February 15, 1969

Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs [ISA] Paul Warnke to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 'Stopping the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the Middle East'

Citation:

"Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs [ISA] Paul Warnke to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 'Stopping the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the Middle East'", February 15, 1969, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Mandatory declassification review request. Originally published in Avner Cohen and William Burr, eds., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book #485 (September 12, 2014).

https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/121092

Summary:

Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke wrote this memo to the Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to alert him to the new reality that Israel may already possess nuclear weapons or was very close to that point. Warnke proposed that Laird "consider another serious, concerted, and sustained effort to push Israel to halt its work on strategic missiles and nuclear weapons."

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

Cash .

++ 31 -0-

See.

1

11111

1101-101-101-1

3

Original Scan

2

SPATIAL STR

		ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEPENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 2000	:
		1,5 FEB 1969	
	IN ANDRES REALIZED THE	1-35091/69	1
	HENORANDUM FOR T	THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	
	SUBJECT: Stoppi Middie	ing the introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the East //)	H
ар С	As have report	ed to you, from all of the available intelligence and intensive conversations with Ambassador Rabin in the fall	L SPHEL
		25X1 and 6, E.O.13526 ations on this subject with Ambassedor Rabin were) =
	no serious threat		
8	does not coincide	dity of israel's position from its own standpoint, it with the interests of the United States and, in fact,	у М., С
0.13526	does not coincide constitutes the s enough without nue The problem is how	dity of israel's position from its own standpoint, it with the interests of the United States and, in fact, ingle most dangerous phenomenon in an area dangerous clear weepons.	
6, E.O.1	does not coincide constitutes the s enough without num The problem is how the development of more than invoke s duction" of nuclea	dity of israel's position from its own standpoint, it with the interests of the United States and, in fact, ingle most dangarous phenomenon in an area dangerous clear weapons. w to stop this development. If the israelis complete <u>f a nuclear weapon within the next 3 to 6 months</u> we will be powerless to do sanctions, i.e., cease delivery of F-4s after the "intro- er weapons into the area. Such a negative course would	
	does not coincide constitutes the s enough without num The problem is how the development of more than invoke s duction ¹¹ of nuclea take us nowhere. genie back in the strength would be invoking the sanct	dity of israel's position from its own standpoint, it with the interests of the United States and, in fact, ingle most dangerous phenomenon in an area dangerous clear weapons. w to stop this development. If the israelis complete f a nuclear weapon within the next 3 to 6 months we will be powerless to do senctions, i.e., cease delivery of F-4s after the "intro- ar weapons into the area. Such a negative course would The israelis would be unable and unwilling to put the bottle. Moreover, their requirement for conventional greater, not less, and the likelihood of our actually ions would not be great in such circumstances.	
and 6, E.O.1	does not coincide constitutes the s enough without num The problem is how the development of more than invoke s duction ¹¹ of nuclea take us nowhere. genie back in the strength would be invoking the sanct Furthermore, at any thereafter, we may facts. So far thes stantiated, and not	dity of israel's position from its own standpoint, it with the interests of the United States and, in fact, ingle most dangerous phenomenon in an area dangerous clear weapons. w to stop this development. If the israelis complete f a nuclear weapon within the next 3 to 6 months we will be powerless to do senctions, i.e., cease delivery of F-4s after the "intro- ar weapons into the area. Such a negative course would The israelis would be unable and unwilling to put the bottle. Moreover, their requirement for conventional greater, not less, and the likelihood of our actually ions would not be great in such circumstances. by time prior to such events, or certainly not long well be faced with public knowledge of the essential se facts have remained in the category of yaque, unsub-	Y 21
25X1 and 6, E.O.1	does not coincide constitutes the s enough without num The problem is how the development of more than invoke s duction" of nuclea take us nowhere. genie back in the strength would be invoking the sanct Furthermore, at any thereafter, we may facts. So far the stantiated, and not on luck. Once the tion's delicate tag	dity of israel's position from its own standpoint, it with the interests of the United States and, in fact, ingle most dangerous phenomenon in an area dangerous clear weapons. w to stop this development. If the israelis complete f a nuclear weapon within the next 3 to 6 months we will be powerless to do senctions, i.e., cease delivery of F-4s after the "intro- ar weapons into the area. Such a negative course would The israelis would be unable and unwilling to put the bottle. Moreover, their requirement for conventional greater, not less, and the likelihood of our actually ions would not be great in such circumstances. by time prior to such events, or certainly not long well be faced with public knowledge of the essential se facts have remained in the category of yaque, unsub-	15 21/2



of certain factors of which I have apprised you, we were unable at that time to extract from the israelis agreement to sign the NPT and guarantee a cessation of work on nuclear weapons and strategic missiles. They did however, renew their agreement that israel "will not be the first power In the Middle East to Introduce nuclear weapons," and " not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier." It was further made clear in the agreement that the American definition of "introduction" would apply. (The agreement consists of an exchange of letters between Ambassador Rabin and myself dated 22 and 27 November 1968, respectively, copies attached at Tab B.) Furthermore, the government of Israel recognized our right "under unusual and compelling circumstances, when the best interests of the United States require it, to cancel all or part of its commitment to provide F-4 aircraft and related equipment and services at any time prior to the delivery of these defense articles or performance of these services." Such "unusual and compelling circumstances" would, under the terms of this agreement, not only exist were israel to produce or possess nuclear weapons but at any time in our opinion that their activities constitute a danger to the security to the United States.

My extreme concern about the gravity of the risk leads me to urge that you consider another serious, concerted, and sustained effort to persuada israel to cease and desist its work on strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. Some of the factors to be considered and my views on them, are:

I. It would be preferable to have the negotiations in Washington (not Tel Aviv). Better control over the operations will exist here; it is extremely difficult for any Ambassador to convey fully the serious purpose of the U.S. Government and to be as tough as will be required in this case.

