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**Cable from the Party Committee of the Chinese
Embassy in Romania, 'Summary Bulletin of
Romania's Domestic and International Policy and
Sino-Romanian Relations since the Moscow
Conference'**

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Summary:

In an exhaustive review of Romanian foreign policy, the Chinese Embassy concludes that the "USSR has a decisive influence over Romania's foreign policy."

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Summary Bulletin of Romania's Domestic and International Policy and Sino-Romanian Relations since the Moscow Conference

[...]

Developments in Romania's circumstances since the Moscow Conference have been heavily mixed. They have made progress on some issues, however they have upheld their mistaken views on several issues related to basic Marxist-Leninist principles. Relations between the party and the government have taken a step closer to Soviet domestic and international policies. In foreign relations, Sino-Romanian relations have basically normalized. On matters of basic principles, Romania has avoided directly contradicting us. At present, post-Moscow domestic and foreign policy in Romania and Sino-Romanian relations are as follows:

Since the Moscow Conference, Romanian opposition to imperialism and support for the people's liberation and independence movement has demonstrated significant changes. Their exposures of imperialism, above all American imperialism, have increased. With Kennedy in office for half a year, he has provided the people of all nations with a perfectly fine negative example. At a certain level, he has also educated the people of Romania and their leaders, leaving them on guard against the Kennedy administration's foolish policies and military strategies. The Romanian press has also borrowed from the Soviet phrasebook, saying, "American imperialism is the primary fort for global reactionary power. They are the world's police, the enemy of the world's peoples." However, Romania's exposures against imperialism have basically been put forth according to the fashion of a movement supporting ethnic liberation. Direct and straightforward exposures have been few and lacking in force. Their stance toward ethnic liberation is clearer now than it was before the Moscow conference, and their support has proved to be quite powerful. Romania has built up quite good relations with Cuba. They have made a large scale show of support the Cuban people's militarized struggle against the American empire's plot. In economic terms, they have given Cuba 15 million USD in payments and assisted their oil explorations. They have exposed the American empire's interference with Laos and come out in support of the Lao Patriotic Front and [Prince Souvanna] Phouma's positions. They have built up quite good relations with [Congoese Prime Minister Antoine] Gizenga and the Legitimate Government of the Congo. After [Congoese Prime Minister Patrice] Lumumba was assassinated, they organized 100 students at the Belgian Congoese embassy for a protest. Before and after the Ta-ta-na-li-fu [sic] meeting, there were also exposures made against the American empire. They have shown support for the struggles of the people of Albania. During Algeria-French diplomacy, Romania exposed and condemned France's planned conspiracy to use undercover means to colonize Algeria and divide the Sahara from Algerian territory. During this time, there was an increase in their assistance through press coverage to the people's struggle against servile followership of the American empire in Japan, South Korea and South Vietnam, to the people's struggle against the colonizers in Angola, and to the struggle within the labor movement in capitalist states against the class system. Within the socialist camp, they have tightly grasped the flag of unity, advancing their relations with the USSR. They have strengthened their exchanges with Eastern European nations. With the aid of visits from high-ranking heads of state, they have rectified some contradictions within their political policy and economic relations. They have escalated their struggle for North Korea and Vietnam, providing significant support for the people's struggles in those states. They have agreed with Vietnam to establish full time embassies and they have given them 22.5 million USD in conditional payments (15 million old rubles). Sino-Romanian relations have substantially warmed up since the Moscow Conference.

However, Romania's changes given above do not represent fundamental changes. Since the Moscow Conference, Romania's foreign policy and their relations with China, in addition to their methods of propaganda for Moscow's statements, their points of emphasis, and other kinds of behaviors all demonstrate that their

divergence with us on major principles has still not been remedied.

As concerns their relations with other socialist states, despite Romania's vehement emphasis on unity, and a generally warm attitude toward us, their attitude toward Albania has worsened significantly since the Moscow Conference. They have collaborated with the USSR and other fraternal Eastern bloc in administering their own noticeable, independent attacks. Nor have they merely denied political support, moreover they have enacted rigid censorship in their propaganda, such that the press does not print news from Albania. They have deliberately imposed numerous difficulties on the Albanian embassy's news bulletin. In a meeting with the Albanian ambassador, [Communist leader of Romania Gheorghe] Gheorghiu-Dej said that the lack of friendly treatment toward Albania was due to the fact that Albania did not stand with them (meaning the USSR, Romania, etc.).

