

September 16, 1993

**Memorandum from William H. Itoh for Leon Fuerth
et al, 'Notification of Principals Committee Meeting
on PRD-13, Peacekeeping'**

Citation:

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Summary:

A draft version of PDD-25, the Clinton Administration's policy on multilateral peace operations.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20508

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September 16, 1993 .

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL Robert P. McALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget


MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
to the United Nations

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Principals Committee Meeting on PRD-13,
Peacekeeping

A meeting of the Principals Committee will be held on Friday,
September 17, 1993 at 3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation
Room. The agenda is attached at Tab A and the draft PDD for
discussion is at Tab B. (S)


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Draft PDD

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

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By ADS NARA, Date 7/11/16
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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: September 17, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 p.m.

PRD-13, PEACEKEEPING

Agenda

- I. IntroductionNSC
- II. Peacekeeping Command and ControlAll
- III. Hill Consultations on PeacekeepingAll
- IV. Other IssuesAll
- V. SummaryNSC

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

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By ABS NARA, Date 7/1/16
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY ON MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS (S)

Serious threats to the security of the United States persist in the post-Cold War era. History suggests that new threats will surface. The United States remains committed to meeting such threats as our interests dictate. (U)

Circumstances have arisen and will arise in the future where imminent or actual breaches of the international peace affect our interests but do not immediately threaten our own nation. In such cases, it will often be in our interest to proceed in partnership with others to preserve, maintain or restore the peace. The United Nations will be an important instrument of such partnerships. (U)

Participation in UN peace operations can never substitute for the necessity of fighting and winning our own wars, nor can we allow it to reduce our capability to meet that imperative. It can, however, serve, in effect, as a "force multiplier" in our efforts to promote peace and stability. (U)

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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During the Cold War, the United Nations could resort to multilateral peace operations only under the rare circumstances in which the interests of the Soviet Union and the West did not conflict. Such operations can now serve as a cost-effective tool in many cases to advance such American interests as the maintenance of peace in key regions and the relief of suffering abroad. (U)

Since it is in our interest to support or participate in UN peace operations on such occasions, it is also in our interest to seek to strengthen our own and the United Nations' peace operations capabilities. That is the object of the "Policy Guidance on Multilateral Peace Operations," which I approve today. (U)

The Role of Peace Operations in U.S. Foreign Policy

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of which spill across international borders), and the total collapse of governmental authority in failed states are now among the principal threats to world peace. The UN has sought to play a constructive role in such situations by mediating disputes and obtaining agreement to cease-fires and political settlements. Where agreements to that effect have been reached, the interposition of neutral forces under UN auspices can help facilitate lasting peace. (U)

The United States will vote in the UN Security Council to support multilateral peace operations, or, where appropriate, take the lead in calling for them, when other nations are prepared to support the effort with forces and funds; when the U.S. decides that the operation's military and political objectives are feasible; and when UN involvement represents the best means to advance U.S. interests. Where UN involvement is not viable or not available in a timely manner, or if UN involvement would interfere with U.S. interests, we shall use other means to achieve our objectives. ~~(S)~~

UN and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain, or solve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly. In such cases, the U.S. benefits from having to bear only a share of the burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke the voice of the community of nations on behalf of a cause we support. Thus, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and the establishment of a capability to conduct multinational peace operations will become part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. ~~(S)~~

Peace operations can be valuable tools in certain circumstances to advance our national interest. They cannot and will not substitute for unilateral or coalition action when that is what our national interest requires. Thus, in building our capacity for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving U.S. objectives. The U.S. will maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our interests and those of our friends and allies are at stake. Multilateral peace operations must, therefore, be placed in

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proper perspective among the instruments of U.S. foreign policy.
(C)

When large scale involvement of U.S. combat forces occurs, the responsibilities and requirements for national command will take precedence. Large scale combat operations should not be directly run by the UN but by the U.S. alone or a militarily viable coalition in order to preserve U.S. political and military prerogatives. (S)

