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**Telegram from the Northeast Asia Department,  
'Handling of the Korea issue in the United Nations  
(Draft)'**

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**Summary:**

The Northeast Asia Department at the Japanese Foreign Ministry reports on the Korea question at the UN, inter-Korean relations, and political developments inside of the two Koreas.

**Credits:**


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国連における朝鮮問題に対する対  
処振り(案)

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北東アジア課

1. 国連における朝鮮問題に対する対処振りは、わが国の朝鮮半島政策の一環として考えられるべきであるところ、わが国の朝鮮半島政策は、朝鮮半島の緊張緩和を促進する、その現実的なアプローチとしては南北の共存関係の樹立を促進するという目的の下に、具体的には次のように要約することが出来る。
- (1) 韓国に対しては、経済の発展を通じ、民生の安定がはかられ、かつ民主主義国としての基盤が強固となるよう、経済協力を中心とする日韓友好協力関係の促進をはかること。
- (2) 北朝鮮に対しては、韓国との友好協力関係の促進を基本政策としつつも、各種交流については、南北赤十字会談等の南北の対話の進捗状況、その他国際情勢の推移を見

守りつつ弾力的に対処してゆくこと。

- (3) 南北の対話等を通ずる朝鮮半島の緊張緩和をできる限り促進すること。少なくとも、わが国としては、緊張緩和への方向を妨げないこと。

2 国連における朝鮮問題に対する具体的な対処振りは次のとおりとする。

- (1) 朝鮮問題の積極的な棚上げをはかる。

南北赤十字会談の進捗振りや最近南北相互間に大国や第三国に左右されずに朝鮮問題を両者の直接の対話を通じて自主的に解決しようという気運が高まりつつあるやにみうけられるところ、他方国連の場に出れば南北双方とも必要以上に原則論に固執せざるを得ず、強硬な対決姿勢をとることは必至であり、直接の対話を妨げるおそれがあることにかんがみ、朝鮮問題は差当つて南北の自主的解決に委ねることとすべく国連における朝鮮問題の審議延期をはかるよ

う努める。

- (2) 積極的棚上げ論は、昨年の如き招請問題に関する不利な表決を回避することを実際上の目的とした消極的な棚上げ論とは異なり、上記(1)のとおり南北双方および南北双方の支持国にとつてメリットを有するものとみられるところ、韓国との協力の下に(従つて先ず韓国との間に協議を行なう必要がある。)国連の主要関係各国に根まわしを行ない、南北双方の合意(少なくとも黙認)をとりつけるよう努める。

- (3) 積極的棚上げ論の成否は、基本的には北朝鮮の態度如何にかかっているところ、北朝鮮への意向打診は、例えばルーマニアを  
*Follow up*  
通じて(チャウセスクの来日の機会を活用する等)行なうこととする。又、必要に応じソ連(出来れば米ソ首脳会談において米国を通じ)および中国(例えば米国を通じ)を通じて北朝鮮への働きかけを行なうこと

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とする。

- (4) 積極的棚上げ論について、積極的に根まわしを行なうかたわら、(1)同棚上げ論をバックアップするためにも（一般委員会の構成をわが方に有利にすること等により、北朝鮮が朝鮮問題の国連での審議を主張することを實際上断念させるため）、又(2)同棚上げ論が北朝鮮の賛同を得られない場合に備えて、国連一般委員会の構成をわが方に有利にするよう然るべく工作を行なうこととする。

- (5) その他、棚上げ論が南北双方のコンセンサスを待たれないような場合の対処振り等については、事態の推移を見守りつつ追って検討することとする。

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この棚上げ論の  
審議の  
断念の  
ため

### (3) 朝鮮半島情勢を含む朝鮮問題

#### A 朝鮮半島の情勢

イ・ニクソン・ドクトリンの実施をらびに米中接近傾向は、アジア諸国、とくに米・中・ソ3国の利害関係が複雑に絡みめつている朝鮮半島に至大の影響を及ぼし、南北両朝鮮は新情勢の帰趨を見極めかね、新事態への対応策の模索に腐心している。

今日の国際政治の趨勢の下に、朝鮮半島においても緊張緩和の風潮が盛り上がり、1967-8年当時の如き緊張事態はもはや存在しない。いわゆる北からの挑発行為は1969年以降激減し、今日ではほとんど零に等しい。朝鮮半島の緊張は実質的方ものよりも多分に心理的なるものである。

南北両朝鮮ともいままでの基本的姿勢を崩してはいないが、上述緊張緩和

の風潮を背景に、南北の姿勢には漸次  
柔軟化の傾向がみられ、朝鮮問題の自  
主的解決を模索する兆候がみられる。  
現に昨年9月以来南北赤十字会談が進  
行中であり、これが政治会談に発展す  
る可能性が全くないとはいえない。

