April 8, 1981

Memorandum from John McMahon to the Secretaries of State and Defense and Director of the National Security Agency, '[Redacted] Report'

Citation:

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Summary:

Report outlines the duties of Polish government ministries in the case of martial law.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

8 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

Director, National Security Agency

Report

FROM

John N. McMahon Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

1. Enclosed is a report. For convenience of reference by NFIB agencies, the codeword has been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensitive agent sources of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The word is classified and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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John N. McMahon

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
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


on 16 February 1981 by representatives of appropriate government ministries. This exercise consisted of studying the modus operandi of state power and authority during a period of martial law. This report details the responsibilities and actions to be taken by individual ministries and is an expanded version of FIRDB-312/00762-81.

End of Summary

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REPORT

ON THE STATUS OF NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS IN THE EVENT IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO DECLARE MARTIAL LAW AND ON CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE DECISIONMAKING GAME

I. Concurrent with the onset of the national crisis actions have been taken aimed at preparing the nation for the possibility that it might become necessary to declare martial law. An executive staff has been formed--headed by the Chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers--consisting of designated secretaries of the PUWP Central Committee and government ministers in charge of key ministries. The staff held a series of meetings for the purpose of analyzing and assessing the chain of events in the country and assigning appropriate crisis-management tasks to organs of authority and administration. At a meeting of the National Defense Committee a wide range of issues pertaining to martial law was reviewed and decisions were announced concerning ways to make further improvements in this area. The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, in conjunction with the planning of armed forces operations, held an advisory briefing for tightly restricted groups of executive staff members of key ministries during which general guidelines were spelled out for the drafting of ministerial emergency action schedules and plans. By mid February 1981--with a coordinating role being played by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense--work was completed in the central organs of state authority and administration on the implementation of the most important measures of an organizational and planning nature, and a number of practical actions were also initiated.

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II. An interministerial decisionmaking game was conducted on 16 February 1981 in the framework of a review of the present state of preparation of the nation in case of the need to declare a state of martial law^{*}. Participating in this project were operational groups of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Committee of National Defense Secretariat, as well as a representative of the. Propaganda Department, Central Committee, Polish United Workers Party-a total of 38 persons. In addition, as a separate action within the framework of the game, problems of the economic ministries were presented by ministers and directors of military departments of the Ministries of Transportation, Communications, Power Industry and Atomic Energy, as well as Domestic Trade and Services. The game was conducted in two stages.

[Translator's Note: The expression "martial law" is an arbitrary translation of the Polish stan wojenny, literally "military or wartime state." This is a state of law covering situations of threat from abroad and from domestic antigovernment forces. The normal Polish term for martial law (stan wyjatkowy) has been declared as inapplicable under socialism-communism and only used in reference to capitalist countries which were reportedly prone habitually to suspend rights of citizens indefinitely. Stan wojenny is defined by the Encyklopedia Powszechna (General Encyclopedia), published in 1973 as a state of law, the introduction of which suspends temporarily certain civil rights and increases government authority and obligations of citizens. The propaganda-based concept-straddling stan wojenny introduced linguistic confusion and the Leksykon Wiedzy Wojskowej (Military Lexicon), published in 1979, already noted that it was sometimes used (particularly in Poland) synonymously with the purged stan wyjatkowy. The term seems to have been rehabilitated for use in the present crisis situation in Poland.]

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During stage I there was general verification and unification of views on the substance, content, and results of introduction of a state of martial law in the interest of state security; also at that time there was--in the light of hypothetically assumed variants of developments in the country--a precise restatement of the main circumstances, conditions, and the best method of introducing this state. Against this background there was conducted a comprehensive review of preparation of individual organs of authority and administration for implementation of tasks connected with introduction of the state of martial law; a study was also made on how to synchronize the plans of activities and possibilities of effective cooperation.

During stage II a study was made of operational concepts after introduction of the state of martial law when special attention was given to those projects which conditioned the attainment of the chief objective, namely, to secure normalization of the national life during the period when martial law is in force.

