

March 30, 1972

Telegram from the Japanese Ambassador in Korea to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Observations on the Management of North Korea Issues (I)'

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Summary:

The Japanese Ambassador in South Korea considers Japan's policies toward the Korean Peninsula in light of the US-China and Japan-China openings.

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部の内 号) 注意

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極秘

外儀官
典房
審長長
電厚計
会営給
析調
旅査移

電信写

総番号(TA) 16115
 72年 月 30日 09時 09分
 72年 月 30日 10時 57分
 外務大臣殿 駐在大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理
 主管 発着 ア北

北鮮問題処理振りに関する所見 (I)

第455号 極秘

往電第379号に関し

先般朝総連系朝鮮人の北鮮訪問の件は、はしなくも日朝接触に当つての問題点の所在、根深さ等につき再認識を得させる契機となつたが、この機会に日朝コンタクト、特に国内朝連系分子の北鮮との接触問題につき本使の感じたる所、何等御参考まで次のとおり。

1. 先ずわが国の北鮮接触の増進と中共に対するそれとの間には本質的差異が存すべきものと思われる。

即ち、中共の場合はその国連加盟により従来の万般の議論はともあれ、今やニシキのミハタは中共側にうばわれ、わが国も台湾との正式国交を止め、中共と正式国交を開く方向に進むべき基本方針を宣明するに至つた以上、わが国の右基本方針に則した中共との諸般のコンタクト増進に当つては、右は半面において必然的は台湾に対するくつつう、困難の増加ないし、そのぎせいにおいて行なわれること、即ち「AT THE PRICE OF TAIWAN」に

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において推進される結果となるが、これはれい厳な現実外交のゴーストとしてわが国ももはや右に不当にかい意する要なく、また台湾も今や「ふまれても、けられても」いんにん自重の心構えにあるものと思われる。

2. ヴイエトナムの場合はやや異るとはいえ、今や米国はヴイエトナムミゼーションの名の下に米国の最少限度の面子さえ^(換わり外は)たは「後は野となれ」式に撤兵のはらであり、従つて南越が将来において現在の体質とIDENTITYのままで長くVIABLE NATIONとして存続し得るや否やについては自他ともに疑問の深いところであろう。

3. 約言すれば、アジアの分裂国家のうち、シナとヴイエトナムについては、いわゆる「東ふう西ふうを庄し」「^はたか、また、それに近い事態になるポテンシャルを強く包蔵するものなることは否定し難いところであろう。

右に対し韓国の場合はその立場はさきの台湾等の場合と全然異つている。韓国成立に関する国連決議や、日韓条約をはじめ各国の韓国承認の際とつた態度に因り、韓国は、その全朝鮮半島に対するMORAL CLAIMは別として、国際法的には南鮮のみの国家であり、逆に言えば将来如何に北鮮の地位が上つて来ても、右が台湾の場合の如く、韓国の国際的地位をREPLACEするものではなく、事

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態が北鮮にとつて最もうまく運んだ場合といえどもドイツの如く ONE NATION 中における TWO STATES として南北鮮がへい存することを認められるのがおちである。況んやその人口、面積、国際社会における地位等より見て、西ドイツの場合と同じく、むしろ「西ふうが東ふうを圧する」ポテンシャルを有するとすら見得るであらう。かくして北鮮による南鮮の地位の REPLACE が ないことがはつきりしている。即ち「ニシキのミハタ」が北に行く心配も、またかかる兆ころも見られない以上（北による武力ないし暴力革命方式の統一がない限り、右「REPLACE」は起り得ない。わが国の北との接触増進工作は北による REPLACE の EVENTUALITY を念頭に置きつつ南のぎせいに於いて（AT THE COST OF SOUTH KOREA）これを押進める必然性も必要性も全然なく、わが国としては何等の後めたさなく、その与国たる韓国の立場に十二分の配慮を払つて処理すべきであり、万がにも前述の如く事情の全然異なる中国、ヴェトナムのケースから類推し「次は北鮮も」ときそい合うが如き国内一部のムードに流されることなきようから心すべきであらう。朝鮮においては韓国を支持することは決して負けうまにかけていることにはならない。

4. また今日北鮮とのコンタクト増進の名分はこの地域に

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おける緊張かん和に対するこうけんなるべきところ、わが国として若し朝鮮半島に戦火起るが如き緊張の増大ウあれば、これこそ最もわが国益に反するところであり何を措いても緊張かん和策にばつ頭すべきであらうが、現在のところ韓国に武力北進の実力と自信なく、他方北鮮側も内心はともかく差し当り平和かぜをふかせおる現状の下にあつてわが国の安全保障がINVOLVEされるが如き差し迫つたSERIOUSな緊張は、この方面には存在しないと見得る。然りとせばわが国益の見地からすれば、対北鮮融和措置は現在の一般的な緊張かん和のふう調にGET ALONGして適当につないて行く程度のはら構えてよく、少くともわが与国たる韓国にしれつなくつらを与え、ひいては日韓の離間を招ねいてまで、生懸命にいわゆる緊張かん和外交推進するに値いしないと観念すべきであらう。5.もつとも基本観念は右の如くとしても国内政情上の顧慮等より対北鮮融和につきある程度のゼスチャーは止むを得ざるべきところ、右実施に当つては上述の基本観念に照し、かつはその各かん和措置が北鮮に対するFLIRTTATION行為たる本質を免れていることにかんがみ、名実共に与国たる韓国の立場、これに与える心理的インパクト等につき細心の注意を払いつつ、実施に移すべき各措置の順位、実施のペース（ないしインターバル）、及びタイミン

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グ等を決めるよう留意すべく、特に現在韓国は「クソソ」のドクトリンの米中ゆきどけ以来「落日」にならんとしおるが如き心境にあるときだけになりん国たる盟邦のわが国としては「層」思いやりのある配意を要しよう。(この点米国が北鮮向けパスポートの発行を1年間延期したのは他山の石と言えよう。)

なお右ページないしタイミングを考ふる為の若干の標準としてはせき十字会談等において韓国も内々試みている対北鮮かん和の水かき外交より日本が大はばにとび離れて独走し、右韓国側の外交措置をOUTSHINEし、しばませないようにとの考慮もかん要たるべく、また来るべき国連総会における朝鮮問題審議の模様、くう気もにらみ合わせるべき重要データーとなるらう。

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[...]

Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs | Ambassador Ushiroku

Observations on the Management of North Korea Issues (I)

No. 455 Secret

Outbound No. 379

The travels of Chongryon-associated Koreans (Chōsenjin) to North Korea have recently provided an opportunity to acknowledge where the issues lie, and how deep they are, in regards to contact between North Korea and Japan. I take this opportunity to provide for your reference my thoughts on contact between Japan and North Korea, particularly the contact of domestic Chongryon-related elements with North Korea.

Firstly, I believe that there should be a fundamental distinctions be made between our contact with North Korea and our contact with Communist China.

1.□That is to say that while there are still the usual arguments in regards to Communist China, they have seized legitimacy through their UN membership. We have ended formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and proclaimed that it is our basic policy to pursue formal relations with Communist China. Given this, contact with Communist China that follows this basic policy will, on the one hand, necessarily increase pressure and difficulty on Taiwan or be conducted at their expense. In other words, this policy would in effect be pursued "AT THE PRICE OF TAIWAN." At the same time, this is our chosen course of stern and realist diplomacy, and as such we should not continue to take into consideration the injustice of the above. In addition, at this point it appears that Taiwan is prepared to endure heavy burdens.

2.□Although the case of Vietnam is slightly different, under the name of Vietnamization, the United States is attempting to maintain the barest minimum in order to save some face. Mirroring the phrase, "après moi le déluge," the troops have been withdrawn leaving no trace. For this reason, it is doubtful to all parties involved whether or not South Vietnam can continue to be a viable nation while also retaining its current qualities and identity.

3.□To summarize, among Asia's divided nations, it is difficult to deny that China and Vietnam strongly carry the potential for there to be a situation where "The East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind," or some other similar situations. In contrast with the above, the situation of the Republic of Korea is completely different from that of countries like Taiwan.

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Following the UN resolution on the establishment of Republic of Korea and the attitudes taken when Korea was officially recognized by various countries, including the Japan-Republic of Korea Treaty, in terms of international law the Republic of Korea is a state limited to the south of the Peninsula; notwithstanding their moral claim to the entire Korean Peninsula. To put it differently, even if North Korea were to improve its international position in the future, unlike the situation of Taiwan, North Korea would not replace the Republic of Korea's international position. Even if the state of affairs proceeded in the best possible manner for North Korea, it would still result in international recognition of North-South coexistence, like the German 'One Nation, Two States.' Similar to the situation for West Germany, considering the factors, such as the Republic of Korea's population, geographical area, and position in international society, there is more potential for a situation where "The West Wind

Prevails Over the East Wind." It is clear that North Korea will not replace the position of South Korea. In other words, there is no reason to be concerned that the North will grasp legitimacy. As long as this is the case, and barring the North's use of force or unification through violent revolution, the replacement of international positions is an impossibility.

For this reason, our work to enhance contact with the North requires neither concern about an eventuality where the positions of North and South Korea may become replaced, nor concern that such contact is carried out at the expense of the South. We should proceed with ample consideration paid to our ally, the Republic of Korea's position, but without guilt. We should also be prepared to not be swayed by some domestic elements that claim that 'North Korea is next.' They wrongly draw analogies between the Korean Peninsula and the totally dissimilar cases of China and Vietnam. Concerning North Korea, our acceptance of Republic of Korea is certainly not a losing bet.

4. Enhancing our contact with North Korea would contribute towards decreasing tensions in the region. If tensions were to increase such that it risked war on the Korean peninsula, that would present the greatest threat to our national interest, and it would necessitate our complete dedication to decreasing tensions. However, at this time the Republic of Korea has neither the capacity nor confidence to invade the North. Similarly, notwithstanding their true intentions, the North is also subject to an international environment that favors peace. Therefore, it appears that at this time there is an absence of serious and imminent tensions that might concern our national security. From the standpoint of our national security, it is sufficient if our measures to decrease tensions with North Korea simply follows the general trend of detente. We should not pursue, so called, detente so diligently that it causes difficulty for our ally, the Republic of Korea, or that it leads to distancing between Japan and South Korea.

5. Even with the basic understanding as described above, détente with North Korea is more likely than not to be at the level of gesturing, rather than one coming from a deep consideration of domestic politics. Be that as it may, implementing détente with North Korea must reflect the above described basic understanding of the situation and be free of flirtation with North Korea. Furthermore, when we are determining the pace (or interval) and timing of such measures, we must do so while being truly an ally to the Republic of Korea and pay close attention to their position and the possible psychological impacts that détente may have. As a neighboring country, we must be more sympathetic to the Republic of Korea, especially since they are worried that their importance may be waning since the Nixon Doctrine and the thawing of Sino-American relations. (The United States decision to defer the issuance of passports for North Korea is an object lesson to this point.)

The Red Cross dialogue may serve as a sort of benchmark for when thinking about the pace and timing. In the Red Cross example, care must be taken as to not outshine and deflate the diplomatic measures of the Republic of Korea by going much deeper than surface level détente vis-à-vis North Korea. This would also provide invaluable data on reading the atmosphere ahead of the upcoming discussion and deliberation on the Korea issue at the UN General Assembly.