTED]

d. Economic Aid and Trade Relations

(u) [REDACTED] Economic aid remains the most selectively and parsimoniously employed implement of Soviet regional policy. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Moscow still prefers to commit its economic aid to high visibility projects, especially those related to the development of heavy industry. A planned hydroelectric dam project in Angola and the Ajaokuta Steel Plant project in Nigeria epitomize this preference. Such projects serve the dual purpose of providing tangible evidence of Soviet commitment to aid developing nations and insure prolonged ties with Moscow during the construction and shakedown phases of projects.

(U) Although the Soviet Union has been encouraging expanded commercial relations while attempting to downplay aid commitments, the adverse effects of the international recession on most of the Sub-Saharan countries have made significantly expanded trade relations unlikely in the near future. However, Soviet dependence upon African waters for fishing will continue to provide an economic impetus for Soviet-African relations. In 1980, the USSR accounted for 13 percent of the world fishery catch, second only to Japan's 14.4 percent. Of this, roughly 20 percent came from African waters. The Soviets' dependence on fish protein in their diet and fish meal for livestock and aquaculture feeds insures that Moscow will continue to seek entry into joint ventures and bilateral agreements with African nations for the foreseeable future.

(u) [REDACTED] The provision of Soviet economic technicians and advisers remains an important element of Moscow's assistance program. During 1982, approximately [REDACTED] such Soviets personnel were in Sub-Saharan Africa. They assist in the daily operation of some nations' national infrastructures as well as in various development projects.

(u) [REDACTED] Similarly, academic training for large numbers of African students continues to be provided in the Soviet Union. The USSR views its academic assistance program as highly visible and one with a potentially high-yield at low-cost. Students are generally awarded full scholarships, which cover subsistence, living quarters, tuition, and transportation. For many African countries, the Soviet scholarship program is Moscow's only aid effort. During 1982, there were approximately 18,000 students receiving academic training in the Soviet Union, up from 8,000 in 1975. Moscow hopes that some of these students will become indoctrinated in Marxism or will be recruited by Soviet intelligence personnel to serve as Soviet intelligence agents. However, African students in the USSR frequently complain of racial discrimination and write home about inadequate food, supplies, and money, as well as excessive political indoctrination.

4. INTRODUCTION TO COUNTRY STUDIES

a. Guinea

(u) Historically, the Soviets have had significant presence and influence in socialist Guinea. Currently, there are some 50-60 Soviet military personnel in that country acting as advisers and technicians. The USSR is permitted to use Conakry harbor routinely as a facility for their West African naval contingent and to use Conakry airfield as a stopover point for military transport flights to Angola.

(u) In August 1980, the Soviet Union reportedly agreed to provide additional military assistance to Guinea. The Soviets have long been the primary military supplier to Guinea, and the new Soviet assistance package was said to include MiG-21/FISHBED fighters, Mi-8/HIP helicopter, An-24/COKE transports, and additional training of pilots, mechanics, and technicians in the USSR.

[REDACTED]

b. Cape Verde

(u) [REDACTED] Since the 1977 loss of Conakry as a staging base [REDACTED] the Soviets have become more attracted to the Cape Verde Islands. The Soviets have assigned [REDACTED] technical advisers to the army and [REDACTED] to the navy. At present, some [REDACTED] Soviet pilots, crews, navigators, and mechanics maintain the two new An-26/CURLs the Cape Verde National Airline received in 1981.

[REDACTED]

(u) [REDACTED] Despite intense efforts by the Soviets to gain greater access to Cape Verde facilities, the Soviet diplomatic offensive has run into opposition [REDACTED] for several reasons. First, the nonaligned position of the country tempers the granting of access rights to the USSR. Second, Cape Verde is moving to balance Soviet military assistance with closer ties to the West. These ties include not only military aid but also economic development assistance, particularly from Portugal, the European Economic Community, and Brazil. Third, Cape Verde has long historical ties to the West. Many Cape Verdeans have continued to immigrate to Portugal, the US, France, and the Netherlands, while increasing numbers of students are studying at Western institutions as opposed to Eastern Bloc schools. Finally, the Soviet failure to provide much-needed economic assistance, particularly during the recent drought years throughout the islands, has not gone unnoticed by the Cape Verdean leadership.

