

March 3, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

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Summary:

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the "adverse consequences" of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Reservate Memoriandum

REU-14, March 3, 1967

To

The Secretary

Through:

From

INR - Thomas L. Hughes 10.110 L. Guylla

Subject:

How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment

The press and officials in NATO countries have followed with increasing interest the debate over whether the US should deploy an anti-ballistic missile system now that the Soviet government is installing ABMs. This paper describes the opinions that informed West Europeans and Canadians have already expressed about ABMs, and, on the basis of available evidence, estimates how West Europeans and Canadians might react if an American ABM system were actually deployed. This paper also shows the extent to which some basic European attitudes toward the balance of deterrence and toward East-West relations in general underlie current reactions to the ABM question. Specific opinions which have been expressed in some of the major NATO countries are summarized.

ABSTRACT

In general, officials and the press in Western Europe and Canada do not seem to be alarmed over the Soviet ABMs, and they readily accept US assurances that increases in US offensive capabilities can keep pace with the development of Soviet defenses. They have applauded the US decision not to undertake an ABM deployment at the present time, and, in general, they earnestly hope that current discussions between US and Soviet officials on a mutual limitation of ABM deployment can succeed.

The present view of most press and officials in these countries is that if the US-Soviet talks should fail, and if the US should deploy ABMs, the West would gain few, if any, benefits, and in fact a US-Soviet arms race in ABMs could bring a number of adverse consequences, including the

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
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Intelligence and Russearch. Aside in normal substantive exchange with the agencies at the working level, has not been coordinated elsewhere.

following: 1) a great waste of resources on a system whose effectiveness is at best questionable; 2) damage to the prospects for detente; 3) unsettling effects within the Atlantic Alliance; and 4) a possible "de-stabilization" of the balance of deterrence, which could increase the long-run chances of war.

This general concern over the adverse consequences of an ABM deployment could be modified by developments in coming months. If it were clear that the US-Soviet talks had been broken off because of Soviet intransigence in the face of a determined US effort to reach an agreement, and if it were clear that the USSR was continuing to deploy ABMs at a rapid rate, a US deployment might be more understandable. A "light" system, moreover, that was designed to protect US offensive strategic weapons or to intercept missiles from China might be somewhat more acceptable than a "heavy" system designed to protect US cities. If present attitudes do not change, however, West Europeans and Canadians would be apt to deplore a US deployment, and to consider it a result of pressures from military and industrial "interest groups." Despite the fact that the Soviet Government set the process in motion by deploying missiles around Moscow, many West Europeans and Canadians would tend to consider the United States responsible for the adverse consequences which they believe would come from nutual deployment.

In comments on ABMs made by press and officials, the possibility of deploying an ABM system in Western Europe or Canada has either been ignored, has been dismissed because of high costs and presumedly limited effectiveness. As for the impact of Soviet ABM possession on UK and French nuclear forces, the British press has remarked on changes that the British government may have to make in its warheads and delivery vehicles if they SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM



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are to remain effective in the face of Soviet defenses; the French Government, on the other hand, is not likely to agonize over a reduction in effectiveness of the <u>force de dissuasion</u> because its main purpose is political rather than military.

Although views that have been expressed in West Germany are mixed,

Germans in general have indicated somewhat less concern over the adverse

effects of ABM deployment than other West Europeans.

The overall reaction in Europe to the ABM question is based on underlying attitudes toward nuclear strategy and East-West relations, and on stresses arising from the fact that over 90 percent of the West's strategic deterrent is controlled by the US. The emphasis on deterrence and on offensive capability in West European strategic thought predisposes West Europeans against the expenditure of large sums of money for defensive missile systems. This predisposition is reinforced by the generally sanguine attitude in Western Europe toward the Soviet threat.

