

September 3, 1992

Cable from Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Ministry, 'Brazil-USA. Access to advanced technology. MTCR. Interview at the Department of State.'

Citation:

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Summary:

This cable reports the meeting between Brazilian diplomat Sergio Amaral, Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant for Politico-Military Affairs, and Vahn H. Van Diepen, Director of the Office of Weapons Proliferation. Eihorn made clear during the meeting that space programs such as Brazil's are a source of concern for the US administration because it could use the same technology developed for the SLV to build ballistic missiles.

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CRUSABREM 03/09/92 02:24

DE: BRASENB WASHINGTON

PARA : EXTERIORES

MSG OF01900A 03/09/92 00:00

MINUTA:

DISTRIBUICAO : DCIA/DMAE/DNU/DCS

DESCRITOR : XCOI

CONFIDENCIAL

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NBR185 781BPQ/EHORA

OD BRASTEC

.USABREM 021655 OF01900A TEKA 02

DE BRASENB WASHINGTON PARA EXTERIORES EM 02/09/92 (DNS)

~~XCOI 100 614~~XLEX-200-614

CONFIDENCIAL

DCIA/DMAE/DNU/DCS

BRASIL-EUA. ACESSO A TECNOLOGIA AVANÇADA. MTCR.
ENTREVISTA NO DEPARTAMENTO DE ESTADO.**DESCLASSIFICADO**DE ACORDO COM O DEC.
5.301, DE 09/12/2004

1900 41915 - COM VISTAS A RETOMAR O DIALOGO SOBRE A COOPERACAO BRASIL-EUA EM ASSUNTOS LIGADOS AO "MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME" (MTCR), ENTREVISTEI-ME HOJE, DIA 2, COM ROBERT EINHORN, QUE SUBSTITUIU ELIZABETH VERVILLE COMO "DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS" NO DEPARTAMENTO DE ESTADO, E COM VANN H. VAN DIEPEN, DIRETOR DO "OFFICE OF WEAPONS PROLIFERATION POLICY". PARTICIPOU TAMBEM DO ENCONTRO A SECRETARIA CARMEN LIDIA MOURA.

2. AO INICIO DA CONVERSA, RECORDEI AS INICIATIVAS BRASILEIRAS EM MATERIA DE NAO-PROLIFERACAO NUCLEAR, A DECLARACAO SOBRE ARMAS QUIMICAS E BIOLOGICAS, AS MEDIDAS RELATIVAS AO PROGRAMA ESPACIAL E AO CONTROLE DE EXPORTACAO DE TECNOLOGIAS SENSIVEIS.

3. EINHORN AFIRMOU QUE AS MEDIDAS ADOTADAS PELO BRASIL SAO IMPORTANT AND IMPRESSIVE E TEM SIDO DEVIDAMENTE APRECIADAS PELO DO GOVERNO NORTE-AMERICANO, INCLUSIVE PELO PRESIDENTE BUSH, QUE ACOMPANHA DIRETAMENTE O ASSUNTO. ACRESCENTOU QUE, EM DECORRENCIA DA NOVA POSTURA BRASILEIRA NESTA MATERIA, DEVERAO ABRIR-SE NOVAS AREAS DE COOPERACAO ENTRE BRASIL E EUA. RECORDOU, NESSE CONTEXTO, QUE A POLITICA NORTE-AMERICANA DE NAO-PROLIFERACAO ATENDE A PREOCUPACOES DE SEGURANCA, E NAO VISA A AFETAR OPERACOES COMERCIAIS OU PROGRAMAS TECNOLOGICOS DE TERCEIROS PAISES. NAO OBSTANTE, ALGUNS PROGRAMAS CONTINUAM A SER FONTE DE PREOCUPACAO COMO, POR EXEMPLO, NA AREA ESPACIAL, A CAPACITACAO PARA LANÇAMENTO DE SATELITES, UMA VEZ QUE TECNOLOGIA PARA O LANÇAMENTO DE SATELITES NAO SE DIFERENCIA DAQUELA APLICAVEL AO LANÇAMENTO DE MISSEIS BALISTICOS. POR ESSA RAZAO, OS EUA NAO CONTEMPLARIAM COLABORACAO BILATERAL EM AREAS COMO A DE

CONTINUA NA 2A PARTE

CRUSABREM 03/09/92 02:28

DE: BRASENB WASHINGTON
 MSG OF01900B 03/09/92 00:00
 DISTRIBUICAO : DCIA/DMAE/DNU/DCS
 DESCRITOR : XCOI
 CONFIDENCIAL

PARA : EXTERIORES
 MINUTA:

CONFIDENCIAL

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DESCLASSIFICADO

DE ACORDO COM O DEC.
 5.301, DE 09/12/2004

NBR186 782BPS/EHORA

QD BRASTEC

.USABREM 021655 OF01900B TEKA 02

DE BRASENB WASHINGTON PARA EXTERIORES EM 02/09/92 (DNS)

XCOI L00 G14 CONF DCIA/DMAE/DNU/DCS BRASIL-EUA, ACESSO A TECNOLOGIA A
 VACADA, 2A PARTE DO TEL 1900

.... COMO A DE
 LANÇAMENTO, OU OUTRAS QUE ESTEJAM IGUALMENTE INCLUIDAS NA CATEGORIA I
 DA LISTA DE PRODUTOS CONTROLADOS PELO MTCR, MESMO EM RELACAO A
 MEMBROS DO MTCR.