U.S. Support for Multilateral Peace Operations

The United States is expanding its support for United Nations and appropriate regional peace operations politically, militarily, and financially. We will contribute U.S. forces judiciously on a case-by-case basis, as provided in the Policy Guidance. However, the Commander-in-Chief will never relinquish ultimate command authority over U.S. forces. (S)

We will support the full range of activities from preventive diplomacy through traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace-building. While we work with the UN to make its operations more efficient and effective and our financial assessment more equitable, the United States will aggressively seek congressional support to meet its financial obligations for UN peacekeeping. (C)

The United States will take a leadership role in obtaining international agreement to enhance the headquarters capabilities of the UN to conduct peace operations effectively, to achieve economies of scale and reap the benefits of past experience. The United States will contribute personnel, technical assistance, equipment, facilities, and funding for that enhancement. (U)

Within the U.S. Government, agencies will improve their capabilities to contribute to and coordinate with UN peace operations through significant organizational changes. The Secretaries of State and Defense will be jointly responsible for obtaining adequate peacekeeping funds and for managing day-to-day U.S. support for international peace operations. Decision-making and support for UN peace operations will be a shared responsibility as elaborated in the Policy Guidelines. The conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York will remain a State Department responsibility. (C)

Implementation

An interagency Peacekeeping Core Group chaired by the NSC and reporting to the Deputies Committee shall monitor implementation of this PDD, make recommendations on U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping operations, oversee interagency management of support for peacekeeping operations in the form of goods, services, and personnel, and consider future peacekeeping policies. (C)

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The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense shall submit to me through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a joint report on the status of implementation of this directive and the state of peace operations every six months.
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SUBJECT: POLICY GUIDANCE: U.S. POLICY ON MULTILATERAL
PEACE OPERATIONS
(S)

1. Half a century ago the United States played a central role in the drafting of the United Nations Charter, a document which provides the legal basis for multilateral peacekeeping.¹ Yet for most of the last forty years, the Cold War prevented the full utilization of that UN capability. (U)
2. Now, in the post Cold War era, threats to international peace and security come increasingly from ethnic hostilities, border and territorial conflicts, governmental collapse, civil wars, and attempts to suppress young democracies. UN and other multilateral peace operations can offer the best way for the international community acting together to prevent, contain, and resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and far more deadly. (S)
3. Thus, United Nations peacekeeping has been in our interest and we have supported its rapid expansion. We have also greatly expanded our role in UN peacekeeping. (S)
4. The United Nations, however, was not well prepared to take on this expanded role. Nor have United States laws and policies adjusted to the new availability of this expanded instrument for peace and stability. (S)
5. Therefore, the President directed a new United States initiative to improve the ability of the United Nations to conduct peacekeeping. Simultaneously, he directed changes within the United States Government to facilitate support for multilateral peace operations. (S)

¹ For simplicity, the term peacekeeping is used throughout this document to mean the entire spectrum of activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement aimed at defusing and resolving international conflicts. Annex VII elaborates the operative definitions that will guide military practitioners within the USG. (S)

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Policy

- 6. The United States will maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our interests and those of our friends and allies are threatened. Operations on the scale of the Gulf War, where the U.S. has a large military contingent employed in combat, should not be directly run by the UN but by the U.S. alone or a militarily viable coalition in order to preserve U.S. political and military control. (S)
- 7. Yet, when appropriate, the U.S. will employ multilateral peace operations in the interests of national security and as an important tool of our foreign policy. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and the establishment of a capability to conduct multinational peace operations will become part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. (S)
- 8. The United States will support United Nations peacekeeping politically, militarily, and financially. When decided by the President in consultation with Congress, we will contribute U.S. forces, when appropriate, as detailed in this policy directive. We will support the full range of activities from preventive diplomacy, through traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace-building. We will work with the UN to make its operations more efficient and our financial assessment more equitable. The Administration will aggressively seek Congressional support to meet U.S. financial obligations for UN peacekeeping. (S)

