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**December 8, 1955**

**Political Report, Minister Yong Shik Kim [Kim  
Yong-shik] to the Office of the President**

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**Summary:**

Report on followings: Japan and UN Membership, Japan's population problem, Japanese reaction on Korean Joint Chief of Staff Statement

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

KOREAN MISSION IN JAPAN Tokyo, December 8, 1955

TO : Office of the President  
FROM : Minister Yong Shik Kim  
SUBJECT : Political Report

The items in this week's political report are as follows:

- I. JAP REACTIONS ON THE STATEMENT BY THE KOREAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.
- II. JAPAN AND UN MEMBERSHIP.
- III. JAPAN'S POPULATION PROBLEM.

I. JAP REACTIONS ON THE STATEMENT BY THE KOREAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

As reported previously, Japan paid serious attention to the statement and was anxious to find out whether Korea was actually going to put into practice the statement. Japanese public opinion was focussed on the point that "Korean naval vessels would fire upon Japanese fishing vessels and if necessary, sink them." Public sentiments particularly in the Kyushu and Western Japanese areas were extremely tense and Japanese fishermen's group began to launch an active movement to persuade the Japanese government to settle the fishery dispute with Korea as soon as possible. The Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff statement was issued just 2 days after the conservative merger was accomplished on November 15.

In this connection, it must be noted that the statement has served a great deal to divert the attention of Japanese people to the international problem with Korea instead of their internal political problem.

All the newspapers, radio and other publications were busy engaging in reporting the statement and distorting the real character of the Korea-Japan fishery issue. The report on the development of the issue was made in editorials and headlines of all the Japanese newspapers almost every day since the statement was issued on November 17.

As soon as the Diet session was resumed on December 2, representatives of both Houses of the Diet immediately took up this issue. And every day, Diet members urged the Cabinet ministers concerned to clarify what the Japanese Government was going to do with this issue. In the meantime, representatives of nine prefectures in Western Japan and family members of

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the Japanese fishermen under detention in Korea journeyed to Tokyo and appealed to the various ministries concerned for an early settlement of the issue. And on December 5 and 6, the activities of the fishermen's representatives reached their climax. They visited the Japanese Diet, Hatoyama, Shigemitsu, the U.S. Embassy in Japan. On December 6, they stormed at the gate of this Office with anti-Korean placards and banners and shouted for an immediate withdrawal of the Peace Line for more than two hours. Visiting the Diet, they urged the Diet to persuade the Government to take an immediate counter-measure against the Republic of Korea with the following recommendations:

1. To sever economic relations with Korea.
2. To guarantee safety of fishing operations of Japanese fishing vessels.
3. To map out the measures for helping families of Japanese detainees in Korea.
4. To expedite an early repatriation of 643 Japanese fishermen now under detention in Korea.

Among a certain segment of Diet members, views are being advocated that in case the Korean navy should fire at Japanese fishing vessels, as stated in the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff statement, Japan should exercise the so-called "right of self defense" and order the Japanese navy to the scene. But, the Japanese government is still cautious against such moves of some Diet members. On December 5, 1955, Shigemitsu and Defense Minister Funada testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House that the fishery dispute should be settled by peaceful means, in other words, through diplomatic negotiations, and not by force and that this was not the stage to have the Japanese navy take any action on this issue. Shigemitsu emphasized that there was no other way than continuing the attempt to settle the issue by diplomatic negotiations and that his Government was convinced that the only way to solve this issue was to depend upon peaceful negotiations with Korea.

Prior to making the afore-mentioned answer to the Diet, Shigemitsu and his staff of the Japanese Foreign Office carefully studied the ways and means to settle the issue. And they reached a tentative conclusion that there are the following three ways to counter the Korean statement:

1. Request for withdrawal of the Korean Mission in Japan.
2. Severance of economic relations with Korea.
3. Appeal to the UN Security Council for UN intervention in the dispute.

But later, they decided that those measures were not feasible to adopt at the present stage since it must be more practical for the Japanese government to try to settle the issue by more diplomatic means. These are (1) to try to directly approach the Korean side to iron out the difficulties connected with the fishery problem and (2) to find out the possibilities to request for US mediation in settling the issue.

In order to study the detailed steps to be taken to implement the above two tentative plans, the Hatoyama Cabinet, on December 6, decided to set up a Cabinet Deliberative Council in charge of the Korea-Japan problems. The proposed council is to be composed of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, Agriculture

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Minister Kono, Transportation Minister Yoshino and Minister of International Trade and Industry Tanzan Ishibashi. The so-called peaceful means of settling the fishery issue with Korea was confirmed by Hatoyama who testified before the Diet session held on December 8 that he "personally" believed that deployment of Japanese naval vessels at the present stage was beyond the framework of self-defense. Defense Minister Funada also denied that the present situation was so strained as to call for the use of the Japanese naval force or the intervention of the US Security Forces as stipulated in the Japan-US Security Pact. Now, judging from the above Japanese reactions on the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff statement, it seems that the Japanese government will pursue the following measures at least for the time being:

1. The Japanese government will not tell Japanese fishermen to refrain from crossing the Peace Line, since it has repeatedly said that Japan will not recognize the propriety of delineation of the Peace Line.
2. However, the Japanese government will not allow its naval forces to enter the zone to protect Japanese fishing vessels engaging in fishing there, but only have its unarmed patrol boats (belonging to the Marine Safety Board--Water Police Headquarters) engage in sending Japanese fishing vessels informations on the activities of Korean patrol boats so that fishing vessels could escape from the Korean waters without being captured.
3. In the meantime, the Japanese government will continue to sound out the possibility of US mediation in the fishery dispute through the US Embassy in Tokyo and to launch an active propaganda activities against Korea in capitals of the countries where Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives are stationed.
4. And the Japanese government will continue to make efforts to find out whether Korean naval vessels will actually fire upon or sink Japanese vessels in the future, as stipulated in the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff statement.