Substantive analysis of problems, opinions, assessments, and proposals presented, forms the basis for reporting the following:

1. In the opinion of those who participated in the game, introduction of the state of martial law must be our last resort and its single objective must be restoration of the disrupted constitutional order of the Polish Peoples Republic. Calling attention to the need for further preparation of the nation in case of emergency introduction of the state of martial law it was stressed that--taking into consideration the social repercussions of such a step which are hard to estimate, as well as the negative politicoeconomic internal and international results--the chief task of all organs of state authority and administration in the present crisis situation must be recognized to be the energetic action on behalf of elimination of conditions which brought on the crisis and introduction of martial law through the meticulous execution of provisions of the law, strengthening of social discipline and restoration of normal rhythm of work and study.

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2. The game revealed the existence of an advanced, although not yet complete, degree of national preparation for emergency need of introduction of martial law.

In the normative and legal sphere, an end was put to the stage of drafting and coordinating the package of legal acts for the state of martial law containing drafts of resolutions and decisions of the PPR <u>Sejm</u> (taking into consideration the possibility that the need may arise for introduction of this state while the <u>Sejm</u> is in session), resolutions of the Council of State on introduction of the state of martial law, and decrees establishing this entity in the interest of safeguarding state security and public order as well as administration of justice during the period when martial law is in force, and also basic executive acts supporting these decrees which are to be issued by the Council of Ministers, the National Defense Committee, and by the Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs, and Justice. In the opinion of participants of the game, these documents, upon acceptance by the leadership of the Party and Government, may serve as the basis for initiation of necessary organizational and legal actions during preparation and introduction of this state.

Among more complicated problems is the <u>legislative procedure</u> of the main normative and <u>legal</u> acts of the <u>state of martial law</u>. General opinion was for the greatest possible simplification of the procedure through utilization of constitutional authority of the Council of Ministers to issue decrees which have the power of law. Such a solution would enable us to preserve the secrecy of preparation and would consequently provide a greater guarantee for effective operation of governmental organs during the initial phase of the process of introduction of the state of martial law.

It was pointed out at the same time that in the light of the presentation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers at the PPR Sejm session on 12 February 1981 there is the possibility of an alternate procedural variant consisting of taking up in the PPR Sejm forum, together with the whole package of laws pertaining to implementation of social agreements of 1980, the problems dealing with support for activities of state organs and citizens in event of undermining of the constitutional order. In such a case the PPR Sejm could examine the necessary legal

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measures guaranteeing orderly procedures during the period when martial law is in force. We could also consider at this forum the preparation and study of changes in existing regulations in the direction of establishing martial law [stan wyjatkowy] more suitable to the existing situation in the country. A study of these matters by the PPR Sejm could be in a certain sense a disciplinary factor which would also enhance the public consciousness of responsibility on the one hand, but on the other hand, it could become an important trump card for the organs of state authority and administration bearing on law and order. Nevertheless, this variant is seen as being less promising and affording no guarantee that the projected goal would be attained.

<u>Choosing the [right] time for introduction of the state of</u> <u>military law was recognized as being particularly important. In</u> regard to this, general conviction was expressed that from the standpoint of operational effectiveness of organs enforcing provisions pertaining to this state, the period of aggravated tensions, particularly during sitdown strikes, would be most unfavorable. But the most favorable time--specifically in conducting Operation WIOSNA [SPRING]*--would be the period preceding this state or after the strike wave subsides. In this case we should, however, recognize the possibility of negative public reaction. In any case it would be important that an appropriately early warning be given to the directors of appropriate departments, particularly in the Ministries of Internal Affairs and National Defense, regarding the political decision on these matters some 3 days before announcement of the state of martial law. This period could be used for secret and selective deployment of necessary military forces and forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and also for supplying all those involved with execution of the decision with normative documents. This period could also be used for initiation of propaganda action.

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
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A very real, but not yet fully solved problem is the <u>material and technical preparation of information for the public</u> <u>about consequences following introduction of the state of martial</u> <u>law</u>. Printing of notices under conditions of normal work of a printing shop would require at least 3 days. Because of the complicated situation prevailing in the printing business we must forego early printing because this would invariably lead to revelation of the preparations. In such a situation the Ministries of Internal Affairs and National Defense will study the possibility of early printing of notices and prepare an emergency system for initiation, at a given signal, of a closed printing presses.