Deciding When Peacekeeping is Appropriate

- 9. The guidelines in Annex I will be used for reference when deciding whether to support a UN operation in the Security Council or to support a regionally-sponsored peacekeeping operation. The guidelines will be an aid in decision-making, not alone a prescriptive device. Decisions will be based on the cumulative weight of the guidelines, with no single guideline necessarily being an absolute determinant. The U.S. will share a version of the guidelines in Annex I with the UN and regional organizations as appropriate. (S)
- 10. In addition to these guidelines, each UN peace operation should have a specified timeframe tied to intermediate or final objectives as well as an accompanying sunset provision, specified troop levels, a firm budget estimate, and (once adequate funding arrangements are in place) the U.S. will identify funding sources for the U.S. to pay its assessed and/or voluntary share(s), before the U.S. votes to approve a peacekeeping mandate. (S)
- 11. The Administration will adopt the guidelines in Annex II for reference when deciding, in consultation with Congress, whether U.S. personnel should participate in a given UN or regional operation and whether to lead the operation. The

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decision will be based on the cumulative weight of the guidelines, with no single guideline necessarily being an absolute determinant. (S)

12. As a matter of principle, the U.S. will employ peace operations as a tool to provide finite windows of opportunity to allow combatants to resolve their differences and failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves. Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political solutions; otherwise, they should not be undertaken. The U.S. will urge the UN Secretariat and Security Council members to engage in rigorous, standard evaluations of all proposed new peace operations, with special attention paid to the aforementioned prerequisites and principles. (S)
13. The U.S. will closely scrutinize all existing peace operations when they come up for regular renewal by the Security Council to assess the value of continuing them. In particular, the U.S. will seek voluntary contributions by beneficiary nations to cover fully the costs of certain long-standing UN operations and/or will terminate these operations in order to free military and financial resources for more pressing UN missions. (S)

The Role of Regional Organizations

14. In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to involve regional organizations. In considering their role, our policy will be: (S)
 - The U.S. will continue to emphasize the UN as the primary international body with ultimate authority to conduct peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the U.S. will support efforts to improve regional organizations' peacekeeping capabilities. (S)

When regional organizations seek to conduct peacekeeping with UNSC blessing, U.S. support for UNSC endorsement will be conditioned on the adherence of the regional activity to the principles of the UN Charter, the criteria established by the UNSC, and the guidelines discussed in Paragraph 9 above. (S)

In Europe, the U.S. will look also to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and other regional organizations to deal with problems that could be resolved through low-intensity peace operations. On a case by case basis, the U.S. will support efforts to ensure that CSCE receives political and material support in its crisis-management efforts. (S)

NATO has confirmed its preparedness to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UNSC and/or CSCE on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures. The U.S. will work to ensure

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that NATO preserves the integrity of its military command structure when operating for the UN or CSCE and will encourage non-members (including both former European neutrals and former Warsaw Pact states) to associate with the Alliance for peacekeeping operations. The U.S. will take the lead in accelerating cooperation on peacekeeping within the NACC. (S)

- 15. Our policy on regional peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union will be: (S)

-- As appropriate, on a case by case basis, and subject to the guidelines in Paragraph 9 above, the U.S. will be prepared to support specific Russian proposals to seek UN Security Council endorsement to organize peacekeeping operations on the territory of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. U.S. support will be conditioned on these operations adhering to the principles of the UN Charter and meeting established UNSC criteria, including neutrality, consent of the conflicting parties, formal UNSC oversight and finite, renewable mandates. While the CSCE may play an important role in overseeing Russian peacekeeping efforts, ultimate authority for authorizing and legitimizing such operations should reside at the UN. In addition, the U.S. will not agree to accord the CIS in its current form the status of a regional organization or arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. (S)

If the issue arises, the U.S. will indicate our difficulty with and likely opposition to any effort to fund peace operations in the Former Soviet Union through UN assessments at least through FY 1994 due to our current resource constraints. Instead, the U.S. will support, on a case-by-case basis, Russian proposals to establish a Voluntary Fund and endeavor to contribute to this Fund. (S)

-- In its on-going dialogue with Moscow, the US should make clear to Russia that UN oversight of any operation will be real and ongoing and could result in U.S.-Russian policy differences over the mandate, scope and even the advisability of such operations. At the same time, we will engage in ongoing dialogue with other newly independent states to ensure that they understand the objectives of U.S. policy and to ensure that policy and UN oversight of operations reflect the legitimate interests and concerns of the newly independent states. The U.S. will encourage Russia to begin multilateral consultations on these issues as well. (S)