Their dealings with imperialist states have also seen some changes, particular in terms of strategy. Their primary goal is still to cozy up to and enter into peaceful competition with capitalist states by way of developing economic and cultural connections. Therefore, despite their inability to resist supporting ethnic liberation movements, and contemporaneous with their slight exposures against the imperialist states, they are still harbor certain illusions about these states. Their relationship with the US is a clear example. Since the beginning, their strategy with Kennedy has been that of "cozying up first, hitting back second." We hope there will be changes in their foreign strategy. Before and after Kennedy took office, the Romanian press consistently placed the blame for US aggression and military policy on Eisenhower. In March, the Kennedy administration stepped up their aggressive tactics against Laos and Cuba. Even then, Gheorghiu-Dej still entrusted his hopes for peaceful diplomacy in a meeting to be held between high-ranking leaders of four countries. His address to voters emphasized, "The policies put in place by the US are major obstacles to the development of entente and collaborative international relations...They have thwarted the positive results of numerous international summits and engagements." After news spread of the meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev, the Romanians announced a "victory for diplomacy." In order to complement this meeting, they showed four American films. Afterward, they separated the People's Democratic Party and the Republican Party. They stated that the Republicans were against diplomacy. On 16 August, based on an article posted in the New York Daily News and abstracted by ITAR-TASS, Scînteia and three other news outlets announced that Kennedy's foreign policy was essentially that of Eisenhower, the result of pressure by right-wing republican politicians. In the course of progressive economic and cultural development with the US, UK, France, USSR, Italy and FRG, they deeply worship Western civilization, particularly American skills. Their dependency on American trade went up from 10.1 million leu in 1959 to 41.6 million leu in 1960. In 1960, their trade with England, France, West Germany and Italy went up 71.5%, 86%, 110% and 130%, respectively. In 1961, their trade went up again by 30% with France and 60% with Italy. In the first part of 1961, France, Australia and Italy have successively held industry showcases in Romania. American businessmen, the chairman of England's international trade initiative, and a business delegation from West Germany have made successive visits to Romania, all treated with extreme importance by Romania. In June, the Vice President of the Council of Ministers [Alexandru] Moghioroș brought an unofficial government delegation to US and Canadian meetings, not returning until mid-August. The primary objective of this was to study some agricultural practices, while at the same time conducting some friendly political activities. This is not unrelated to the issue of petrochemical equipment brought up by the Americans during the businessmen's visit to Romania earlier in the year. By the early part of 1959, Romania had already begun to accept payment in the form of equipment from the UK, France and other states. In recent years they have begun signing three to five year long-term trade agreements with Western states. Romania's cultural exchange with France, Italy, etc. was initially very frequent, but after the US-Romanian cultural exchange association agreement last year on 9 December, the volume of personnel and cinematic exchange has already begun to surpass that with France and Italy. The US-Romanian cultural exchange association is involved in education, science,

training, industry, performing arts, radio, television, sports, travel, etc. Its scope is extremely large. Since this year, American personnel in Romania include: a 94 person wind orchestra from the University of Michigan, a 30 person basketball team, and high volume tour groups (400 people just in mid-February). The strengthening of economic relations with "Americanist" states cannot but reflect on Romania's foreign policy and the development of cultural exchange. It will also inevitably broaden the influence of the bourgeoisie in Romania.

Following the Moscow conference, Romania made certain to contain Romanian-Yugoslav relations within the realm of national relations. For example, during the 40 year anniversary of the Romanian government, the Yugoslav ambassador was not invited to the ceremony. However, since they still harbor certain illusions about Yugoslavia, they plan to advocate for Yugoslavia's return to the socialist camp, which they say will benefit a relaxed international climate and the advancement of peaceful coexistence. They are more so afraid that if they tarnish Romanian-Yugoslav relations, it will create tension at their southwest border. Therefore, in seeking to remedy their relations with Yugoslavia, Romania has been very cautious, and they have struggled to the utmost to create good relations. Although the pamphlets and articles published by Romania since the Moscow conference occasionally bring up the responsibility of opposing modern Yugoslav revisionism, these are just standard slogans that are brought up for their own sake. They have certainly not made any deep exposures or criticisms. Speeches by the Romanian leaders are even more hesitant to oppose Yugoslav revisionism by name. Not only do they refuse to support the Yugoslav anti-revisionist rebels in exile, but they have even taken steps to obstruct them. Through reporting the Yugoslav political exiles, Romania and Pakistan want them to either become Romanian citizens or citizens of another socialist country, their motive evidently being the limitation of Yugoslav exiles' anti-revisionist activities. Since this year, public organizations between the people of Romania and Yugoslavia, particularly trade unions, has gone up considerably. Women's organizations and social justice committees also come into contact. Athletic and artistic exchanges, along with other cultural forms, are also quite frequent.

