

June 15, 1954 Address, James H. R. Cromwell, A New Foreign Policy for United States

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Summary:

Summary, introduction, and full transcription of address in which James Cromwell proposes a new foreign policy for the United States. In his new policy, he argues that US should enhance its armed forces abroad.

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A New Foreign Policy For The United States

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The Honorable James H. R. Cromwell

of New Jersey

An address delivered before The Rotary Club of Nashville, Tennessee, on Tuesday, June 15th, 1954.

The Seven Point Program

- 1. Cease appeasing both our enemies and our Allies and chart our own course and focus our foreign policy upon developing sources of indispensible materials within the Western Hemisphere.
- 2. Cancel all diplomatic privileges and immunities in our relations with the Soviets and her Satellites.
- 3. Withdraw all participation in the Indo-China War.
- 4. Concentrate our military expenditures in Asia upon expanding the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and Nationalist China and put a minimum of 25 additional such divisions on the Korean front.
- 5. Recruit an "American Liberty Legion" of at least 10 divisions with special emphasis upon its G-2 or counter-infiltration corps.
- 6. Concentrate our military expenditures in Europe upon the armament of Germany and Spain.
- 7. Create an "American Allies Reconstruction Finance Corporation", concentrate our economic aid towards establishing industrial and strategic Gibraltars within the realms of such of our Allies as are not afraid to fight communishm and terminate all other foreign military and economic expenditures.

Introduction of the Guest Speaker,
The Honorable James H. R. Cromwell

At the ROTARY CLUB, Nashville, Tennessee

June 15th, 1954

by

Whitehall Morrison, Jr.

Some men write history, many observe it, but few make it.

We are, therefore fortunate in having with us today, a distinguished speaker who has been not only a writer, but an observer and a maker of history. His activities as a soldier, business executive, politician, diplomat, author and economist have been as constructive as they have been varied. And now, as an industrial consultant, he has become the trusted adviser whose services are sought, not only by governments but by manufacturing enterprises, both great and small.

We occasionally meet men who have an uncanny gift of prophetic discernment. Such men seem to know instinctively what is going to happen, although their statements, as prophets in their own land, are often disbelieved. Our speaker has been, and is, one of the most gifted and accurate forecasters of future events and policies in the fields of our national and international affairs.

In March of the year 1940, while Mr. Cromwell was our Envoy to Canada, he made a speech in Toronto, during which he predicted the entry of the United States into World War II and warned us to prepare for it. So great was the isolationist sentiment in America in those days, that demands were made in Congress to recall him from his diplomatic post. But, within two years, we had joined in the hostilities of World War II.

In many other speeches, as well as in his books, articles and

- 2 -

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statements, our guest has repeatedly forecast with startling accuracy, the shape of things to come. He has been correct so often, throughout the past two decades, and to so great a degree, that we should remember and carry away with us the predictions and recommendations he may make today. In this respect, let me read you a statement concerning the address we are about to hear, from no less an authority than our own brilliant and famous, Lieutenant-General Albert Wedemeyer, I quote:

"All Americans concerned with the evaluation of changes in foreign policy contemplated by the Administration would do well to heed the advice of the Honorable James H. R. Cromwell. I have read carefully the ideas developed by Mr. Cromwell and affirm strongly the principles which he suggests as a frame work for a sound foreign policy that would protect America's interest at all times and in all fields of human endeavor".

Mr. Cromwell is an old friend of Dr. Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, and acted as his American adviser during World War II. By reason of this background and because he was the consultant and guest of President Rhee in Seoul last Fall, I doubt that there is an American citizen who is better informed about Korea, or who can more closely estimate the duration of the precarious peace which exists there and in the Far East today.

Although Korea is not the chief subject under discussion, the indominatible President Rhee and his brave people are given a leading role, as you will now learn in the formulation of,

"A New Foreign Policy for the United States"
which is the title of the address to be delivered by our speaker for today, who I now take great pleasure in presenting.

The Honorable James H. R. Cromwell of New Jersey

A NEW FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

By

James H. R. Cromwell

The Result of Precipitous Changes in U. S. Foreign Policy

It should be no occasion for surprise that the foreign policies

I advocate here and now are very different indeed from those I recommended

back in the year 1940. At that time I urged a policy of internationalism

in a wilderness of isolationism, whereas today, I plead for a policy of

Americanism - or call it Nationalism if you will - in a wilderness of

internationalism.

