

March 11, 1963
**Secret Telegram from Maneli (Hanoi) to
Spasowski-Morski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 3175]**

Citation:

"Secret Telegram from Maneli (Hanoi) to Spasowski-Morski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 3175]", March 11, 1963, Wilson Center Digital Archive, AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-96, t-1368, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska. Published in CWIHP Working Paper No. 45. <https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/118915>

Summary:

Cable from Polish Ambassador in Hanoi Maneli to Warsaw, describing a conversation he had with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Soviet Ambassador Tovmassian. They discuss the idea of neutralization in Vietnam, and the possibility of the United States pulling forces out. Tovmassian adds that the PRC pressured the DRV to start incidents in the demilitarized zone.

Credits:

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Original Language:

Polish

Contents:

Translation - English

Secret

Ciphergram No. 3175

From...Hanoi.....dispatched on 03.11. at 12:00 hours.....received on 03.12. at 12:21hours...

Came in to the Decoding Department...03.12.63. at 14:30 hours.....

Spasowski-Morski

(FYI: Trojanowski, Thee)

□Eyes Only

I conducted lengthy conversations with Prime Minister [Pham Van Dong] and [Soviet Ambassador] Tovmassian.

Synthetic[1] conclusions are as follows:

1) The Prime Minister underscored several times that their policy regarding general Vietnam matters entirely corresponds with [those] of Moscow and Warsaw, that they want consistent execution of the Geneva Accords, that this is actually the neutralization of which [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru and [US Ambassador to India John Kenneth] Galbraith were speaking.

They considered and continue to consider the Geneva Accords as beneficial, [and] they do not want any foreign [military] bases or military alliances anywhere in Vietnam.

We assess this statement, together with Mikołaj [the Soviet embassy] as a real consent to something along the lines of neutralization also of the North under the condition that some other terminology be used.

2) The aim of struggles in the North, the Prime Minister said, is to aspire to establish a government based on a wide democratic range like the Laotian type.

The intensification of the struggles should lead to an international conference. I reminded [him] of the statement of Goburdhun that the Americans could withdraw only under the circumstances of saving face. He replied that he appreciated this necessity and that the Poles would surely find some intelligent formula [to solve this problem].

3) I am to present the following matters during the sessions of the commission [ICC]:

- a) introduction of weapons based on weekly reports of permanent groups b) chemical warfare
- c) provocations [conducted by] the South in the demilitarized zone.

4) In case of counter-accusations about the sabotage, I am to express consent for the creation of a mobile group which would conduct a full investigation with the participation of communication officers from both sides. Goburdhun told me that proving the sabotage by legal [court] channels is impossible.

5) Tovmassian informed me that the Chinese pressured [the DRV] to cause incidents in the demilitarized zone, but Secretary Le Duan decisively opposed this while stating that they wanted to show the world their good will. I add that based on the information and opinions of our officers one can recognize that there were attempts to cause incidents in the [demilitarized] zone by the North. They also acted ambiguously in Haiphong. I will relay details of these matters, as well as further results of consultations, later.

No. 94

Deciphered on 03.12. 18:30 hours

Deciphered by Miaśkiewicz, checked by Bakunowicz

[1] Translator's Note: In this case, synthetic means "relating to or involving synthesis: not analytic."