

**October 3, 1963**

**Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski  
(Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 12768]**

**Citation:**

"Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 12768]", October 3, 1963, Wilson Center Digital Archive, AMSZ, Warsaw; 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska. Published in CWIHP Working Paper No. 45. <https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/118982>

**Summary:**

Report by Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, on his meeting with the North Vietnamese delegation. The North Vietnamese outline their stance toward South Vietnam and the United States, looking to exploit the tension between the latter and Ngo Dinh Diem and a refusal to cease fighting until the US allows for negotiations and the formation of government in South Vietnam. They also want to establish contact between the International Control Commission and the NLF.

**Credits:**

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**Original Language:**

Polish

**Contents:**

Translation - English

Secret

Ciphergram No. 12768

From...Saigon.....dispatched on 03.10 at 10:00 hours.....received on 06.10 at 10:50 hours...

Came in to the Decoding Department...06.10 at 15:40 hours.....

Spasowski

I am presenting, in its summary, the report from my visit in Hanoi:

1. I was received by the prime minister [Pham Van Dong], the minister of foreign affairs [Xuan Thuy], and Ambassador Tovmassian.

2. As far as South [Vietnam is concerned], they [the North Vietnamese] stated:

a) They will carry out the fight until there is a change in the constellation of forces, and then the US would agree to negotiations and formation of the government [based] on a democratic coalition. Subsequently, this government will transform itself into a socialist one by way of peace, and not military means.

b) They want to exploit the divergences "Diem-USA"; if a part of the military loyal to the US were to rebel they would support Diem.

c) They positively assess de Gaulle's declaration, but they are not taking any public stance towards it. There are many signs which point to a rapprochement with France. They asked me about the divergences "Diem - Vatican - Western Europe" and the possibilities of exploiting them.

d) What struck me [while listening] to the [North] Vietnamese contemplation was the fact that they were ignoring the overall world situation and the existence of the socialist camp.

3. As far as the [International Control] Commission [is concerned], the prime minister [Pham Van Dong] and [foreign] minister [Xuan Thuy] accentuated the necessity of maintaining good cooperation with it. However, Ludwik [Ha Van Lau] stated that the [work of the] Commission should be limited by, among other things, reducing the number of [supervisory] groups. He asked about [our] opinion. I replied, "I will present this to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; as for now, I don't see any appropriate legal or political arguments."

4. The Vietnamese comrades want to establish contact between the Commission and the [National] Liberation Front. They will propose that the Commission, within the framework of good humanitarian services, be present at returning the six American prisoners of war by the [National Liberation] Front. I replied that I would turn [to you] for instructions. The Soviet comrades are supporting this proposal.

5. As to the meeting with Nhu, they asked not to decline if I were invited again. I justified my negative stance [towards such a request].

6. I was welcomed very warmly; Prime Minister [Pham Van Dong] in particular thanked me for all of the materials and the analysis.

7. All matters mentioned above were discussed with Tovmassian with the participation of Siedlecki.

Please [send] your instructions as to 3 and 4.

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/-/ Maneli

No. 460

Decoded on 07.10 at 8:30 hours

Decoded by Retański

Checked by Fiutowski