2. The first demarche might best be made by the President, or by you and the Secretary of State together. Because the U.S. Government tried once unsuccessfully, high level participation is needed to convey the strength of our purpose. Horeover, a Defense Department representative should be present at all negotiations.

3. An israell request for a formal U.S. Security Guarantee as a <u>guid pro quo</u> can be expected. To accede to such a request would be tantamount to placing all of our chips in the entire area on israel for an indefinite period and surely without commensurate control over israel's policies or actions.

4. We may have to offer, through an exchange of letters, to supply israel with conventional weapons in such quantity and kind as to assure them superiority over any combination of Arab foes. However, we are more or less in this position now.

5. Because of probable resort to delaying tactics, a time limit should be set, after which we would stop supplying F-4s and related services.

2

3


1122003

101 St. Pills 7. .

きんち いたいろ

3

3



israel's resistance to this proposition will be of a high order and all our influence would be required to overcome it. This influence is probably neither so great as other governments think nor so weak as those who have long dealt with israel believe. But we could not hope to succeed if, as we have done in the past, we concurrently placed equal emphasis on changing israel's policies with respect to other matters of importance to her -- for example, to give up the militarily important Sinai to a hostile Egypt, to be generous with Jordan over Jerusalem and the West Bank, to give up her policy of retailation, to adopt a negotiating stance with Ambassador Jarring which suits our taste, etc.

if you agree with this course of action, you may want to discuss it with the Secretary of State with a view to approaching the President jointly. Although the President may wish to discuss the matter with the NSC members -- without putting it on the agenda -- this extremely delicate operation would best be undertaken outside the regular NSC machinery.

Ralph Earle and Harry Schwartz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, are fully familiar with this matter.

2 Enclosures: 1. Tab A - MemCons 2. Tab B - Ltrs - 22 & 27 Nov 68

Original Scan

.0352.67%



HINGTON, D. C. 20201

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TRANSA SECURITY AND

4 November 1968 Refer to I-35993/68

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

Participants:

Israeli Bid

Ambassador of Israel, Ideutenant General Yitzhak Rab:

Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy "Major" General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1400 - 1445, 4 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, Pentagon

Ambassador Rabin opened the conversation by referring to his meeting on 30 October with Ambassador Harr, in which Mart had asked Rabin to write a proposed Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the provisions Israel considered necessary to the F-4 sale. This was written and delivered to Ambassador Hart. "We put in it what we whought was necessary, following the precedent of the prior agreement (A-4 aircraft)." Last Friday, 1 November, Rabin said he received a call from Department of State to the effect that "in principal, the answer is yes" with regard to Israel's request for F-4s and that he was to get in touch with Mr. Warnke. Ambassador Rabin said that today he would like to get agreement on how we proceed but not go into details.

Mr. Warnke said that he would like at the outset to set forth the United Stated' position. The President sprees in principal to the sale. It is a difficult decision, not because we are not interested in Israel's security,

KJE 15 KS

but precisely because we are interested. Heretofore, we have avoided becoming the principal arms supplier to Israel. Wherever possible we have urged that Israel acquire its arms from other Western countries. We felt that this was to, our mutual benefit for it lessened the risk of US-USSR confrontation in the Middle East and therefore lessened the dangers to the security of the United States and Israel. We would prefer to continue that policy; however, the Europeans apparently have opted out, and the French particularly seem reluctant to supply the Mirage aircraft Israel has purchased.

LEP SECRET

Mr. Warnke stressed that with a decision to go ahead on the sale of F-4 aircraft we will have a different set of circumstances concerning our supply relationship to Israel. We will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel's security situation . and involving more directly the security of the United States.

Mr. Warnke reminded Ambassador Rabin that Secretary Rusk had talked with Foreign Minister Eban about the problems and the dangers of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. Mr. Warnke referred specifically to the paragraph in the standard sales contract which permitted cancellation "under unusual and compelling circumstances"; he suggested that Israeli acquisition of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons would comprise such circumstances. Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that because the security of the United States was clearly involved we must seek from the Government of Israel certain assurances:.

(1) that Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles,

(2) that Israel will not develop, manufacture, or otherwise acquire strategic missiles or nuclear veapons,

(3) that Israel will sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.


At a subsequent point in the conversation, Mr. Warnke mentioned the inspection arrangement at Dimona as a precedent that might be required here.

Mr. Warnke noted that we had not sought such specific assurances in our prior agreements because, based on the information we had at that time, these developments were not imminent. Our present information, however, indicates that Israel is on the verge of nuclear weapons and missiles capability. This development would seriously and adversly affect the security interests of the United States; it involves the Soviet Union and risks a US-USSR confrontation; it dramatically changes the situation in the area.


(Ambassador Rabin did not dispute in any way our information on Israel's nuclear or missile capability, nor did he comment directly on the assurances we requested. He did not scen particularly surprised or upset at Mr. Warnke's . presentation. He referred to the fact that the Israeli position on the question of Israeli nuclear and missile programs had been conveyed to Ambassador Barbour.)

