

May 24, 1953

**Sample Plan for the Draft Response to the Notes of
the Three Powers**

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Summary:

Unhappy with the call for a conference in Lugano, this plan outlines several points that should be taken into consideration when drafting the official response including the Soviet awareness that any lack of results from this conference would result in blame being placed on the Soviet state and the dismissal of questions raised by the Soviet government in prior correspondence. The Soviets conclude that they should arrange the program of the conference in order to maximize the conferences effectiveness in resolving lingering post-war problems.

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SAMPLE PLAN
FOR THE DRAFT RESPONSE TO THE NOTES OF THE THREE POWERS FROM
18.X.1953

In preparing the response to the notes of the three powers, one should be guided by the following:

1. The three powers are trying to call a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 4 powers in Lugano on 9 November, in order to use the lack of results from this conference for putting pressure on France and Italy to force them to expedite the ratification of the Paris agreement for the creation of a "European army." The lack of results from the conference will be used by them in order to put the blame on the intractability of the Soviet Union.

2. In their response notes to the 28 September note from the Soviet government, the governments of the three powers have essentially rejected the Soviet proposal for a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 5 powers for the examination of measures to decrease tension in international relations. Moreover, they are citing the upcoming political conference on Korea and the UN deliberations on a number of questions pertaining to the problems of reducing tensions in the international arena.

Our response to these notes from the three powers should insist on the Soviet government's proposal for a conference of the 5 powers and present criticism of the three powers on this question.

3. Noting that at the present time the government of the USA is taking all measures to influence France and Italy in order to achieve an expedited ratification of the Paris agreement, our response should once again focus the question on the impact upon the German people and the movement toward peace that would be caused by the creation of the "European army" and its inclusion of the revenge-seeking West German armed forces headed by Hitlerian generals.

4. The note should lay out our program for the conference, as well as the conference programs of the three powers, and demonstrate that the Soviet program is directed at maximizing the effective results of the conference of powers which are possible at the present time and which would create the necessary preconditions for a successful resolution of all unresolved post-war questions.

On the other hand, the conference program proposed by the three powers does not bring the fundamental questions up for resolution and thus cannot lead to effective results.

5. Point out that the notes of the three western powers do not provide an answer to important questions raised by the Soviet government in the note of 28 September and, in particular, regarding the discussion at the 5 powers conference of the questions of arms reduction, prohibition of military bases on foreign government territory, cessation of military propaganda, and others. To demonstrate further that, in their notes, the three powers also did not provide answers regarding the Soviet draft for the Foundations of a Peace Treaty with Germany, the convening of a peace conference on the German question, and so on.

6. It should also be noted that the three powers, while rejecting the Soviet proposals for a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 5 countries and for the examination of the most important questions pertaining to Germany, are at the same time in reality carrying out measures that are increasing tension in the international situation (the formative creation of the West German revenge-seeking army, the events in Trieste, and so on).

7. Our response should insist on the Soviet government position laid out in the notes of 4 and 15 August and 28 September.

8. With regard to the Austrian question, our response should emphasize that the Soviet government has still not received a reply to its note of 28 August regarding the question of the Austrian treaty and, in particular, on the question whether the three powers are prepared to withdraw their condensed draft of the treaty. Point out that the Soviet government, as it had already stated previously, continues to express readiness to continue the discussion of the question of the Austrian treaty through normal diplomatic channels.

9. Present the Soviet agenda for the conference, stating that we are prepared to examine during the conference also those questions that interest the three powers.

Inquire the governments of the three powers whether they agree to discuss the questions raised by the Soviet Government.

10. At the conclusion of the note, point out that the Soviet Government does not object to holding this conference in Lugano. With respect to the dates of the conference, this may be easily agreed upon once an agreement is reached regarding the conference participants and the questions to be examined at the conference.

11. Our note must not be bullying. At the same time, it must not give reason to be perceived as a USSR refusal from the Lugano conference.