しかし、同時に、南北双方とも、朝  
鮮には依然として“緊張が存在する”  
との認識が先行しており、南北間の相  
互不信感は強く、現段階ではなおこれ  
が容易に克服される状況にはない。従  
つて、朝鮮半島に緊張緩和が定着する  
までにはなお相当の紆余曲折と可成り  
の時間が必要であろう。

- ロ 朴正熙政権は第1次および第2次5  
カ年計画につづき、本年より第3次5  
カ年計画の実施に移っている。この間、  
政権は決して安定基盤を持続し、これ  
を背景に経済建設面であげた成果は割

目に価するものがある。しかし、近年、高度成長に伴う多くのひずみが集中的に露呈し、いまや経済問題とくに国際収支困難、企業不安化、物価上昇、農業の立おくれ、国内資源動員体制のせい弱性等の解決が緊急課題となつてゐる。また上述のひずみは、緊張緩和風潮の抬頭と相俟つて、政治問題、社会不安を誘発する要因となつてゐる。

昨年12月の非常事態宣言は上述の如き国内情勢を背景に宣布されたものであり、そのねらいは、これにより国内の引締めをけかり、もつて経済・政治面での諸困難を克服することにあるものとみられる。非常事態宣言後、朴政権は「新しい村」運動等に見られる如く意欲的な姿勢をみせているが、その成果を予断するは尚早であり、1975年に予定される大統領選挙を目前



し、ここ一兩年は朴政権にとりもつとも重大な試練期となるものとみられる。

ハ 北朝鮮は、中国の国連における代表権の回復を契機として、国際情勢は自己に有利に展開しつつあるものと判断し、この波に乗りさらに自己の国際的地位の向上に最大の努力を傾倒している。北朝鮮の外交活動は1971年以降漸次活発化しはじめているが、とくに本年2-3月にわたる外交活動は前例をみざる大規模のものである。国際地位の向上を主眼としたアジア・アフリカ・ラテン・アメリカ諸国にたいする外交活動もさることながら、日本に対する積極的な接近姿勢は、その対米接近態度とともに注目される。

金日成政権は、1958-69年に一部軍人派爾清後、体制固めに成功し概して安定している。現在北朝鮮が当

面する最大の難関は経済問題である。  
北朝鮮は7カ年計画を3カ年延長し、  
実質的には10年かかつて1970年  
にほぼ計画目標を達成した。3カ年延  
長の理由は、軍事力の強化を余計なく  
されたことにあると推測される。こ  
れまで、北朝鮮は、経済発展の原動力  
を自力更生といわゆる「千里馬運動」  
に求めてきたが、それには自ら限界が  
ある。今や、北朝鮮経済がより以上の  
発展を遂げるためには産業構造の改革  
が不可避となるにいたっている。1971  
年から実施されている6カ年計画  
において3大技術革命が中心課題とし  
てとくに強調されている所以である。  
共産圏諸国とくに中・ソ両国に多くを  
期待できな北朝鮮としては、技術革  
新についてはこれを自由主義先進諸国  
特に日本からの援助に待たざるを得な  
い状況にある。

秘  
無期限

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## B 国連における朝鮮問題

イ、わが国は、目下のところ主として国連において韓国、米国をはじめその他の友好諸国と意見交換や情報収集を行なつており、わが国としての対処方針はまだ最終的に決定するには至つていない。しかし、南北赤十字会談の進捗振りや最近南北相互間に大国や第3国に左右されずに朝鮮問題を自主的に解決したいという気運が高まりつつあるやにみられることにもかんがみ、今次総会においては従来のような南北支持国間の相互非難や対決はできるだけ回避し、南北間の対話を促進（少なくとも妨害しない）し、朝鮮半島の緊張緩和に資するという、積極的な意味からも朝鮮問題の審議延期（可能ならば無期）をはかることが望ましいと考えている。

- ロ、審議延期の成否は北朝鮮の意向やソ連、中共等の動向にもかかっているが、昨年北朝鮮支持国側も南北赤十字会談の重要性を認める発言をした経緯があることにも徴し、できれば南北支持国側双方間の話し合いで審議延期をはかることが望ましい。よつて、北朝鮮側を審議延期に同調させるためにも、また、やむを待ず表決による争わざるを得ない場合等にも備え、一般委の構成をわが方側に有利に固めておくことが極めて重要であると考えられるので、わが国も国連予算、人事等わが国にとつて関心の深い第5委員会委員長に立候補し、一般委メンバーとなることにした。(この点ニュージーランドが副議長に立候補されたことは心強い)
- ハ、審議延期が不成功に終つた場合、従来とおりの審議を繰り返さざるを得ない