(u) [REDACTED] The Cape Verde position toward the Soviet Union will remain one of either support or silence on major international issues, avoiding outright criticism. For example, the leadership was silent on the issue of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, preferring to wait until a nonaligned position could be taken. Nevertheless, in a show of apparent sensitivity to Moscow's concerns, Prime Minister Pires visited the USSR in July and August 1981, reportedly to reassure the Soviets of Cape Verde's intent to remain nonaligned as well as to lobby for economic aid. To balance further his nonaligned credentials, President Pereira visited the US in early October 1983.

Meanwhile, the Soviets can be expected to continue to press the Cape Verdean Government for access rights in order to achieve enhanced monitoring capabilities over the Central Atlantic. The chances that such access rights will be granted, however, are small. Should the fragile health of the President fail in the near future, the Soviets might take this opportunity to attempt to enhance their influence through pro-Soviet elements within the government.

c. Guinea-Bissau

(u) • Communist countries account for a minor part of Guinea-Bissau's foreign aid and concentrate their efforts primarily on military assistance. The Government of Guinea-Bissau considers the Soviets, along with the Cubans, close friends who helped them in their struggle for independence during the 1960s and 1970s. In December 1981, President Vieira visited Moscow for talks with senior CPSU officials on bilateral issues. The Soviets are the primary supplier of military assistance to Guinea-Bissau.

However, they have not been granted permanent access to any military facilities, including the newly extended runway in Bissau. Moreover, Bissau officials have become increasingly dissatisfied with the level and quality of Soviet military assistance. Spare parts and Soviet assistance in maintaining equipment, boats, and aircraft are difficult to obtain.

(u) [redacted] Beyond the military realm, in late 1982, the two governments signed a protocol to their 1975 economic and technical assistance accord. [redacted] it provides for continued Soviet assistance in the fields of hydrology, mineral prospecting, construction, and rural electrification for the period 1982-86. On the negative side, however, friction continues between the Bissau leadership and the Soviets over terms of their joint fishing agreement.

(u) [redacted] In the past few years, the Government of Guinea-Bissau has shown an interest in broadening its sources of military assistance with the West. Guinea-Bissau has a Portuguese naval defense attache assigned to the country. France has also provided some military assistance to Guinea-Bissau and the US has established an International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) with that country. The Soviets will continue to supply some military equipment, spare parts, and training, and will stress past friendship and cooperation. [redacted]

d. Mali

(u) [redacted] In Mali, the 13-year military regime of Brigadier General Moussa Traore changed to full civilian constitutional rule in 1979. [redacted]

(u) [redacted] The USSR has been the primary source of military assistance to Mali since the mid-1970s. Much of this Soviet assistance has been paid for or is guaranteed by Malian gold production, thus increasing Soviet hard currency earnings. The Soviets have delivered to the Armed Forces a variety of equipment including [redacted] aircraft, SA-3 SAM, [redacted] APCs, and [redacted] tanks. Some junior officers who received training in the Soviet Union maintain strong pro-Soviet views. Also, there are currently [redacted] Soviet military advisers in-country providing training and technical assistance.

(u) [redacted] In 1975, the Soviet Union agreed to improve several Malian airfields. Runways and support facilities at Mopti Barbe and Bamako Ville were upgraded in 1978 and 1979. Official inaugural ceremonies for the military airfield at Mopti Barbe took place in November 1980, with a Soviet general officer in attendance. [redacted]

(w) Nigeria, the most populous nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, returned to a democratically elected civilian government in October 1979, following 13 years of military rule, and held civilian elections again in

August and September 1983.* Shehu Shagari was again elected President and his National Party of Nigeria increased its political power as a result of its sweeping electoral victory. The Republic has potential for economic development based on its proven oil and natural gas reserves. Furthermore, Nigeria seeks a continental and international leadership role as a moderate but enlightened spokesman for Africa's aspirations. It is within this context that the Soviet Union has long had an interest in this West African nation. Nigeria, however, has been reluctant to grasp the mantle of leadership on broad African issues and has preferred a low profile approach in asserting itself. With elections behind him, Shagari may consider a higher profile but will encounter challenges from such leaders as Mobutu of Zaire, Toure of Guinea, and Diouf of Senegal, each of whom see themselves as leader of moderate Africa.