Furthermore, the prospect of a deployment of ABMs in the US tends to aggravate the continuing uneasiness in the relationship between the US and its European allies which comes from the disparity between US and European military capabilities, as well as from their different geographic locations. West Europeans willingly rely on the US for their defense, but at the same time they are uneasy over the fact that their ultimate fate is tied to US decisions. The deployment of ABMs in the United States could aggravate this kind of uneasiness in several ways:

Europeans might reason that the US would itself be admitting the inadequacy of its existing deterrent, an admission that might tempt the Soviet Union to pursue a more adventurous policy in Europe. A US decision to deploy ABMs might also lead Europeans to believe (despite US assurances SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

to the contrary) that the President of a United States which was reasonably well protected by ABMs would calculate the risks of nuclear war differently from West Europeans who were as exposed as ever to Soviet missiles, and might be more apt to take risks that might draw Western Europe into war. These fears, in turn, could lead West Europeans to conclude that their safety lay in greater neutrality. If there were to be an attempt to solve this problem by making Western Europe's strategic situation more like that of the United States by deploying ABMs in Europe, this "solution" would raise profound difficulties, including the problems of paying for such a system and of working out acceptable command and control procedures.

A summary of views in individual countries, and our estimates of their likely policies, follows:

United Kingdom. Some of the UK officials who came to Washington for talks on ABMs in October indicated that the reaction of the UK and other European countries to a deployment of ABMs would be strongly negative. They believed that, while Europeans would not be disturbed by the ABMs which the Soviet Government had deployed, they would begin to consider that ABMs might be effective after all if the US deployed them, and they would suspect that the Soviet action might have already upset the balance of deterrence. Other members of the group, however, said that many West Europeans would consider a US ABM deployment justifiable in view of the Soviet action.

The British press has been better informed and more concerned about ABMs than the press of any other NATO country. It has expressed almost unanimous concern over the adverse consequences of a deployment of ABMs

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by the US and USSR.

Federal Republic of Germany. Some German officials have expressed concern over the adverse effects of ABM deployment; others have said that a deployment by the US would be desirable. The West German press has been somewhat less concerned than the press in other countries over the adverse effects of ABM deployment. The ABM issue could affect the overall readjustment of US-German relationships in the field of defense which is now taking place in connection with troop levels and nonproliferation. For example, deployment of ABMs in the US following a cutback of US forces in Europe could reinforce an impression that the US was now less committed to the defense of the FRG. The ABM issue has also been an element in the current storm in Germany over the NPT. It is not possible to say at this time just how the ABM question will affect or be affected by these other unresolved issues.

A US deployment would probably add new stress to US-German relations; yet, paradoxically, the recriminations in Germany over the NPT suggest that a US-Soviet agreement to halt or limit ABM deployment might lead some Germans to complain that Washington and Moscow had once again reached agreement over the FRG's head to enhance their own security at the expense of the security of others.


Canada. The present Canadian Government's chief concern is to be consulted in advance about any US decision to deploy ABMs. There is no official eagerness in Canada for an ABM deployment, and press comment has stressed the adverse consequences.

France. There has been no significant official comment in France on the ABM issue, but a US decision to increase offensive capabilities SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

instead Aeploying an ABM system in response to the Soviet deployment would be consistent with French strategic doctrine which stresses deterrence and the importance of offensive weapons. The informed press in France has stressed the negative consequences of deploying ABMs.

Italy and Benelux. Italy and the Benelux countries would certainly not welcome a deployment of ABMs by the US and USSR, since it would be a step backward in the view of the many people in these countries who hope strongly for detente and eventual general disarmament. No alarm has been expressed in these countries over the Soviet deployment.

Scandinavia. There has been little concern in Scandinavia over the ABM question. Scandinavians are generally willing to leave the solution of problems of nuclear strategy to the US.



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Attitudes Toward ABMs. The question of deploying anti-ballistic missiles has not yet become a major public issue in Western Europe and Canada, but interest in the subject has grown during the past several weeks. The press inthese countries reported Secretary McNamara's revelations in November and December that the Soviet Government was deploying an ABM system around Moscow and that Soviet ICBM strength was growing faster than we had thought. More recently, the US decision not to deploy ABMs at the present time has been the subject of scattered editorial comment.