Ambassador Rabin observed that this question (of missiles and nuclear veryons) had been raised two weeks ago, and that an answer was given by the Israeli Government to the United States Embassy in Israel. "I don't have anything to add to my Government's position." Rabin said he was esked to draft a





7 Capies.



1

できたがないというないのであったので、


Test. New

Original Scan

C Sta	en	·*. *		CRETARY OF DI	4			· .
			100 A 10 A 10	,				
TRANORAL	I HERRIT AJART				s <u>s</u> 1	November lefer to:] Second Sea	-35993/68	
	MENORANDUM	OF CONVERS	ATION			•		2
	SUBJECT: 1	Segotiation	s with Israe	: 1 - F-4 and	Advanced	Vespons	•	•
	Participant		· · · · · ·		11100, 8 - 3.4 (b) (3.1 Day 2022 3.1 Day 2027		• • • • • •	
•		·** .•	Israe	li Bide			••••••	•
- X	lajor Gener Brigadier G	al Hod, Com eneral Davi	Licutement mander, Isr id Carmon, D	seli Defense	e Force An Armed For	ir Force ces Attach		
	т. <i>с. сарр</i>	iro, Direct	tor, Ministry	ates <u>Side</u>	e M188101	, New Iork	· · · · ·	
D	eputy Assis	stant Secre	Defense (Is tary of Defe Region (ISA)	ense (ISA),	Harry II.	Schwartz		
-			Novembor 196		L		· ·	
P	lace: Ass	ilstant Sec:	rctary Warnk	c's Office;	Pentagon		· ·	
8	Memorandum	of Agreem	ador Rabin t ent the poin to Ambassado	ts discusse	d yesterd			3.
			ng finished : three basic of					
	. Warnke sa propriate.	aid that th	ie word "unde :	erstandings"	'would pe	rhaps be n	ore	
not mis Nor con	t test or d sailes or n -Prolifera dition."	leploy stra nuclear veap tion Treaty Ambassador	I prefer to tegic missil pons; and th y. You also Rabin asked these condit:	es; second, ird we woul ask to mak	we will d sign and c inspect: the offic	not acquir d ratify t ions, maki cial United	e strategi he Nuclear ng a fourti	


.

Original Scan



Original Scan

have mutual trust and confidence. We have not had mutual understandings and therefore the facts as we now know them have frankly come as a surprise and shock to us. Ambassador Rabin asked: "What, may I ask, comes as a block to your Mr. Warnke replied: 25X6, E.O.13526 (Ambassador Rabin made no reply. "After a moment; he said: "General Hod will call Mr. Hoopes tomorrow.") Mr. Warnke said that he would be gone for the next several days, but if it was necessary to have further discussions in this period that the Ambassador should contact Mr. Nitze or Mr. Schwartz. , (Signan)-PAUL C: WARNKE Approved by: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) 5 November 1968 -Deto: 7 of 7 copies. E ze gua.



1.2000

Same printer

-

a matter of principle. Hy Government's position is that the matters raised in Article 3 are extrancous to the question before us, namely, the terms for the sole of 50 F-b alreaft. These matters have been the subject of separate discussions between our two Governments. Host recently, 23 October 1963, we submitted through the U.S. Ambassador to israel a comprehensive statement concerning these issues, the contents of which I can make available to you now.

"Accordingly, I should like to propose that isreel's assurances In connection with the theoretical question of the use of the planes for the delivery of nuclear weapons remains as submitted to you in our original proposel, nemely, that the Government of isreel egrees not to use any circrafts supplied by the U.S. as a nuclear weapons carrier. I am also authorized to reaffirm, in this connection, that it is isreel's long-standing policy not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Hiddle East. Assurances to that effect can be incorporated into the agreement.

"May I also comment on the Precedule to Article 3 and state that the Sovernment of Israel does not consider itself qualified to express an epinion on what constitutes an endangement of the security interests of the U.S. This is the exclusive preregative of the Sovernment of the U.S. Similarly, with reference to subsection 2 of Article 2, the Sovernment of Israel does not feel that it is qualified to comment on that is not a major tenet of . U.S. policy. Again, this is the exclusive preregative of the U.S. Government.

"This is my Government's position and the only blais on which we consider it possible to conduct negotiations for the purchase of military equipment -- in this case, 50 Phentoms."

<u>Ambassiving Right</u>, having finished reading from his prepared text, observed that paragraph 1 of the American draft Heuprendum of Agreement 1s on excet wording of the 1965 heuprendum of Understanding, and therefore odds nothing new. To reiterstad that israel did not believe that they uses genilfied to except or to use ojudgments concerning the points covered in Article 2. Ambassedor Robin also thought that Article 5 on scoredy was not even as feverable as the paragraph on tearcey to the A-4 Agreement, which he thought was "more motual." Robin sold, hewever, that this was not a major point.

(At this point, Addresseder Robin proceed to Dr. Vernie a copy of the Sevenement of Tercolfs statement which had been given to Aslasseder Larbour on 28 Getaber 1998. Hr. Marshe glonged at 16, confirmed that we biready had a copy, and returned it to Asbasseder Babin.)

CODY ST OF SCOLOR



Pres

<u>Ambassador Rabin</u> sold that General Hod had met with the Air Force. General Hod said thet, while he had one briefing, nothing more was being done, the Air Force was waiting for Hr. Hoopes. Hr. Schwartz explained that Hr. Hoopes had forwarded the Israell requests to Hr. Warnke, but, because Hr. Warnke had just returned from Europe, he had not yet seen Hr. Hoopes' memorandwa.

Anbassador Robin said: "So thore we are." Hr. Warnko said: "Yes, Hr. Anbassador. We have managed to isolate a major difference."

<u>Mr. Warnke</u> sold ho would like to take issue with two points relsed by the Ambassador: first, that our request for assurances in connection with the sale of the F-4 aircraft is extraneous. What israel does with strategic missiles and nuclear weapons affects the notional security of the United States. "It is the national security of the United States that I am charged with protecting. By law I am required to consider the impact of the sale on the United States. You, from your vantage point, do not have to accept my judgments, but I am required to make them." Second, the ossurances we have requested are not, and are not intended to be, anihvesion of sovereignty. All international agreements impluge on absolute sovereignty. Our request is no different than other international agreements.

