

September 20, 1957

**Letter No. 54 from Tai Ha Yiu [Yu Tae-ha] of the
Korean Mission in Japan to President Syngman Rhee**

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Summary:

Yu briefs President Rhee on a meeting with Tanaka regarding the opposition to the Korean amendment proposal and Kishi's weakened political position.

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

KOREAN MISSION IN JAPAN

September 20, 1957

No. 54

TO : His Excellency
The President

FROM : Tai Ha Yiu

At my afternoon meeting with Tanaka, deputy chief cabinet secretary, he stated there was no way of getting the opposition groups in the government and party to accept the Korean amendment proposal. He added that among the fishermen detained in Pusan about 70 per cent of them were from Yamaguchi prefecture. With a Diet dissolution imminent, the problem of the detainees was a big anxiety for him, personally and otherwise. With his victory in the election dependent on the settlement of the issue, he said he could not and did not spare his efforts. Kishi was not so adverse to inserting our amendment proposal in the agreed minutes, for if Kishi was against it, he, Tanaka, could not even mention it. However, with such strong opposition from influential groups in the government and the party, his talks did not achieve any good results, he said. The more he talked to them, the cooler their attitude became. Tanaka also cited the strained relations between Kishi and the Hatoyama and Kono groups because of the prime minister's Red China policy which also add to Kishi's difficulties in settling the Korea-Japan problems.

According to Tanaka, Kono and those who are opposed to the Korean amendment proposals are demanding the government to ask Korea whether it intends to abide by article 4 of the San Francisco peace treaty. Kono asserted that Japan's renunciation of property claims in Korea was made in accordance with the pertinent provision in the peace treaty because Ordinance 33 issued by USAMGIK was accepted by Japan. He then questioned why the government was taking such a weak attitude toward Korea in regard to the U.S. memorandum when he had carefully studied the memorandum, adding that during the Hatoyama cabinet when it was trying to settle the detainee problem, he approached Ambassador Allison who told him that he (Allison) was the very person who drafted the answer to Korea's request for U.S. clarification of Article 4b of the San Francisco peace treaty. Another of Kono's assertion was that even if the two sides were to discuss the property issue another problem would confront Japan. Japan renounced her claim to property in south Korea but north Korea was not under U.S. occupation and therefore ~~was~~ not affected by Ordinance 33.

Tanaka stated that Kishi's weakened position after the appointment to the cabinet of opposition members was making it difficult for him to have his own way. Kono and Ikeda are treating Kishi coldly due to the fact that Ishibashi's health has greatly improved. Ishibashi has serious designs of getting back the power he relinquished. As stated in the papers, Ishibashi has announced his desire to take a trip abroad. Due to this development, the Japanese political situation has become very delicate. Ishibashi voluntarily turned over the reins



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to Kishi
of the government/for reasons of health but with his improvement his followers will do everything possible to get him back to power, Tanaka said.

Although it was improper for him to say this, Tanaka stated that if the Diet is dissolved and Kishi's popularity is restored and strengthened, then things might turn to the better, but since the contrary might result he asked that we consider the situation and not make Kishi's position any worse by making demands that he could not accept. The opposition groups are afraid, he said, that the Korean side's attitude toward the U.S. memorandum was aimed at reparations and was not to succeed with the talks.

Kishi is presently on a nation-wide stumping tour to explain his domestic and foreign policies and to find out how they would be accepted. Kishi is testing his own popularity which will have an important bearing on his plan to dissolve the Diet.

I have some knowledge of Kono's character from my experience with him when we were negotiating the sale of our rice to Japan. I told Tanaka that if Japan settles the Korean property claims with sincerity, Korea might not bring up the problem of reparations. However, if Japan does not show her sincerity, we would do that very thing. Only Kono, who advocates close ties with Soviet Russia and Red China, would bring up such a problem as that of Japanese properties in north Korea, I said.

Returning to K-J problems, Tanaka requested that we stop insisting on our amendment proposals but insert a milder term and resume the conference. I rejected this and requested for further meetings. He agreed, adding that during his absence I should conduct talks with Itagaki and Yatsugi who would remain in Tokyo.

From my talks with the Japs, I have found that the Jap internal situation is very complicated and Kishi's position is not becoming any stronger. However, we will continue to push through our demands.

Taikayin