So far, officials of only two NATO governments have had an opportunity to review in depth with US officials the political and military implications of the deployment of ABMs. In October 1966 a special UK delegation came to Washington for two days of intensive, confidential talks. In the same month, Canadian officials discussed the subject at a meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Other allies have expressed their views in more general and superficial discussions of the subject during two meetings of the NATO Disarmament Experts Group during 1966, which were open to all members of the Alliance, and during the February 1966 meeting of the Nuclear Planning Working Group of the Special Committee, which was attended by the Defense Ministers of the US, UK, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Turkey. Informal discussions of the subject have also occurred from time to time between various US officials and individual officials of NATO governments.

The extent to which the press or government officials in NATO countries understand the implications of ABM deployment varies widely, and interest in the subject is more active in some countries (notably the UK) than in others. At this time, however, officials and newspaper editors generally do not seem to be alarmed over the ABMs that the Soviet Government has deployed so far. They readily accept US assurances that increases in US offensive capabilities can offset increases in Soviet defensive strength, and they have applauded the US Government's decision not to undertake the deployment of an ABM system at this time. In general they earnestly hope that the US-Soviet talks on a mutual limitation of further ABM deployment will succeed.

The present view of most newspapers and officials in Canada and Western Europe is that if the US-Soviet talks should fail, and if the US should deploy ABMs, the West would gain few, if any, benefits, and, in fact, a US-Soviet arms race in ABMs could bring a number of adverse consequences, including the following: 1) It would be a great waste of resources, since the ABMs would probably not provide a really effective defense, and both sides would quickly devise the means to penetrate them.
2) It would damage the prospects for detente, especially in the field of disarmament. 3) A deployment of ABMs in the US without a deployment in Western Europe would cause security and status problems for the West Europeans which would have an unsettling effect on the Atlantic Alliance, yet it would probably be neither feasible nor desirable to deploy ABMs in Europe. 4) In the long run, a deployment of ABMs by the US and USSR might increase the chances of war by "destabilizing" the existing balance of deterrence.

This concern in Europe and Canada over the adverse consequences of an ABM deployment could be modified by developments in coming months. If the US actually decides to deploy ABMs, the reactions of West Europeans and Canadians would probably be affected by their view of why the US-Soviet talks on a mutual limitation of ABM deployment failed, and by the extent and stated purpose of the US deployment. If it were clear that the talks had been broken off because of Soviet intransigence in the face of a determined US effort to reach an agreement, and if it were clear that the Soviet Government was continuing to deploy ABMs at a rapid rate, a US deployment might be understandable to many West Europeans. A "light" ABM system, moreover, that was designed to protect US offensive strategic weapons or to intercept missiles from China would cause less concern than a "heavy" system designed to defend US population centers against Soviet missiles.

If present attitudes are not changed, however, West Europeans and Canadians would be apt to deplore a US deployment and consider it the result of pressure from military and industrial "interest groups". Despite the fact that the Soviet Government had set the process in motion by deploying its GALOSH missiles around Moscow, many West Europeans and Canadians would tend to consider the United States responsible for the adverse consequences which they believe would come from mutual deployment.

The possibility of deploying ABMs on West European or Canadian territory has either been ignored in official and non-official comment in these countries, or it has been dismissed because of the high costs involved and because of general doubts about the long-run effectiveness of ABMs, particularly those that might be deployed in Western Europe in close range of Soviet missiles. The question of the effectiveness of small national nuclear forces in the face of the Soviet ABMs has been discussed to a limited extent in the UK and France.

The exception to these prevailing views on various aspects of the ABM question has been West Germany, where there seems to be less concern over the negative consequences of ABM deployment than there is in other countries.

The Basis for European Attitudes. The official and non-official reactions in NATO countries to the prospect of ABM deployment have roots in certain underlying attitudes toward nuclear strategy and East-West relations in general, and in past stresses within the Alliance arising from the fact that a single country controls over 90 per cent of the West's strategic deterrent.