Strengthening the UN

16. The U.S. will share with the Security Council Permanent members, the Secretariat, and the UN General Assembly Committee of 34, and the Contact Group of major peacekeeping contributors as soon as possible proposals to strengthen UN peace operations. In making these proposals, we will stress our willingness to make specific commitments and provide goods and services. In general, we will seek either direct reimbursement for U.S. provision of goods and services or credit against our assessments. In rare instances, we may contribute goods, services, and funds on a voluntary basis. Included in the package of U.S. proposals will be: (S)

A. Expanded Staff: The UN should improve and expand the new UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) staff with the addition of at least 100 skilled civilian and military personnel. State, DOD and other U.S. agencies will offer to detail on a voluntary basis approximately 20% of the total personnel required. (S)

B. Turn-Key Operation: The U.S. will offer to provide a study of facility requirements for DPO and based on that study, if a new DPO facility is needed, the U.S. will propose that concerned nations make a facility available to the UN on a turn-key basis for the DPKO. This facility could house the elements of DPO listed below. (S)

C. Organization: The U.S. will urge the UN to include in DPO the following divisions: (S)

-- Plans Division: To address the larger planning problems facing UN peacekeeping operations, the U.S. will support the creation of a professional peacekeeping headquarters staff for planning. Multinational peacekeeping planning should be linked with regional organizations. The U.S. will provide its military experience to the UN to strengthen its planning for peacekeeping. (S)

Information and Research Division: The DPO staff should include an Information and Research component (IRD) that is linked to field operations in order to obtain and provide current information. The IRD staff could offer a range of useful support, including publishing a daily report for principals in the UN, DPO, and field operations. It should also manage a 24 hour cell to monitor open source material and information submissions from governments. The U.S. Intelligence Community will establish a single point of contact with DPO/IRD and will provide as much informational support as possible without compromising protected sources and methods. (S)

Operations Division: DPO should include a modern command, control and communications (C3) facility and

architecture that are based on commercial systems. The U.S. will offer to design a C3 systems architecture for such a C3 facility and solicit members to donate specified components or funds for the facility. (S)

Logistics Division: Peace operations should have their own military logistics system. The U.S. enthusiastically supports the plan to transfer the Field Operations Division (FOD) from the Department of Administration and Management to DPO. To minimize costs by achieving economies of scale, much of the UN's logistical requirements should be contracted on competitive basis to a small number of commercial contractors. These contracts should be re-bid on the basis of price and performance on a regular basis. (S)

Civilian Police Cell: The U.S. will urge the UN to accelerate plans to improve its capacity to support UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) operations and related efforts to build police and judicial institutions as part of UN peace operations. The UN should form a small staff to manage current police operations, compile lessons learned in El Salvador, Somalia, Cambodia and elsewhere, conduct planning, and develop standard procedures, doctrine and training for police support operations. (S)

Public Affairs Division: The UN should greatly enhance its peacekeeping public affairs capability by hiring highly qualified, experienced, multinational specialists to serve in New York and the field. The U.S. will offer to detail public affairs specialists to perform key public affairs functions and help train other countries' nationals. (S)

D. Logistics Support and Start-Up Capability: To avoid the need for costly regional stockpiles, the U.S., with other member states, will offer to assist the UN DPO to establish an improved, cost-effective logistics system to support UN peacekeeping operations, including a computer network to link the UN DPO with a single logistics office in each participating nation. Using that computer network, the UN could request price and availability data and order materiel from participating states. A U.S. decision to respond to a UN request for price and availability data using this system would be contingent on an interagency policy decision that the U.S. would be willing to provide the supplies or equipment given acceptable arrangements for reimbursement and legal requirements for transfer of technical equipment have been met. Continued U.S. participation in this system will be reviewed in light of the level of participation by other member states. (S)

- The UN should establish a standing airlift capability. The U.S. will develop a plan for such a capability and share it with the UN. Possible solutions could include

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contracting with commercial firms or with member states such as Russia for a small number of heavy lift cargo aircraft that could operate channel flights to support peacekeeping operations and would be available for emergency deployments. (S)