<u>Mr. Marning sold that however these negotiations come out he has folt that</u> this dialogue has been useful. "I have full it was important to get acress to you have to feel about israel's negatifies of strategic disting and nuclear weepons. As you know, there is a provision in our sales contract that permits concellation of the contract by the United States for 'unucual and coupelling circumstances." To me, if israel goes cheed with its missile and nuclear programs this would involve that percyraph; and while I can not speak for the next adulaistration, I feel sure they will feel the same way too: Therefore, to a considerable extent, the arguments we are having about the wording of assurances are mere words and not substance. The substance revains the same,"

Anthropsetor fields sold: "I can understand you would like to have assurances about the key your hardware is going to be used an not as a nuclear Merphas carrier." But in Article 3 you ask for all the rights to know and for us to give agreement for you to insplict in our country. We were very careful not to use the word "inspect" with respect to Binone. We see in the two words quite a difference. The word "visit" means you are a guest in our country an not an inspector.

<u>Dr. Mark's solds. "I would be prepared to accept an examinant to our neworandum</u> substituting "visit" for inspection."

Autossador Sabin said: "No have an agreement today.",

hr. Marchy sold: "Yes, but that applies only to Educe, not to the cites where existing are being produced" (nervous laughter fram israelis).

The Asian The F

A PORTAGE COLOR

19. 1 1


WEINER STR. WAT N.

4

Swine.

Original Scan

THE S	COELICITORIE
	EORE I COREIVAL LIVE
Ambassador Rabin osked: "What do yo Arab~Israeli context?" IIr. Warnke g the Arab capitals." Rabin agreed; s definition." He also commanted that the Arab capitals."	cplicd: "Those capable of reaching aying: "At least we have the same
	s well as other possible targets.
Anhossador Rabin said: "You are on! the right to ask ell these things?"	y salling arms. How do you fest you have .
Mr. Warnko sald: "I think I do. O	therwise i wouldn't bring it up."
Ambassador Rubin sold: "We have prom that we do not would not be the first the filldle East."	wished not to carry nuclear weapons and t to introduce nuclear weapons into
Hr. Warnka replied: "We will think to Secretary Clifford and Secretary Dita Leastrow."	bout what you have said and talk with a. I will talk with you again
· * .	
•	the day 12
DTH.	RSEL
Preparad by: Robert J. Hurray	Approved by: (signed: Paul C. Warnke) Ascistent Secretary of Defense (ISA)
	Date: 8 Housen 1969
•	2
	•
	•• **
ان م الجيم بين مشتر من ال	· ·
a Berghamman and an and an an a Difference	CCRET REMENSEN
PB 50, and the new OL and prove Normal C. 20.9	SECTOR BEINGUILINE



Ambassador Rabin, said that "it means what we have said, namely, that we would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons." Mr. Warnke asked what ".specifically was meant by the word "introduce." Ambassador Rabin said, "you are more familiar with these things than we are. What is your definition of nuclear weapons?" Mr. Warnke said that there are two aspects to the question: the definition of what is and what is not a nuclear weapon, and what is and what is not introduction into the area. Regarding the first, if there are components available that could be assembled to make a nuclear weapon -- although part A may be in one room and part B in another room ~- then that is a nuclear weapon. As for introduction, that is your term and you will have to define it. Does It mean no physical presence? Ambassador Rabin said, "I suppose so." Mr. Warnke said: "what if you have access to nuclear weapons that are in another country? Is that then 'introduction'"? Ambassador Rabin asked if we believed ... that this was the situation. Mr. Warnke replied that he was just trying to find the Israeli definition. He noted that the same situation could apply the other way around: for example, what if another country in the area had access to nuclear weapons but had not brought them in? Ambassedor Rabin said, continuing the example, that if China said they had nuclear weapons for Egypt stored in China, he didn't know what the Israeli reaction would be. He hasn't given the matter a great deal of thought. He believed that "introduction" would require their physical presence in the area. General Hod asked if the term "introduction" had an accepted usage in international law. Mr. Warnke replied that it had not. General Hod said that throughout the world the experience was that introduction of a weapon could only mean after testing. You could not introduce a weapon until after it actually became a wcapon. Ambassador Rabin asked: "Do you consider a nuclear weapon one that has not been tested, and has been done by a country without previous experience"? Mr. Warnke: "Certainly. China with a strategic pissile capability would be assumed to have nuclear weapons even had it not tested these weapons." Ambassador Rabin said: "All nuclear powers -- the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China -- have tested nuclear weapons. Do you really believe introduction comes before testing"? Mr. Schwartz said that what the Ambessador was talking about is reliability. Ambassador Rabin disagreed saying that based on his experience with conventional weapons, he would not consider a weapon that had not been tested to be a weapon. Mr. Warnke asked whether, if the UAR had missiles with nuclear war heads but had not actually tested them, would Israel consider that the UAR had not introduced nuclear weapons? He said that testing by other nuclear powers is very relevant to a potential nuclear power if the latter is developing weapons based on existing technol.ogy.