The view of nuclear strategy that prevails in all major NATO countries in Europe emphasizes deterrence, since a war with the Soviet Union would be fought in the first instance in Western Europe, causing intolerable damage. The only way to provide real security to Western Europe, according to this view, is to have an offensive strategic capability that is sufficient to deter the Soviet Union absolutely from starting a war. Most West Europeans still tend to regard conventional forces as a trip-wire, and

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to favor planning for the rapid escalation past the nuclear "firebreak" of any conventional conflict that might break out in Europe.

These views are well-established, despite their inconsistency with US views. They lay behind European uneasiness over the idea of the "pause" and over "flexible response," and they are reinforced by European reluctance to add to defense budgets by increasing conventional capabilities. These views predispose West Europeans against the expenditure of large sums of money for the deployment of defensive missile systems, since they do not consider that such systems would add directly to the West's ability to deter attack. Spending the money on improving offensive capabilities would be more consistent with European strategic views.

West Germans have stressed the importance of deterrence and of maintaining offensive strategic capabilities as much as their West European neighbors, if not more. Their apparently more positive attitude toward the deployment of ABMs probably reflects a feeling that West Germany is particularly exposed to Soviet MRBMs, more so than the UK and France which have at least token nuclear deterrents of their own.

This general predisposition in Western Europe against the expenditure of large sums for the development of defensive weapons is reinforced by a general complacency toward the present Soviet threat. Most West Europeans consider the possibility of an attack by hostile Soviet missiles to be more theoretical than real, in part because they believe that the West's deterrent strength is adequate and will remain so, and in part because they consider present trends in the Communist world to mean that detente is here to stay. The fact that there was no strong reaction in Europe to Secretary McNamara's announcements that the Soviet Government was deploying ABMs and that the US estimate of Soviet offensive strength had been revised upward is telling evidence of the sanguine attitude in Western Europe toward the threat of Soviet attack.

West European attitudes toward ABM deployment also reflect attitudes that have arisen from the great disparity between the military capabilities of the United States and the military capabilities of Western Europe. Most Europeans have willingly relied on the United States for their ultimate defense, yet this relationship has bred uneasiness over the fact that Europe's fate is tied in many ways to US decisions. The deployment of ABMs in the United States could aggravate this kind of uneasiness, because it might lead Europeans to believe (despite US assurances to the contrary) that the President of a United States that was reasonably well-protected by ABMs might calculate the risks of nuclear war with the Soviet Union differently from the leaders of European countries which were as exposed as ever to Soviet missiles. Fear that the US might be more willing to take risks that would draw Western Europe into war could lead West Europeans to conclude that their safety lay more in neutrality rather than in dependence on the US.

If an attempt were made to bring Western Europe's strategic situation more into line with the situation of the United States by deploying an ABM system on the European continent, this could raise a number of complex

problems. West European governments would be unable or unwilling to pay the increased costs of such a system, and, because ABMs must react instantaneously to the firing of a hostile missile, a two-key system would not be appropriate. Therefore, delicate problems of command and control would be raised. A debate on this subject within the Alliance would do little either to advertise its solidarity.

Specific Attitudes in Individual NATO Countries. The following is a summary of attitudes toward ABM deployment which have been expressed by government officials and by the press in major NATO countries:

1). United Kingdom. The British officials who came to Washington in October to discuss ABMs considered that the main effects of ABM deployment were political and psychological. While the existence of ABMs probably does not really increase pressures to strike first, they believed, their deployment speeds up the arms race and leads people to think about how nuclear wars should be fought rather than about how they should be deterred.

The UK delegation had mixed views on possible European reactions to an ABM deployment. Several members of the group indicated that the UK and other European countries would be concerned that their own status within the Alliance would be reduced, that the present system of deterrence would be undermined, and that the prospects for detente would be damaged in the wake of a new arms race. These members of the group believed that the Soviet ABMs would not in themselves be very disturbing to Europeans, but that if the US deployed ABMs Europeans would then suspect that the Soviet ABMs were effective and that the USSR had upset the balance of deterrence in its favor. Other members of the group, however, doubted that European reactions to a US deployment of ABMs would be so negative. They said that many Europeans would believe it justified and even desirable for the US to deploy a system in response to the Soviet deployment.