To eliminate the lengthy and potentially disastrous delays in deployment after the UN Security Council has authorized the dispatch of a mission, DPO should have a rapidly deployable headquarters team, a composite initial logistics support unit, and open, pre-negotiated commercial contracts for logistics support in new missions. The U.S. will notify the UN of forces or capabilities it would consider offering on short notice for the composite initial logistics support unit. UNSC approval would be required to deploy the logistics unit. (S)

The UN should develop a data base of specific, potentially available forces or capabilities that could be available for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The U.S. will provide input to such a database by notifying the UN of the specific U.S. forces or capabilities that could be made available for the full spectrum of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. U.S. notification in no way implies a commitment to provide those forces, if requested. The U.S. will help to design this data base of military forces of member states that the UN might request be contributed to a given UN peacekeeping or humanitarian operation. (S)

Nearly as difficult as rapidly identifying and deploying appropriate military forces is finding qualified civilian personnel to serve in UN peace operations. To reduce the UN's costly reliance on the dispatch of UN Headquarters employees to field missions, the U.S. will urge the UN Secretariat to establish a trained civilian reserve corps as a ready, external talent pool to assist in the administration, management, and execution of UN peace operations. (S)

E. Training: The UN should establish a professional Peace Operations Training Program for commanders, other military and civilian personnel. The U.S. will offer to help create and establish this program, as well as promote multilateral peacekeeping training, exercises, simulations, and leadership development. The U.S. will also urge the creation of correspondence courses, along the lines successfully employed within the U.S. military, in order to make peacekeeping instruction widely available at low cost. The U.S. will offer to participate in peacekeeping training efforts and offer the use of U.S. facilities. (S)

F. Financial Reform: The U.S. welcomes the establishment of an Inspections and Investigations Unit at the UN and will work

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to ensure the efficacy of this function. The U.S. will also press for a reduction in the U.S. peacekeeping assessment to 25% as well as early consideration by the Contact Group and early implementation by the Secretary-General of the package of UN peacekeeping financing and budget management reforms listed in Annex III. (S)

G. Emergency Humanitarian Assistance: Often humanitarian relief must take place in a peacekeeping context. Indeed, at times, humanitarian assistance may be among the primary reasons for deploying a peace operation. The U.S. will urge the UN to implement rapidly the proposals in Annex IV to improve coordination among the UN's peacekeeping and humanitarian relief organs. The U.S. will detail experienced military and civilian personnel to the UN as appropriate to enhance the expertise of UN humanitarian agencies and to provide surge capacity in times of humanitarian crisis. (S)

H. Peace Negotiations: As the complexity and number of peace operations has increased, the lack of adequate coordination between UN negotiators and those in UNHQ who will implement eventual peace settlements has become especially problematic. To improve advance coordination, the U.S. will urge the UN to establish clear terms of reference for UN negotiators that outline operational constraints and limit the negotiator's ability to commit the UN in the context of peace negotiations without the explicit consent of the UNSC. When conducting negotiations that may result in possible peace operations, UN negotiators should have on-hand UN military advice. (S)

Strengthening U.S. Support for Multilateral Peace Operations

17. The U.S. Government must enhance its capability to manage and support UN and other peacekeeping organizations effectively and must ensure that it is able to fund our peacekeeping obligations adequately. Towards this end, I direct the following: (S)

A. Organizational Changes: The Secretaries of State and Defense will be jointly responsible for obtaining adequate peacekeeping funds and for managing day-to-day U.S. support for international peace operations. Decision-making and support for UN peace operations will be a shared responsibility as laid out in the Chart in Annex V. In all cases, the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York will remain a State Department responsibility. (S)

-- The State Department will have lead responsibility for the oversight and management of those Chapter VI peace operations in which U.S. combat units are not participating. The Administration will seek to fund these operations through the existing State Contributions to International Peace Activities (CIPA) account. (S)

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- The Defense Department will have lead oversight and management responsibility for all Chapter VII peace operations and those Chapter VI operations in which there are U.S. combat units. The Administration will seek to fund these operations through the establishment of a new CIPA account within DOD. Once this change is achieved, DOD will receive direct reimbursement from the UN for all of its contributions of goods, services, and troops to UN peace operations. (S)