(u) [redacted] Military relations between Nigeria and the USSR were initiated in the late 1960s. Of prime interest to the Nigerian military leadership was the acquisition of MiG-21/FISHBED aircraft, and by the mid-1970s, 2 squadrons (24 aircraft) of the MiGs were in the Air Force inventory. The Soviet Military Assistance Program (SMAP) also included Soviet technicians, advisers, and pilot training. Currently, there are 10 Soviet advisers to the Air Force and Army.

(u) [redacted] The Soviets also have provided equipment, technical assistance, and training to the Nigerian Army [redacted] is the second largest standing army in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Army possesses [redacted] T-55 tanks and some [redacted] ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns.

(u) [redacted] Moscow's relations with Nigeria remain on a cordial basis, but there are several factors which serve to limit the Soviets' ability to improve their position. The relative stability and prosperity of Nigeria when compared with many African nations does not provide Moscow fertile ground for inroads based on urgently needed military assistance. Nigerian dissatisfaction with the Soviet military assistance program further complicates this problem.

[redacted] Finally, Soviet economic and technical development aid has come under attack by the Nigerian political leadership because of its limited results. The primary example of this problem is the steel mill project at Ajaokuta, which involves some 6,000 Soviet technicians and workers and has been plagued by cost overruns and construction delays.

(u) [redacted] Despite these stumbling blocks, Moscow continues its efforts to maintain a cordial relationship. In the summer of 1982, a Soviet naval task

* [redacted] On 31 December 1983, Brigadier Muhammadu Buhari overthrew the [redacted] government of Shehu Shagari in a mostly bloodless coup. It is doubtful that relations between Nigeria and the USSR will change much under the military government.

group of four ships made a port visit at Lagos. It included the helicopter cruiser Moskva, a FOXTROT Class submarine, a KRIVAK I Class frigate, and a tanker. In early 1983, the Soviets received permission to open a new consulate in Ajaokuta, in conjunction with their presence associated with the steel mill project. Furthermore, the Soviets attempt to damage US-Nigerian relations as evidenced by a disinformation effort in April 1983, alleging US plans to interfere in the political process in Nigeria.

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


Figure 4. (U) Soviet Navy Visit to Lagos, Nigeria.

g. Sao Tome and Principe

(u) [redacted] The leftist government of Prime Minister Manuel Pinto da Costa identifies with Marxist ideology and doctrine. Since independence from Portugal in 1975, this isolated island nation has maintained a close relationship with the Soviet Union.

Military equipment is of Soviet origin, and currently [REDACTED] Soviet advisers reside on the islands of Sao Tome and Principe, but not all of these are military.

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] But during the past few years, the close relationship with Moscow has been less intense, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] improved relations with moderate African neighbors and believes that the Brazilians, Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese, and French can provide his country with economic help. In the eyes of [REDACTED] Moscow's assistance to this poor nation has been inadequate and insufficient.

[REDACTED]

h. Congo

(U) [REDACTED] Soviet presence and influence has existed in the People's Republic of Congo for the past 18 years. However, there is a coolness in current Congo-USSR relations, due partly to the Congolese disenchantment with lack of a meaningful Soviet economic aid and the generally poor quality of military equipment. Over the past decade, the Soviets have supplied the majority of military equipment to the Congo, including small arms, artillery, T-54 and PT-76 tanks, APCs, MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG-21s, and Mi-8 helicopters.

[REDACTED] Currently, there are [REDACTED] Soviet military advisers and [REDACTED] civilian technicians in-country, and Moscow provides a small number of scholarships for Congolese military personnel to study in the USSR. The two countries occasionally exchange official delegations, the most recent being a Congolese military delegation to Moscow in November 1982.