The UK group showed little interest in ABMs for Europe, and said that if the UK had to pay for such a system, it would be at the expense of other commitments.

The British press has shown more interest in the subject of ABMs than the press of any other country. In their articles on the subject, British newspapers and weekly journals have expressed almost unanimous concern over the negative consequences for the West of an ABM deployment by the United States and the Soviet Union. Among the negative consequences frequently cited in articles during the past two months are the following:

- a) Cost. As the Economist put it, the deployment of an ABM system "costs the earth."
- b) <u>Limited Effectiveness</u>. In a long article describing the technical advances which have been made in the development of ABMs and of the means to "outwit" them, the defense correspondent of the Sunday Times concluded

that "in almost every respect the attacker is still at a great advantage," and that even when an ABM system is deployed, enough missiles will penetrate the defenses to cause unacceptable damage. An editorial in the <u>Guardian</u> said that "an anti-missile race is a colossal waste of money that will leave neither side significantly more secure. Putting defensive missiles around Moscow was little safer than putting one's head in the sand.... On the American side, even the advanced NIKE-X would leave gaps that would risk, in the modern jargon, 'unacceptable damage'."

- c) Greater risk of war. The New Statesman noted that if the US and USSR deployed ABMs, a "new factor of uncertainty" would disturb the balance of deterrence, since "a nation believing itself secure (rightly or wrongly) would be tempted to risk war, or would be suspected by the antagonist of being so tempted." The Economist indicated that while there may be some merit in the argument that ABMs can reduce the risk of a full-scale war being set off by the accidental firing of a missile, this argument is greatly outweighed "by the increase in risks arising from dependence on wholly automated systems." In addition, the Economist said, the "appearance [of ABMs] in the pattern of nuclear conflict tends to weaken the element of human restraint."
- d) Harmful effects on East-West relations. Almost every article said that the deployment of ABM systems would diminish hopes for detente, which a London Times correspondent wrote was "more eagerly sought" in Western Europe than in the United States. The Economist said that ABM deployment would "impair the chances" for a non-proliferation treaty and would "surely blot out the prospects" for a ban on underground nuclear testing.
- e) Harmful effects on US relations with Western Europe. The Washington correspondent of the London Times said that if the US deployed ABMs, "Western Europe would be dangerously exposed to Soviet aggression unless it was similarly defended," yet the cost of a European ABM system would be prohibitive. The Economist commented that: "If ever anti-missile systems became so efficient that the Americans had serious doubts about their ability to penetrate Russia's defenses -- or vice versa =- the smaller European countries on both sides of the Elbe would... be in the position of being held as hostages for the good behavior of their patron, without any assurance that he could deter an attack on them. The super-powers would either have to provide their allies with anti-missile defenses of their own, or else face a general retreat towards neutrality."
- that deployment of ABMs in the US and USSR would make "European 'deterrents'--whether national or jointly owned -- look sillier, and more dangerous, than ever." The defense correspondent of the London Times observed that the A3 missile which the British Polaris submarines will carry "will not be valid so far as Russian targets are concerned," and the British Government will have to decide whether to buy Poseidon missiles from the US and to develop a new British warhead which would be appropriate for the Poseidon.

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Although the great majority of British press comment has been negative, an article in the Times of February 8 set a different tone by citing the views of some US officials who saw some merit in an ABM deployment. Explaining that these officials were not "fossils of the first glacial age of the cold war," a Washington correspondent of the Times said that they believe that ABMs could be a stabilizing factor in East-West relations and even a form of arms control. These officials believe, according to the article, that the US and USSR would be "safe from nuclear blackmail or a low-level nuclear attack from a third power" if they were defended by ABMs. Furthermore, "a European ABM system would serve the national security interests of countries such as West Germany without arousing opposition in Eastern Europe." Finally, ABM expenditures would limit funds available for offensive weapons -- "hence the claim that ABMs would be a form of arms control."

