December 22, 1976

Ministry of External Affairs, Africa Division, 'Disarmament and Nuclear Energy'

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Summary:

This report depicts India’s stance on disarmament.

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SECRET
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Ministry of External Affairs
(Africa Division)

DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

General and Complete Disarmament

The Government of India has been consistently of the view that in this nuclear age lasting world peace can only be based on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Government of India attaches great importance to this goal, and accords special significance to the order of priorities which should be followed while taking steps towards and formulating measures for the achievement of this goal. The Government of India considers that the highest priority in the field of disarmament should be accorded to the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Important first steps which should be taken in this direction are: (i) a cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes combined with prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and (ii) a comprehensive ban on all testing of nuclear weapons.

Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

India has consistently stood for the prevention of all proliferation of nuclear weapons by all States - nuclear-weapon as well as non-nuclear-weapon States - i.e. the prevention of both horizontal and vertical proliferation. In India's view, an approach to this question which merely seeks to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States while allowing the existing nuclear-weapon States to increase their nuclear arsenals is not workable.

Unfortunately, the NPT as it emerged in 1968, is an unequal and discriminatory treaty, as it only seeks to prevent a further increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers without placing any curbs on the ever-growing and more destructive nuclear weapon stockpiles of existing nuclear-weapon States. The treaty places all obligations on non-nuclear-weapon States without any binding commitments whatsoever on the nuclear-weapon States. The treaty imposes international safeguards on the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States only, without any such safeguards on the nuclear activities, whether civil or military, of nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty also prohibits only the non-nuclear-weapon States from conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

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A genuine and generally acceptable non-proliferation treaty should have aimed at stopping the production of nuclear weapons by all States. In that event, there would have been a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for military purposes by all States, and since all nuclear facilities in all States would then have become peaceful, a uniform system of international safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful to military purposes could have been made universally applicable.

India could not accept and sign the NPT because of its unequal and discriminatory nature and also because the Treaty would have hampered our programme of development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

World Disarmament Conference

Even before the USSR inscribed this item on the agenda of the XXVI Session of the UNGA in 1971, the non-aligned States had taken the initiative in calling for a world disarmament conference in Belgrade in 1961, in Cairo in 1964 and in Lusaka in 1970. The call has also been repeated at the Fifth Non-aligned Summit meeting held in Colombo in 1976. However, a stalemate seems to have been reached in regard to the early convening of a world disarmament conference, due mainly to the strongly negative positions of the United States and the People's Republic of China.

India had fully supported the non-aligned initiative. The Government of India is convinced and has consistently taken the view that a world disarmament conference, held after adequate preparation and with the participation of all States, would promote the strivings of the peoples of the world to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and thereby ensure lasting world peace and security. In keeping with this position, India will continue to support all efforts directed towards the early convening of such a conference.

Convening of a Special Session of the UNGA to consider the Question of Disarmament

In view of the importance of disarmament, the first non-aligned summit held in Belgrade in 1961 had recommended the convening "of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to the discussion on disarmament" or "of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament". However, since a stalemate has been reached on the question of holding a world disarmament conference, the suggestion to hold a

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special UNGA Session to consider the question of disarmament has been repeated by the Fifth Non-aligned Summit which met in Colombo in 1976. Its Political Declaration inter alia states:

> "139. The Conference also recommended in the meantime, that Members of the Non-aligned movement request the holding of a Special Session of the General Assembly as early as possible and not later than 1978. The agenda of the Special Session should include:
>
> a. a review of the problem of disarmament.
>
> b. the promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament.
>
> c. the question of convening of a World Disarmament Conference."

We attach great importance to progress on the question of disarmament and are, therefore, in favour of all measures including the convening of a special session of the UN General Assembly directed towards the achievement of that object. We, however, consider that such a special session should promote the idea of a world disarmament conference.