Europeans lack confidence in our new world leadership, and one of the chief reasons is that they consider us to be psychologically unstable and subject to violent and sudden shifts in our international attitudes and policies. From an objective rather than a patriotic perspective, I cannot deny the truth of this allegation for we have, within a period of 15 years, gone from the extreme of isolationism to the extreme of internationalism.

In 1939 we would not cooperate with our fellow-democracies under any circumstances and insisted upon unilateral action. Today we have abjured unilateral action and apparently will take no action of any kind, under any circumstances, without the cooperation or consent of our fellow democracies.

That is certainly a complete about-face and I do not blame the Europeans for their anxiety and lack of confidence in our leadership during the past decade. I do not blame them because I share their feelings. To put it bluntly, we have been consistent only in taking the wrong attitude and in adopting the wrong foreign policy at the wrong time.



I will go so far as to say that our 1939 attitude would be more appropriate and effective if applied today; and that our attitude of today would have been more appropriate and effective, if applied in 1939!

I do not mean to imply that I have boxed the compass and become a 1939 model isolationist. God forbid! I feel just as strongly now as I did then that it is vital to the security of the United States to be certain that the sources from which we derive our critical and strategic materials, remain accessible to us. For I wish to stress the fact that these numerous materials, and they are constantly increasing in quantity and diversity, although often small in tonnage, are indispensible to the efficient and profitable functioning of American industry.

Our Permanent Problem

Our problem at present is much the same as it was in the past, and as it will be in the future. It is the problem, or vital necessity, of keeping open our lines of communication to the sources of these indispensible materials. That is the ball, and remember what they used to tell us in the days of our youth, "keep your eye on the ball".

Of course, the problem of our lines of communication has a Siamese twin, and that twin is the vital necessity of keeping those same sources of supply in the possession of friendly hands. We must not, we cannot, permit anti-democratic, totalitarian powers to control those sources, and thus be able to put a deadly economic squeeze upon our intricate economy, whenever they choose to do so.

This life and death power to deprive a people, or peoples, of those industrial necessities, i.e., strategic and critical materials, is the fundamental thesis of those books written by a great American Admiral. The general subject of his writings was "Scapower", and the



name of the Admiral was Mahan. What he said 60 years ago applies, in theory, almost to as great a degree today as it did then. We all know that Mahan's thesis has become immensely complicated and destructively enlarged by air power, guided missiles, modern submarines, and hydrogen bombs, but the fact is that all these innovations are only highly technical adjuncts to the vital, basic task. The task, to repeat, of maintaining the flow of indispensible materials and commerce to the factories of America.

That vital necessity, therefore, is the axle around which the foreign policy of the United States should revolve. And in this respect, we must leave no stone unturned nor count the cost, of finding and developing, within the Western Hemisphere, every possible source of our lengthening list of strategic and critical materials.

But even though we succeed in that endeavor and make ourselves largely independent of Europe and Asia, let us never forget that we cannot sustain the economic functioning of industry and commerce in North America without control of the sea about us, along with the air above it. Again I say, "that is the ball and keep your eye on it."

From time to time I am beset with fears that our State Department has forgotten to keep its eye on that ball. "State", it seems to me, has too often been immersed in conferences, treaties, grandiose schemes and institutions for peace by talkathons and reliance on unreliable Allies both in Europe and Asia. Our fundamental objective has, I am afraid, been frequently lost sight of.

The Failure of Isolationism

To illustrate the impact upon our foreign policy of the materialssea-air complex, allow me to give you the reasons that compelled me, in



March of 1940, to stick out my official neck by urging my then isolationist fellow-countrymen to support the British and French with everything we had. I had, of course, anticipated the fall of France and I was fearful that Britain, despite her indominatible courage, could not, alone, hold out against the combined armed might of Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan. Such perilous potentialities, to my way of thinking, required a radical reversal of our current foreign policy.

Remember too, that thanks to the isolationists, we had crawled into our imagined hole and pulled it in after us; and remember that we were dependent upon a wholly inadequate one-ocean Navy to maintain accessibility to our world-wide sources of indispensible materials. In other words, we were utterly unprepared to survive in a world controlled by an overwhelming alliance of military autocracies, armed to the teeth, and hostile to us and our democratic way of life. Had Britain been compelled to capitulate like France, and had her navy along with that of France been added to the fleets of Germany and Japan, the preponderance of scapower against us would have exposed us to the mortal economic squeeze I spoke of in a preceding paragraph.