2) Federal Republic of Germany. The new coalition government in Bonn has been preoccupied with resolving questions relating to troop levels, offset and non-proliferation, so that other aspects of defense policy -- including the Federal Republic's attitudes toward ABM deployment -- have received somewhat limited attention. Comments by West German officials on the subject of ABMs have been mixed. Some officials have indicated that they would favor a deployment of ABMs in the US, or even on West German territory. Some of the German interest in ABMs has been apparent in comments by FRG officials on the According to intelligence sources, for example, Defense Minister Gerhard Schroeder said during a discussion of German policy on the non-proliferation treaty at a cabinet meeting in January that the FRG should not foreswear defensive nuclear systems such as ABMs by signing such a treaty. deputies have echoed Schroeder's view, as well as members of West Germany's scientific community. The German Ambassador in Washington gave the Secretary an Aide Memoire on February 3 which said that "a binding interpretation by the Soviets" regarding "the reservation of the possibility to protect Western Europe by a nuclear anti-missile system" would be necessary if the FRG was to drop its objection to a non-proliferation treaty. In an interview in Die Welt on February 18, Foreign Minister Brandt said that the introduction of an antiballistic missile systems "could not be without its effects on Europe" and it could cause an "exceptional situation" which "would also have its effects on a non-proliferation treaty." On other occasions, interest in ABMs for Germany has been expressed directly. In an informal conversation at the Department of State in late January, a senior official of the FRG's Foreign Ministry said that he did not believe Europeans would be particularly concerned by a US ABM deployment and said that the FRG might even be interested in having ABMs on its territory if they could be shown to be effective. A German representative at a NATO Disarmament Experts meeting in September 1966 said that a deployment of ABMs in Western Europe would be desirable because it would increase the certainty of an automatic nuclear response to aggression.

Other West German officials, on the other hand, have been as concerned over the adverse effects of an ABM deployment as officials in other European countries.

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In mid-February, for example, the military adviser to the German delegation to NATO, acting on instructions from Bonn, raised the subject of ABMs with an American official, saying that he believed that the net effect of a deployment of US and Soviet ABMs would be a reduction in the credibility of the West's nuclear deterrent, with serious consequences for NATO. He said that he believed that, in order to justify the immense costs of deployment, a US administration would have to advertise the protection which an ABM system provides in a way which would leave the governments of other NATO countries in a "very serious" position viswa-vis their domestic public opinion. The German official said that a limited US deployment designed solely to protect strategic offensive forces need not raise this type of problem.

The relatively sparse press comment in West Germany on the ABM question has expressed less opposition to ABM deployment than the press in other countries. In an editorial in January, Christ und Welt warned that the existence of ABMs in the USSR would enable Soviet leaders to extract concessions from the US -- in particular, concessions on the language of a nonproliferation treaty which would be contrary to German interests. In Echo der Zeit, CDU Deputy Werner Marx (Chairman of the Party's Committee on Defense) wrote that the Soviet deployment of ABMs called into question the nuclear stalemate between East and West. An editorial in Handelsblatt said soon afterward that Marx's conclusion was somewhat hasty, as US ICBMs will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses for some time and the US will therefore have time to deploy an ABM system if talks with the Soviet Government fail. In January Sueddeutsche Zeitung warned that "delaying maneuvers such as the suggestion to foregothe development of an anti-missile system are dangerous. A great power which misses an opportunity in this field will find it difficult to catch up with developments at some later date."