[REDACTED]

i. Angola

(u) - Farther to the south, in Angola, the Soviets remain in a much stronger position. In 1975, during the months preceding independence from Portugal, the Soviet and Cuban supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) seized control of the transitional government from rival nationalist groups. International pressures and the weight of Soviet and Cuban assistance forced the eventual collapse of the regular forces of the non-Marxist insurgent groups and the pullback of the South African forces that were supporting them. Currently, under the Soviet-educated President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Angola remains plagued with political instability, insurgencies, and economic stagnation. In order to remain in control of the situation, dos Santos needs continued technical assistance and substantial military support from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

j. Namibia

(w) 1 - The unresolved Namibian independence problem remains the most contentious issue in southern Africa. The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) under the leadership of Sam Nujoma, continues its protracted guerrilla war against South African control of Namibia, and the

Soviet position in Angola provides Moscow a means of channeling support to SWAPO. The USSR continues to oppose any Western-sponsored settlement, particularly one which leaves any doubts about SWAPO's chances of gaining power. Moscow insists that a UN-sponsored settlement based on UN resolution 435, which recognizes SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, is the only legal basis for Namibian independence. At the same time, the US and Western countries also recognize SWAPO as a legitimate party to the conflict, but do not grant it the exclusive status that Moscow does.

(u) [redacted] The Soviet Union considers SWAPO a legitimate national liberation organization as does the United Nations' General Assembly. Through its close ties with the Angolan Government since 1975, the USSR has supplied SWAPO with most of its military equipment, including small arms, mortars, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, heavy machineguns, SA-7/GRAIL anti-aircraft missiles, mines, and communications equipment. While the majority of SWAPO guerrillas received their training in Angola, some have undertaken specialized training in Cuba and the USSR. In addition, some wounded SWAPO personnel are treated in East Bloc hospitals. [redacted]

(u) [redacted] Much of the financing provided to SWAPO comes from international organizations, not directly from the Soviet Union. These donors include the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the World Council of Churches, and individual nations, such as Sweden.

(u) [redacted] SWAPO currently espouses socialist economic principles and leaders publicly have spoken of equalizing ownership of the nation's resources as well as of forming a "popular democratic people's government" based on "scientific socialist ideas and principles." The SWAPO leadership is vague, however, when questioned about future political and economic goals, emphasizing instead that the liberation struggle must be won first. [redacted]

(u) [redacted] During much of 1982 and 1983, Western-sponsored multilateral and bilateral negotiations have been taking place. Nevertheless, Soviet and Angolan rejection of the "linkage" of the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola with independence for Namibia as well as continuing Soviet support for SWAPO makes it unlikely that Angola, SWAPO, and South Africa will come to terms in the near future. Failure to settle this conflict will lead to gradual escalation and more Soviet involvement. [redacted]

k. Zambia

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Figure 9. (U) Zambia's President Kaunda with Soviet Ambassador Cherednik.

(u) In April 1982, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilyichev visited President Kaunda in Lusaka

Although the trip received very favorable Zambian press coverage and generated criticism of US policies, there is no evidence of any substantive results of the talks. In March 1983, the first CPSU delegation to visit Zambia in 2 years signed a 2-year protocol on cooperation with Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party. Finally, in April 1983, Moscow apparently reluctantly agreed to reschedule Zambia's debts, a move which

won the Soviets a public refutation by Kaunda in the Zambian press of "Western charges that the socialist bloc does not help the Third World countries economically."

(u) [redacted] The Soviets have frequently targeted Kaunda with disinformation campaigns designed to damage Zambian relations with Western nations. The most recent was intended to poison the air prior to the Zambian Head of State's visit to the US in late March 1983.

(u) [redacted] Zambia, along with other black states in Southern Africa, faces acute economic problems. The ability of the USSR to provide meaningful aid to the key mineral and agricultural sectors of the economy is limited by several factors. First, Western Europe and Japan already have extensive interests in Zambian mining and agriculture. Second, the markets for Zambian products are tied to the West.