While we were thus confronted with the probabilities of that desperate situation, I wrote in 1941, a little book about the materials - sea-air complex called, prophetically enough, "Pax Americana". I still think today that it served its purpose and while the conditions and problems in 1954 are totally different, the fundamental thesis of "Pax Americana", which I will not repeat again, remains about the same.

But I will repeat, for emphasis, the statement I have just made that the conditions and problems in 1954 are totally different from those of 1939 and 1940.

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Our Overwhelming Sea and Air Power of Today

- 5 -

Today, our seapower far surpasses that of all the seapower which could possibly be arrayed against us. Furthermore, I am informed by reliable authorities on airpower, that our air force is capable of providing the air umbrella essential to assure us of complete control of the adjacent seas.

Seapower and airpower, of course, are concomitant factors; one cannot be wholly effective without the other. It is obvious that air bases, except within continental limits, cannot be serviced and supplied without adequate lines of communication, both by sea and air; nor can control of the seas be maintained without undisputed control of the adjacent air. While I do not deprecate the increasing importance of airpower, I am in thorough accord with the following statement. It was made by an authority on airpower in whose judgment I have the utmost confidence. I refer to the late General Hoyt Vandenberg, former head of our Air Force. He said:

"Air superiority alone cannot win a war Nothing is sillier than the premise that a few planes, flown by a few people can, in a few days, win a war at the cost of a few dollars. Any future war must be won by ground, sea and air forces working as a team."

I am not delivering this speech as an alarmist, nor am I sounding a warning as I did at Toronto in 1940. On the contrary, I want to emphasize the fact that we have but little to worry about today if - and this is a very big if:

If, first, we keep our eye on the ball.

And if, second, we cease squandering ourselves into bankruptcy trying to arm, sustain and support so-called Allies whose loyalty is doubtful and whose aid is as unnecessary as their loyalty is dubious.

- 6 -



And if, third, we set our course straight down the channel exclusively of what is best for America and simultaneously cease appearing the strong and currying the favor of the weak.

A Meeting of Minds

That kind of policy will, of course, evoke agonized cries from our frantic internationalists, as well as their contemptuous protestations that I am reverting to the "Fortress America" concept of Messrs. Hoover and Taft. It would be, indeed, a compliment to be accused of keeping such erudite and distinguished company. Perhaps my good friend and respected leader, the late Robert A. Taft, was, at one time, an isolationist. Well, I would like to see any American who would not like to be an isolationist - if only he could be.

Bob Taft, like nearly all of us, knew very well that to be an isolationist these days is just an impossible dream. Is there a man among us who does not long for a world, free of psychopathic dictators, where we Americans might be permitted to mind our own business and enjoy the fruits of our toil in this magnificent country?

But, to repeat, Taft knew that that was impossible. So he cast around for years, by trial and error, while he watched and analyzed the calamitous blunders of Messrs. Roosevelt, Truman and Acheson. And, finally, he, Taft, the so-called isolationist, came to the same conclusions that I, Cromwell, the so-called internationalist, had simultaneously reached. Those conclusions are contained in Taft's book, written in 1951, "A Foreign Policy for Americans". I agreed in 1951, and continue to agree today, wholeheartedly with just about all the recommendations he made in that book. But I do not presume to speak for my late friend and leader; I speak solely for myself.

- 7 -



The Futility of Peace by Appeasement

What concerns me most today is that we appear to be as incapable of learning from experience as our British cousins. The British precipitated the wars of 1914 and 1939 by the same kind of vacillating, appearement-minded policies that they pursued throughout the Geneva Conference. I hope and pray that we will not let them, and our other United Nations Allies, suck us into another war and another defeat, on precisely the same basis as we lost the war in Korea. In case anyone is in doubt about what I mean, I am talking about appearement.

That is what I fear the most today — appeasement. I neither fear nor anticipate an atomic-hydrogen war between the Russian elephant and the American whale. That is just a wishful fantasy of European and Asiatic neutralists. I do not so under-estimate the intelligence of Soviet leadership as to believe that they would start an atomic-hydrogen war of complete mutual destruction under any imaginable circumstances. There is no reason I can discern, why they should deliberately commit suicide in order to destroy us. And what could possibly impel them to do so when they are winning the "not-so-cold-war" hands down?