Since the publication of the statements from Moscow, despite their acknowledgement of the dual character of an authoritative national bourgeoisie, they have still continued their cozying up with nationalist states and their refusal to explicitly criticize them. For example, they have always believed that India and the United Arab Republic are Afro-Asian powers, that they have a great influence over Afro-Asian nationalist states, and they haven't dared to condemn them. They have even helped whitewash their deeds. Even as India was drawing closer to the US day by day, on 15 August the Free State of Romania reprinted an article published by India with some real bragging in it, saying that [Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru's Indian government has enacted a socially just national security policy and made substantial contributions to solving many international issues. At the Bandung Conference, they contributed especially to the struggle to defend and strengthen the principle of peaceful coexistence, etc. etc.

Also, in considering Romania's methods of propagandizing of statements from Moscow and the contents of that propaganda, it is clear that Romania's old views still have yet to shift. After publishing the statements, Romania did not in any way energetically mobilize to divide up the public and conduct debates. Moreover, what they did first was to take whatever there was in the Conference that implicated the CCP's "mistakes" and disseminate this down so as to consolidate the internal opinion and understanding (it has been reported that the Romanians sent some speeches by Khrushchev and [French Communist Party leader Maurice] Thorez to certain members of the central committee). Afterwards, they quoted some passages from the statements to explain their mistaken viewpoints. During their studies, they advanced the discussion through articles published in the press as part of an effort to deny the public's suspicion, which stemmed from Romania's history of mistaken viewpoints and from discontinuities between their oratory and the actual statements from

Moscow. As far as the contents of their propaganda, there were things said in there that had not been said in the past. In addition, their wording was somewhat more comprehensive. But overall, regarding epochs, war vs. peace, peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition, etc., they still maintained their same outdated points of view. They asserted that Lenin's definition of the modern era "already cannot precisely reflect the basic facts of the present," going on to say that supporting Leninist beliefs is just "one-sided indoctrination." They verbally acknowledged both views, that the World War can be stopped and that the dangers of war are still present. Based on the theory of the unique importance of weapons, they claim, "It is difficult to predict whether the most bellicose of Pentagon generals would make this argument, if he were aware that what death awaited him within the first few days of a hot nuclear conflict." They depict the terrors of war in extreme terms and bully those who say that it will "strengthen people's willingness to struggle for peace." They still primarily rest their hopes on bringing about total disarmament, and they make this out to be an achievable goal in the present time. They fantasize that "total, comprehensive disarmament is the quickest, most effective path to peace and world leadership, because total, comprehensive disarmament essentially eliminates the possibility for war." The slogan of achieving the Three "Withouts" World through nuclear disarmament appears constantly in the press and in speeches by leaders. (When Gheorghiu-Dej visited the USSR, his wording of the Three "Withouts" World was already different than the previous version). The general line of the socialist state foreign policy is to continue to emphasize peaceful coexistence. Although acknowledging peaceful coexistence is an important form of class struggle, emphasizing this form of struggle should demonstrate the peaceful competition of the two opposing systems in every field. Merely emphasizing peaceful coexistence helps the development of class struggle within capitalist states, as well as the possibility for individuals in colonized states engage in nationalist activities. Moreover, never mentioning revolution or ethnic liberation movements also advances the consolidation of peaceful coexistence. Acknowledging the transition from capitalism to socialism raises two possibilities, but further emphasizing the transition to peace means the belief that "the power of the world's stage to benefit socialist transformation is such that, under peaceful conditions, it is possible to break through the front line of imperialism.