[redacted] have been slow in providing the necessary economic aid.

(u) [redacted] is facing increased political and even military discontent, fomented by a deteriorating economy. Many government officials argue that it is through Western economic development and cooperation that Zambia may be able to solve its domestic ills, not through the purchase of Soviet military equipment. Past Soviet inability to provide substantial economic assistance has tempered Soviet influence in Zambia.

1. Zimbabwe

(u) [redacted] Prime Minister Robert Mugabe gained power in 1980, following a 7-year guerrilla war in which his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its military wing played the preponderant role in bringing an end to white rule in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Since that time, he has exercised consummate skill in overcoming the bitterness of the war and reassuring the West through moderate policies. Despite this, however, festering problems worsened during 1982, and today threaten to divert Zimbabwe from its constructive course, and possibly even to plunge the country into civil war. Zimbabwe's stability in the near future could be seriously jeopardized if Mugabe cannot successfully reconcile with his long-term rival Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the increasingly disaffected Ndebele ethnic group.

Nevertheless, for the near term it appears that Mugabe will remain cool toward the Soviets. Despite his advocacy toward a socialist course and movement toward establishing a one-party socialist state under the ZANU banner, he has accepted the need for a private sector in the national economy and has secured an immense amount of economic aid from the West. In international forums, he has guided Zimbabwe on a genuine nonaligned course as evidenced by trips to Eastern Europe and the United States in 1983.

(u) | - The future of Moscow-Harare relations appears to rest mainly on the principal issue of Zimbabwe's security. If the level of violence between ZANU and ZAPU continues to rise, as is likely, it will create a Zimbabwean need for foreign military supplies--needs which the Soviets can rapidly and relatively inexpensively meet. If neighboring South Africa supports ZAPU, massive amounts of military aid will be needed to counteract this threat.

n. South Africa (U)

The downfall of the current South African Government and its replacement with a socialist regime remains Moscow's ultimate goal in Southern Africa. The Soviets continue to support the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), which cooperate closely, as the primary means of destabilizing the pro-Western apartheid government. Active for 70 years, the ANC, since the late 1950s, has followed a Marxist-Leninist ideology and seeks to establish a multiracial, socialist society in South Africa. In pursuit of the goal, the ANC has maintained close ties with the South African Communist Party and other groups directly connected to the Soviet Union. SACP members dominate the ANC's highest decisionmaking bodies, including the military wing.

The ANC, led by Acting President Oliver Tambo, remains the prime insurgent group. It has enjoyed some success in directly attacking South African installations and property and has escalated its terrorist attacks to include sites in urban areas, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties. The ANC can be expected to continue these attacks, maintain its training and weaponry connections to the USSR in order to escalate its activities, and seek the overthrow of the minority South African regime. The USSR is in an excellent position to improve its influence with the ANC and demonstrate its firm support for what it considers a legitimate national liberation organization.

(u) [redacted] Moscow misses no opportunity to launch diplomatic attacks against Pretoria and to link the US with South Africa's widely condemned apartheid system. Recent themes of such attacks cite US political and economic ties as proof that the US supports apartheid. Moscow goes beyond mere interpretation of known facts, however, frequently publishing disinformation alleging US efforts to provide South Africa with nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons. The Soviets hope to ultimately replace the current government with one dominated by the SACP or at least a socialist-oriented, black-dominated government which will be indebted to Moscow for past assistance and future military security.

o. Mozambique

(u) [redacted] Soviet influence in Mozambique can be traced to Soviet support for the war against Portugal and the Marxist orientation of President Samora Machel and other top officials. When independence was achieved in 1975, the need developed to transform a guerrilla army into a conventional military force. The Soviets were considered a natural source of assistance. Although Machel did not limit his aid requests to the Soviet Union, it was the Kremlin which was willing and able to provide the necessary equipment and training. Consequently, since 1976, the Soviet Union has delivered over \$200 million in military equipment and provided for the training of the Mozambican military. This training has been conducted in Soviet Bloc states as well as in Mozambique. At present, there are some 600 Soviet military advisers in-country. These advisers are active in the counterinsurgency effort against the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO)*, a South African-supported antigovernment organization operating throughout Mozambique.