Now why are the communists winning the "not-so-cold-war" hands down? The answer is -- appeasement. Why was MacArthur defeated at the Yalu? Appeasement! Why were Generals Almond, Ridgeway and Van Fleet, again and again held back from winning a decisive victory over the Red Chinese?

Appeasement! Why did we agree to a disastrous truce in Korea? Appeasement!

Why do we continue diplomatic relations with the Soviets and their Satellites when it is common knowledge that their Embassies and privileged agencies prostitute every purpose and principle of true diplomacy and when their staffs consist of specially trained spies, assassins and saboteurs, toiling overtime for the sole purpose of undermining and destroying our

-8-



democratic institutions and American way of life? Why, indeed? There is no good reason and so the answer is still the same - appearement.

Yes, appeasement. We are afraid the ruthless rulers of the enslaved Russian people might be offended if these nests of vipers in our midst were rooted out and if we ceased to waste time attending talkathons whose end result is invariably double zero. Only the Russian people can return their fatherland to the comity of civilized society and the greatest disservice we can render them, in their fight for freedom, is to seal the chains of their servitude by persisting in our recognition of, and subservience to, those monsters of Moscow - the Politburo.

How Crazy Can You Be?

Why do we, the mightiest Nation on earth allow ourselves to be led around by the nose by superfluous and expensive Allies whom we carry on our back like the Old Man of the Sea? Allies, I say, whose policies and interests are dictated by conditions diametrically opposed to our own. Their policies stem from weakness and fear; ours from boldness and strength; and, believe me, never the twain shall meet.

For example, consider the Koream war. There we fought first, the communist Koreans and then the communist Chinese, beneath the banner of the United Nations, that self-same organization of which the Soviets still remain a member in good standing. Yet everyone knows that they and nobody else but they instigated and waged the Korean war from start to finish.

We, the people of the United States, suffered 95 per cent of the casualties, underwrote 95 per cent of the cost and carried 95 per cent of the burden- and then we allowed the 5 percenters - under the guise of the United Nations - to deny us victory and to tell us what we could do and what we could not do! I ask you in all earnestness and sincerity, how crazy can you be?

- 9 -



Has it become impossible for us to learn from experience, or are we now going to do the same thing all over again? One would think, to see our Secretary of State scurrying around the capitals of Europe, hat in hand, that America was about to fall apart! One would think that we had no other alternative but to continue the bankrupt Roosevelt-Truman-Acheson policies, of which President Eisenhower is the unfortunate heir. Yet the fact is that we have a whole flock of alternatives, and they encompass policies which would assure us, instead of the communists, the prize of winning the "not-so-cold-war", hands down.

New Foreign Policy

The seven point program I am about to give you is designed exclusively to safeguard the interests and security of the United States, and if, by implementing it, we lost the esteem and good will of the egg-shell neutralists, that is just too bad. Ask one of our boys from Korea which he would have preferred when he was being shot at by the Red Chinese — the good will of Mr. Nehru from India — or more air support, more artillery and a bullet-proof vest from the United States? Here is my program:

First, as to Asia. I say first, because, like Messrs. Lenin and Stalin, I happen to believe that the gateway to Paris is through Peking. To safeguard our Far Eastern interests we should liquidate our participation in the Indo-China war as quickly and cheaply as possible. Thereafter, we should concentrate our resources upon expanding, training and equipping the armed forces of our fighting Allies - the Republic of Korea and Nationalist China.

The Indo-China war is a colonial quagmire, and can never be decisively won. But in Korea, the power of the Red Chinese can be smashed beyond redemption, and that must be done before there can be any real and lasting

- 10 -



peace in the Orient. In order to gain victory at a minimum cost in American lives, we should and could, within a period of two years, put at least 25 fully equipped Republic of Korea and Nationalist Chinese divisions on the Korean front. These new troops would be in addition to the 18 veteran R.O.K. divisions already there. President Rhee has recently stated that 25 R.O.K. divisions can be maintained at no greater cost than one American division. The proposed additional forces would, therefore, not be prohibitively expensive.