Ambassador Rabin said that, "weapons serve policy, not vice versa. Since the UAR's goal is to destroy us I would take it with very great concern. Our policy is not to destroy the UAR. You must combine the weapon with the policy." General Hod observed that a very good example of introduction was when Egypt introduced missiles into the area in 1963, claiming they were capable of hitting anything south of Beirut. Ambassador Rabin said: "My concern with Egypt is with pissiles with chemical rather than nuclear war heads. If Egypt were to hit our

Mr. Warnke said, as he understood it, Ambassador Rabin applied two prerequisites to the word "introduction" -- notoriety and pre-testing.

densely populated areas, even in a limited way, it could be disastrous,"

Ambassador Rabin, saying that "I don't know what the Prime Minister said, but" there must be public acknowledgment. The purpose of nuclear weapons is not to use the weapon itself, but to use their deterrent power. "I don't believe any powers that have nuclear weapons plan to use them, although you cannot ever be sure." Ninety-nine per cent of their value is deterrence. Mr. Schwartz said: "You mean deterrence against governments, to deter governments from specific actions." Ambassador Rabin agreed: "The fact that you have got it must be known."

Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador also introduced the factor of intent: if the UAR has missiles, Israel would be concerned; if Israel has them, there is no cause for concern. The purpose of strategic missiles for Israel would be for deterrence.


Ambassador Rabin said: "You are trying to combine strategic missiles and nuclear war heads. This is not necessary in the Middle East. To my mind, in the Middle East, missiles with war heads which are not nuclear weapons can play a role." Mr. Warnke asked, "What sort of role"? Ambassador Rabin said: "It depends on the other side. What we are concerned about in Egypt is their chemical warfare capability. As I explained in 1963 when I was here, one of our thoughts was that Egyptian missiles, even with conventional war heads, might contribute to their success if they made a surprise attack on our cities. They could interfere with the mobilization system under such circumstances, and this might play a great role in determing the outcome. Seventy per cent more or less of Army capability, although less for the Air Force, is based on mobilization, not just on manpower but vehicles, transport, supplies, and so forth. During the six day war we had mobilized so much of the resources of our cities that we had to devote a portion of our military effort to resupplying the cities."

<u>General Hod</u> observed that Egypt has sea borne (Styx) missiles with 35 mile range and may have or may be receiving even more sophisticated missiles. Although these have a short range, they can be used sca-to-shore as well as sea-to-sca, and therefore can raise havoc with coastal cities such as TelAviv.

Ambassador Rabin said that they had heard of a plan, although they could not know for certain, to sell to Egypt missile destroyers with missiles of about 100 miles range which, although normally sea-to-sea, could also be used sea-to-shore. Rabin said Israel was worried that Egypt might launch sea borne missiles during the six day war, "but they did not dare to do this." Rabin said he also understand.

Original Scan

there is a Cannon missile on, the TI-16s, now in Egypt that can hit the centers of our cities. "Therefore, we look at missiles somewhat differently j than you. It is not necessary to have nuclear war heads on our missiles. There Gara Mar heads between high-explosive and nuclear. Antereduced microlles and the area in 1565, charming the E Mr. Harnke said: "Then in your view, an unadvertised, untested nuclear device . is not a nuclear weapon." Anhassador Rabin said: "Yes, that is correct." c.Mr. Harnke asked: "What about an advertised but untested nuclear device or weapon. Would that be introduction?" Ambassador Rabin said: "Yes, that would 1. be introduction." Mr. Warnke, said he would interpret mere physical presence in the area as constituting, in itself, "introduction". Mr. Warnke concluded the discussion by saying that he would talk with Mr. Hoopes, that-we would have a Memorandum of Understanding prepared within a few days incorporating the provisions we have discussed, and that General Hod could in the meantime meet with the Air Force to continue the technical discussions "that we are at this time prepared to go shead with. Mr. Warnke said that we ought to continue these discussions so that we might try to arrive at some ; understanding between us as to the problems of missiles and nuclear weapons. At this time, with respect to "introduction", Mr. Warnke said there was not much clarity and no agreement. ine static plays i sea (Signed) F.191. C. repared by Approved by The Assistant Secretar of Defense (ISA) Date 12 November 1968



RENATIONAL SECURIT AFFAIRS

22 November 1968 Refer. to I-26126/68 (Fifth Session)

MENORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SURFECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambhasador of Iarael, Licutenant General Yitzhak Rabin Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke Deputy Ausistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwarts Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time! 1740 - 1815, 22 November 1968

Place: Assistant Scorctary Marnke's Office, The Pentagon

Ambassador Rabin said that he had received his Government's reaction to the US-proposed Memorandum of Understanding (referring to the draft Memorandum of Understanding sent to the Israeli Enbassy on 19 November 1968). He said that there is a paragraph in that memorandum which looks to the Government of Israel as "quite awkward." Rabin said that the awkwardness was "not the because of its practical implications" but because of the way it is worded.

Ambassador Rabin read a portion of the paragraph in question: "It is understood by the Government of Israel that action contrary to any of the underis standings specified in paragraph II of this memorandum shall constitute 'unusual and compelling circumstances' and shall permit the United States to recover any aircraft already delivered under this Agreement." Rabin said that his Government could not accept that the United States could ask for such language. "There is no precedent. It creates something that I

exempted, from Automatic : 2-12 - 15- 0071=2. DOWNERADING A 110 land in the second second 10110 DIES SIZ LODLY - course atherton

don't believe that exists anywhere.". Rabin said that the paragraph implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy" and that it did not believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel, and therefore this paragraph was worded as it is.

"Mr. Warnke took issue with Ambassador Rabin's statement. Mr. Warnke said that he had talked with Mr. Clifford, and Mr. Clifford in turn with Mr. Rusk, -and the United States Government clearly did not put such a construction on this paragraph. The United States does believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel. "I believe you and what you have said." It is quite natural, however, that Israel would look after its own national security requirements. It would be understandable for Israel to enter into an F-4 -agreement now and later feel-compelled to change its mind for reasons existing at that time. It would not be unusual in international agreements for undertakings previously made to prove improvident in the future. But the United "States for its part must look after its own national security interests; if Israel wero to decide at some point that it could not adhere to the provisions of the agreement, it would revert to status quo ante. That is the purpose of this paragraph.