(u) [redacted] RENAMO has been conducting a successful insurgency since mid-1980 and operates throughout most of the country. As a result of the current insurgency, Mozambique's active support for anti-Rhodesian guerrillas in the late 1970s, and socialist economic shortsightedness, the country's economy has become a shambles. Although Moscow and Maputo had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in March 1977, the Soviets were slow in shoring up Machel's increasingly beleaguered regime. Following a series of visits, beginning in late 1981, by high-level military delegations of both sides, it became apparent that Moscow had agreed to provide additional military equipment. These visits and additional aid were probably the result of a reassessment by Machel of the serious threat posed by RENAMO. Machel's subsequent decentralization of the military and, to a lesser extent, the new equipment, improved the ability of Machel's army to counter RENAMO.

*(U) In the past, RENAMO has been referred to as the NRM.

(u) In an effort to acquire additional and more useful aid, President Machel has personally met with Soviet leaders on two recent occasions in the Soviet Union; in November 1982 following Brezhnev's funeral and, in March 1983, prior to attending the NAM summit in India. By some accounts, Machel was apparently unhappy with the results of these visits. Other than for a cultural-scientific protocol and some minor economic aid projects, no tangible results of either meeting in the form of agreements or treaties are known. Moscow pledged continued support for Mozambique and probably pressed Mozambique to promote a favorable image of the USSR at the NAM summit.

(u) The exclusiveness of past Soviet-Mozambican political ties has been reduced because of Moscow's reluctance to provide the amounts of economic aid needed by Machel. Although Soviet-Mozambican trade has increased dramatically over the past 5 years, Mozambique's economic ties remain primarily with the West and South Africa. In September 1982, the Soviet Union and Mozambique initiated the implementation of a long-term economic and trade cooperation program which extends until 1990. Since then the two countries have signed a 3-year and a 2-year trade agreement. However, the Soviets are still dragging their feet on the implementation of Mozambique's large-scale economic aid requests, and twice refused Mozambique's applications to join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).

(u) Machel has expressed his disappointment with this rejection, emphasizing that Mozambique is a socialist state. As such, developed socialist countries were obliged to assist an underdeveloped ally. The USSR leadership has countered that Mozambique was merely on the path toward socialism and is not yet a fully developed socialist state. Consequently, Moscow does not feel obliged to grant Mozambique's large-scale economic aid requests.

p. Madagascar

(u) The Soviets continue to pursue close relations with Madagascar

Since coming to power in 1975, leftist President Didier Ratsiraka has developed close ties with the USSR and more radical nonaligned states. Although he makes a great display of guarding his nonaligned status, during his most recent visit to the USSR in October 1981, he described the late Leonid Brezhnev as a "great and faithful friend" of the people of Madagascar. However, over the past year, relations have cooled somewhat.

(u) Ratsiraka has turned down all Soviet requests for naval and naval aviation access to facilities at Diego Suarez and Andrakaka airfield. He has, nevertheless, allowed Moscow to conduct some low profile, military-related activities on the island. This activity has been primarily related to communications, and reporting indicates that this activity is ongoing at the Andrakaka facility.

(u) [redacted] The Soviet military advisory presence decreased early this year at the request of the Malagasy Government [redacted]

[redacted] However, Ratsiraka [redacted] could request the return of the Soviet advisers as the Malagasy military is limited in their capability to maintain Soviet-supplied equipment. Moscow continues to lend two An-12/CUB transport aircraft with crews to the government. These provide much-needed military mobility as well as commercial transport. If the Malagasy continue their dependence on Soviet military personnel and equipment, Ratsiraka's efforts to expand military ties with the West may be limited.

(u) In addition to military cooperation, Moscow and Antananarivo continue to develop cultural and economic ties. In March 1983, the two signed their fourth cultural agreement since January 1977. It provides for a wide variety of exchanges, as well as for scholarships and Soviet instructors at Malagasy educational institutions. In October 1982, the Malagasy press reported that 1,400 students were studying in the USSR and that a large number of Soviet professors worked at the University of Madagascar and regional education centers.