4. EINHORN ESCLARECEU QUE, ENBORA O MTCR SE DESTINE
 BASICAMENTE A CONTROLAR A EXPORTACAO DE BENS E TECNOLOGIAS
 RELACIONADOS A MISSEIS BALISTICOS, SEUS PRECEITOS SAO TAMBEM
 APLICAVEIS A "JOINT-VENTURES" OU OUTRAS FORMAS DE COLABORACAO QUE
 POSSAM AJUDAR NO DESENVOLVIMENTO DAS TECNOLOGIAS COBERTAS PELO
 REGIME. ADUZIU QUE, MESMO ENTRE OS MEMBROS DO MECANISMO, NAO DEVE
 OCORRER A TRANSFERENCIA DE BENS INCLUIDOS NA CATEGORIA I. A UNICA
 EXCECAO, PROSEGUIU, SERIAM AS TRANSFERENCIAS FEITAS PELOS EUA AO
 REINO UNIDO, NA AREA DE MISSEIS BALISTICOS, NO AMBITO DE ACORDOS DE
 COOPERACAO ANTERIORES AO PROPRIO MTCR. AS DIRETRIZES RELATIVAS AO
 MTCR NAO SE OCUPAM ENTRETANTO DOS DESENVOLVIMENTOS AUTONOMOS DE
 TECNOLOGIA SENSIVEL. A LEGISLACAO NORTE AMERICANA, CONTUDO, PRESCREVE
 A OBRIGACAO DE SANCOES PARA O IMPORTADOR E O EXPORTADOR DAS REFERIDAS
 TECNOLOGIAS, SEJAN ELES MEMBROS DO MTCR OU NAO, COMO OCORREU EM
 RELACAO TANTO AA INDIA QUANTO AA RUSSIA, EM DECORRENCIA DE OPERACAO
 RECENTE DE TRANSFERENCIA DE MOTORES PARA FOGUETES. AS RESTRICOES
 IMPOSTAS PELA LEGISLACAO NORTE AMERICANA SE REFEREM AAS CONDICAOES
 OBJETIVAS DO PROJETO - CONSTRUCAO DE MISSIL SUSCETIVEL DE
 UTILIZACAO PARA FIM MILITAR, POR EXEMPLO - E NAO AA AVALIACAO DO
 EXECUTIVO SOBRE AS INTENCOES DO PAIS.

5. COM REFERENCIA A RECENTE ARTIGO PUBLICADO PELO "NEW YORK
 TIMES" (VIDE TEL 1821, DE 19/8/92), SOBRE POSSIVEL PREOCUPACAO DAS
 AUTORIDADES NORTE-AMERICANAS PELA FALTA DE EVIDENCIA DA PARALISACAO
 DO PROJETO CONDOR II, VAN DIEPEN ASSINALOU QUE ESTE CASO E ESPECIAL,

CONTINUA NA 3A PARTE

DE: BRASEMB WASHINGTON
 MSG OF01900CX 03/09/92 00:01
 DISTRIBUICAO : DCIA/DMAE/DNU/DCS
 DESCRITOR : XCOI
 CONFIDENCIAL CONFIDENCIAL CONFIDENCIAL

CRUSABREM 03/09/92 02:30
 PARA : EXTERIORES
 MINUTA:

NBR187 783BPT/WADG
 QD BRASTEC
 .USABREM 021655 OF01900C TEKA 02

DESCLASSIFICADO

DE ACORDO COM O DEC.
 5.301, DE 09/12/2004

DE BRASEMB WASHINGTON PARA EXTERIORES EM 02/09/92 (DNS)

XCOI L00 G14 CONF DCIA/DMAE/DNU/DCS BRASIL-EUA. ACESSO A TECNOLOGIA
 AVANÇADA. MTCR. 3A PARTE DO TEL 1900

...ESPECIAL,

POIS NAO SE TRATA DE TRANSFERENCIA MAS DE TECNOLOGIA ROUBADA DOS EUA
 . EINHORN RECORDOU O COMPROMISSO DO PRESIDENTE DA ARGENTINA E DO
 MINISTRO DI TELLA EM ENCERRAR O PROJETO, COMPROMISSO QUE OS EUA NAO
 COLOCAM EM DUVIDA; POIS ENTENDEM POSSIVEIS DEMORAS, DECORRENTES DAS
 RESISTENCIAS INTERNAS AA PARALISACAO DEFINITIVA DO PROJETO.