It was generally agreed that propaganda presents a separate problem in the whole field of preparations. Thus, there is an urgent need for acceleration of effort aimed at comprehensive preparation of activity in this field giving special attention to creation of conditions for emergency expansion of editorial and technical teams capable of assuring, after introduction of martial law, a normal functioning of at least one central radio and TV program and daily publication of Trybuna Ludu and Zolnierz Wolnosci. As soon as possible the Central Committee Propaganda Department, in cooperation with the Ministries of Internal Affairs and National Defense, should work up these problems from the standpoint of organization (together with consideration for possible mobilizational expansion of military editorial staffs and technical teams of radio, TV, and press) as well as substance in the sense of preparing content of appropriate propaganda materials (drafts of proclamations, appeals, pronouncements, leaflets, posters, etc.). For the propaganda work we should draft people who have great social, moral, and political authority.

The degree of preparing ministries for activity in case of need to introduce the state of martial law will differ from one ministry to another.



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The Ministries of Internal Affairs and National Defense, basing themselves on provisions of "Key Defense Premises of PPR," have defined and coordinated among themselves operational concepts of subordinate forces and means; they have also established principles of cooperation and had defined the extent and forms of mutual personnel and material services. Both ministries had compiled ministerial timetables for projects planned for implementation during the period of preparation and introduction of martial law; the tasks based on these projects were incorporated in appropriate operational plans and in some cases were tested in practice. The ministries in the framework of their current activities have implemented the necessary undertakings and practical measures raising the fixed authority of command organs as well as certain units expected to take initial actions. Principles for placing all special installations under the protection of the armed forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs Forces have been drafted and coordinated with interested ministries; plans have been made for deployment for government control requirements, of an emergency radio and radiorelay communications system for sealing off the PPR maritime border, for military takeover of air traffic control, for improvement of the operational position of the troops, for blocking off designated zones of responsibility in the vicinity of Warsaw, for reinforcement of military installations and expanded protection of cadre living quarters areas, for securing selected mobile means of the Committee for Radio and TV Affairs in order to support propaganda, and for other matters.

On the basis of analysis of needs during the state of martial law the following are expected to be called up:

- for the Ministry of Internal Affairs--over 45,000 soldiers and about 2,200 motor vehicles, mainly into the Citizens Militia and also to the Border Guard units as well as the <u>Nadwislanskie</u> units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;

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- for the armed forces--about 40,000 reservists, more than 5,500 motor vehicles as well as a small number of engineering machines (about 50).

The initial plan calls for calling reserves in two stages, the first of which could occur secretly in the period preceding introduction of martial law in the framework of annual limits for reserve retraining.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs in its first stage would call up about 25-30 percent of needed personnel and in the second stage--the remaining 70-75 percent.

In the first stage the armed forces expect to expand, through mobilization, their units of Internal Defense Forces and Military Internal Service as well as military organs of prosecution and justice and in the second stage--four tactical large units of the Warsaw Military District.

The Ministry of National Defense--in cooperation with other ministries--has also worked up the concept of militarization, in the interest of state security, of selected organizational units of state administration and national economy, and also drafts of normative-legal executive acts in this field. Based on these documents the necessary planning and organizational measures have been prepared in the ministries (or equivalents).

In the course of the game representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have favorably evaluated the military aid effected and coordinated during martial law on behalf of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, proposing at the same time consideration of the possibility of additional joint efforts on behalf of internal security and order including assignment of appropriate armed forces for organizing joint patrols even now in large urban agglomerations, anticipation of armed forces blockades of national economy installations indicated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and also planning the use of military forces to restore public order in the event of mass antigovernment demonstrations.

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Due to the complicated nature of certain problems the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces will shortly make a thorough analysis of the whole package of proposals and will present its stand in this regard in a separate report.


The Ministry of Transportation has implemented tasks pertaining to organization of intensified protection of the railroad lines, installations and equipment. The system covers 40 percent of the general length of the key railroad net which carries 80 percent of the transport. In 87 organizational units of the ministry, cells of authorized representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Peoples Militia Provincial Headquarters were formed. Additional headquarters for military transports were formed and the net of military railroad commands was broadened. This move resulted in improvement of work discipline on the railroads; however, they do not guarantee the continuity of work of the railroads in case of a general strike.

Among the most serious unsolved problems of the ministry are the following: exclusion in the trade union law now in the process of preparation of railroad workers' right to strike, installation in the offices of director of Polish Railroad districts of "WCz" [expansion unknown] telephones, and enlarging the number of authorized personnel in the Railroad Security Service.