On December 8, the Cabinet's Deliberation Council in charge of Korea-Japan relations held its first meeting at a Diet hall and it is reported that discussions were centered upon how to settle the fishery issue. And the Council led by Shigemitsu decided to find out ways and means for resuming talks with Korea on the overall problems including the Peace Line issue and to request for America's mediation in settlement of issues pending with Korea, and as details of the above basic policy, the following measures have been mapped out at the Council:

1. To request the US to render its good offices for the settlement of the Korea-Japan issues by peaceful means.
2. To give political consideration to the question of Korean detainees in Omura camp in order to expedite the settlement of the case of Japanese fishermen detained in Korea, and
3. To make efforts to resume negotiations with Korea with a view to settling all the pending issues including the fishery dispute.



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Besides the above basic policy of the Japanese government toward Korea, Shigemitsu stated as follows in reply to the question raised by a member of the Diet Foreign Affairs Committee on December 8:

Shigemitsu: "I want to settle the Korea-Japan issues only through peaceful means. I think that some people may believe that my policy is rather lukewarm, but it is necessary for us to be patient. The US is very much interested in an early settlement of the Korea-Japan issues. I am sure that Korea also will have no objection to the settlement of the issues by peaceful means. I sincerely hope that the present tense atmosphere will be relaxed in the near future."

Any further development of arguments on the JCS statement will be reported immediately.

## II. JAPAN AND UN MEMBERSHIP.

Both Houses of the Jap Diet, on December 6, unanimously passed a resolution appealing for Japan's admittance into the United Nations. The resolution appealed to the UN General Assembly for acceptance of membership into the UN of Japan and other countries which had applied for inclusion, before the present session closes. The action was taken jointly on a supra-party basis by the members of the Government and the Opposition parties.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu cabled the resolution to UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold asking that Japan is extremely anxious to be admitted into the UN as a full-fledged member together with other 17 nations. The idea of the so-called package deal was proposed by the Canadian Delegation this time. There were actually 21 applicants including the Republic of Korea. But Canada proposed in its package deal that all the applicants, except Germany, Korea and Vietnam, be admitted into the UN. The present package deal is backed by 28 nations and the Japanese Government believes that if the Canadian proposal is adopted in the Security Council, Japan will be surely granted a chance to be admitted into the UN.

The real difficulty, however, lies in the Security Council. Both Nationalist China and Russia have committed themselves to the employment of the veto—Taipei against the inclusion of Outer Mongolia and Moscow against the other applicants if Outer Mongolia is excluded. Thus, Taipei and Moscow are regarded as responsible for success or failure of the package membership plan. But it is evident that the Russian threat that it uses the veto against admittance of 17 nations into the UN if only one country—Outer Mongolia—is excluded is extremely unreasonable. And Nationalist China has ample reasons for refusing the admittance of Outer Mongolia into the UN. But shrewd Russians have managed to place the onus on Taipei for the success or failure of the package deal, for the Taipei Government has been called upon to act first when the package plan is presented to the UN Security Council for discussion. And it is a deplorable fact that not only 28 nations which jointly submitted the package deal, but also other member nations including the United States are giving pressure only to Taipei to refrain from employing the veto, without touching upon the Russians' unreasonable and malicious scheme.

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## III. JAPAN'S POPULATION PROBLEM.

The Jap Cabinet's Statistics Bureau carried out the national census as of October 1, 1955. And the Bureau, on December 6, announced an interim report on the October national census.

According to the interim report, Japan's population as of October 1 stood at 89,269,278 persons comprising 43,855,764 males and 45,413,514 females. The report shows that the nation's population had increased by 6,069,641 persons during the five years since the previous national census conducted in 1950.

The number of households in Japan totaled 17,958,284, the average per family being made up of 4.9 persons, or slightly lower than the 5.2 person average recorded in the 1950 census. The biggest increase was noted in Tokyo where the population showed a rise of 1,756,029 from 1950 to 8,033,529, accounting for 9 per cent of the nation's total. And Japan's population density now is 241 persons per square kilometer. The interim census also showed that Japan ranks the fifth in the world in regard to population, following China, India, Russia and the U.S.

In view of the possibility that Japan's population may exceed 100-million by 1965 if it increases at the present rate (6 million increase in 5 years), the Jap government set up a new governmental branch named the Emigration Bureau in the Foreign Ministry to handle the emigration affairs and promote emigration of Japanese nationals to South American countries including Brazil. The Jap government also established a sort of special corporation named the Japan Emigration Promotion Corporation. This Corporation is a special agency which will be held responsible for promotion of Japanese emigration.

*Gong Shu Kin*