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Ministry of External Affairs
(UN & Conferences Division)
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Subject: Brief on India's position on the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

At the initiative of Pakistan, the UN General Assembly has considered at its 29th Session in 1974 and 30th Session in 1975 the question of declaration and establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

2 India has a positive approach towards the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. India supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those parts of the world, where suitable conditions exist, and where a zone is proposed to be established with the initiative of and agreement amongst the countries in that zone. The Group of Experts drawn from 21 countries, which was appointed by the United Nations to carry out a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, has in its report taken the same fundamental approach by adopting the following principle unanimously: "The initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from States within the region concerned, and participation must be voluntary."

3 Basing itself on this principled approach, India had tabled a draft resolution at the 29th Session of the UN General Assembly held in 1974, whereby the General Assembly "considered that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region of Asia should come from the States of the region concerned, taking into account its special features and geographical extent". This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly with an overwhelming majority. The 30th Session of the UN General Assembly held in 1975 has adopted without a vote another resolution sponsored by India, according to which the General Assembly "decides to give due consideration to any proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region of Asia, after it has been developed and matured among the interested States within the region concerned".

4 India has adopted a negative approach to Pakistan's proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. India voted against Pakistan's resolution in 1974 and placed on record its position on a similar Pakistani resolution in 1975 that if it had been put to a vote, India would have again cast a negative vote.

5 India's position on Pakistan's proposal for the declaration and establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has stemmed from the following three considerations: 76

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(i) Pakistan's proposal is politically motivated and is part of a propaganda campaign which Pakistan has been carrying on against India's programme for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly against the nuclear experiment conducted by India for peaceful purposes on 18 May 1974.

(ii) Before taking its proposal to the General Assembly for endorsement, Pakistan did not carry out any consultations with any of the countries in South Asia. Prior consultations are essential in any regional proposal of such a nature, and subsequent consultations can only be held among countries which are willing to join any such proposed arrangement.

(iii) South Asia is an integral part of the region of Asia and the Pacific. The existence of nuclear weapons in the region of Asia and the Pacific and the presence of foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean make the situation inappropriate for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the sub-region of South Asia.

6. India's nuclear energy programme has been geared from its very inception exclusively to peaceful and developmental purposes.

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MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
(Policy Planning Division)

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NOTES ON A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA

I

Distinction between peace zone, nuclear-free zone and nuclear-weapon-free zone. Indian Ocean zone of peace first discussed in 1964 on Ceylonese initiative - in Non-aligned Conference - we have always supported - the nuclear-weapon-free zone proposal in our area is new - result of our 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion. Pakistan's Resolution in General Assembly based on the following arguments:

i) All countries of region had already proclaimed opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons or introduction into the region - this common denominator could be basis of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

ii) India in particular had done so both before and after her PNE.

iii) During Assembly debate the Five weapon states had indicated support.

iv) Military alliances and "treaties of friendships" in other parts of the world had not prevented establishment of such zones.

v) Proximity of nuclear weapon powers need not be inhibiting factor; only defence against nuclear weapon powers would be multilateral action to form zones by smaller states.

vi) These reasons make it possible for U.N. to take action for initiating discussions.

Our opposition was based on the following arguments:

i) We always had had a positive approach to the concept of such zones and supported similar proposals elsewhere.

ii) But it was necessary that suitable conditions should exist in a particular region.

iii) Also the initiative of and the agreement to form the zone should be from the region.

iv) Any individual proposal for creation of such a zone has to be considered on its merit. No general formula exists.

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v) In South Asia no consultation had taken place.

vi) Our firm view that regional arrangements cannot be imposed from outside; they have to "mature" in the region.

vii) South Asia cannot be treated in isolation for creating a zone; it is a sub-region of the larger region of Asia and the Pacific; security environment of the whole region should be taken into account.

viii) Nuclear weapons now exist in the regions of Asia and the Pacific.

ix) Military bases exist in the Indian Ocean.

