

**July 4, 1967**

**Airgram to Department of State from Embassy in  
the Hague, 'Visit by Ambassador of Romania, Dr.  
George Elian'**

**Citation:**

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**Summary:**

George Elian, the Romanian ambassador to the Hague, advocates for closer relations between Romania and the United States during a meeting with an American diplomat.

**Original Language:**

English

**Contents:**

Original Scan

# AIRGRAM

*Pol Rom - U.S.*

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RM/R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
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OSD	USIA	NSA

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TO : Department of State

INFO : Amembassy BUCHAREST

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RECEIVED  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 JUL 12 7 15 AM 1967  
 SERIES A  
 ANALYSIS BRANCH  
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*MG*

FROM : Amembassy THE HAGUE

DATE: July 4, 1967

SUBJECT: Visit by Ambassador of Romania, Dr. George Elian

REF :

LIMDIS

A few days ago the Romanian Ambassador, Dr. George Elian, asked for an appointment to come and have an informal talk with me.

He called on Wednesday morning, June 28th, and stayed slightly over an hour. Our talk was largely a strong plea by Ambassador Elian for closer relations, and increased exchanges between Romania and the United States. He recalled that the Romanian position with regard to the Middle-East crisis was close to that of the United States. In answer to my question, he said that the reason why Romania had refused to sign the Moscow Declaration and Communique on June 9th had been because it felt that condemnation of Israel as an aggressor could only make matters worse. He developed the Romanian policy with regard to the Middle-East, claiming similarity of its basic assumptions to those underlying U.S. policy.

Ambassador Elian said that the Romanian people (and he emphasized that he was talking about the man in the street) had a very deep admiration for the American people and felt great envy of the prosperity and high standard of living enjoyed by Americans. Asking permission to speak frankly, he said that this feeling of sympathy and envy was tinged by a certain apprehension or fear that current events might be leading ultimately toward a world catastrophe. He said the Romanian people were deeply committed to peace. I said that the American people and government were, too, and that we would

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Drafted by: AMB:WRTyler:mrm

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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continue to apply all our resources to the task of contributing to the establishment of peace, prosperity and justice in the world. He said he believed that this was indeed the goal of Americans.

He said that Romania wanted to increase its exports to the United States but that Romania unfortunately did not benefit from the MFN clause. He said that it would be most helpful if this situation could be corrected.

He then talked at great length about the transformation of Communism in Eastern Europe, discounting radically the validity of orthodox Marxist doctrine, and relegating Communism as preached and practiced by the Romanian establishment, to the status of a kind of social and economic philosophy akin to that of Scandinavian socialism. As though aware that there might be some unspoken thoughts in my mind, he said that the current meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party was bringing about important changes in the internal security and police structure of the country. Romania, he said, had ended its period of transformation and could now move forward confidently in an increasingly liberal pattern.

Turning to prospects for the future, he expressed his deep concern for the ultimate fate of the world unless some means were found to contain and deter Communist China. He said that just sitting back and waiting and hoping that nothing would happen was a recipe for potential disaster. There were, he said, only two major roads that could be followed: either annihilate China before it annihilates the rest of the world, or organize the rest of the world on a basis which would face China with such an overwhelming array of potential military power, that China would have no alternative but to give up any thoughts of aggression or expansionism unless it wished to succumb to a suicide instinct. The Ambassador said that the first of the two roads was only theoretical, as it was unimaginable that a policy should be carried out to obliterate eight hundred million human beings. The second road, he said, required imagination and a courageous reassessment of international realities. In reply to my question, he said that the Soviet Union was thinking in that direction, and was in various ways encouraging the Eastern European countries to develop the kinds of relations with the West, and particularly the United States, which might lead eventually to the creation of a basis

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for cooperation on certain common assumptions with regard to China.

Turning to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, he said that his government would sign it, but he wondered about the effectiveness of the treaty in view of China's position. He could not understand how China had acquired such technical proficiency in so short a time. He did not think that the Soviet Union could have given China sufficient knowledge, prior to the cut-off of nuclear information, to explain the incredible speed with which China had succeeded in detonating a hydrogen device.

He expressed great satisfaction at the Glassboro conversations and said he hoped that they would lead to many more and closer exchanges between the United States and Eastern Europe. He also expressed his pleasure at the news that President Johnson had received Prime Minister Maurer and Foreign Minister Manescu at the White House.

Before leaving, the Romanian Ambassador left with me the text of Mr. Maurer's speech before the UNGA on June 23rd, and various texts of statements by the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, and Romanian Government officials on the Middle-East crisis.

Finally, he alluded to the forthcoming visit to The Hague of Prime Minister Maurer and Foreign Minister Manescu from July 17 to 21, and he said that this was particularly important because the thinking and outlook on world affairs of the Netherlands Government was so close to that of the United States.

Comment: Ambassador Elian said he was under instructions to come to talk to me, and that other Romanian Ambassadors had received similar instructions. I have since been told by the U.K. Ambassador, Sir Peter Garran, that he had also received a visit "but he didn't have much to tell me." Ambassador Elian spoke to me (in French) with great intensity throughout and seemed to feel that his *démarche* was significant.

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