The ABM issue could affect the overall readjustment of US German relationships in the field of defense which is now taking place. This couldd occur in a number of different ways. A deployment of ABMs added to a cutback of US forces in Europe could reinforce an impression that the US was less committed than before to the defense of the FRG. As German officials have indicated, the question of ABM deployment is also an element in the current storm in the FRG over nonproliferation. A deployment of ABMs by the US and USSR without a deployment in Western Europe would raise some of the same fears of second-class status that have been apparent in the German reaction to the NPT. These fears would be aggravated by the fact that Germans generally feel somewhat more exposed to Soviet missiles than people of other West European countries. Just how the ABM issue will finally affect, or be affected by, these issues is not apparent at the present time, but a US deployment would probably add new stress to US-German relations. On the other hand, paradoxically, we can wonder, after the storm in Germany over the NPT,

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whether a US-Soviet agreement to halt or limit ABM development might not lead some Germans to complain that Washington and Moscow had once again reached agreement over the FRG's head to enhance their own security at the expense of that of others.

3) Canada. The question of deploying ABMs on US territory is of direct interest, of course, to the Canadians. Deployment could be a benefit and a hazard to Canada at the same time. The large percentage of the Canadian population which lives near the US border could benefit from the security afforded by ABMs. On the other hand, interception of incoming missiles could occur over Canadian territory, which would then receive the brunt of the fallout from ABM explosions. The Canadian Government's basic attitude toward the deployment of ABMs in the US was expressed by Prime Minister Pearson in June 1966, when he said that "the deployment of such a system would be an enormously costly undertaking which in the end would probably lead, as the ballistic missile race did, to ever-mounting defense budgets, without any permanent increase in international security or international stability." At that time, Pearson urged a "tacit understanding" between the US and USSR to limit ABM deployment. Now that the Soviet Government has deployed ABMs and the matter has become a subject of public debate in the US, Prime Minister Pearson's chief concern, as conveyed by the Canadian Embassy in Washington, is that the Canadian Government be consulted before the US reaches a decision on ABM deployment. The discussions in the US-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense in October 1966 indicated that, while Canada does not favor ABM deployment, it would probably not object strongly to a US decision to deploy a system on US territory. The Canadian Government might be more reluctant to agree to the placing of elements of an ABM system in Canada, especially if increases in the Canadian defense budget or the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil were involved.

Comment in the Canadian press has stressed the negative consequences of ABM deployment. An editorial in the influential Toronto Globe and Mail said: "The two great powers seem poised for a drastic escalation of the arms race that could undermine all their previous efforts at peaceful cooperation and actually increase the danger of nuclear war by upsetting the present balance of terror." It noted that the cost of developing the Nike-X system would be three times the cost of the aid which the affluent nations of the world provide to developing countries in the course of one year. "There would only be one word for such a tragic misplacement of priorities. That word is madness." A Washington correspondent for the Montreal Star deplored the effects of a new arms race on the prospects for East-West accommodation, and said that if ABMs were deployed, "Washington's allies would face unpleasant decisions. Canada, for example, might find itself embroiled in a debate that would make the Bomarc row look like a Sunday school p cnic."

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4) France. During recent months there has been no significant official comment in France on the ABM question. Prevailing French views of nuclear strategy, however, place a strong emphasis on the importance of deterrence and offensive weapons. As de Gaulle put it in a speech in April 1963, nuclear weapons provide "the modern means of ensuring our security, in other words, with the means for deterring any country whatsoever from attacking ours, at the risk of subjecting itself to frightful destruction." In principle, therefore, the French Government would be likely to be more sympathetic to a US decision to respond to the Soviet deployment of ABMs by means of an increase in offensive capabilities than to a deployment of defensive missiles. Such an attitude has been evident in some of the semi-official or unofficial French comment on the question of ABMs.

In a chapter on nuclear strategy in his book An Introduction to Strategy (1963), General Andre Beaufre, whose views are highly regarded by official circles in France, wrote that "the efficacy of ... methods of defense is both changeable and uncertain and ... the only true protection consists in the threat of retaliation." With regard to ABMs, he said: "A gigantic technological race is in progress between interception and penetration, and each time capacity for interception makes progress, it is answered by a new advance in capacity for penetration... This race will never be finished, but fully effective interception, though it may have its ups and downs, seems likely to remain problematical."