Since peace operations are neither wholly military nor wholly political in nature, consisting instead of military, political, humanitarian and developmental elements in varying degrees, no one agency alone can manage all facets of an operation effectively. Therefore, the designated lead agencies will engage in full and regular interagency consultation as they manage U.S. support for peace operations. In addition, each agency will be responsible for ensuring that all appropriate functional bureaus within their departments (such as the State Refugee bureau, or the DOD Humanitarian bureau) are fully involved in decision-making relevant to their areas of competence. (S)

The NSC will continue to chair the interagency Peacekeeping Core Group (PCG). The PCG shall make recommendations to the Deputies Committee on U.S. policy on peace operations and U.S. support for and participation in new and on-going UN operations. In addition, the PCG will oversee interagency management of U.S. support for peace operations. When meeting to consider U.S. support for new and continuing operations, the PCG will invite representatives of the regional offices of the various departments to attend, and the regional IWG leader will serve as deputy chair of the meeting. When lead agencies have been designated for specific peace operations, those agencies may continue to chair individual interagency working groups. (S)

- To ensure high-level coordination with the UN Department of Peace Operations in New York, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Military Staff Committee, the senior military officer on permanent duty at USUN, will be upgraded to flag rank. (S)

B. Reimbursements from the UN: Until permanent change is achieved in the way the USG funds UN peace operations, the Departments of State and Defense shall credit UN reimbursements to the 050 and 150 budget functions according to the procedures in Annex VI. (S)

C. Legislative Changes: The Administration will begin immediate consultations with Congress to seek to move the State CIPA account from the CJS Appropriations Subcommittees to the

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Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittees. In addition, at an appropriate time, the Administration will seek the following legislative changes: ~~(S)~~

Amending Section 7 of the UN Participation Act first to remove the limitations on detailing personnel to the UN in Chapter VI operations and then, to the extent that it is politically feasible, to delete the prohibition against using that section as authority to support Chapter VII operations and combatant missions; ~~(S)~~

Amending DOD's authority to provide cross-servicing to peacekeeping operations (10 U.S.C 2341 et seq.) to simplify the current procedures (FAA Sec. 607 AECA); ~~(S)~~

Obtaining permanent extraordinary transfer authority to allow the President to transfer up to \$250 million of current year or unexpended past year funds internally within the 050 function or internally within the 150 function to support urgent international peacekeeping activities. ~~(S)~~

D. U.S. Forces: When large scale involvement of U.S. combat forces occurs, the responsibilities and requirements for national command will take precedence. Large scale combat operations should not be directly run by the UN but by the U.S. alone or a militarily viable coalition in order to preserve U.S. political and military prerogatives. ~~(S)~~

However, in other instances, on a case by case basis, the President, in consultation with Congress, will consider participating in UN and appropriate regional organization peace operations and placing appropriate forces and personnel (both active duty and reserve, including small contingents) under the operational control of a UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the UNSC. The U.S. will retain ultimate command authority over such units and must be satisfied with the arrangement, the operation, and the risk to U.S. personnel. The following conditions must be met: ~~(S)~~

-- The U.S. unit commander will maintain the capability to report separately to U.S. higher military authorities, as well as to the UN commander; ~~(S)~~

Commanders of U.S. military units participating in UN peacekeeping operations will refer to higher U.S. authorities orders that are illegal under U.S. or international law, or are outside the mandate of the mission to which the United States agreed with the UN, if they are unable to resolve the matter with the UN commander. ~~(S)~~

The U.S. reserves the right to terminate the participation of U.S. personnel in the

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peacekeeping mission at any time and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect them if they are endangered; (S)

U.S. units would at all times remain under U.S. administrative command for purposes such as discipline and evaluation. (S)

The U.S. will urge the UN to adopt standard military terminology to describe the command and control relationship for forces of member countries participating in UN operations. (S)

