

July 15, 1957

**Letter No. 26 from Tai Ha Yiu [Yu Tae-ha] of the
Korean Mission in Japan to President Syngman Rhee**

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Summary:

Yu briefs President Rhee on a meeting with Sawada Renzo and Soviet approach for a visit to Japan of Khrushchev and Bulganin.

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

KOREAN MISSION IN JAPAN
CONFIDENTIAL

Tokyo, July 15, 1957

No. 26

TO : His Excellency
The President

FROM : Tai Ha Yiu

SUBJECT : Meeting with Sawada Renzo, and
Soviet Approach for a visit to
Japan of Khrushchev and Bulganin

I met Sawada Renzo this afternoon and had a two-hour talk with him.

According to Sawada, he had long talks with Prime Minister Kishi and Vice Foreign Minister Ohno in regard to the Korean-Japanese problems. He tried to assure me that the Prime Minister has not the slightest intention of using the U.S. memorandum against Korea's property claims saying that if he had such an intention he would not have been anxious to settle the problems. Sawada said he advised Kishi that since the preliminary talks had made such progress, he should make a commitment to the Korean side that the U.S. memorandum will not affect Korea's claims in any way. Kishi told Sawada that although he was anxious to do so, the administrative level in the Ministry would not be easy to deal with. Besides that, the opposition factions in the Party would attack him mercilessly if they were to know of his commitment.

Sawada asked that we consider Kishi's very difficult position, adding that he had not forgot the favor the Korean government did him in the past and tried all he could.

I told Sawada that Kishi, as the prime minister, can accept the Korean proposal if he has such an intention. The administrative level has never agreed to anything that which it would agree to later on, and if Kishi insist, it could be done. Sawada replied there was a limit to everything and Kishi was not in a position to override stiff opposition although he is the prime minister and that Korea should make Kishi's position easier for him.

According to Sawada, Kishi told him that he would make an oral commitment to the Korean side. I told Sawada that anything committed must be done in writing and that Sawada, as an influential member of the Foreign Office, should advise Kishi to settle the problems at this time based on our terms. Sawada replied that he would try to do so but asked that we also reconsider our stand.

Commenting on Kishi's visit to the U.S., he said that a certain influential source advised Kishi to ask for U.S. mediation in the settlement of K-J problems but which Sawada said was refused because the Prime Minister felt that the two countries should first come to some agreement before requesting U.S. mediation.

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Sawada stated that if the formal conference reopens and he becomes the chief Japanese delegate, he will definitely not link Korea's property claims to the U.S. memorandum and neither will the other delegates because if anyone were to do so, the conference would break up in no time. The Korean side need not be sorry, he said, for as the draft memo on the property claims showed, the Japanese side made many concessions, and since suspicions have no end, we should resume the conference. Sawada insisted that although he would do his utmost he saw no hope of the new Cabinet accepting the new Korean amendments.

Turning to Soviet-Japan relations, Sawada confided to me the information he obtained from Vice Foreign Minister Ohno that the Soviet Ambassador in Japan had approached the Foreign Ministry with the confidential request whether or not Khrushchev and Bulganin's planned visit to Japan sometime during the end of August or the first part of September would be agreeable to the Japanese government. The Soviet Ambassador told Ohno that he had been sent instructions from Moscow to sound out whether their visit would be appropriate at this time. Ohno said he told the Russian that he would have to discuss the matter with the then foreign minister Kishi. Sometime afterwards, Kadowaki, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow reported to the Foreign Ministry that he had been approached by the Far Eastern chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry that the two top Kremlin men would like to visit Japan.

The Japanese government is presently in a dilemma as to how to act on this proposal and according to Sawada is having a big headache. With Kono and his group holding prominent positions in the cabinet, if they come to know of the Russian approach, they would push strongly in favor of the visit by giving the fishery and other problems as the reasons why the government must accept their visit. The socialists on their part will make big propaganda out of it and this would mean a big minus for the Kishi cabinet. Kishi will have the same trouble whether he accepts it or not.

In the Joint Communiqué issued when he was in the U.S., Kishi stated that Japan will follow anti-communist policies. Russia is attacking Kishi for this, asserting that the establishment of relations between the two countries had become meaningless. The Russians consider the opening of ties with Japan a big achievement on their part and are anxious to visit Japan at this particular time in view of Kishi's statement of anti-communist policies made in the U.S. Ohno was told by the Russian ambassador that since he would be leaving soon for Moscow he would like the Japanese government to give him an answer before his departure. It is not known what answer Kishi will make to the Soviet approach.

I have been asked by Sawada to keep the above matter confidential as very few people in the Jap government know of it and if there was to be a leakage, he would be placed in a very difficult position, he said.