Both domestic and international elements have led to the above mistakes in Romania's interior beliefs and actions. After 19 years of peaceful construction following independence, their economic situation has changed drastically. They fear that a world war will shatter their precious pot. With the development of their economy, the standard of living has gone up—though relative to other Eastern bloc fraternal states it is still low. Their people are inclined toward taking life easy, and as such the Romanian leaders are emphasizing material stimulation for their economy. Ideological government has adapted to being left behind; in foreign relations their only emphasis is peaceful competition. Therefore, capitalist pleasure-seeking and pacifism have grown enormously. In international matters, this arises on the one hand from the influence within the socialist camp of the Soviet foreign policy and global perspective, but on the other hand it is the product of pressure from the imperialist states, which is why Romania does not dare to confront them with sharp struggle, but instead plans to give up ground and make unprincipled compromises, easing international tensions in exchange for peace.

The USSR has a decisive influence over Romania's foreign policy. Since the Moscow Conference, Soviet-Romanian relations have grown even more intimate. Romania does its best to praise Khrushchev and the Central Committee. They sent a party and government delegation headed by Gheorghiu-Dej to the USSR in July, emphasizing the complete unity between their views and taking the opportunity to offer their political support. It appears that Romania has become the USSR's most respectful and competent role-player within the international communist movement. Concerning foreign policy, Romania is fundamentally in agreement in the USSR. However, since they have their own interests in mind, their attitude toward the American imperialists seems particularly weak compared with that of the USSR.

This is the manner in which Romania blindly follows close behind Khrushchev. First of all, the Romanian leaders' thinking is basically identical to Khrushchev's. In addition, Romania and the USSR share a long, unique history; their economic and political connections offer great benefits. The USSR is Lenin's homeland, the first socialist nation: this fact cannot help but give rise to superstitions about the USSR. At the same time, it was the Soviet army that liberated Romania, therefore earning their admiration. Economically, Romania has an immense dependence on the USSR. According to the Eight Nations Economic Assistance Committee's integrated program, this dependence is increasing every day. Romania's six year plan and their projections through 1980 were all formulated in the USSR. Their mining and industrial infrastructures were all completed using Soviet equipment. Their police methods are modeled on the Soviet example. Their training requirements, in addition to many of their materials including pellets, coke, [illegible], cotton, etc. are predominately dependent on the USSR. Moreover, the USSR is the leading market for Romanian goods. As such, Romania's domestic economic plan has essentially been rolled into the Soviet economic plan, and their products carry a heavy component of Soviet input. Any single measure within the USSR's economic relationship with Romania can have an enormous influence, and serious after effects, upon the country's economic life. Therefore, Romania's economic reliance on the USSR has led to major political pressure, and it has become a deciding factor in the determination of Romania's foreign policy. Meanwhile, Soviet control over personnel in the Romanian government and Communist Party, particularly the military, foreign ministry, economic and political offices, even civilian organizations, has reached an exceedingly high degree. For example, appointments at the colonel level and above must all undergo Soviet training. It has become commonplace in recent years for young Soviet-educated cadres to replace the original cadres in schools and factory enterprise. Following the Moscow Conference, there have also been substantive shifts within decision-making organs of the Romanian Central Committee. The result of this recent shakeup has been to elevate the ranking within the core of Romania's leadership of those who support and adhere to the USSR: [Gheorghe] Apostol, [Nicolae] Ceaușescu, [Alexandru] Drăghici, [Leontin] Sălăjan, etc. The current Chairman of the Council of Ministers [Ion Gheorghe] Maurer has never been anything but tepid toward us. Most of the officials from the old government, supporters of reason and objective researchers, not to mention bearers of good feelings toward China, have been deposed, including President of the National People's Assembly [Constantin] Pîrvulescu and Vice President of the Council of Ministers [Dumitru] Popa. Other individuals with good impressions of China, such as Chivu Stoica and [Emil] Bodnăraș, have managed to maintain their posts in the new government, but have been designated to posts concerned with socialist state relations. The Foreign Ministry has also made adjustments. The present Foreign Minister was a colonel in 1952. Since then, his career has skyrocketed. He quickly became major general, then lieutenant general, then foreign minister, only because he was not a Central Committee member. He clearly has a history (as of now the details are still unclear). On 1 May of last year, Mu-er-nai-shan [sic], always tepid toward us, replaced Du-mi-te-lei-si-ku [sic] as the Deputy Foreign Minister, a position chiefly occupied with China. Soviet control over Romanian personnel matters is one of the deciding elements that compel Romania to follow the USSR in its domestic and foreign policy.