In addition, each peace operation involving U.S. combat units will have an advance field military assessment by DOD personnel. In all other cases, to the extent possible, U.S. personnel should accompany UN assessment teams dispatched to the field to verify the feasibility and cost effectiveness of proposed plans for UN peace operations. (S)

E. Article 43 Stand-by Agreements: The U.S. will not pursue any Article 43 agreements with the UN at this time. I view the PRD recommendations as workable, preferable alternatives to Article 43 agreements at this time. (S)

F. U.S. Training: The Armed Forces will include appropriate peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance training in appropriate DOD training programs as needed to ensure the U.S. has adequate military forces and capabilities available to conduct or participate in the full spectrum of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Individual services will continue to conduct appropriate peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance training pursuant to Title X, USC responsibilities. Training U.S. forces to fight and decisively win wars will, however, continue to be the highest training priority. (S)

Implementation

18. To implement the recommendations contained herein, I instruct agencies to do the following: (S)

A. OMB, with JCS, OSD and State, will produce a preliminary estimate of the cost of the proposed U.S. reform package and the budgetary implications of the U.S. contributions, of goods, services, and personnel by September 30, 1993. (S)

B. As soon as possible thereafter, USUN will present U.S. proposals for UN peacekeeping reform initially to the Permanent Members of the Security Council and then to the Secretary General. These proposals will constitute the USG's considered response to the Secretary General's 1992 Agenda for Peace initiative, building upon the suggestions that the U.S. made to the P-4 in January 1993. USUN should continue its efforts to ensure that a Ministerial Session of the UNSC is held at an appropriate time to adopt a package of peacekeeping proposals. (S)

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C. USUN will urge the UN to coordinate a multinational pledging activity, focusing on Japan and Germany, to expand the DPO as described above. ~~(S)~~

D. Within 90 days, OMB, JCS, OSD, and State will complete a study of whether it is practical for the U.S. to contribute a greater New York area U.S.G facility to house the expanded DPO. ~~(S)~~

E. OMB/State/OSD will complete a study of the viability of a number of additional proposals to improve UN peacekeeping financing and budget management by November 30, 1993. ~~(S)~~

F. As specified in Annex IV, an interagency group chaired by AID will make specific recommendations for enhancing the humanitarian assistance capabilities of the UN and the USG in the context of peace operations. Recommendations will be presented to the interagency Peacekeeping Core Group no later than October 31, 1993. ~~(S)~~

G. The OSD and JCS will immediately review their organizational structures that currently support peace operations and augment them as necessary by reassignments to ensure that there are adequate personnel to support DOD's new responsibilities for managing and funding peace operations as outlined above. ~~(S)~~

H. The Peacekeeping Core Group will review the separate questions of rapid reaction capabilities and Article 43 arrangements, once the relevant U.S. recommendations have been presented to the UN and, to the extent feasible, implemented and evaluated. ~~(S)~~

19. The interagency Peacekeeping Core Group shall monitor implementation of this PDD. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to me through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a joint, semi-annual report, beginning six months from today, on the status of implementation of this directive and on the state of peace operations. ~~(S)~~

ANNEX I

Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping

- A. There is a threat to international peace and security, defined as one or a combination of the following:
- international aggression;
 - a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent action, coupled with violence;
 - sudden and unexpected interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights, coupled with violence or the threat thereof.
- B. There is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
- C. There are clear objectives, including an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
- D. For Chapter VI peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties to the conflict obtained before the UN Security Council votes to deploy the peacekeeping mission.
- E. The means to accomplish the mission are available, including forces, financing and a mandate (regional or UN) appropriate to the mission.
- F. An end-point to UN participation can be identified.