Let Others Help Us Fight For Freedom

Next, we should recruit an "American Liberty Legion" of men and women from any country in the world who wish to fight for freedom under the Stars and Stripes. This task force should be at least 10 divisions strong. However, I will describe the vital ramifications of this proposition more fully at the conclusion of my address.

Naturally we must continue to give moral support and selective materiel to our fighting Allies, wherever they may be. We must help them technically, economically and with an abundance of excellent equipment - just as the Soviets, from the coach's bench, so effectively support the aggressions of their Satellites. There is no necessity for matching American lives with those of Soviet Satellite soldiers on the front lines in Korea, or anywhere else.

The Soviets do not expend the lives of their own soldiers in winning these "not-so-cold-wars", so why should we? What President Rhee and President Chiang-Kai-Shek want most of all is to be given the direction and assistance that will permit them to fight for their own freedom and, if it could be done, to defeat their ruthless enemy without the loss of a single American life.

Now as to Europe. It is of the utmost importance to the United

States to prevent the compulsory communization of the cradle of Western civilization. But the only certain and sure way to guarantee Europe against ultimate communization, is to concentrate our major effort upon the rearmament of Germany. That, I well recognize, is a hazardous risk but, in calculating it from the viewpoint of American interests, I would a thousand times prefer to have Germany rearmed by the U.S.A. than by the U.S.S.R.

Let me state that I am 100% opposed to the notion of ever again sending a vast American expeditionary force to fight the battles of Europe. If 260 million Europeans cannot protect themselves against the Soviets, then all Europe, except Spain, had best be written off. In short, I favor the application of the same policies and the same principles to the Occident as I have advocated for the Orient.

We should furnish air, naval, technical assistance and materiel support to such nations as will really fight the communists when the chips are down. Possibly minor token forces of American troops should be present, for purposes of morale or management, although I agree to this latter proposition with reluctance. But to the notion of a major American expeditionary force, anywhere in the world - I say no - a thousand times no - never again.

Private Enterprise Plan

Now, let me give you one more new idea before I complete this exposition of a "New Foreign Policy for the United States." I refer to the "Private Enterprise Plan", published last March in the Congressional Record. This Plan proposes the setting up of an "American Allies Reconstruction Finance Corporation" adequately financed by Congressional appropriations. Branches of the organization would be operated in the lands, and under the

- 12 -



laws of those of our Allies who would welcome such a lending organization, and be entitled to it by reason of their proven loyalty and devotion to the cause of world freedom. American supervision and advice concerning the loans granted would assure sound and profitable operations.

In this respect, the outstanding feature of the "Private Enterprise Plan" would be to induce leading American corporations to sponsor the construction and operation of counterpart factories in those countries that qualify for the establishment of branch Reconstruction Finance Corporations. The inducement consists of a 25 percent permanent equity ownership in the new allied corporations, coupled with the assurance that the sponsoring companies need not risk a penny of their stockholder's money.

The objective of the Plan is to establish, within the realms of our staunchest Allies, a series of industrial and strategic Gibraltars wherein the application of American know-how and American capital would rapidly assure far higher standards of living, and should develop a social and political philosophy founded upon private enterprise, freedom and democracy. Thus the staunch Allies would become "show cases" for all the world to see how superior to the slavery and terror of communism is the unfettered functioning of private enterprise.

The eligible nations I have immediately in mind would be the Republic of Korea, Nationalist China, the Phillippines, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, Spain and several of our South American neighbors. All other foreign dollar expenditures should be terminated at the earliest possible moment.

This is no give-away program; its slogan is "we lend as we spend" and its doctrine is "For the laborer is worthy of his hire." (St. Luke 10:7). Inauguration of the new "Private Enterprice Plan" would not only concentrate

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- 13 -

greatly reduced American foreign expenditures upon definite and limited objectives but would liquidate the further failures of an attempt to "buy" peace, based upon the operation of a world-wide poorhouse supported by far-flung and indiscriminate gifts of American dollars. In pursuing that false will-o-the-wisp, we have, since the war, gratuitously sown all over the globe, a total of 60 billion dollars, and we have reaped a harvest of little but contempt and ill-will.