There are also a few points of conflict between the USSR and Romania. This demonstrates the paradox between the USSR's increased restrictions upon Romanian politics and economics, and Romania's struggle for a certain degree of independence. Stalin's brand of patriotism from when he was alive still leaves its mark in the present. Romania is bound to have misgivings about this. The historical struggle between Romania and the Soviets for control of Moldavia still produces anti-Soviet emotions among the Romanian people. Romania has a Soviet-Romanian friendship month once a year. The large-scale Soviet friendship activities held last year in Iași are proof that their relationship is not a flawless one. The USSR's strict control over Romania's military poses a threat to Romania's leaders themselves. In terms of their specific actions and positions in international relations, they are clearly not in complete unity with one another. Romania's apprehension toward the international

situation come from their own feelings of fear, which is why they appear weaker than the USSR, since they cannot keep from envisioning that one day war will break out. Will all they have be annihilated? Will they be able to control what happens to them?

However, as far as the present situation, the more important aspect is that which is shared almost completely by the USSR and Romania. The paradoxes are only incidental; some are not particularly obvious.

Soviet-Romanian relations have thawed since the Moscow Conference, and yet, since the basic disagreements over principle are still there, the situation developing now between the USSR and Romania only appears to be loosening. It does not amount to a substantively positive turn. Romania's approach toward China since the Conference has been that of seeking common ground despite the existence of differences, staying alert to new developments, and awaiting what is to come. Domestically, they are restrictive, and internationally, they loosen up. For over eight months, the situation in Sino-Romanian relations has shown the following signs:

(1) In terms of international relations and foreign relations etiquette, things have basically normalized. The Romanian reception toward China's visiting delegation was comparatively warm and friendly. There is a marked difference between this and what happened prior to the Moscow Conference. However, this type of warmth and friendliness is rather superficial. Despite the fact that Romania avoids direct confrontation, as well as divergence on issues, during their meetings with us, they are not eager to have deep contacts or sincere discussion either.

(2) They still strive for blockades against us, and have achieved convergence in some areas. Following the Bucharest Conference, Romania has repeatedly obstructed and assaulted the publication of our embassy's news bulletin. It had already gone into publication following the Moscow Conference. Despite things still not being completely normalized—certain issues have been pulled out, an extremely serious phenomenon—in the end, it is being distributed again (in effect, this is under the condition that we do not discuss matters of policy). Every publication offers coverage of our international struggles and activities, in addition to our successes in economic construction. In the course of commenting on our country's economic development, the emphasis is on the USSR's assistance, the inseparable nature of our success and Soviet aid. When there is coverage of news from China, the majority of it deals with our party's leader Mao Zedong and his strong leadership. When covering our efforts and activities in international affairs, they basically stick to their own interests, violently abridging the piece to symbolize their own points of view. Anything that they do not agree with does not get published. There was not a single word of the Ninth Plenary Conference's bulletin or its resolutions. There was no press whatsoever devoted to the documents we supplied for our "8/1" Army Day.

(3) They appear to support our claim to legal membership in the United Nations, but they continue to be reticent as concerns our struggles with India and other states. When capitalist states issue attacks against us, Romania neither reprints them nor retorts against them. Nor do they publish or reprint our articles that rebuke and slander imperialism.

(4) Their manner of generally avoiding public denunciations of China (same as toward Albania) is slightly different from that of countries like Germany or Czechoslovakia. However, there are still denunciations made through recourse to innuendo. Yet these are here and gone again, like flashes in a pan. After our statements are issued, the public can see that all of China's views are reflected therein. The Romanian leadership's strategy for neutralizing the influence of our statements is to act in the spirit of not letting the public engage in deep study of these statements, but instead to internally propagate the statements from the Moscow Conference with language in them that denounces China. This counters the public's feelings of doubt toward them.

(5) In Sino-Romanian negotiations related to culture and economics, Romania's attitude has been good on the whole. Their policy has been that of advancing in order to retreat. In general, they issue plans that are far more grandiose than the ones we issue, and then retract their plans in favor of ours. During our trade negotiations, they expressed their understanding toward our hardships resulting from the two years of extreme natural disaster, yet they still sought to expand trade volume as much as possible.

(6) Although they do not wish to propagandize for our experience level, they still study specific categories of our experience which have been effectual, such as our agricultural system's "eight character constitution," our integration of education and labor, our generalist approach within the military, and so on.