In the January 1967 issue of the semi-official Revue de Défense Nationale, Professor Jacques Vernant commented on recent developments relating to ABMs, saying that, from a technical point of view, the deployment of ABMs would "not change substantially the strategic situation existing today." But a race to deploy ABMs "risks having disastrous effects on international relations by sapping the very basis of deterrence. In effect, if the great powers invest considerable sums in constructing an anti-missile defense, this effort will inevitably be accompanied by public or private propaganda claiming the effectiveness of the protection against missiles. This propaganda cannot help having effects on public opinion, and finally on general staffs and governments. In this way there could be, in the long run, a discrepancy between the psychological situation and the real, technical military situation.... To the arms race and its international consequences will thus be added a psychological destabilization which would put an end to the truce from which we benefit today thanks to nuclear arms." Professor Vernant urged the US Government to resist military and industrial pressures to deploy an ABM system. "In the present period, the choice of the Administration can determine the future of humanity."

An editorial in <u>Le Monde</u> in January reviewed the debate in the US over ABMs. The Soviet Union, it said, does not have the resources to deploy an ABM system that would assure absolute protection. Those in the US who contended that a network of anti-missile missiles around Moscow and Leningrad would upset the balance of terror were nostalgic anti-communists. The idea that the US should do likewise was "absurd."

As long as the French can claim that Soviet ABMs do not provide total protection from the force de dissuasion, it is doubtful that the Soviet ABMs will have any effect on the French nuclear program, which is designed more to provide prestige for France and a degree of independence from the US deterrent than to provide effective military strength. A French Embassy officer commented in December that General Beaufre had said that Soviet ABM deployment would reduce the effectiveness of force de dissuasion, but that the French Government would probably not be deterred from its nuclear program. The French aim was to be capable of delivering one nuclear warhead on a major Soviet city. This capability, he said, "would be sufficient to give France the right to be heard when major decisions are made."

5) Italy. No official Italian reaction to recent developments on ABMs is available, but the prospect of an arms race in ABMs would certainly not be welcomed by the Italian Government, which strongly advocates progress in disarmament and the development of general East-West detente.

The US decision not to deploy ABMs at the present time received nearly unanimous approval in the Italian press, which strongly hopes that the US and USSR can reach agreement to avoid further deployment of ABMs. If the talks fail and the US deploys an ABM system, Italy would probably not be interested in having ABMs on its own soil unless there were a major deterioration US-Soviet relations. In such a case, the country would almost certainly be badly divided between those who would seek security in neutrality and those who would want to continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella.

6) Benelux Countries. The press in the Benelux countries has devoted some attention to the ABM debate in the US, and the Dutch ambassador has inquired about US intentions. The only concern of these comments seems to be over the possibility of a new arms race and an increase in defense spending. With a few exceptions, there has been no mention of the relation of ABMs to West European security. The people of the Benelux countries seem to believe that the Soviet ABM deployment does not in itself affect mutual deterrence, and they (especially the Belgians) are so optimistic about the possibility of East-West detente that they feel that even if the balance of deterrence shifted somewhat more in the favor of the USSR, it would not lead Soviet leaders to embark on an adventuristic policy toward Western Europe.

One editorial in the Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant sounded a note of alarm over the negative consequences of ABM deployment, saying that "if Russia should become virtually invulnerable, America's power would lose much of its deterrent character." Moreover, if both the United States and the Soviet Union deployed ABMs, "the credibility of American support in the event of a Russian threat directed only at Europe would be difficult to maintain."

7) Norway, Sweden, Denmark. So far, little concern has been expressed in Scandinavia over the ABM question. Scandinavians generally, and government

officials in particular, have believed that the US would take any measures necessary to maintain the balance of deterrence and that the questions of what weapons are necessary is a technical matter that only US officials can judge. It is generally recognized that NATO and Scandinavian security depends on the US nuclear-strike capability and, in general, Scandinavians have carefully refrained from criticizing the US in this field. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that any significant group of Scandinavians would oppose a US effort to build an ABM force.