Seven Point Summary

To sum up, this is my seven point program:

- 1. Cease appeasing both our enemies and our Allies and chart our own course and focus our foreign policy upon developing sources of indispensible materials within the Western Hemisphere.
- 2. Cancel all diplomatic privileges and immunities in our relations with the Soviets and her Satellites.
- 3. Withdraw all participation in the Indo-China War.
- 4. Concentrate our military expenditures in Asia upon expanding the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and Nationalist China and put a minimum of 25 additional such divisions on the Korean front.
- 5. Recruit an "American Liberty Legion" of at least 10 divions with special emphasis upon its G-2 or counterinfiltration corps.
- 6. Concentrate our military expenditures in Europe upon the armament of Germany and Spain.
- 7. Create an "American Allies Reconstruction Finance Corporation", concentrate our economic aid towards establishing industrial and strategic Gibraltars within the realms of such of our Allies as are not afraid to fight communism and terminate all other foreign military and economic expenditures.

An American Liberty Legion

The creation of an "American Liberty Legion" was the subject of the following letter that I wrote to President Truman on March 1, 1951 and which has, heretofore, never been made public. Here is the letter: - 14 -

"Dear Mr. President:

The purpose of this confidential letter is to obtain your support of a project to organize a counter-infiltration and subversive corps to operate chiefly behind the Iron Curtain. Inasmuch as the expansion of communist power over the past five years, has taken place without the firing of a shot by the Great Red Army, the success of the Politburo must be due to the meticulously organized and directed work of its elite subversive corps, the Comintern.

Your courage in halting communist aggression in Korea last June finally awakened our country to the Red Sword of Damocles hanging over the head of Western Civilization and we are now planning to spend tens of millions of dollars, for years to come, in the effort to deter further aggression. Yet, apparently, the best we can hope for is decades of this appalling waste of our natural and human resources, accompanied by the constant psychosis of the Red sword.

Since preventive war is impossible for democracy, must we stand condemned to bear these terrible burdens and infinitum? The answer is No. The weapon which will permit us to seize the initiative from the Politburo, and can ultimately encompass the destruction of Russian militarism, lies ready to our hands.

It is the Politburo's own major weapon and the key to its success, the planned and disciplined subversion, conducted within the frontiers of a friendly nation, which rang down the Iron Curtain upon democratized and western oriented Czechoslovakia, without the presence of a single Red soldier. But Russian militarism, masquerading under the cloak of communism, is infinitely more vulnerable to this weapon than democracy for the more it expands, the longer time is given to illuminate the false promises and to highlight the stark fraud of the Red terror, the more susceptible it becomes to fatal penetration by its own sharp spearhead - subversion.

Since I visited Russia in 1937 the printed record proves that my opinions and predictions with respect to communism and totalitarianism have been correct. I say this not to boast but only to lend weight to the prediction that within three years after the implementation of an American counter-infiltration corps, Russia's Satellites can be so undermined as to prohibit further aggression and that within ten years' time organized revolution with Russia herself may well wipe the threat of communist militarism off the face of the earth.

Mr. President, there is only one method I know of by which we can promptly and properly implement an American counter-infiltration corps without, as a democracy, committing an overt act. That method is by organizing a foreign legion upon the facade of which appropriations can be hung for an intelligence corps which would constitute and, in fact be, the proposed counter-infiltration corps. If this letter arouses your interest I have enclosed a leaflet, which is presently being distributed

- 15 -

to selected members of the Senate and House, describing such a foreign legion and its objective.

Virtually without exception everyone with whom I have discussed this project agrees enthusiastically with its necessity, yet it is a strange phenomenon of our democracy that because the project is new and bold, no person or department will assume responsibility for it. It is not within the province of the Department of Defense, a military organization, nor the Department of State, a diplomatic organization, nor the Central Intelligence Agency, a fact-finding organization.

Clearly, therefore, the breath of life can be blown into this vital project only through executive and legislative action and it is for this reason that I have taken the liberty of petitioning your support through the interest and good offices of our mutual friend, Harley Kilgore.

Respectfully yours,

JAMES H. R. CROMWELLⁿ.

I never received any response, acknowledgment or reaction to that letter. And why not? The answer is still the same — appeasement! Yet, this combination of an alien military task force with its G-2 or counter-infiltration corps is the only instrument I know of by which we can win the "not-so-cold-war" and with it, peace in our time.

The road of appeasement leads but to the grave of Democracy, and of freedom, and of our American way of life. We must turn away from the narrow road of weakness and fear and travel the broad highway of boldness and strength, where this mighty Nation of ours belongs.