Because of these reasons, the sub-region of South Asia is inappropriate for the establishment of a zone. This requires further discussion from within the region. The United Nations should wait for an initiative from the states of the region who could only determine what would be an appropriate region of Asia taking into account its special features and geographical extent.

II

The Pakistan proposal has been endorsed by some Asian countries. Sri Lanka has been very vague. Bhutto utilised his visit to Colombo last year to canvass support for his proposal with Sri Lanka's acquiescence. We should expect complete support to Pakistan's position from Bangladesh. Nepal's zone of peace for itself is different and she may not support the proposal but would happily go along with any idea to embarrass India.

To understand the Ceylonese, Bangladeshi and Nepalese reaction, it is necessary to analyse two earlier proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones. In Africa, the proposal has been now on the anvil for several years but has not got off the ground because of lack of enthusiasm and behind-the-scenes manoeuvres of France and the Big Powers. But one positive reason behind the demand for a zone in Africa is the fear of South Africa becoming a nuclear power. In the Middle East also, there is a proposal which has also not materialised because of Arab pre-occupations. Here again, the only genuine reason for Arab anxiety is the possibility of Israel manufacturing nuclear weapons.

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In our region, it is the same logic, of course, in a rather fuzzy manner: India's position, policy and general influence are so different from Israel and South Africa. Hence the rather lukewarm support Pakistan is getting.

Our tactics should be to refuse to be stampeded by such essentially tepid and non-committal support to the zone concept. The fact of the matter is that the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone has never been enthusiastically adopted in any part of the world except in uninhabited regions like the Antarctic and the deep sea bed. Where populated regions are involved, we have single example of the Latin American treaty which is a very special case because of the U.S. nuclear umbrella on the one side and because of the absence of nuclear ambitions at the time of the signature of the Treaty in Latin American countries. Even such a treaty, however, has well known lacunae. Of these, some are:

i) Refusal of Cuba to join.

ii) Refusal of U.S. and France to accept treaty jurisdiction in their possessions in the area.

iii) Refusal of USSR to sign the protocol because of several factors.

iv) Argentina, Brazil and Chile have expressed their reservations. Bahamas, Cuba and Guyana have not signed the treaty.

It is the countries like China which have no interest in the region who have been most enthusiastic. A rapid survey of the other earlier proposals during the last 20 years shows that the nuclear-weapon-free zones have no realistic prospects of being accepted. This is because of four basic problems:

i) What should be the degree of de-nuclearisation? This means arguments about NPE, IAEA safeguards about nuclear power reactors, etc.

ii) Geographical extent.

iii) The eternal problem of verification.

iv) The responsibilities of extra zonal states; for example USSR in North Europe, China in South Asia, France in Latin America, etc.

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III

Well known precedents for the Pakistan's South Asian proposal are:

i) Central Europe - Rapacki Plan in 1957-59.

ii) The Balkan Zone Plan 1957-59.

iii) Mediterranean Plan in the early 60s.

iv) North Europe - Finnish Plan in the early 70s. All these have been supported by the Soviet Union though the USSR has shown not much enthusiasm for the first three, in recent years.

v) China's suggestion in the late 50s for a zone for Asia and the Pacific. They have not referred to it after they became a nuclear state.

No need to go into the details; all these have come to nothing because of the parallel negotiations on the PTB and NPT shifted the weight of the problem to Great Power negotiations. We had always been in principle in favour of the zones but this support became affected by our opposition to the NPT as being unequal on the question of horizontal and vertifical proliferation and the discrimination on peaceful use.

An attempt to study the general question of creation of these zones was initiated by Finland in 1975 and the Secretary-General appointed an experts' meeting at Geneva. Their conclusions are non-committal and they have not been able to agree on any serious question. In fact, apart from Pakistan on South Asia, it is only Finland which seems to be pressing for a zone in North Europe. While their views have been listened to with a respect and no one has opposed the Finns, it is interesting to see that not a single Nordic neighbour has supported the idea. They have been silent. The reason is self-evident. They feel that such a zone will give a totally unreal sense of security against the background of Big Power nuclear deployment all around them. Precisely the same thing is being repeated in our area. China has now become a major nuclear weapon state. The U.S. navy's presence in the Indian Ocean and the proximity of Soviet nuclear installations in Asia make our region as vulnerable to nuclear attack from weapon states in the larger region today, almost as much as the states in Europe were in the nineteen fifties. The same reasons which militated against the success of these proposals in Europe then now exist in South Asia.