Ambassador Rabin sold he couldn't understand why, for example, the United States could ask in ten years for these aircraft to be returned. <u>Mr. Warnke</u> said: "Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in these aircraft in ten years time?"

Mr. Warnke said that what was put in the Memorandum of Understanding, after all, propresents only the summation of our discussions. Ambassador Rabin said that he had not agreed to commitments in the contract; he said that Israel had agreed to reaffirm its previous understandings -- that they would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or carry nuclear weapons on U.S. aireraft. "Why do you want us to do this?"

Minister Argov said: "We feel we are on parole." The Israeli Government is giving assurances, said Argov, but the paragraph presumes we will not live r up to them. Ambassador Rabin said that it isn't the standard paragraph.

<u>Mr. Warnke</u> disagreed that there was a "presumption" in the contract that Israel would not live up to its assurances. Mr. Warnke also disagreed with Ambassador Mabin's statement that this wasn't a standard paragraph. ""There is no such thing as a standard contract." Each one varies. A past contract is not a binding precedent for future contracts.

Ambassador Rabin, somewhat epologetically, said that his instructions were to follow the former wording. He said also that, although he agreed with the form of the U.S. proposal (i.e., a memorandum of understanding), "my Government has had second thoughts" and prefers the same format as in the Skyhawk Agreement: "I send you a letter, you send me'a letter."

Original Scan

SEINOPHIAE

Mr. Warnke observed that we had the form of a Memorandum of Understanding before, in the Skyhawk Agreement. Ambassedor Rabin seid he thought not. Minister Argov said that yes, at the time in 1965 of the visit of Mr. Harriman and Mr, Komer, there was a Memorandum of Understanding: "You participated in its development Mr. Ambassador." Ambassador Rabin agreed and said that that was the Harriman Mission, which was a different matter. Mr. Warnke observed that that was the point he was trying to make: there different matters and different circumstances that now exist. Mr. Warnke said that he understood that what Israel wanted now wasn't a Memorandum of Understanding but an exchange of letters; for this he had no instructions, and would have to discuss the matter with Secretary Clifford. Mr. Warnke also asked the Ambassador whether he had a letter to submit. The Ambassador passed him the Israeli letter (attached).---Mr.Schwartz suggested that Ambassador Rabin not press the A-4 analogy too far, that it consisted of a number of documents, not just an exchange of letters, and that it was negotiated under different circumstances. For example, it contained an agreement that Israel would not come back to the United States for planes for five years. General Hod observed that the President, when Prime Minister Eshkol was here, was willing to overlook the five year clause. Ambassedor Rabin said that the United States didn't say anymore that it would not be a major supplier; the formulation of the communique issued at the Ranch in 1958 was different from that of 1965. In 1965 it said that the United States would not be a major sumilior; it did not say that in 1968, but said instead that the United States would keep Israel's defense requirements under roview in light of the situation in the area. Mr. Warnke said that the Ambansador's remarks were not inconsistent with what Mr. Schwartz had just said. Mr. Schwartz said that the 1965 precedent (of the Skyhawk) didn't apply. Mr. Warnke said he would discuss the latest Israeli proposal with Mr. Clifford.


Mr. Warnke asked Ambassador Rabin if he wished to sign the letter. Rabin did.

Ambassador Rabin said that there is a third problem. He laughingly said that he assumed we would overcome the "technical difficulties" of getting a satisfactory agreement in an acceptable form. Rabin said: "Everyone has his own superiors." Rabin asked if we could proceed with the technical talks while waiting to sort out the basic agreement.

HESENSITIVE SEWSTI Mr. Warnke said that the problem won't arise, for he expects to respond to Ambassador Rabin the first of next week. General Hod interjected that what he needs to know is what specific equipment can be included on the F-4 air-craft and its approximate cost, so that he can draw up a list of his specific requirements for the USAF, and they in turn may prepare a Letter of Offer. Mr. Murray said that he would review this and call General Hod on the telephone. Approved he Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) 22 November 1968

-26196/68

lafar to:



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: F-4 Regotiations with the Government of Israel

On November 26, Ambassador Rabin called me and reported that he had received my letter in reply to his letter requesting that the United States Government sell 50 F-4 Phantoms to Israel. Ambassador Rabin said that the letter posed no problems for him except for the reference to the interpretation of the United States Government as to what would constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons by a Middle East power.

Ambassador Rabin said that he understood from our second conversation that we would not incorporate a definition of this term. I pointed out that this discussion had occurred in the context of an anticipated Memorandum of Understanding, to be subscribed by both parties. With a Memorandum of Understanding it would be necessary to arrive at an agreed upon interpretation and our conversation had made it clear that this was unlikely. I commented further that the existence of such differences of öpinion had, as I understood it, been the reason for his proposal of an exchange of letters in lieu of a Memorandum of Understanding. I also commented that, as Ambassador Robin had noted in our last conference on Friday, meither of us was responsible for the content of the other's letter.

I pointed out further that the interpretation of the United States Government was not directed exclusively at the circumstances under which israel would be deemed to have introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East but that it applied equally to the eventuality of such action by any other Middle Eastern power. In the event that another Middle Eastern power should acquire possession and control of nuclear weapons then this would relieve the Government of israel from the restrictions of its announced policy.

Ambassador Rabin said that he recognized that our position was equally applicable to other Hiddle Eastern powers and asked again if i thought this a paragraph should remain in the letter, i said that I did and Ambassador Rabin said "all right."

in response to my question as to how the negotiations are proceeding, Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met yesterday with Mr. Schwartz and had presented a list of the items desired in order that an appropriate latter of offer could be prepared. He also commented that he might want to talk with ms at the end of the week with regard to the dalivery schedule. I said that I would be free to see him on Friday.