(u) [redacted] Economic relations remain a minor aspect of the Soviet-Malagasy equation. In April 1982, Moscow agreed to reschedule Madagascar's commercial debt and the Soviets continue to extend credit and to make an occasional gift, although they provide no hard currency. The Soviet development projects have apparently gained Moscow the political benefit of opening a consulate in Tamatave, where the USSR is building a flour mill and near to where a road to the interior is under construction. But Madagascar's economic situation remains dire and Ratsiraka will make efforts to obtain and keep Western sources of economic aid.

(u) [redacted] Although Ratsiraka is seeking closer ties to Western nations for the purpose of obtaining economic aid, Moscow will continue to support him as long as he continues to support Soviet international policies, particularly in the Indian Ocean, and because of Madagascar's strategic location. [redacted]



q. Seychelles


(u) [redacted] Moscow remains committed to increasing its involvement in the Seychelles [redacted]


[redacted] The unstable socialist government of President Rene faces real and imagined external and internal threats and [redacted] therefore [redacted] seek East Bloc military security assistance at the same time as it attempts to maintain Western economic ties.

(u) The Soviets began making inroads into the Seychelles' military by offering ammunition for arms already in the inventory. Later, Moscow expanded its diplomatic presence and subsequently provided military hardware, including armored cars, artillery, air defense artillery, antitank weapons, radar, small arms, and trucks.



r. Mauritius


(u)  Prior to the elections in June 1982, which brought the  of Prime Minister Jugnauth to power, the previous Ramgoolam pro-West government attempted to broaden its foreign policy contacts by expanding relations with the USSR. Until recently, President Jugnauth continued this trend. However, the intense power struggle within his uneasy coalition government which pitted a radical faction of the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), led by Paul Berenger, against the more moderate left-wing Jugnauth faction culminated in a split in the coalition and a new coalition government formed. Jugnauth has been cool toward the Soviets and has indicated that relations between the two governments may even decrease.


U s. Tanzania

 Although Soviet-Tanzanian relations have been strained over the past years, Moscow remains interested in continuing its ties with this East African nation. Virtually bankrupt, the basis of the relationship is primarily the huge military debt owed by Tanzania to the Soviets and the Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) continuing need for Soviet technical advisers and spare parts. Since the mid-1970s when it supplanted China, the Soviet Union has provided the majority of military assistance to this nation. Since 1974,

replaced by the Soviet Union, since all Western states were unwilling to maintain a close relationship with Burundi. The Soviets are still the major arms supplier although France has recently increased its influence.



(u)  For Moscow, Ethiopia remains the most important country in Sub-Saharan Africa because it is the dominant country in the Horn of Africa and, because of its proximity to the oil rich Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. It is also the country most heavily committed to the maintenance of close ties with Moscow, although those ties frequently suffer strains of varying severity.



(u) Political ties increasingly focus on the formation of an Ethiopian Communist party. The Soviets have been pressing Chairman Mengistu for several years to accelerate the work of the Commission to Organize the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE). During Mengistu's October 1982 visit to Moscow, a CPSU-COPWE agreement was signed along with a more specific plan of ties for the period 1983-84. During the Second COPWE Congress in January 1983, Mengistu announced that the party would be formed at the Third Congress, probably in late 1984.

(4) The Soviets are also becoming more involved in Ethiopia's economy. Moscow remains a major supplier of petroleum to Ethiopia, currently at favorable rates; and is also conducting oil exploration in the Ogaden. From 1-15 March 1983, a Soviet delegation headed by Chairman of the Soviet State Planning Committee, Nikolai Baibakov, visited Addis Ababa to discuss Ethiopia's proposed 10-year economic development plan, scheduled to start in 1984. Baibakov recommended that the plan emphasize mining, energy, and agriculture. Ethiopia's collectivized agricultural system has been hard put to perform, particularly as a result of lack of agricultural expertise and military conscription of able-bodied farm laborers and continuous combat operations which destroy areas under agricultural development.