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Even in those regions where such compulsions are not strong like Africa and the Middle East, the proposals are still being very tentatively discussed between the states or between the States and the U.N. Secretary-General.

Nothing has happened to introduce an element of urgency about this question in South Asia as Pakistanis are trying to put out.

There is some confusion between nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and the nuclear free zone in Indian Ocean - the second proposal is different from the Pakistani proposal but could well merge with it. A Tanzania-Mozambique communique has asked for making Indian Ocean a nuclear-free zone; the Mozambique Constitution specifically talks of "defending the principle of transformation of the Indian Ocean into a de-nuclearised and peaceful zone."

These ideas from the East African littoral states derive from the fear of South Africa but could be exploited by not merely Pakistan but also the Soviet Union because of its clash of interests with the U.S. and its opposition to new nuclear states(weapon or otherwise) during the coming years. (It must be remembered in this context that the latest developments about the seven/powers meeting in London about the export of nuclear materials has confirmed what has been only an impression until now - that the Soviet Union's attitude is practically indistinguishable from that of the U.S. and U.K. on the need for taking the most drastic measures possible to stop nuclear proliferation.)

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CONCLUSION

Nuclear-weapon-free zones as such are only second-best solutions in a world of ICBMs and other long-range projectiles. This is the reason why most proposals on the creation of these zones have not got off ground. While people are naturally unwilling to oppose them, there is a general disinclination to discuss proposals in serious terms. The Pakistanis have not concealed that their interest derives from their feud with India and not from global principles.

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MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
(UN & CONFERENCE DIVISION)

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DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE; DEVELOPMENTS AT THE U.N.

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At its 26th Session in 1971, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2832(XXVI) designating the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The resolution inter alia called upon the great powers to consult with littoral States with a view to halting further expansion of their military presence and eliminating all bases, military installations, legistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great power rivalry.

In 1972, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2992 (XXVII) appointing an Ad Hoc Committee of the following 15 countries to study the implications of Resolution 2832 with special reference to the practical measures that could be taken in its furtherance:

Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.

In 1973, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3080 (XXVIII) requesting the UN Secretary-General to prepare a factual statement of the great powers' military presence, in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great power rivalry. It further recommended that the statement should be based on available material and prepared with the assistance of qualified experts.

Pursuant to the above resolution, the Secretary-General established a committee of three experts to prepare the factual statement. The Committee included Dr. K. Subrahmanyam of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

The report submitted by the Experts in May 1974 dealt primarily with the most visible elements of military and naval presence in the area, viz., the deployment of warships and maintenance of naval and military installations and naval bases etc. However, a number of governments protested, as a result of which the Secretary-General took the unusual step of requesting the three experts to review the report. The revised report released in July 1974 deals with all the five great powers in alphabetical order and deletes or modifies references to facilities etc., the existence of which had been denied by governments. Other references are clearly attributed to sources. The report does not contain any conclusions or make any recommendations.

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The report is useful from our point of view in that it concentrates on great power rivalry without going into the question of the build-up of littoral States' navies and activities.

In meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee during 1974, Pakistan raised the question of India's peaceful Nuclear Explosion and also attempted to bring into the report of the Committee some references to the question of inter-se security of the littoral States. We were able to resist these attempts successfully.

In 1974, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3259 (XXIX) calling upon the great powers to refrain from increasing and strengthening their military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean as an essential first step towards the relaxation of tension and the promotion of peace and security in the area. The resolution further requested the littoral and hinterland States to enter into consultations, as soon as possible, with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean. The strength of the Ad Hoc Committee was also increased from 15 to 18 by the inclusion of Bangladesh, Kenya and Somalia.

