

**December 30, 1964**

**Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the  
Secretary, 'Soviet Interest in a West German  
Commitment Not To Manufacture Nuclear Weapons'**

**Citation:**

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**Summary:**

INR estimated that the Soviets wanted to “play upon French concern” that West Germany might acquire nuclear weapons through new NATO nuclear arrangements, such as the MLF.

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To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

DEC 30 1964

Subject: Soviet Interest in a West German Commitment Not To Manufacture Nuclear Weapons

In a reported demarche in Paris earlier this month, the Soviets proposed the conclusion of a new security pact concerning Germany. In this connection, the Soviet diplomat making the approach pointed out that the USSR had not been a signatory of the 1954 protocol in which the Western powers had accepted West Germany's pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons.

NATO Nuclear Arrangements. On the face of it, the Soviet proposal seems calculated to play upon possible French concern over West Germany's acquiring nuclear weapons via NATO nuclear arrangements. Beyond that, however, it may mark the adoption by the USSR of more sophisticated tactics toward new NATO arrangements. It may be that the Soviets, uncertain about defeating new NATO nuclear arrangements by blanket opposition, will at least seek to shape them in a manner which maximizes restraints upon West Germany.

European Security. Moscow probably has little hope that a proposal such as the one advanced in Paris would be accepted.

1. Because of the sensitivity of the source, this information is not to be discussed with any foreign nationals, including the French.

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Indeed, the Soviets took out insurance against the contingency of rejection when they registered their claim (in the November 14 TASS statement on MLF) that the USSR already has rights over the West German military establishment by virtue of the unconditional surrender of Germany and the early postwar agreements. Nevertheless, the Soviets may hope that by agitating for a new, explicit German commitment, they will encourage the West to build into new NATO arrangements a reaffirmation of West German obligations under the Paris agreement of October 23, 1954. Thus, the Soviet demand for a new international agreement barring West German acquisition of nuclear weapons seems likely to become part of Moscow's mounting diplomatic and propaganda campaign on the subject of new European security arrangements.

Forum. Though Moscow has been increasingly stressing the European security theme, it has not committed itself on the question of a possible forum for negotiations on the subject. The reported Soviet demarche in Paris indicated that France, Britain, and the US would be parties to the proposed new pace, along with the USSR. It thus implied that a quadripartite forum might be an appropriate starting point for negotiations. In his December 19 conversation with Secretary Rusk, Gromyko refused to be drawn into quadripartite discussions in any context which might undercut the Soviet Union's long-held position that German reunification was a matter for the Germans themselves. Gromyko did not,

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however, address the question of four-power talks on European security -- a subject on which Moscow does ~~not~~ recognize the competence of the four powers when it reiterates its contention that it has rights over the West German military establishment.'

One option currently open to the Soviets would be to accept the Austrian proposal for the foreign ministers of the US, the UK, France, and the Soviet Union to attend the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty. Such a meeting would serve to underscore the special position of the four powers and provide an opportunity for mutual probing without committing the USSR to a four-power forum for negotiations.

At the same time, Moscow has left open the alternatives suggested by Rapacki's proposal for an all-European conference and a preparatory meeting composed of representatives of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and perhaps European neutrals.

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