All in all, the facts show that Romania has been struggling to avoid a worsening of foreign relations with China since the Moscow Conference. They are still waiting for the situation to develop. We believe that the reasons for this state of affairs are roughly as follows:

(1) For a long time now, Chairman Mao and the CCP have enjoyed a high amount of prestige, and a significant influence, among the Romanian people and certain of their politicians. Any action that harms the friendship between China and Romania has been met with refusal in the greater Romanian public.

(2) China is a powerful state with 650 million people. It is a state with enormous political and economic force within the socialist camp. It is unthinkable that our state would be relegated outside of the socialist camp.

(3) Since the diminution in Sino-Romanian trade volume, a result of the hardships caused by our two years of natural disaster, is already having a certain effect on Romanian economic and political life, Romania's dependence on China for economic goods (particularly rare earth metals and agricultural industrial crops) must continue to increase as our country's nationalized agriculture and skills continue their rapid development. Romania cannot help but take this into account.

(4) The current international situation is certainly not developing in the direction of the mistaken views and desires. In fact, it continues to prove the correctness of our views. What has happened in regions like Cuba and Laos is bound to be a valuable lesson for them.

(5) We have adopted correct strategies for managing certain contradictions within a socialist state. Due to our continuing implementation of the Central Committee's strategies, it has been possible to maintain generally friendly relations over the complicated course of China and Romania's long-term struggle, with results that are neither good nor bad.

Coming to Sino-Romanian relations in the present time, we believe that, based on the above circumstances, little in particular has changed, as is the case with the development of the international situation. Over the course of many years, Romania has continued to adopt a generally restrictive policy toward China, waiting anxiously for future developments in Sino-Soviet relations. On many issues, they still seek common ground despite the existence of differences, with firm domestic restrictions, relaxed international policy, and support for friendly harmony. It could be that their propaganda on our successes in construction has relaxed, whereas their propaganda on our strategic policy roads has become more limited. During international events, they are careful about appearances, formalities, not engaging with facts, and

avoiding direct confrontations. Sino-Romanian relations change with the times, taking their cue from the status of Sino-Soviet relations. We reckon that they are often more positive, though. Sometimes they are worse; sometimes they get hot, and sometimes cold. The basic status is still cold. If it gets better, it won't be much better. It may get worse, but not to the most hostile degree.

The development orientation in Sino-Soviet relations is proof of the complete accuracy of the predictions made by the Central Committee following the Moscow Conference, as well as the correctness of its strategies to raise Marxist-Leninist Moscow declarations and statements; elevate the flag of harmony; support principles and harmony; work hard; and, most of all, secure Sino-Soviet harmony, adopting a colder attitude to separatist fraternal states.

In order to complete the project of Sino-Romanian harmony and friendship with honesty, we have to do well in our investigation and research, and continue to implement the Central Committee's strategies and policies, in addition to Mao Zedong thought and measures. During foreign negotiations, we must go up against the upper crust of officials. We have to preserve those who uphold correct views and support China with friendship. We have to harmoniously struggle against those who doubt China, yet still want to have contacts with us. For example, when they bring up a suggestion that there should be a mandatory explanation for Central Committee policies, we must wait patiently and work harder. We should escalate our vigilance toward those who split from our views. For example, when an argument breaks out, we can use sharp verbiage to make our point clear. We will not nag, for we must be considerate in our etiquette, and in form we will be friendly, give ground, and not hurt feelings. But at the same time, we must make the proper mental preparation, get our hands ready, and protect against a spontaneous attack from the opposition. In our propaganda, we must look at the context and the response. We should have different attitudes toward different people. We must take hold of moderation during our speeches, work bit by bit, and wait patiently. At the appropriate time, we can commence our attendances and visitations, thus maintaining as much as possible our close connections with the Romanian Central Committee and upper-level cadres. This will be some of the long term, painstaking work. On issues related to major principles in Sino-Romanian relations, we have to follow correctness to systematize the conflicting ideas and principles within the populace, opening up a stable state of affairs. We will continue to express ourselves and refuse to compromise. This will allow us to reach the goals of harmonious friendship and unity on the basis of Marxist-Leninism and the Moscow declarations and statements.

Please alert us to any mistakes in the above report.

Party Committee of the Chinese Embassy in Romania
21 August 1961

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