

January 10, 1978 National Intelligence Daily Cable, NIDC 78/007C, 'Argentina: No Treaty Ratification'

Citation:

"National Intelligence Daily Cable, NIDC 78/007C, 'Argentina: No Treaty Ratification'", January 10, 1978, Wilson Center Digital Archive, National Security Archives https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/121402

Summary:

This CIA bulletin notes the failure of U.S.-Argentine nuclear negotiations after Cyrus Vance's visit to Argentina in December 1977. The U.S. proposed to supply highly enriched uranium for Argentina's reactor exported to Peru, as well as to approve of a heavy water plant from Canada and asked in exchange for the Argentine ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty as well as the deferral of their spent-fuel reprocessing plans.

Original Language:


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
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Panama


25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010014-7 National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 10 January 1978. 25X1 The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing 25X1 senior US officials. CONTENTS ARGENTINA: No Treaty Ratification Page 1 25X1 USSR: Shcharanskiy Investigation Page 4 25X1 PERU: Disagreement Between Leaders Page 6 25X6 25X1 CHINA: Restoration of Medical Losses Page 12 BRIEF: Page 13

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four months. The official reportedly specified that only a member of the Soviet Association of Lawyers would be acceptable as Shcharanskiy's attorney, and that he must be cleared by the KGB.

Shcharanskiy was arrested last March. The subsequent investigation of his case dragged on beyond the nine months specified by Soviet law, and in mid-December his family was told that a special extension of the investigation period had been granted. The unusual delay was widely interpreted as a Soviet effort to keep Shcharanskiy's status ambiguous during the review of the Helsinki accords at the Belgrade conference on European security and cooperation.

The Belgrade talks are scheduled to reconvene on 17 January. Their closing date has not yet been agreed upon; the Soviet position is that the meeting is to close in one month, while the West wants it to continue until agreement is reached. The Soviet official's prediction that Shcharanskiy's trial could go on for three to four months—an unusually long time for a trial in the USSR—suggests that the Soviets, while tightening the screws by planning to begin the trial, are still reluctant to allow it to become an item on the Belgrade agenda.

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PERU: Disagreement Between Leaders

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Peru's major political parties and the military government over the autonomy to be enjoyed by the future constituent assembly and over government economic policies. Failure to resolve these differences could create obstacles to the scheduled return to civilian rule in 1980.

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The clash of views arose following public statements by President Morales Bermudez on 30 December. Responding to questions about the assembly election scheduled for 4 June 1978, the President declared that if the assembly fails to incorporate in the new constitution institutional reforms adopted by successive military regimes, the assembly would be annulled, leading to a prolongation of military rule. He also said that the political transition will constitute "a transfer of government but not of power."

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The President said the government's failure to extricate itself from a deepening economic crisis was a result of external factors—an unjust international economic order, unfair loan conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund, and refusal by US private banks to supply necessary credits, which he implied was politically motivated.

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Five prominent political parties have registered their objections to Morales Bermudez' remarks, which coincided with the beginning of Peru's first election campaign since the military overthrew the civilian government of former President Belaunde in 1968. Some of the sharpest criticism has come from the two largest parties, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance and the Popular Action Party.

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
Victor Haya de la Torre--whose APRA party began secretly cooperating with the government last fall in hopes of gaining an election advantage--told 50,000 followers in Lima on Saturday that APRA intends to campaign for a free and sovereign constitutional assembly. He also responded to the President's statements by asserting that control of the government and the exercise of political power are indistinguishable.

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Haya reserved his harshest attacks for the government's attempts to blame its economic failures on international capitalism; he characterized these allegations as "half-truths and whole lies." He demanded an official report on Peru's huge foreign debt, which he attributed in part to "administrative immorality."


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Popular Action leader Belaunde, in an address to another large political rally in Callao last Friday, said his party would not accept any limitations on the constituent assembly. He charged that the government's economic policies have promoted high unemployment, declining agricultural production, and dependence on foreign countries.



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25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP79T0097\$A030500010014-7 instead of having to go to work first in rural areas. This probably is part of the effort to relieve the critical shortages of medical specialists, particularly surgeons. 25X1 China has not graduated physicians with five years of training since 1966. The inadequate three-year curriculum instituted in the early 1970s has for the most part produced only one graduating class at each medical school. The Chinese should be able to bring the three-year graduates up to the desired level of training before the first students in the extended training programs graduate. 25X1 BRIEF Panama 25X1 Press reports indicate that several thousand Panamanian demonstrators held a peaceful march yesterday to mark the anniversary of the anti-US riots in 1964. Student leaders asserted that the US has three months to approve the canal treaties. The government's apparent intention to exceed last 25X1 year's turnout of 1,500 and to apply pressure for early US ratification of the treaties while avoiding violence seems to have gone according to plan. 25X1

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(Security Classification)

Top Secret

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