6. NO QUE RESPEITA AA VISITA DO GRUPO QUADRILATERAL AO BRASIL
 E AA ARGENTINA, EM ABRIL ULTIMO, EINHORN DESTACOU O CARATER POSITIVO
 DOS CONTACTOS E REITEROU O INTERESSE DOS EUA EM PROSSEGUIR COM O
 DIALOGO. VAN DIEPEN, QUE PARTICIPOU DA REUNIAO PLENARIA DE OSLO, DE
 29 DE JUNHO A 2 DE JULHO ULTIMO, LEMBROU QUE O RELATORIO DAS VISITAS
 AO BRASIL E AA ARGENTINA FOI APRESENTADO DURANTE O ENCONTRO E QUE OS
 MEMBROS DO MTCR MANIFESTARAM O INTERESSE EM DAR CONTINUIDADE AO
 DIALOGO COM AMBOS OS PAISES. EINHORN DEIXOU EM ABERTO A HIPOTESE DE O
 BRASIL VIR A ADERIR OU PLEITEAR PARTICIPACAO PLENA NO REGIME,
 HIPOTHESES QUE SERIAM EXAMINADAS PELOS MEMBROS, AA LUZ DOS
 DISPOSITIVOS DA LEGISLACAO BRASILEIRA SOBRE CONTROLE DAS EXPORTACOES
 E DO TRACK RECORD DO BRASIL NESTA AREA.

SERGIO AMARAL

From: Embassy in Washington

To: Exteriores

CONFIDENTIAL

DCIA/DMAE/DNU/DCS

XIEX LOO G14

No. 1900

Date: 03/09/92

Brazil-USA. Access to advanced technology. MTCR. Interview at the Department of State.

1900 41915 - With views to take up again the dialogue about the Brazil-USA cooperation in issues linked to the "Missile Technology Control Regime" (MTCR), I had an interview today, September 2nd,, with Robert Einhorn, who replaced Elizabeth Verville as "Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-military Affairs" at the Department of State, and with Vahn H. Van Diepen, "Director of the Office of Weapons Proliferation Policy." Secretary Carmen Lidia Richter also participated in the interview.

2. At the outset I recalled the Brazilian initiatives on nuclear non-proliferation, the Declaration of chemical and biological weapons and the measures related to the space program and to export controls of sensitive technologies.

3. Einhorn said that the measures adopted by Brazil are "important and impressive" and that they have been duly acknowledged by the American government, including by President Bush, who follows the issue directly. He added that as a result of the new Brazilian posture on this matter, new areas of cooperation between Brazil and the United States should open up. He recalled, in this context, that the American non-proliferation policy responds to security concerns and does not intend to affect commercial operation or technological programs of third countries. Nevertheless, some programs are still a source of concern, such as, for example, in the area of space, the capacitation for the launching of satellites, since the launching technology is no different from that related to the launching of ballistic missiles. For this reason, the United States would not contemplate bilateral cooperation in fields such as launching, or others that are equally included in category 1 of the list of products controlled by MTCR, even with regard to members of the IAEA.

4. Einhorn made clear that while MTCR is basically aimed at controlling the export of goods and technologies related to ballistic missiles, its provisions are also applied to "joint-ventures" or other forms of collaboration that might help in the development of technologies covered by the regime. He added that even among the members of the mechanism, the transfer of goods included in category 1 is not meant to occur. The only exception, he went on, were transfers made by the United States to the United Kingdom, in the field of ballistic missiles within the scope of cooperation agreements prior to the MTCR itself. The guidelines related to the MTCR do not deal, however, to the autonomous development of sensitive technologies. Nevertheless, the American legislation provides for the obligation to apply sanctions to the importer and the exporter of such technologies, regardless of membership in the MTCR, as happened both regarding India and Russia as a result of the recent operation of transfer of rocket engines. The restrictions imposed by the American legislation refer to the objective conditions of the project - construction of missiles that may have military use, for example - and not to the evaluation by the executive about the intentions of the country.

5. With reference to a recent article published by the New York Times (see my cable 1821 dated 8/19/92), about possible concern of the American authorities about the lack of evidence of the stoppage of the project Condor II, Van Diepen remarked that this is a special case, since it does not regard a transfer but rather technology stolen from the United States. Einhorn recalled the commitment of the Argentine president and of Minister Tella to shut down the project, a commitment that the United States does not doubt, since they understand possible delays, due to internal resistance to

the definitive termination of the project.

6. With regard to the visit of the quadrilateral group to Brazil and Argentina last April, Einhorn highlighted the positive character of the contacts and reiterated the interest of the United States to continue the dialogue. Van Diepen, who participated in the plenary meeting in Oslo, from June 29 to July 2 last, recalled that the report on the visits to Brazil and Argentina was presented during that meeting and that the members of MTCR stated their interest in pursuing the dialogue with both countries. Einhorn left open the hypothesis of Brazilian adherence or of a request for full participation in the regime, which would be examined by the members, in the light of the provisions of Brazilian legislation on export controls and the track record of Brazil in this field.

SERGIO AMARAL