In pursuance of Resolution 3259, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee called a meeting of littoral and hinterland States on 3rd March, 1975, and subsequent to a decision taken at this meeting, the Chairman addressed letters to littoral and hinterland States seeking their views on the following six points: (i) purposes of a conference on the Indian Ocean, (ii) date and duration, (iii) venue, (iv) provisional agenda, (v) participation and (vi) level of participation.

Pakistan, in its reply to the Chairman's letter, has introduced concepts unrelated to great power rivalry such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a regional State of the Indian Ocean, questions of inter-se-security among the littoral and hinterland States etc.

In our reply to the Chairman's letter, we have put across our views on various aspects of the conference and also taken care to refute the unacceptable concepts put across by Pakistan. The main points in our reply are as follows:

(i) Purposes of conference: The primary purpose of the conference should be to provide the opportunity of a constructive dialogue between the littoral and hinterland States on the one hand and the great powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean on the other.

(ii) Date and duration: There should be adequate time for thorough preparations. Duration of one to two weeks would be most appropriate.

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(iii) Venue: Colombo would be a most suitable venue.

(iv) Provisional Agenda: The agenda should include a general assessment of the extent of great power military and naval presence, elaboration of measures for achieving its reduction with a view to its eventual elimination as well as for the elimination of all foreign military bases conceived in the context of great power rivalry, and appropriate follow-up action and machinery.

(v) Participation and its level: Participation should now only of littoral and hinterland States but of the great powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean. This should be at an appropriately senior level.

Apart from our formal reply to the Chairman's letter, our Permanent Representative in New York was instructed to emphasise that the focus of Resolution 2832 on great power military presence conceived in the context of great power rivalries, should be maintained, and that attempts to introduce extraneous issues such as internal developments in littoral or hinterland States, questions of inter-se security, etc. or to exploit the conference to pursue national objectives or regional rivalries will divert the attention of the Conference, disrupt its proceedings and may well lead to totally negative results.

A series of meetings of the littoral and hinterland States and of the Ad Hoc Committee were held between June 5 and 20 to consider the replies from the various governments. It was apparent in these meetings that not many States had given much thought to the Chairman's letter or to the idea of the Conference itself.

In these meetings, we stressed the need to have the great powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean associated in the consultations even at the preparatory stages since we feel that without their participation it would not be possible to achieve any meaningful results. Unfortunately, none of them, excepting China and Japan, have shown interest in doing so. We now have to accept the reality of a Conference without the participation of great Powers. Our strategy would now be to insist that the Conference should concentrate on discussing and developing a strategy of littoral and hinterland States on how to secure the participation of great Powers in the implementation of the Declaration of 1971 and not go into intra-regional, particularly bilateral issues which have no direct bearing on the Declaration.

In his concluding remarks after these meetings, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee has, by and large, shown understanding of our position. The Pakistani ideas on agenda were merely mentioned but not commented upon and it was made clear that these consultations were merely a first round and more would have to follow before an area of agreement could

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be determined. As regards the Conference itself, it may not be possible to hold it earlier than mid 1976. There is also a recognition that even this date may not be practical and it may have to be postponed to 1977.

The Ad Hoc Committee resumed its meetings in September, 1975. At its final meeting held on 7th October, it recommended to the General Assembly, by consensus, the adoption of a procedural resolution which, inter alia, requests the littoral and hinterland States to continue their consultations with particular attention to the following six points:-

(a) Purposes of a conference on the Indian Ocean;

(b) Date and duration;

(c) Venue;

(d) Provisional agenda;

(e) Participation; and

(f) Level of participation.

