Analysis of the Romanian Attitude toward Maoism

On the Romanian Attitude toward Maoism
(Attempts to [illegible]] Maoist positions into the Warsaw Pact states)

The divergent positions of the RCP leadership regarding the fundamental issues of the global Communist movement and their national-opportunistic special positions in the socialist community of states are defining for the Romanian attitude toward Maoism. 

1. Overall, the RCP takes a neutral, or alternatively a sympathetic, attitude vis-à-vis Maoism’s ideology and politics. 

- Not only the domestic policy but also the foreign policy of the leaders in Beijing are assessed to be positive and a contribution to the strengthening of socialism. 

- Relations between the [unclear] and China are characterized demonstratively as based on Marxist-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. 

- The intention of maintaining good relations with all socialist countries is consistently and in an undifferentiated manner emphasized in all RCP declarations. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and China are formally equated but on the other hand, however, clear, anti-Soviet accents cannot be overlooked, especially recently. In Ceaușescu’s interviews and speeches, all reference to the role of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy is avoided. The press was informed about Comrade Brezhnev’s visit to the USA only via the reporting of facts, without any additional commentary of their own [This sentence was very unclear]. In contrast, the Chinese leadership’s foreign policy activities are appreciated highly. 

- In the context of party relations, a regular exchange of delegations takes place between the RCP and the Maoist party. 

- The Romanian leadership has repeatedly turned openly or indirectly against a collective, critical statement of the brother parties against the Maoist course. They not only avoid all critical remarks regarding the policies of the Chinese leadership, but also set themselves against the condemnation of Maoism by the brother parties. In this way, the distribution of the “Horizon” Nr. 24/1973 for example – and just to name an example from the very recent past – was openly prohibited by the Romanian foreign ministry because an article by Spartak Baglov regarding the Beijing leadership’s foreign policy in Asia was present in it.  

2. Romania takes positions in its foreign policy on a number of issues that advance the goals of those in Beijing and places itself in opposition to the common line of the states of the socialist community with this. 

- The RCP comports itself in an emphatically reserved manner vis-à-vis important requirements and concrete measures of coordination between the countries of the socialist community of states, avoids as a rule a recognition of the Warsaw Pact, of the RGV, and other multilateral forms of cooperation (while at the same time overemphasizing the role of bilateral relations). 

- Along with the constant emphasis of the special role of small and middle-sized states, the Chinese theme of “superpowers” is supported at the same time. 

- Romania’s self-appraisal as a “developing country” since the national conference of the RKP corresponds to the un-Marxist approach of the Chinese leadership and aids and abets their efforts to make China as a “developing country” into the leading power of the “third world.”

- Romania’s attitude regarding the issues of European security as well as the reduction of armed forces and armaments, which diverges from the common position of the socialist community of states, accommodates the Beijing leadership’s attempts to weaken the influence of the Soviet Union and the socialist community of states. (Attitude of Romania toward non-violence, regarding the principle of the inviolability of borders, class-neutral demands, to sovereignty and non-interference, to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from foreign territory, the prohibition of maneuvers, etc). 

- In accordance with various statements by Chinese politicians, the Romanian foreign minister recently posed anew the question of the conclusion of a “peace treaty” with both German states in a discussion with the director of the Polish Institute for International Relations. This matches statements by Ceaușescu to the GDR ambassador in October 1972 in which Ceaușescu simultaneously supported the continued existence of a “unified German nation.”

- Through their Balkan policy, which was justified anew by the Romanian foreign minister at the foreign ministers’ conference in Helsinki, the Romanian leadership accommodates Beijing’s goals of creating a group of states aimed against the Soviet Union in the Balkans. 

- In the Romanian press, the current foreign policy course of Beijing is publicized on the main pages. The development of relations between China and the imperial states is presented as a success for socialism. In this manner, the assumption of diplomatic relations between China and the FRG was more strongly appreciated than the creation of diplomatic relations between India and the GDR and characterized as meaningful the international process of détente. 

3. The demonstrative development of relations between the SRR and China in all matters is an open affront to the states of the Warsaw Pact. 

- Since Ceaușescu’s visit to Beijing, Romanian-Chinese relations have been comprehensively activated. A lively delegation exchange in the political area also took place. The high-ranking composition of the Romanian delegations and the high protocollary treatment of all Chinese delegations, independent of the rank of their members, underscores the great meaning that is attributed to these relations on the Romanian side. 

- Through the construction of an SRR-PRC friendship society in April of this year, wide opportunities for a political-ideological and cultural confirmation of the Chinese side in the SRR were also created. 

- While the Romanian-Soviet friendship society [unclear] is directly ascribed to the central committee of the RCP, the new Romanian-Chinese society answers to the head of the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

- On the occasion of his return to China, the Chinese ambassador to the SRR was honored with a high Romanian order. (The sendoff of the Soviet ambassador in 1971 took place without any official appreciation of his work). 

- Economic relations between the SRR and China have substantially expanded since Ceaușescu’s visit to Beijing. The yearly report for 1973 envisions a further increase of the volume of foreign trade by about 20%. 

4. A number of phenomena appear in the domestic politics of the SRR, which – contingent upon the position of the RCP diverging from Marxist-Leninism – exhibit certain similarities with Chinese practices. These include, among others: 

- The intensifying cult of personality around Ceaușescu, 

- Examples of arbitrariness in the central [word unclear] policy,

- Increasing regimentation in the party and state apparatus and protection against criticism from below, 

- The abolition of demonstrations on May 1^st.