くなるが、実質問題については招請問題で敗北を喫しない限り従来よりわが方に若干不利ながらも一応安全な票差で勝ちうるとの見通しをもっている。唯、招請問題、とくに無条件同時招請案については樂觀を許さない情勢にあるので、例えば昨年ニュージーランド案の如き改訂案（参考資料参照）や情勢の推移いかんによつては北朝鮮の無条件招請に応じるという弾力的かつ柔軟な態度で対処することも必要となつてくるのではないかと考えており、本件については今後とも意見の交換を行なつていきたい。

二、いずれにしても今後国連を中心に密接な連絡協調を保つこととしたく、本問題では共同歩調をとることとしたい。（参考資料3参照ありたい。）

## Handling the Korea Issue at the UN

Showa 47 May 10

1. The handling of the Korea Issue at the United Nations should be thought of as one part of the Korean Peninsula policy of Japan. It is Japan's Korean Peninsula policy to encourage the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula by promoting the establishment of a North-South relationship of coexistence. The implementation of this policy can be summarized in the following way.

I. Regarding the Republic of Korea, promote friendly and cooperative relations focused on economic cooperation so that, through economic development, livelihoods can be stabilized and the foundation of democratic nationhood can be strengthened.

II. Regarding North Korea and various interactions with them, we should observe and flexibly deal with North-South dialogue, such as the North-South Red Cross discussions, and other international developments. This should be done while also promoting friendly and cooperative relations with the Republic of Korea.

III. As far as possible, promote the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula through the promotion of North-South relations. At the very least, Japan should not be an obstruction towards the reduction of tensions.

2. The Korea issue vis-à-vis the United Nations should be dealt with in the following way.

1. Proactively shelve the Korea Issue

Through developments in the North-South Red Cross dialogues, it can be seen that there recently is an increasing mutual effort being made between the North and South to solve the Korea Issue on their own without being swayed by great nations or third parties. However, when at the United Nations, both sides inevitably insist on unnecessarily sticking to their principles and assume very confrontational postures.

Given that there is the possibility that direct dialogue may become obstructed, for the time being, strive to postpone UN deliberation on whether or not to entrust the North and South with solving the Korean Issue on their own.

2. This argument for proactively shelving the Korean issue is different from the proactive shelving of the UN invitation issue from last year, which was in actuality intended to avoid a disadvantageous vote. For the reasons given above, in this current case, shelving the issue has merits for both North and South, as well as the respective countries that back them. In cooperation with the Republic of Korea (this must be discussed beforehand with the Republic of Korea), lay the groundwork among the major countries at the UN before striving to convince the North and South to both agree (or at the very least acquiesce) to shelving the issue.

3. Success of shelving the issue at base depends on the attitude of North Korea. The inclinations of North Korea should be sounded out through, for instance, Romania (for example, by making use of the opportunity of Ceausescu's visit to Japan). In addition, if necessary North Korea is to be reached through the Soviet Union (if possible through the United States during the United States-Soviet Summit) or China (through, for instance, the United States).

4. While laying the ground work towards proactively shelving the issue, we should

work accordingly to bring the members of the UN General Assembly on our side as a way to bolster the effort to shelve the issue and as a precaution in case we cannot gain North Korea's approval to shelve the issue (to effectively convince North Korea to abandon its insistence on deliberating the Korea issue at the UN by convincing the General Assembly to take our side).

5. In addition, if it is the case that the North and South cannot reach mutual consensus on shelving the issue, changes in the situation should be closely observed and considered.

### 3. The Korean Issue and the conditions of the Korean Peninsula

#### A. Conditions on the Korean Peninsula

i. Implementation of the Nixon Doctrine and closer US-China relations have greatly impacted the Korean Peninsula, as place where the interests of Asian countries, including the United States, China and the Soviet Union, have numerous entangled interests. Both North and South Korea have recognized the new situation and are struggling and groping for measures to deal with the changed circumstances.

Even under the current circumstances of international politics, the winds of détente are blowing and the heightened tensions seen in 1967-1968 no longer exists. Provocations from the North have ceased as such since 1969, and today they are close to none. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are likely more psychological rather than something that is actual.

While neither the North nor South have strayed from their fundamental posturing, under the backdrop of détente, both sides appear to be gradually becoming more flexible and there are indications that they are searching for an autonomous solution to the Korea issue. The Red Cross dialogues between North and South has progressed since September of last year, and it is not an absolute impossibility that this may lead to governmental talks.