During a discussion on this item in the First Committee, our Deputy Minister stated as follows:-

"At a time when the advanced nations of the world meet in a conference of European security and praises of detente are sung incessantly, it is pertinent to ask whether it is not reasonable to expect that the process of detente should also be applicable in other, less fortunate, areas of the world. Peace like freedom, it is said, is indivisible. It is with these considerations in mind that my delegation, which participates in deliberations of the adhoc Committee on Indian Ocean as a member, while supporting fully the draft resolution put forward unanimously by the members of that Committee, wishes to place on record its disappointment that it does not go as far as we wished it to inasmuch as it does not refer to or even take note of increased military presence of the great powers in the region of the Indian Ocean."

Continuing, the Deputy Minister added:-

" Concerning the question of holding a Conference on the Indian Ocean, the views of my Government have been communicated to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on

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Indian Ocean, who, in that capacity, had initiated consultations among littoral and hinterland States on that subject. We continue to believe, in the background of continued escalation rivalry and tensions in the Indian Ocean area, that priority attention should be given to mobilising the support of the international community for concrete and constructive action to implement Resolution 2832(XXVI) for eliminating all foreign military bases conceived in the context of great power rivalry and for reversing the present trend of escalating great power rivalries in the area. Any conference on Indian Ocean should aim at providing an acceptable framework within which consultations with the great powers could be initiated. A process of constructive dialogue between the littoral and hinterland States on one hand and great powers and maritime users of the Indian Ocean on the other, should be set in motion to discuss and determine meaningful steps for the implementation of the Declaration of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. This dialogue would make a great and significant contibution towards the achievement of our goal only if it provides an opportunity for discussions which might lead to:-

(a) Halting further escalation and expansion of military presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean; and

(b) elimination from the Indian Ocean of bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great power rivalry."

The Resolution was ultimately adopted by the General Assembly, as resolution 3468 (XXX), by 106 votes in favour, none against and 25 abstentions.

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Recent Developments.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean which met in New York in September 1976, unanimously recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of a procedural draft resolution which, interalia, requests the Ad Hoc Committee and the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, to continue their consultations with a view to formulating a Programme of Action leading to the convening of a Conference on the Indian Ocean; renews its invitation to all States, in particular the Great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to cooperate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions; requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work and consultations in accordance with its mandate and to submit to the General Assembly at its 32nd Session a report on its work.

The resolution is likely to be adopted by the General Assembly shortly.

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Ministry of External Affairs
(Policy Planning Division)

THIRD WORLD SUMMIT

I

Prime Minister Bhutto has been vigorously pursuing his proposal for a Third World Summit to deal with the economic problems of the developing countries which he recently put forward during his visit to the DPRK and China in April. Since then, he has, while carefully avoiding any criticism of the Non-aligned Movement, repeatedly argued that there is no real alternative to a Third World meeting at the summit level if the dialogue between the rich and the poor nations has to be effectively carried on. He has ostentatiously refused to apply for the membership of the Non-aligned Movement even though he has not objected to Saudi Arabia sponsoring Pakistan's case at Colombo. He has also not reacted to the admission at Colombo Conference of similarly situated countries like Rumania and the Philippines which are members of the military pacts. It is well known that during his visit to Colombo last December, he did discuss the question of Pakistani membership; it ended up by unofficial leaks to the effect that Pakistan would only join the Non-aligned Movement as a full member, and that by invitation. During the Colombo Conference and afterwards, Mr. Bhutto and his officials have shown towards the Non-aligned Movement and Conference a public posture of benevolent detachment. This became easier to maintain because of some of the very warm sentiments referring to the old Third World as in Mrs. Bandaranaike's key-note speech. Also the admission of the Islamic Conference as an observer was of great significance. For the first time, Pakistan had, in an indirect manner, an opportunity to influence the future deliberations of the Movement.