SENSI

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MERIATIONAL STOUGHT APPARS

29 November 1968

1-26232/68

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and U.S. Intelligence Requirements

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1630 - 1730' 29 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, The Pentagon

Ambassador Rabin began by saying he had three subjects to discuss. The first concerned the definition of "introduction" in Mr. Warnke's letter to him of 27 November 1968. Rabin said "some people" in Israel are not happy "that the definition appears in the letter; they feel that it may imply that Israel accepts that definition, and that nothing in the correspondence makes it clear enough that Israel has its own definition.

<u>Mr. Warnke</u> said that he could not see any ambiguity in the situation. The letter clearly states that this is the American definition and the last sentence was changed to preclude the construction that Israel agrees with it.

Ambassador Rabin said that some people say that by failing to comment on it, we in fact accept it. Mr. Schwartz suggested that, in order properly to clarify that issue, Israel should write down its own definition. Ambassador Rabin said that he would have to send Fr. Warnke another letter. Mr. Warnke said: "I can not of course stop you from sending me a letter." Ambassador Rabin laughingly replied: "Yes, I know, but I want, you to answer it." Mr. Warnke suggested that the Ambassador draft a letter to him and show it to him "and I'll tell you what my response would be." Ambassador Rabin agreed.

EXCEPTION PLEASED INCOME See LA (A) (GEOD F & 312 Dawn 30 Meig 2013 Review Durksmidy Charl 201 Daw 2017 Dawn Agency Gastr. TUD



А.

2

Arbassador Rabin said that the second problem concerned publicity. The Ambassador mentioned an article in today's <u>Baltimore Sun</u> and a recent Finney article. Mr. Warnke said that he doubted that this was recent information. Ambassador Rabin said that publicity in this case should be different than in the A-4 negotiations. In this case, it was public knowledge that F-4 negotiations were going on, as was clear from the President's announcement. The Ambassador said he was concerned about future leaks and that, while he didn't want to give the numbers of aircraft involved, he would like to say something. The Ambassador said that, "political figures are involved" and it wasn't fully under his control.

ALUMU ULIKO

<u>Mr. Warnke</u> said that the press knew already that negotiations were underway, and that there really wasn't much more to be said that could satisfy them without giving the full details. Mr. Warnke asked what the Israelis wanted to say.

<u>Miniater Argov</u> said that he gets three to four calls a day from the press, ... and he finds it difficult to keep repeating the same thing day after day. He would like to say a deal has been consumated. <u>Mr. Warnke</u> said that that would not be appropriate: no contract has been signed, no final arrangements made, and there are a variety of loose ends to tidy up. Mr. Warnke said that he would think about it and let the Ambassador know.

<u>Mr. Schwartz</u> asked if the requirement for publicity was in Israel. The Ambassador replied: "Not only in Israel, but also here." The Ambassador thought that if we could say that in principle a positive decision had been taken, it would take the pressure off. Mr. Warnke said that this wasn't a problem for the Defense Department alone, that he would have to check with others including the White House, but that he would let the Ambassador know.

Ambassador Rabin next raised the problem of delivery of F-4 aircraft. The Ambassador said: "We think we have justified reasons for earlier deliveries. Six or eight or ten aircraft by the middle of 1969 should not be too much of a problem for the big U.S. Air Force." Rabin said that he had spoken with General McConnell who had said there are two problems, one is the political. and the other is technical. Rabin said that McConnell is working on the technical problem, but the two were related. "If a political decision can be made" said Rabin, "then this would help along the technical decision."

<u>Mr. Schwartz</u> said that the Air Force was concerned about the technical difficulties of rapid introduction of this very sophisticated aircraft without adequate preparation. Mr. Schwartz said that the Air Force had had similar difficulties in Australia and Iran. Ambassador Rabin suggested that we not compare Israel with Australia and Iran. Israel has great technical capabilities. He noted that Israel was already flying the MIG aircraft without any assistance and without spare parts.

<u>Mr. Schwartz</u> noted that Israel under this plan would be able to fly the aircraft, but could not maintain the electronics systems or use the weapons systems. Ambassador Rabin said: "You give them to us and we'll use them" Rabin said that what was wanted was "six to twelve" aircraft by mid-1959. Rabin said he realized that there were some differences between our intelligence people on numbers of Soviet aircraft, but even so, the numbers in the Arab inventory were large. Rabin noted that since the June war Israel had not received one additional supersonic aircraft although it had lost four or five.

SENSINVE

Original Scan

, 3 TOFCALL SERVERING

Ambassador Rabin said that he had also raised the question of delivery with General Wheeler. Ambassador Rabin said, in reference to General Wheeler, "what he had to say at the Ranch was the most favorable from our point of view. When I met him again in May 1968, he (Wheeler) said Israel's situation depends on two things: if we get the MIRAGES, and the rate of Soviet shipments." On the first, said Rabin, "although we don't like it, there is no sign" of delivery. On the second, Soviet shipments (to the Arab states) have been faster than expected.

Mr. Warnke said that he could not give an answer now but that he would look into the problem.

The Ambassador said he had a fourth problem. The fourth problem, the Ambassador said, concerns technical negotiations. He asked whether we could now proceed to such negotiations?

<u>Mr. Murray</u> said that we were already doing this, that Generals Roth and Carmon and others net with the Air Force on Wednesday and that the Air Force was now in the process of arranging follow-on briefings. Mr. Murray said that it was our understanding that these negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily.