However, for both the North and South, recognizing that there indeed still exists a state of tension appears to take precedence. There is strong, mutual mistrust between the North and South. At this stage, this situation cannot be easily remedied. Therefore, it will require quite a lot of complications and plenty of time for the reduction of tensions to become established on the Korean Peninsula.

ii. The Park Chung Hee government has moved on to implementing the third Five-Year Plan, following after the first and second Five-Year Plans. It is worth paying attention to the achievement of economic development through the government's maintenance of a stable foundation throughout the implementation of the Five-Year Plans. However, in recent years the many stresses owing to rapid economic development are beginning to show. Pressing issues that must be resolved include disadvantageous balance of payments, faltering business confidence, rising prices, a lagging agricultural industry, and fragile domestic resource mobilization systems. These economic stresses, coupled with the prevailing mood of détente, are factors that contribute to political issues and social uncertainties.

The declaration of a state of emergency of last December was done so with the domestic circumstances described above as a background. It appears that the intention was to effectively tighten domestic control and in doing so overcome varying economic and political difficulties. Since the state of emergency, the Park government has taken a committed posture, as seen, for instance, in the New Village movement. However, it is too early to predict whether it will produce results. Looking ahead to the presidential election scheduled for 1975, the next few years will be a

consequential period of trial for the Park government.

On the occasion of China regaining its seat the United Nations, North Korea has determined that international circumstances are shifting in their favor and are placing the utmost effort in continuing this momentum to further increase their international standing. Although North Korea's diplomatic activities have already been gradually becoming more active since 1971, the scale of their activities between February and March of this year has been unprecedented. North Korea's enthusiasm in approaching Japan and the United States is more noteworthy than their diplomatic activities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which are intended to elevate their international standing.

Since the partial purging of the military clique between 1968-69, the Kim Il Sung government has succeeded in consolidating power and on the whole has achieved stability. At the moment, the greatest obstacles faced by North Korea are economic. North Korea has extended its Seven Year Plan by three years. In actuality, it has taken 10 years to achieve the planned objectives in 1970. It is presumed that the reason for the three-year extension was because they unsparingly prioritized military strengthening. Until now, North Korea has relied on self-reliance and the, so called, 'Chollima Movement' to serve as the drivers of economic development. However, this has inherent limits. Reforming North Korea's industrial structure is unavoidable if its economy is to develop any further. This is why the threefold technological revolution is a central heading under the 1971 Six Year Plan. North Korea cannot help but turn to democratic countries, particularly Japan, for the acquisition of technological innovation, as they cannot rely on communist states, such as China and the Soviets, in this regard.

#### B. The Korea Issue under the United Nations

i. At the moment, we are primarily exchanging opinions and collecting information with friendly states, especially the Republic of Korea and the United States. We are not at a point where we can make a final determination on how to develop policies to cope with this issue. Given the progress of the North-South Red Cross dialogues and the heightened sense that both sides wish to resolve the Korea issue on their own without being swayed by large or third-party countries, and with the intention of supporting the decrease of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, it is desirable that we try to postpone or adjourn the deliberation on the Korea issue. In addition, we should support, and at the very least not obstruct, the dialogue between North and South. It is also desirable that we avoid as much as possible the usual recriminations that are hurled between the respective supporters of the North and South.

ii. Whether deliberation can be postponed or not depends on the disposition of North Korea and the actions of the Soviet Union and China. However, last year even the backers of North Korea have expressed their recognition of the importance of the North-South Red Cross dialogue. Given this, it would be favorable that we secure a postponement of deliberation through dialogue between the respective supporters of the North and South. In order to convince North Korea about postponing the deliberation, as well as to prepare for the possibility that a confrontational vote becomes inevitable, it is critically important that we gather general committee members to our side. Similarly, we have become a general member and are running for the chair of the Fifth Committee, which is a committee of national interests as it deals with budgetary and human resources matters. (In this regard, it is encouraging that New Zealand has announced its candidacy as the vice-chair.)

iii. If the postponement of deliberation is not successful, the usual debates will inevitably be repeated. At any rate, as long as we do not lose the invitation issue, we can prevail in this issue with a narrow majority vote, although we would be at a slight disadvantage compared to before. However, it should be noted that the current



circumstances do not warrant optimism regarding the proposal to unconditionally invite both North and South to the United Nations. Given that, we believe that it may be necessary to take a flexible approach and entertain alternative proposals (reference material attached), such as the New Zealand proposal of last year, or to consider allowing the unconditional invitation of

North Korea as circumstances develop. We would like to continue to exchange views on this issue.

iv. In any case, we would like to maintain close coordination centered on the UN, and maintain close collaboration on this issue. (Refer to Reference Material 3)