In the course of further preparations directors of the ministry intend to establish transportation priorities during the period of martial law and also to prepare an analysis on the method of ensuring rail traffic in case of lack of electrical power on electrified lines.

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The Ministry of Communications has reinforced its permanent alert duty service for telecommunications allocation as well as radio and television stations; it has also reinforced protection of communications installations guarded by industrial guards of the ministry. Plans and preparations have been made for military protection of 167 telecommunications, radio, and television stations. Alternate sources of power have been assured for basic telecommunications installations, as well as radio and television transmitters. In basic organizational cells of the ministry, operational and decisionmaking groups have been formed, and trusted teams have been selected to provide technical and operational service of the equipment. Officers of the Signal Troops have been brought into provincial field telecommunications offices as temporary deputy directors. Reinforcement of operational and patrol protection of selected installations by forces of security and public order organs has been planned.

In the course of further preparations, the leadership of the ministry intends to intensify--in cooperation the USSR Ministry of Communications--effective jamming of RFE broadcasts in the territory of central and western Poland, as well as in the coastal region on the 41- and 31-meter wavelengths.

The Ministry of Power Industry and Atomic Energy prepared drafts of directives on preservation of effective operation of electrical power facilities in the national power grid and on militarization of basic services safeguarding the functioning of the power system. The ministry coordinated with the General Staff the assumption of military protection of power installations particularly susceptible to sabotage and diversionary activity. Plans were made in agreement with ministries concerned for initiation of activities aimed at safeguarding operational efficiency of electric power generators (presently they are only about 60 percent efficient). The selection process of employees was completed using more demanding criteria pertaining to their estimated disposition to implement given tasks in the period of martial law.

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Among the most important and still unsolved problems are the increase of coal supplies in electric powerplants in case of a break in deliveries, since present supplies are sufficient for only 3-5 days, formation of armed guards to provide protection for the building of the State Power Allocation Authority, and removal from this building of institutions taken over by NSZZ Solidarity.


In the course of further preparations directors of the ministry intend to introduce on 18 February 1981 a state of emergency [stan pogotowia] in one of the Provincial Power Allocation Authorities, which is planned to take over the alternate function of the State Power Allocation Authority, and to train personnel in taking over the function of managing the national power grid from the [new] alternate position of the State Power Allocation Authority.

The Ministry of Domestic Trade and Services has prepared a transitional sales control [reglamentacja=rationing] during a 2-week period using the ration coupons on hand since 1961 (about 31 million) stored at Peoples Militia Provincial Headquarters in cities which were provincial capitals prior to the administrative reform. Controlled sales will apply to baked goods, meat, smoked meat products, butter, wheat flour, cereals, rice, macaroni, sugar, salt, eggs, soap and washing powder; appropriate differentiation of assorted goods will be made between sales for the urban population and agricultural and nonagricultural populace living in the country. The time needed for introduction of transitional sales control sales--about 6-7 days.

Among the most important thus far unresolved problems is the decision to print the ration coupons needed for the period following the first two [transitional] weeks of sales control (time needed to print them--about 14 days) and the militia or the military takeover of protection of 110 installations (bakeries and consumer stores), mainly in large urban agglomerations.

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In the course of further preparations directors of the ministry intend to determine the means of retaining, during the period when martial law remains in force, the orderly operation of the warehouses, domestic trade transports, consumer industry transports, as well as parts of rural transport.

3. The following proposals for decision are made on the basis of finished information reports presented during the game:

1) To study at the next session of the National Defense Committee the whole complex of matters pertaining to martial law in order to evaluate the state of the nation's preparation in regard to the martial law and possibly to approve an appropriate package of normative and legal acts and also to establish the legislative procedure.

2) To obligate the party organs and the state authority and administration organs engaged in work on the state of martial law to continue to improve appropriate plans of their operation; the Secretariat of the National Defense Committee is to coordinate these plans and to elaborate after the National Defense Committee session a central timetable of actions implemented in the country in case of need to introduce the martial law.

3) To inform the First Provincial Secretaries of the PUWP and the Provincial Governors of the government plan of action in case of the need to introduce martial law and of their obligations to elaborate methods of operation which are well conceived and applicable to the local situation. These matters may be taken up in the course of the next scheduled consultations.