<u>General Carmon</u> said that they had had useful discussions on Wednesday but that they had not obtained certain information on weapons systems, mentioning specifically the Sparrow missile. <u>Mr. Schwartz</u> said the Air Force was authorized to diaguas with Israel all the systems that we are now prepared to release; that there were certain systems which Israel could not have because they are not releasable to anyone and were used only by the U.S. military forces, and these of course the Air Force was not permitted to discuss; and there was a third category of items we were prepared to talk about but for which no final decisions on releasability have been made. <u>Mr. Murray</u> said that we are prepared to continue these discussions and that the Air Force was now preparing a briefing schedule to this end. <u>Mr. Warnke</u> said that we could not release full information on systems as to which we had not taken a decision to release. He commented that it might not be in Israel's interest to push for immediate decisions on these unresolved items.

General Carmon agreed that there were no serious problems in this connection at this time.


ert J. Murray

Prepared by

(Signad) PAUL C. WARNKE Approved by

Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA

Date 29 November 1963



<u>Ambassador Rabin</u> said there was still one problem: early deliveries. <u>Mr. Warnka</u> said that we had done our work and sent the facts to the <u>President</u>. He said that the decision rests with the White House. <u>Ambassador</u> <u>Rabin</u> observed that there were two aspects: political and technical. He said the President would of course decide the political. He asked, however, whether Hr. Warnke could tell him whether early deliveries were possible on the technical side. <u>Mr. Warnke</u> said anything was possible; it was a question of whether it was desirable.

SENSITIVE

<u>General Peied</u> said that he had talked with everyone he could in the Air Force about how the iAF would handle early deliveries. He complained that the USAF people would not engage him in a discussion -- they just listened. <u>Peied</u> asked whether we thought he had been convincing. <u>Mr.</u> <u>Warnke</u> said he did not appear to have convinced the Air Force. He said that while General Peied's sincerity in pleading his case was not at all doubted, it was a difference of professional judgment. <u>General Peied</u> asked if he may talk further with the Air Force people. <u>Hr. Warnke</u> replied that he could and that General Larson was the man to talk to. Mr. Warnke said that it would be the President who made the decision, in any case.

<u>General Carmon</u> suggested that a draft letter of offer be completed for General Peled to take back to israel with him. Israel could then make decisions and these decisions could be communicated to the United States after the holidays. <u>Mr. Warnka</u> agreed,

Ambassador Rabin mised the question of publicity and said, somewhat unhappily, that he presumed that we wanted to continue to say the same thing as before. <u>Mr. Warnke</u> said yes. We would say only that negotiations were continuing. <u>Mr. Schwartz</u> suggested this was a matter primarily for the Department of State.

<u>Ambassador Rabin</u> asked Mr. Warnke if he would like to sign the agreement in israel. <u>Mr. Warnke</u> said he would like to very much but was not sure he would be able to do so.

he Donúty Assistant

Secretary of Defense 8 2 DEC 1968





ושינכטון

טנרירות ישראל

22 November 1968

Dear Mr. Warnke:

SSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding dated March 10, 1965, in which the Government of the United States reaffirmed its concern for the maintenance of Israel's security and renewed its assurance that the United States firmly opposes aggression in the Near East and remains committed to the independence and integrity of Israel, and;

Pursuant to the joint statement of January 7, 1968 by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel in which. "the President agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area";

I should like to request hereby that the Government of the United States sell to the Government of Israel 50 "Phantom" aircraft, together with related armament, ammunition, training, spare parts and other services to be specified in Annexes, which will be considered an integral part of this agreement.

On its part the Government of Israel reaffirms its long-standing policy as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding of March 10, 1965, that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the U.S. as a nuclear weapons carrier.

The Government of Israel understands that the Unitad States reserves the right, under unusual and compelling circumstances when the best interest of the U.S. requires it, to cancel all or part of its commitment to provide.

גרירות ישראל ASSY OF ISRAEL WASHINGTON, D.C ושינכפון 22 November 1968 F-4 aircraft and related equipment and services, at any time prior to the delivery of these defense articles or performance of these services. The Government of Israel further understands that the United States accepts the responsibility for all costs directly resulting from such cancellation. The Government of Israel agrees to full secrecy on all matters concerning this sale until the Government of the United States decides to make the matter public and will cooperate fully with the Government of the United States with respect to the timing and method of public disclosure. Sincerely yours General Rabin Ampassador The Honorable Paul C. Warnke Ass't Secretary of Defense The Pontagon Washington, D.C.

SFICRET

Original Scan



SISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

BRIANA TELEVISIS IANOITANA

27 November 1968

In reply refer to: i-26174/68

His Excellency Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin Ambassador of Israel 2916 Chesapeake Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This will acknowledge and respond to your letter of 22 November 1968, requesting on behalf of the Government of Israel that the United States sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft and related equipment and training. The Government of the United States agrees to sell to the Government of Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft and related equipment and services in accordance with this exchange of letters and technical and financial annexes to be negotiated separately. This transaction is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952.

The United States Government, for its part, accepts the assurances given by the Government of Israel as stated in your letter:

"On its part the Government of Israel reaffirms its longstanding policy as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding of March 10, 1965, that it will not be the first power in the Hiddle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons. carrier."

in this connection, i have made clear the position of the United States Government that the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons,

I wish also to confirm the understanding of the Government of Israel as set forth in the fifth paragraph of your letter of 22 November 1968. Such unusual and compelling circumstances would exist in the event of action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter.

The agreement contained in the last paragraph of your letter concerning the secrecy of this undertaking is satisfactory to us,

SENS It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details of this transaction. Sincerely, Warnke Paul C