

July 9, 1957

Letter No. 22 from Tai Ha Yiu [Yu Tae-ha] of the Korean Mission in Japan to President Syngman Rhee

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Summary:

Yu briefs President Rhee on a meeting with Kitazawa, Ambassador Kim, and Yatsugi, regarding the resignation of the cabinet and the new cabinet.

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

KOREAN MISSION IN JAPAN

Tokyo, July 9, 1957

No. 22

TO : His Excellency The President

FROM : Tai Ha Yiu

At the request of Kitazawa, deputy chief cabinet secretary, I met him together with Amb. Kim last evening. Yatsugi was also present.

Kitazawa's purpose in calling for the meeting was to tell us that he would resign from his position together with the cabinet on the 10th. He talked long of the part he played to bring the Korea-Japan relations to the present stage and of his disappointment that he could not bring it further to the point of opening the formal talks.

The administrative level in the Foreign Ministry is of the opinion that since the Japanese side had agreed to everyone of the Korean demands, it could not bring itself to make any further concessions; that in a diplomacy concessions have to be reciprocated and not done one-sidedly, he said.

Despite opposition from various sources, the Foreign Ministry bowed to the Korean wish regarding the U.S. memorandum, but with the Korean side demanding further changes, it was an impossible matter and even Kishi or Ishii would not be able to do anything now or at any other time, he added. If the present situation prevails, Kitazawa said, there will be no way of settling the problems. Kishi will return from Hakone on the 10th but he will not be in a position to order the lower level to give in to the new Korean proposal. And even if he does, they will not listen to him, he said.

The new cabinet which will be formed in a few days will be composed of men who will be strong in their attitude towards Korea. The past one had been formed of men from both the Kishi and Ishii factions, however, the new one will be filled with most of the former ministers in the Hatoyama government, such as Kono, Takasaki and Nemoto. If this is brought about, Kishi will not get the same cooperation as he did from the old one. Then why does Kishi wish to form a cabinet with people who will be difficult to deal with? The circumstances now presenting Kishi are such that he cannot ignore Kono or any of the others of the same group who helped him to attain his present height, politically and personally. The new cabinet will be formed of members from the Ishii, Kono and Kishi groups, and cooperation among the free factions is not to be expected. Yoshida is critical of Kishi in that the prime minister is anxious to get men into the cabinet who will carry out neutral policies. Yoshida noted, according to Kitazawa, the Soviet-Japan society which was formed some 10 days ago with Hatoyama as president, and Takasaki, Kono and another as advisors with the inclusion of Nozaka, the communist, and deplored the influence of such men in the government.

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With regard to the position of finance minister, Kishi is anxious to remove Ikeda from the post by making him responsible for the big dollar deficit. However, that is merely an excuse for Ikeda did not misuse the funds and the shortage was due to excess imports. Yoshida is against having Ikeda removed,

As to the effect the new cabinet will have on Korea-Japan relations, Kitazawa stated that the new government will not have the same fervor to settle the problems as did the past one.

I told Kitazawa that I was sorry to see a very good friend go. As to the Japanese contention that it made the most concessions, they could be called such if compared with the so-called Kim-Nakagawa agreement. However, that agreement was not recognized by us. As to the two minor revisions made by the Korean side, I could not understand why the Japanese side was taking such an attitude.

Pointing out to the U.S. memorandun, Kitazawa and Yatsugi stated that the Japanese agreement to the Korean terms literally killed the memo and that it makes the Japanese side bitter that the Koreans want further revisions. As to the term "under deportation orders" in the detainee memorandum, they stated that the administrative level is strongly against the deletion of the term, arguing that the Korean government cannot simply ignore the laws of Japan. They added that while the original drafts were being prepared by the Japanese side, there had been much opposition from every level of government, but due to the urgency of the detainee problem, the Japanese side gave in to the wishes of the two top men, Kishi and Ishii.

I asked Kitazawa if it was true that the U.S. had told Kishi during his recent visit to the U.S. that if Korea and Japan fail to come to agreement, the U.S. would act as mediator. This story appeared in the newspapers, attributing the remark to Ishida, the cabinet secretary who was a member of the Kishi party. Kitazawa replied that Ishida himself was surprised at reading the story, wondering where and how the papers got hold of such a thing.

Commenting on the INS dispatch from Seoul regarding President Rhee's statement on Kishi's Southeast Asia Development Flan, Kitazawa said he would like to assure the Korean people that such a development plan cannot even be dreamed of by Japan and that there was no hope of the U.S. aiding her in such a plan.

As to the revision of the U.S.-Japan security pact, the American side advised that if Japan wants a revision of the pact, she must first of all revise her Constitution. No assurance of any kind was received from the Americans regarding the Okinawa problem, he said.

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