Barely a fortnight after the Conference, Mr. Bhutto came out with a lengthy article, almost amounting to a manifesto, justifying his call for a Third World Summit. The substantive part of this article was devoted to the known problems of the Poor-Rich relationship in the comity of nations and the need to re-structure the International Economic Order, existing organisations and on-going negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations and outside were, gently enough, dismissed as not being universal or authoritative enough. The Non-aligned Movement was inadequate because it represented only a part of the developing world; the U.N. organisations concerned were inhibited by institutional constraints. Most of the meetings were not held

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Ministry of External Affairs (Africa Division), SECRET, Copy No. 8
Disarmament and Nuclear Policy

General and Complete Disarmament

The government of India has been consistently of the view that in this nuclear age lasting world peace can only be based on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Government of India attaches great importance to this goal, and accords special significance to the order of priorities which should be followed while taking steps towards and formulating measures for the achievement of this goal. The Government of India considers that the highest priority in the field of disarmament should be accorded to the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Important first steps which should be taken in this direction are: i) the cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes combined with prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and (ii) a comprehensive test ban on all testing of nuclear weapons.

Treat of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

India has consistently stood for the prevention of all proliferation of nuclear weapons by all states - nuclear-weapon as well as non-nuclear-weapon States - i.e. the prevention of both horizontal and vertical proliferation. In India's view, an approach to this question which merely seeks to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon States while allowing the existing nuclear-weapon States to increase their nuclear arsenals is not workable.

Unfortunately, the NPT as it emerged in 1968, is an unequal and discriminatory treaty, as it only seeks to prevent a further increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers without placing any curbs on the ever-growing and more destructive nuclear weapon stockpiles of existing nuclear-weapon states. The treaty places all obligations on non-nuclear-weapon states without any binding commitments whatsoever on the nuclear-weapon States. The treaty imposes international safeguards on the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States only, without any such safeguards non the nuclear activities, whether civil or military, of nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty also prohibits only the non-nuclear weapon States from conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

A genuine and generally acceptable non-proliferation treaty should have aimed at stopping the production of nuclear weapons by all states. In that event, there would have been a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for military purposes by all States, and since all nuclear facilities in all States would then have become peaceful, a uniform system of international safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful to military purposes could have been made universally applicable.

India could not accept and sign the NPT because of its unequal and discriminatory nature and also because the Treaty would have hampered our programme of development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

World Disarmament Conference

Even before the USSR inscribed this item on the agenda of the XXVI Session of the UNGA in 1971, the non-aligned states had ten the initiative in calling for a world disarmament conference in Belgrade in 1961, in Cairo in 1964, and in Lusaka in 1970. The call has also been repeated at the fifth non-aligned summit meeting held in Colombo in 1976. However a stalemate seems to have been reached in regard to the early convening of a world disarmament conference, due mainly to the strongly negative positions of the united States and the People's Republic of China.

India had fully supported the non-aligned initiative. The Government of India is

convinced and has consistently taken the view that a world disarmament conference, held after adequate preparation and with the participation of all states, would promote the strivings of the peoples of the world to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and thereby ensure lasting world peace and security. In keeping with this position, India will continue to support all efforts directed towards the early convening of such a conference.

Convening of a Special Session of the UNGA to consider the Question of Disarmament

In view of the importance of disarmament, the first non-aligned summit held in Belgrade in 1961 had recommended the convening "of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to the discussion on disarmament" or "of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament." However, since a stalemate has been reached on the question of holding a world disarmament conference, the suggestion to hold a special UNGA session to consider the question of disarmament has not been repeated by the Fifth Non-Aligned Movement Summit which met in Colombo in 1976. Its Political Declaration inter alia states:

"139. The Conference also recommended in the meantime, that Members of the Non-Aligned Movement request the holding of a special session of the General Assembly as early as possible and not later than 1978. The agenda of the Special Session should include: A review of the problem of disarmament

. The promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament.

. The question of convening a world disarmament conference

We attach great importance to progress on the question of disarmament and are, therefore, in favour of all measures including the convening of a special session of the UN General Assembly directed towards the achievement of that object. We, however, consider that such a special session should promote the idea of a world disarmament conference.