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ANNEX V

KEY ASPECTS OF THE SHARED RESPONSIBILITY MODEL

Champion	State + DOD
Peacekeeping Core Group Chair	NSC
Start/Terminate an Operation	
-- Political Assessment	State
Military Assessment	DOD
Final Recommendation	State + DOD
Day-to-Day Conduct of Operations	Lead Agency
Identifying Funding Sources	Lead Agency
Source of Funds	
-- UN Assessments	State + DOD
Voluntary Peacekeeping	State + DOD
DOD O&M (which is reimbursed by UN)	DOD
Authorizing Committees	HFAC/HASC SFRC/SASC
Appropriating Subcommittees	ForOps or CJS* Armed Services

*Eliminate role of CJS, if possible

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Reimbursement Policy for US Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations

There is interagency agreement that the US should be reimbursed by the United Nations (UN) when DOD contributes troops, supplies, or services to assessed UN peacekeeping operations. As a matter of policy until permanent change is achieved in the way that the USG funds UN peace operations, State and DOD have agreed to the following procedures, without prejudice to each agencies views of existing legal authorities:

1. SHORT-TERM: In the short-term, State and DOD will continue to consider each assessed UN peacekeeping operation on a case-by-case basis.

1a. DOD Troop Contributions: When DOD details forces to assessed UN peacekeeping operations under either Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (peace-enforcing) of the UN Charter, the US shall seek the normal reimbursement that all troop contributor nations are entitled to (\$988/troop/month; or \$1279/troop/month for specialists).

Such reimbursement, in excess of DOD component incremental troop costs, could be used, to the extent provided under existing statutes, to offset the USG's peacekeeping assessment -- paid from the State peacekeeping account.

1b. DOD Goods and Services: When DOD provides goods or services (e.g., lift, logistics support, medical, or technical services) to assessed UN peacekeeping operations, DOD shall seek direct reimbursement from the UN.

DOD and State will consult in exceptional situations which may require waiver of reimbursement. In such exceptional circumstances, when DOD and State agree, DOD would waive reimbursement. DOD believes that we should consider such a waiver only when the UN is not in a position to provide reimbursement. When the UN does not reimburse DOD, State believes that it may seek a credit against its peacekeeping assessment. State and Defense agree that we should continue to resolve these issues on a case-by-case basis.

2. LONG-TERM: The Administration would seek new legislation or clarification in the legislative history as required to allow:

2a. DOD Troop Contributions: When DOD details forces to assessed UN peacekeeping operations, the US shall seek the normal UN reimbursement for troop contributor nations (the \$988 or \$1279).

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Such reimbursement, would be credited to State's peacekeeping assessment if funds are available in the appropriation for DOD peacekeeping for reimbursement of DOD component incremental troop costs.

In cases where funds are not available from the appropriation for DOD peacekeeping, DOD would receive the direct reimbursement from the UN for incremental troop costs, and State could credit any excess to the State peacekeeping assessment.

2b. DOD Goods and Services: When DOD provides goods or services to assessed UN peacekeeping operations, the US shall seek reimbursement for the costs of DOD contributions.

(1) DOD normally shall seek direct reimbursement from the UN for the incremental costs of goods and services provided. Such reimbursement will be credited to appropriate DOD components appropriations.

(2) On a case-by-case basis, DOD could waive some or all of this direct reimbursement based on considerations such as: assessment of the importance of the operation to US political and security interests; the timeliness and availability of funds from the DOD appropriation for peacekeeping to reimburse DOD components, personnel, and other resources; and the impact on the Military Departments.

If DOD waives direct reimbursement:

-- State may seek reimbursement to the US through a UN credit to the US peacekeeping assessment for up to the full value (i.e., base and incremental costs) of DOD's contribution; and

-- DOD component incremental costs will be reimbursed from the DOD appropriation for peacekeeping.

3. In pursuing the above reimbursement policy, the Administration will actively oppose any efforts by the Congress to authorize and direct the transfer of DOD funds to State to pay for peacekeeping assessments; or any efforts to transfer State funding to DOD to pay for DOD participation in peacekeeping activities.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20508

21024

September 16, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RA*

FROM: SUSAN E. ~~SMITH~~/R. RAND *SR* BEERS

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Friday, September 17, 1993

Attached is the latest version of the draft PDD and agenda for the Principals Committee Meeting on PRD-13, Peacekeeping on Friday, September 17, 1993 at 3:30 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to forward the memorandum at Tab I to agency counterparts.

Approve *SR* Disapprove _____

as revised + discussed with Rice

Attachments

- Tab I Itoh Memo to Agency Counterparts
- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Draft PDD

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

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Declassify on: OADR

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By *SRB* NARA, Date 7/1/11
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